As democracies worldwide face mounting challenges from authoritarian tendencies, there is an increasing imperative to understand the conditions under which citizens legitimize illiberal governance. From the erosion of checks and balances to the normalization of emergency powers, recent developments have shown that the public’s tolerance for illiberal interventions can play a critical role in shaping the trajectory of democratic backsliding (Haggard and Kaufman Reference Haggard and Kaufman2021; Laebens and Lührmann Reference Laebens and Lührmann2023; Waldner and Lust Reference Waldner and Lust2018). Still, important questions remain about the specific conditions under which citizens are inclined to endorse such measures, particularly when they are framed as necessary responses to crises or national security threats.
Against this backdrop, the rise of populism in particular has emerged as a pivotal phenomenon for understanding how citizens relate to democratic norms and how they might come to justify or resist illiberal governance. Over the past few decades, populism has increasingly come to dominate political discourse worldwide (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser2017; Mudde Reference Mudde2021; Müller Reference Müller2016), becoming a critical focal point for debates around democracy’s resilience or vulnerability. Crucially, populism’s growing prominence adds layers of complexity to existing frameworks that attempt to explain public attitudes towards democracy, liberalism and state legitimacy. Populism’s implications for democracy remain contested, raising the key question of whether it inherently undermines liberal norms or functions differently depending on ideology and context.
These questions have gained even greater salience in light of populism’s conceptual flexibility. Populism, commonly defined as a thin-centred ideology lacking a fixed doctrinal content, exhibits exceptional adaptability (Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Stanley Reference Stanley2008), enabling it to align seamlessly with diverse ideological narratives depending on situational factors and prevailing political sentiments. Precisely because of this ideological malleability, populism’s relationship with democracy may not be inherently pro-democratic or anti-democratic; rather, it appears to take different forms depending on ideological alignments and socio-political contexts.
Accordingly, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the micro-foundations of populism by examining populist attitudes at the citizen level (Akkerman et al. Reference Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove2014; Hawkins et al. Reference Hawkins, Rovira Kaltwasser and Andreadis2020; Schulz et al. Reference Schulz, Müller, Schemer, Wirz, Wettstein and Wirth2018). If populism can justify either democratic renewal or authoritarian closure depending on its ideological anchoring, then identifying when and how ordinary individuals endorse illiberal governance becomes especially crucial. This is particularly the case in democratic societies experiencing acute political polarization, where populist rhetoric may legitimize extraordinary state interventions under the guise of defending ‘the people’. Hence, understanding the conditions under which populist attitudes interact with ideological predispositions to either endorse or resist authoritarian measures, such as martial law, is especially crucial amid current democratic vulnerabilities and rising political polarization globally.
This study makes a novel contribution to the literature by empirically investigating the conditional relationship between populist attitudes and support for authoritarian governance, using South Korea’s 2024 declaration of martial law. The martial law declaration offers an unprecedented opportunity to observe public reactions to an extreme and overt form of executive overreach in a contemporary democratic context. Unlike more incremental forms of democratic backsliding, which often unfold gradually and elude public scrutiny (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2016; Waldner and Lust Reference Waldner and Lust2018), the abrupt imposition and rapid termination of martial law in this case placed citizens in a position of immediate judgement on the legitimacy of authoritarian governance. Leveraging this real-world crisis, we use original, nationally representative survey data to examine how populist attitudes interact with citizens’ ideological predispositions to either justify or reject authoritarian measures. This dataset, collected within weeks of the incident, captures public opinion at a moment of heightened political salience, allowing us to assess not abstract preferences, but citizens’ evaluations of an actual illiberal intervention.
Our analysis demonstrates that populist attitudes do not exert a uniform influence on support for martial law. Instead, we find that the relationship between populism and authoritarian preferences is significantly conditioned by respondents’ ideological orientations. Specifically, we find that right-leaning individuals with stronger populist inclinations are substantially more likely to endorse martial law, driven by their emphasis on security, social order and a morally dichotomous worldview. Conversely, left-leaning populists, who are ideologically oriented towards inclusive democracy, civil liberties and bottom-up participation, are more likely to oppose such measures, viewing martial law as a violation of core democratic principles. Moderates, lacking a strong ideological anchor, display more ambivalence or internal divergence in their responses. These findings underscore the ideologically contingent nature of populist reasoning and highlight the importance of understanding how ideological predispositions shape the way citizens interpret and respond to authoritarian interventions. Moreover, our disaggregated analysis shows that among the dimensions of populism, people-centrism and the Manichean worldview strongly predict support for martial law among conservatives, while anti-elitism alone has weaker and less ideologically distinct effects.
This study makes several key contributions to the existing literature. First, we advance scholarly understanding by clearly specifying and empirically demonstrating the conditional nature of populism’s relationship with authoritarian governance, emphasizing ideological moderation as critical to interpreting populism’s impact on democratic attitudes. Second, our findings refine existing theories by highlighting that populism’s association with authoritarianism is not uniformly negative or positive, but contextually mediated through ideological frames. Third, by disaggregating populism into distinct dimensions, we contribute theoretically and empirically by identifying which populist attitudes most strongly interact with ideological orientations to shape endorsement or rejection of martial law.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review existing scholarship on populism, illiberalism, and ideology, identifying key theoretical and empirical gaps. Next, we outline the research design, including data sources, variable construction, and analytical approach. We then present the main empirical findings, focusing on how ideology moderates the link between populist attitudes and support for martial law. Finally, we discuss the broader implications, note key limitations, and suggest directions for future comparative and longitudinal research.
Populism and iliberalism
The extent to which citizens support illiberal decisions has been a topic of increasing scholarly debate in recent years. Existing research identifies a range of factors that shape illiberal attitudes. Economic inequality and instability often heighten citizens’ desire for strong leadership, thereby increasing support for illiberal measures (Solt Reference Solt2012; Sprong et al. Reference Sprong, Jetten, Wang, Peters, Mols, Verkuyten, Bastian, Ariyanto, Autin and Ayub2019). Perceived security threats also play a central role: individuals facing heightened fears of terrorism or physical danger are more willing to sacrifice civil liberties and endorse coercive policies (Davis and Silver Reference Davis and Silver2004; Hetherington and Suhay Reference Hetherington and Suhay2011). While various factors shape public support for illiberal decisions, the relationship between illiberalism and populism has garnered increasing scholarly attention (Blokker Reference Blokker, Hjelm, Sajó and Uitz2021; Koos Reference Koos2025; Piazza Reference Piazza2024).
The close association between populism and illiberalism stems from the intricate and often paradoxical relationship that populism maintains with democracy (Abts and Rummens Reference Abts and Rummens2007; Canovan Reference Canovan1981; Müller Reference Müller2016). While early accounts, such as that of Ernesto Laclau (Reference Laclau2005), framed populism as a democratic force, especially in Latin America, the rise of right-wing populism has intensified concerns about its illiberal potential. Recent studies argue that populist movements frequently adopt anti-pluralist and anti-institutional orientations, undermining liberal democratic norms (Blokker Reference Blokker, Hjelm, Sajó and Uitz2021; Canovan Reference Canovan1999; Foa and Mounk Reference Foa and Mounk2016; Mudde Reference Mudde2021; Müller Reference Müller2016; Pappas Reference Pappas2019). Populism’s anti-system rhetoric often positions it in direct opposition to the institutions and values of liberal democracy (Kriesi Reference Kriesi2014).
Scholarly research has actively examined these dynamics at the level of populist elites as well as the citizen level. Populist leaders often attack democratic institutions and norms, presenting themselves as the sole representatives of ‘the people’ while eroding institutional constraints (Bowler et al., Reference Bowler, Carreras and Merolla2023; Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2019). Illiberal or anti-democratic populist parties tend to attract broader electoral support (Donovan Reference Donovan2021; Lewandowsky and Jankowski Reference Levitsky and Ziblatt2023), and charismatic ‘strongman’ figures frequently bypass institutional checks by claiming to embody popular sovereignty (Kriesi and Pappas Reference Kriesi2024; Pratt Reference Pratt2023). At the citizen level, individuals with strong populist attitudes often express higher tolerance for political violence and authoritarian measures (Bartusevičius et al. Reference Bartusevičius, van Leeuwen and Petersen2020; Piazza Reference Piazza2024; Zanotti and Rama Reference Zanotti and Rama2021). They also tend to show a weaker commitment to democratic norms, resistance to electoral outcomes, and scepticism concerning coalition governance, as seen in studies from the Netherlands and Austria (e.g. Bos et al. Reference Bos, Wichgers and Van Spanje2023; Plescia and Eberl Reference Plescia and Eberl2021).
However, considering the inherently adaptable nature of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser2017), its relationship with illiberalism is likely to be nuanced and complex rather than unidimensional. Existing research highlights that the nature of populism can vary depending on the political and ideological context in which it operates. Scholars who define populism as a thin-centred ideology have noted that it is not confined to a specific fixed ideology but instead adopts the characteristics of the broader ideological framework with which it is combined (e.g. Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Stanley Reference Stanley2008; Taggart Reference Taggart2004). Consequently, populist sentiments at the citizen level will also manifest differently depending on the political and ideological context. Recent studies have increasingly focused on examining how these populist attitudes emerge and become activated in diverse political environments, emphasizing that populism does not necessarily lead to illiberalism but rather reflects public dissatisfaction and democratic demands in varying ways (Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Meléndez and Rovira Kaltwasser2019; Rico et al. Reference Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel Reference Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel2018). These findings suggest that rather than being inherently anti-liberal, populism can take different ideological forms depending on the broader political and institutional landscape.
The growing body of research on populist attitudes, driven by this increasing scholarly attention, has raised critical questions about the relationship between illiberalism and populist attitudes, focusing on the factors that contribute to the emergence of illiberal tendencies within populism. For instance, studies indicate that individuals with populist inclinations often exhibit strong support for democracy, sometimes even demonstrating higher levels of democratic satisfaction than the general public (Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert Reference Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert2020; Spierings and Zaslove Reference Spierings and Zaslove2017). This suggests that populist citizens are not necessarily anti-liberal but may conceptualize democracy in ways that differ from traditional liberal democratic norms. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser and Steven Van Hauwaert (Reference Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert2020) argue that populist citizens frequently experience frustration with the perceived inefficacy and lack of representation within democratic institutions, leading them to favour more direct forms of democratic participation. Empirical studies support this claim, demonstrating that individuals with strong populist attitudes often prefer mechanisms such as referendums and other forms of direct democracy over representative democratic structures (Jacobs et al. Reference Jacobs, Akkerman and Zaslove2018; Mohrenberg et al. Reference Mohrenberg, Huber and Freyburg2021; Zaslove et al. Reference Zaslove, Geurkink, Jacobs and Akkerman2021). Furthermore, the relationship between populism and political violence appears to be context-dependent, with research indicating that perceptions of societal change as a threat and the presence of illiberal attitudes serve as key mediating factors in determining whether populism fosters political violence (Piazza Reference Piazza2024).
These findings suggest the importance of considering contextual factors when analysing the complex interplay between populism and illiberalism. Rather than treating populism and illiberalism as inherently intertwined concepts, the literature suggests a more intricate relationship that is significantly shaped by additional moderating factors such as ideology, political context and institutional arrangements. Specifically, populism’s linkage to illiberal attitudes is neither automatic nor direct; it can either foster democratic engagement or, conversely, justify authoritarian responses, depending on how populist sentiments are framed and mobilized in different ideological environments. Thus, interpreting populism simply as anti-liberal risks overlooking its nuanced nature and its adaptive capacity within varying ideological and political frameworks.
Understanding the relationship between populism and illiberalism requires paying close attention to context-specific dynamics, yet research on South Korea has remained largely peripheral in comparative political science. Despite a substantial body of scholarship examining how populist attitudes interact with different ideological and institutional settings, as noted above, South Korea has rarely been incorporated into these cross-national analyses. The few existing studies have primarily focused on elite-level expressions of populism, often centred on specific political leaders or parties. For instance, some scholars identify elite-level populism as emerging during the Roh Moo-hyun administration (Hellmann Reference Hellmann2017; Kimura Reference Kimura2007; Klein et al. Reference Klein, Krumbein and Mosler2025), arguing that it became more pronounced under the Moon Jae-in government’s campaign to eliminate ‘deep-rooted evils’ (Klein et al. Reference Klein, Krumbein and Mosler2025; Shin Reference Shin2020).
Although South Korea has not produced a single dominant populist figure comparable to those in Western democracies (Park Reference Park2022), the country has experienced deepening political polarization, particularly in the wake of two impeachment crises. These developments have fuelled mass mobilizations along ideological lines, with each camp framing itself as morally legitimate while casting the other as irredeemably corrupt or dangerous (Jang and Jang Reference Jang and Jang2022; Jung Reference Jung2025; Kang Reference Kang2024; Kwon Reference Kwon2023). In this context, a more systematic and contextualized analysis of South Korean populism is urgently needed to illuminate how illiberal tendencies may emerge even in settings with formal democratic stability.
Martial law and populist attitudes
These patterns of polarization and competing populist narratives set the stage for one of the most dramatic confrontations between democratic norms and authoritarian impulses in South Korea’s recent history: the declaration of nationwide martial law on 3 December 2024 by President Yoon Suk-yeol. This was the first time such a proclamation had been made in 45 years, the last instance having occurred in 1979 (Kim Reference Kim2024). President Yoon framed the action as a defence of liberal democracy against threats from North Korea itself and alleged pro-North elements in South Korea (Rashid Reference Rashid2024). Martial Law Commander Park An-su issued Proclamation No. 1, suspending all political activities, placing media under military control, and banning actions deemed to be subversive (Lim et al. Reference Lim, Seiyeon and Cha2024). Specialized military units were swiftly dispatched to occupy critical institutions, including the National Assembly, the main opposition Democratic Party headquarters, and the National Election Commission. Yet the measure was brief. Within hours, the National Assembly passed a resolution demanding its termination, leading to a Cabinet decision and military withdrawal. Martial law ended approximately six hours after its declaration (Moon Reference Moon2024). The incident marked the first use of martial law under the Sixth Republic and resulted in the unprecedented arrest and indictment of a sitting president for insurrection.
This abrupt declaration of martial law illustrates a distinct form of democratic erosion and illiberalism that departs meaningfully from cases such as Turkey (Esen and Gumuscu Reference Esen and Gumuscu2021, Reference Esen and Gumuscu2023; Esfahani and Masoudnia Reference Esfahani and Masoudnia2025) and Hungary (Huber and Pisciotta Reference Huber and Pisciotta2023; Szikra and Öktem Reference Szikra and Öktem2023), where the interplay between populism and illiberalism has unfolded more incrementally. Unlike the more gradual trajectories of democratic backsliding observed in many contemporary contexts (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2016; Levitsky and Ziblatt Reference Levitsky and Ziblatt2019; Müller Reference Müller2016; Waldner and Lust Reference Waldner and Lust2018), South Korea experienced a sudden, highly visible assertion of executive illiberalism within the framework of what had long been regarded as a stable and institutionalized democracy (Lee Reference Lee2025). The rapid suspension of constitutional order followed by the swift reversal under legislative and public pressure not only underscores the fragility of democratic safeguards, but also presents a unique empirical moment to analyse how citizens respond to abrupt authoritarian encroachments.
Although President Yoon’s 2024 martial law declaration was the first to occur under South Korea’s democratic Sixth Republic, it is also important to note that its discursive and institutional foundations were deeply rooted in the country’s authoritarian past. The episode exposed the persistent influence of the Cold War-era security discourse, whereby national security and strong executive authority remain deeply entrenched in public institutions and political rhetoric. Under Park Chung-hee’s rule (1963–1979), sweeping emergency decrees and a security apparatus empowered by the Yushin Constitution enabled systematic repression of dissent (Choi and Woo Reference Choi and Woo2019). Instruments such as the National Security Law and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency were routinely deployed to suppress political pluralism under the guise of national defence (Green and Denney Reference Green and Denney2024). This logic was extended by Chun Doo-hwan’s regime, most notably in the 1980 expansion of martial law and violent crackdown on the Gwangju Uprising (Katsiaficas and Kahn-chae Reference Katsiaficas and Kahn-chae2013). These precedents forged a durable association between conservative governance, anti-communist nationalism and the legitimation of emergency powers. Yoon’s 2024 invocation of martial law thus reflects not an aberration, but a contemporary rearticulation of this authoritarian legacy.
The 2024 martial law declaration further illustrates how deeply embedded security-centric governance remains in South Korea’s political system. Initiated unilaterally by the executive without legislative consultation or judicial oversight, the incident revealed the ongoing tension between democratic norms and crisis-driven authoritarian impulses. Martial law, by design, involves extraordinary state actions that suspend civil liberties and override constitutional procedures, often rationalized as necessary responses to existential threats (Rosenberg Reference Rosenberg1974). Yet such measures pose acute dangers to democratic governance, including the erosion of institutional checks and balances and the entrenchment of executive overreach. In this case, the presidential decree bypassed constitutional constraints, restricted freedoms of assembly, speech and the press, and placed core democratic institutions under temporary military control. The episode underscores how the language of national security can swiftly be mobilized to justify illiberal interventions, revealing the vulnerability of democratic safeguards when confronted with concentrated executive authority.
Examining citizens’ responses to martial law through the analytical lens of populism further enriches our understanding of how populist reasoning influences acceptance or rejection of authoritarian governance. Populism conceptualizes politics as an antagonistic struggle between an inherently virtuous people and a corrupt, self-interested elite (Mudde Reference Mudde2004). Within such a worldview, extraordinary governmental measures, particularly those unilaterally enacted and framed as protective interventions, can achieve legitimacy if citizens perceive them as authentically representing the people’s interests. Populist individuals may thus interpret martial law not as an anti-democratic breach but as an essential corrective mechanism to overcome ineffective, compromised institutions and restore genuine popular representation.
However, it is important to note that the relationship between populist attitudes and support for martial law is not uniform but deeply conditioned by individuals’ ideological orientations. While populist individuals often express distrust towards elites and established institutions (Huber et al. Reference Huber, Greussing and Eberl2022; Plescia and Eberl Reference Plescia and Eberl2021), this scepticism does not inevitably lead to the endorsement of authoritarian rule. Rather, ideology serves as a critical interpretive framework that shapes how populist sentiments are understood and politically activated. Conservative populists tend to interpret institutional distrust through a lens that emphasizes national security, order and traditional authority, making them more likely to justify martial law as a necessary safeguard. In contrast, progressive populists, who prioritize democratic participation and civil liberties, are more inclined to perceive martial law as a repressive tool wielded by elites to silence dissent. Thus, ideological predispositions filter populist attitudes in ways that either legitimize or constrain authoritarian responses. Given that populism lacks a fixed ideological core, its political meaning is contingent on the broader ideological context in which it is situated. By structuring how individuals interpret political crises, ideology not only directs the expression of populist reasoning but also amplifies its implications, shaping whether citizens regard extraordinary measures such as martial law as necessary correctives or as a violation of democratic norms.
Specifically, we expect that among right-wing citizens, stronger populist attitudes will intensify both support for and justification of martial law. This is because right-wing populist attitudes frame politics as a struggle between the righteous majority and corrupt elites, emphasizing the need for strong leadership to protect social stability and national identity. Right-wing populists tend to view society as under constant threat, whether from internal dissent, political opposition or external adversaries, and believe that decisive state action is necessary to maintain order (Béland Reference Béland2020; Schmuck and Matthes Reference Schmuck and Matthes2017). As a result, they do not see martial law as an attack on democracy but rather as a necessary tool to safeguard the true will of the people from those who seek to undermine it. Within this ideological framework, politics is reduced to a clear moral battle: ordinary, law-abiding citizens must be defended against elite forces and disruptive elements that threaten national unity. Consequently, authoritarian measures, including martial law, are justified as essential for preserving stability, ensuring security and reinforcing the power of the people against perceived enemies of the nation.
The martial law incident of 2024 in South Korea vividly illustrates this dynamic. President Yoon Suk-yeol justified the declaration of martial law by explicitly invoking threats of North Korean infiltration and alleged internal subversion (Klug Reference Klug2024), themes which resonate deeply with right-wing populist narratives focused on national security and anti-communist sentiments. This framing effectively capitalized on fears prevalent among conservative populist groups, enabling them to view the suspension of democratic processes as legitimate and even necessary. Right-wing populists tend to perceive security threats not merely as policy issues but as existential challenges requiring decisive state intervention to protect a unified national identity and moral community. Thus, authoritarian measures under martial law become defensible within this framework, as they are seen to be safeguarding national security, social stability and traditional hierarchies against dangerous disruptions.
Furthermore, right-wing populist attitudes often underscore a particular interpretation of ‘people-centrism’, prioritizing collective unity and societal harmony over pluralistic competition and individual liberties. Unlike left-wing populists, who emphasize participatory democracy and inclusive decision-making (Huber and Schimpf Reference Huber and Schimpf2017; March Reference March2017), right-wing populists are typically concerned with substantive outcomes perceived as protective of national unity and order (Wodak et al. Reference Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral2013). Martial law, from this standpoint, represents a justified deviation from procedural norms, deemed necessary to uphold the people’s genuine interests against chaos or elite-driven destabilization. The 2024 martial law case highlights this phenomenon, as conservative segments of Korean society were more willing to overlook the authoritarian implications of the emergency decree, perceiving it instead as a legitimate protective measure against threats to the collective national interest. Hence, among right-wing populist individuals, stronger populist attitudes significantly heighten the endorsement and rationalization of martial law by aligning populist distrust of elites and moralized political polarization with authoritarian justifications framed around collective security and national unity.
Hypothesis 1: Populist attitudes are positively associated with support for martial law when aligned with a right-wing ideological orientation.
In contrast to right-wing populists who view martial law as a tool for national security and order, left-leaning individuals with strong populist attitudes are more likely to reject such authoritarian measures. This reflects the political left’s emphasis on openness, empathy and tolerance (Carney et al. Reference Carney, Jost, Gosling and Potter2008; Osborne et al. Reference Osborne, Satherley and Sibley2021; Sibley et al. Reference Sibley, Osborne and Duckitt2012), and its linguistic focus on care rather than threat or authority (Sterling et al. Reference Sterling, Jost and Bonneau2020). Within this framework, populist distrust of elites is filtered through egalitarian and participatory values, making top-down interventions like martial law appear repressive. Left-wing populism centres on inequality and economic justice, conceptualizes ‘the people’ inclusively, and targets elites as protectors of neoliberal privilege (March Reference March2007; Otjes and Louwerse Reference Otjes and Louwerse2015; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis Reference Stavrakakis and Katsambekis2014). The populist distrust of left-leaning individuals thus reinforces democratic resistance rather than enabling illiberal interventions.
The 2024 declaration of martial law by President Yoon thus offers a compelling case through which to understand how left-wing populist citizens respond to authoritarian interventions. For these individuals, the unilateral imposition of martial law was not seen as a legitimate response to national threats, but as an authoritarian manoeuvre by political elites aimed at suppressing democratic dissent, obstructing grassroots mobilization and preserving elite dominance. Given their strong normative commitment to civil liberties, political equality and participatory democracy, left-oriented populists interpreted the suspension of core freedoms as a direct affront to democratic principles. As their populist scepticism vis-à-vis elites intensifies, so too does their vigilance against any action perceived to undermine popular empowerment.
This resistance is further amplified by historical memory. South Korea’s legacy of authoritarian repression, particularly against labour and civic activism (Nam Reference Nam2002; Song Reference Song2013), renders left-wing populist citizens especially alert to signs of democratic erosion. Ideological orientation, therefore, plays a crucial moderating role. While populism alone constructs politics as a binary struggle between the people and corrupt elites, it is left-wing ideology that anchors these sentiments within a framework of democratic and egalitarian values. This ideological grounding compels left-populist citizens to reject authoritarian measures such as martial law, illustrating how ideological predispositions decisively shape the political direction of populist reasoning.
Hypothesis 2: Populist attitudes are negatively associated with support for martial law when aligned with a left-wing ideological orientation.
Research design
Data
This study draws on a unique survey conducted in South Korea. The survey was developed and executed by the East Asia Institute (EAI), a prominent independent think tank focused on policy research, in partnership with Hankook Research, a leading public opinion and market research firm in South Korea. Data collection took place from 22 to 23 January 2025, roughly a month after the martial law incident.
The survey employed a computer-assisted web interview (CAWI) system to gather responses from a large, nationally representative sample of over 1,500 individuals. Quota sampling was used to ensure demographic representation, with quotas set for age, gender and geographic region.
The dataset offers a reliable snapshot of public attitudes, with a margin of error of ± 2.2% at a 95% confidence level. Additional information about the demographic characteristics of respondents and descriptive statistics are provided in Tables A3 and A4 in the Supplementary Material online, where the complete survey questionnaire in English translation can also be accessed.
Measurement
Public support for the iliberal measure of martial law is assessed using two items that gauge its perceived necessity in contrasting contexts: one frames it as being essential for national security and order; the other as a justified response to unilateral opposition. Respondents rated their agreement on a 10-point scale, enabling us to capture variations in authoritarian justification. These items serve as the dependent variables, allowing us to examine how populist attitudes and ideological orientations influence support for martial law in a democratic setting.
To assess the relationship between populist attitudes and support for martial law, we construct an independent variable using seven survey items designed to capture three theoretically grounded dimensions of populism: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and the Manichean worldview. Given that this tripartite structure is theoretically established (Schulz et al. Reference Schulz, Müller, Schemer, Wirz, Wettstein and Wirth2018), we apply confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) rather than exploratory approaches. The CFA results support the model’s validity with strong fit indices (CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.90; SRMR = 0.05), and all factor loadings are statistically significant. Furthermore, the three latent dimensions are moderately correlated (r = 0.40–0.75), justifying the interpretation of populism as a multidimensional yet interrelated construct. Table 1 reports the survey items, descriptive statistics and standardized factor loadings from the confirmatory factor analysis. Based on the factor scores, we derive an overall indicator of populist attitudes that captures the latent structure reflected in the observed responses.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Populist Attitudes
Note: Items for the question ‘To what extent do you agree with the following statements?’ Responses were originally captured on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (Strongly Agree), so that higher values indicate higher agreement. Loadings show completely standardized estimates of the confirmatory factor analysis. Model information: χ2 = 160.672, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.950; TLI = 0.904; RMSEA = 0.095 (90% CI: 0.082–.108); SRMR = 0.050; N = 1,514.
Each dimension captures a distinct element of populist reasoning. People-centrism emphasizes the belief that political power should rest with ordinary citizens rather than elites, reflecting a preference for citizen-based governance (Abts and Rummens Reference Abts and Rummens2007; Katsambekis Reference Katsambekis2022; Mudde Reference Mudde2007). Anti-elitism conveys distrust in political elites, portraying them as self-serving and disconnected from the public interest (Rooduijn and Pauwels Reference Rooduijn and Pauwels2011; Staykova et al. Reference Staykova, Otova and Ivanova2016; Todosijević et al. Reference Todosijević, Pavlović and Komar2022). The Manichean worldview frames politics as a moral struggle between good and evil, rejecting compromise and favouring absolutist judgements (Arditi Reference Arditi2003; Erisen et al. Reference Erisen, Guidi, Martini, Toprakkiran, Isernia and Littvay2021; Guinjoan and Galais Reference Guinjoan and Galais2023). Together, these dimensions provide a nuanced account of how populist beliefs may inform attitudes concerning authoritarian interventions.
Given that the influence of populism on attitudes towards martial law is likely contingent on ideological orientation, we measure ideology using a standard 0–10 self-placement scale, where lower values indicate more progressive views and higher values indicate more conservative positions. For analytical clarity, responses are grouped into three categories: Left (Liberal), Moderate, and Right (Conservative).Footnote 1 We also include key socio-demographic controls: gender, education, age (in six categories), income quartile, and region of residence. Partisan affiliation is captured through self-reported party identification, covering major parties such as the Democratic Party (DP) and People Power Party (PPP), alongside minor parties and non-partisan respondents.
Results and analyses
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between populism and support for martial law, with separate lines for respondents identifying as left, moderate or right. The x-axis represents the Populism Index, while the y-axis captures martial law attitudes (MLA) based on levels of agreement with statements justifying martial law. Figure 1a assesses whether martial law is perceived as unavoidable for security and maintaining order (MLA 1), whereas Figure 1b examines whether it is seen as an unavoidable response to unilateral opposition (MLA 2).
Bivariate Relationships between Martial Law Attitudes (MLA) and Populism across Ideology (95% CI)
A clear divergence in trends emerges across ideological groups. Among those on the right, higher levels of populism are strongly associated with greater support for martial law, as indicated by the positive slope of the regression line in both figures. This pattern suggests that right-leaning individuals who hold stronger populist attitudes are more likely to justify the use of martial law, aligning with the broader tendency of right-wing populism to emphasize order, security and the need for strong leadership.
In contrast, those on the left exhibit an inverse relationship between populism and martial law attitudes. The negative slope in both figures suggests that left-leaning individuals with stronger populist beliefs are less likely to endorse martial law as a necessary measure. This finding aligns with the expectation that left-wing populism tends to challenge elite-driven governance and state repression rather than advocate for authoritarian measures (Mouffe Reference Mouffe2016; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis Reference Stavrakakis and Katsambekis2014). For moderates, the relationship between populism and martial law attitudes is less pronounced, with a relatively flat slope in both figures, implying that populist attitudes have a limited effect on support for martial law among individuals who do not strongly identify as either left or right.
While the bivariate analysis provides an initial look at the relationship between populism and support for martial law across ideological groups, it does not account for potential confounding factors that may influence these attitudes. To better isolate the effect of populism, we now turn to OLS regression models, incorporating key socio-demographic and political controls.
Table 2 presents the results of OLS regression models predicting support for martial law across two dependent variables: (1) perceiving martial law as unavoidable for security and maintaining order (MLA1); and (2) justifying martial law as a necessary response to unilateral opposition (MLA2). The key independent variable of interest is Populism, along with its interaction terms with ideological self-identification (Moderate and Right, with Left as the reference category).
Regression Results
* Note: p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The main effect of populism is positive in both models, though it does not reach statistical significance. This suggests that, on average, populism alone is not strongly associated with support for martial law when ideology is left out of the analysis. However, this overall effect obscures significant differences across ideological subgroups, as revealed by the interaction terms.
The interaction terms between populism and ideology highlight a clear ideological divide in how populist attitudes influence support for martial law. Compared to moderates (the reference category), the effect of populism on support for martial law is significantly different for both left- and right-leaning individuals. Among those on the left, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in both models (b = − 0.494, p < 0.05 for MLA1; and b = − 0.380, p < 0.10 for MLA2), indicating that left-leaning populists are less likely to justify martial law than their moderate counterparts. Conversely, the effect is reversed for those on the right, where the interaction term is positive and statistically significant for MLA1 (b = 0.708, p < 0.05) and approaches significance for MLA2 (b = 0.424, p < 0.10). These results suggest that while populism among those on the left is linked to resistance to martial law, populism among those on the right is associated with a greater willingness to justify its use. These findings imply that right-wing populism tends to legitimize authoritarian measures when such actions are framed as essential for maintaining security and order, whereas left-wing populism appears more inclined to reject elite-driven repression in favour of participatory and democratic principles.
Beyond the interaction between populism and ideology, the regression models also reveal notable patterns among the control variables. Age emerges as a particularly relevant factor, especially in Model 2 (MLA2), where older respondents are significantly more likely to view martial law as a justified response to unilateral opposition. This suggests that individuals with greater exposure to prior authoritarian regimes may be more inclined to support illiberal measures aimed at suppressing political dissent. Gender also plays a role, with male respondents consistently more likely than female respondents to justify martial law across both models. This aligns with prior findings that men are more receptive to coercive state action (e.g., Hansen et al. Reference Hansen, Clemens and Dolan2022; Lizotte Reference Lizotte2019). Education is negatively associated with support for martial law, indicating that individuals with higher levels of formal education are less accepting of authoritarian interventions – a pattern consistent with the idea that education strengthens commitment to democracy.
Figure 2 presents the kernel density estimation (KDE) of predicted MLA (ŷ) across ideological groups, derived from a counterfactual simulation based on the regression model presented in Table 2. The distribution is stratified by ideology – Left (dashed purple line), Moderate (dotted black line), and Right (solid green line) – to illustrate how expected support for martial law varies across ideological orientations. The results indicate a strong ideological divergence in the predicted values. Among those on the left, the density function is highly concentrated at the lower end of the scale (ŷ ≈ 1−2), with minimal density beyond a score of 3.
Predicted Value of MLA across Ideology (95% CI)
This suggests that even highly populist individuals on the left remain firmly opposed to martial law. Moderates, by contrast, exhibit a bimodal distribution, with one peak around 2–3 (martial law opposition) and another around 5–6 (moderate support for martial law). This suggests that populism polarizes moderates, splitting them into two distinct subgroups: one aligned with left-leaning scepticism towards martial law and another showing increased support. Those on the right, in contrast, display a strong right-skewed bimodal distribution, with a dominant peak at 6–8, indicating substantial support for martial law within this group. The absence of density at the lower end of the scale implies that high-populism individuals on the right overwhelmingly endorse martial law as a necessary measure for security and governance.
These findings hint that populism may not influence all ideological groups equally. While those on the left remain resistant to martial law irrespective of their level of populism, moderates are internally divided, and those on the right with high populism scores exhibit strong pro-martial law attitudes. The contrast between moderates and those on the right suggests that populism operates conditionally, amplifying support for martial law among right-leaning individuals and segments of moderates, while having little to no effect on those on the left. The bimodal pattern among moderates further indicates that populism can lead to internal fragmentation within ideologically ambiguous groups, rather than producing a uniform shift in attitudes. Ultimately, these results suggest the importance of ideology in shaping how populist attitudes translate into support for authoritarian measures, with populism reinforcing authoritarian preferences primarily among those on the right and a subset of moderates.
To further explore how the relationship between populism and support for martial law varies by ideological orientation, Figure 3 illustrates the marginal effects of populism on support for martial law (MLA1 and MLA2), conditioned by ideological orientation. The top panels depict the estimated effects of populism for those on the left (dashed line), moderates (dotted line) and those on the right (solid line),Footnote 2 while the lower panels display the distribution of populism across the sample. A striking pattern emerges: the relationship between populism and martial law attitudes diverges sharply across ideological groups. Among those on the right, the solid line exhibits a steep positive slope, indicating that higher levels of populism strongly correspond with increased support for martial law. In contrast, among those on the left, the dashed line trends downward, suggesting that as populism increases, support for martial law slightly declines. For moderates, the dotted line remains relatively flat, indicating a more ambivalent or mixed relationship between populism and martial law attitudes. These results suggest that populism does not exert a uniform influence but is instead contingent on one’s ideological disposition.
Marginal Plots of Populism on MLA Conditioned by Ideology (95% CI)
A crucial finding from the figure is the extent to which the confidence intervals diverge as populism increases. While the shaded confidence bands overlap considerably for individuals with low levels of populism, they begin to separate at higher values of the Populism Index. This suggests that among those who hold strong populist attitudes, the effect of populism on martial law support is ideologically distinct. Specifically, highly populist individuals on the right are overwhelmingly supportive of martial law, whereas highly populist individuals on the left remain firmly opposed. The fact that the confidence intervals do not overlap within these groups suggests a statistically significant distinction in how populism conditions martial law attitudes across ideological lines. That said, it provides strong empirical support for the argument that populism, when embedded within right-wing ideological frameworks, reinforces authoritarian attitudes and justifies martial law as a necessary mechanism for governance and order.
Additionally, the lower panels, which depict the distribution of populism, indicate that most respondents are concentrated in the mid-range of the populism scale, with fewer individuals at the extreme ends. This distribution highlights that while strongly populist individuals are a minority, their attitudes significantly shape overall patterns regarding support for martial law. Given that the estimated effects of populism become more pronounced at higher levels, the findings suggest that the most politically relevant impact of populism emerges among those with the strongest populist inclinations – particularly within the right-leaning group. This aligns with broader theoretical expectations that right-wing populism often aligns with support for authoritarian measures, while left-wing populism may challenge rather than endorse such measures. Taken together, these findings reinforce the notion that populism and ideology interact in a conditional manner, amplifying support for martial law primarily among those on the right, dividing moderates, and leaving those on the left largely resistant.
Further analyses
Although the composite Populism Index captures overall populist orientation, its constituent dimensions – people-centrism, anti-elitism, and the Manichean worldview – may influence support for martial law in distinct ways, particularly when conditioned by ideology. These dimensions reflect different facets of populist discourse: political authority vested in ordinary citizens, distrust of elites, and a binary moral framing of politics. Disaggregating these components allows for a more precise analysis of how each interacts with ideological orientation, clarifying whether specific dimensions are more closely associated with authoritarian support under varying ideological contexts.
Figure 4 illustrates how the three dimensions of populism relate to support for martial law across ideological orientations. While overall patterns resemble those based on the composite index, disaggregated analysis reveals important variations. People-centrism and the Manichean worldview show the strongest positive associations with martial law support among conservatives, reflecting how belief in a unified popular will and a binary moral worldview can legitimize authoritarian measures in right-leaning contexts. In contrast, anti-elitism exhibits weaker and more moderate associations, indicating that elite distrust alone does not drive support for martial law to the same extent.
Marginal Plots of Populism (Disaggregate) on MLA 1 and MLA 2 Conditioned by Ideology (95% CI)
Among left-leaning individuals, all three populism dimensions show weak or negative associations with martial law support, with people-centrism displaying the steepest decline, suggesting that a stronger belief in popular sovereignty is linked to greater resistance to authoritarian measures. This contrasts with right-leaning respondents, where people-centrism and the Manichean worldview are positively associated with support for martial law, highlighting how interpretations of ‘rule by the people’ and moralized political conflict vary by ideology. Among moderates, the relationships remain largely flat across all dimensions, indicating a weaker alignment between populist attitudes and authoritarian preferences. Compared to the composite index, this disaggregated analysis reveals that support for martial law among conservatives is primarily driven by the moral absolutism and majoritarian logic embedded in people-centrism and the Manichean worldview, while anti-elitism plays a more limited role. These findings underscore that it is not generalized elite distrust but specific normative dimensions of populism that shape divergent authoritarian attitudes across ideological groups.
Discussion and conclusion
This study advances our understanding of how populist attitudes shape citizens’ responses to authoritarian governance by demonstrating the central role of ideological orientation. While prior research has often treated populism as uniformly illiberal or inherently prone to endorsing strongman rule, our findings offer a more conditional account. We argue that populism, as a malleable discursive and attitudinal frame, does not carry a fixed authoritarian valence. Rather, its political implications depend crucially on how it interacts with individuals’ ideological commitments.
Drawing on original, nationally representative survey data collected shortly after the 2024 martial law declaration in South Korea, our analysis demonstrates that populist attitudes translate into support for authoritarian measures only when accompanied by a right-wing ideological commitment. Right-leaning populists were significantly more likely to endorse martial law, framing it as a legitimate response to threats against national security and social order. In contrast, left-leaning individuals with strong populist orientations tended to oppose such measures, indicating that elite distrust alone does not suffice to justify illiberal interventions. These findings underscore that the political implications of populism are not uniform, but instead depend on the ideological frameworks through which citizens interpret political crises.
This pattern is especially pronounced among those scoring high on people-centrism and the Manichean worldview, two dimensions of populism that emphasize majoritarian authority and moralized political conflict. In contrast, left-wing populists rejected martial law as a top-down authoritarian intrusion incompatible with democratic principles and participatory governance. The disaggregated analysis confirms that anti-elitism alone has weaker explanatory power, suggesting that only specific normative components of populism interact meaningfully with ideology to produce divergent political judgements. These findings underscore that support for illiberal governance cannot be fully understood without accounting for the ideological contexts in which populist attitudes are embedded.
Taken together, our findings hold important implications for the study of democratic resilience under populist pressure. First, they caution against assuming a uniform or inevitable trajectory from populism to authoritarianism. While right-wing populism may indeed serve as a conduit for legitimizing illiberal state action, left-wing populism remains anchored in egalitarian, participatory norms that constrain such tendencies. Second, the study highlights the importance of political ideology as a structuring force in shaping how citizens interpret exceptional state actions. Ideology does not merely influence partisan preferences; it fundamentally conditions the cognitive and normative pathways through which populist sentiments are activated. Finally, by situating our analysis in the South Korean context, the study contributes to a more global and comparative understanding of populism and democratic backsliding. Even in democracies with strong formal institutions, the interplay between populism and ideology can generate deeply divergent public responses to authoritarian interventions, revealing both the fragility and the durability of democratic norms in an era of populist contestation.
Despite its contributions, this study is not without limitations. First, although the timing of the survey allowed us to capture immediate public reactions to a sudden authoritarian intervention, such proximity to the event may have heightened emotional responses and limited the generalizability of findings to less acute or more protracted democratic crises. Future research would benefit from panel or longitudinal designs that track attitudinal shifts over time, allowing for a more dynamic understanding of how populist reasoning and ideological commitments evolve in response to ongoing institutional developments. Moreover, our analysis is situated within a single national context, which, while substantively meaningful, limits the ability to draw broader generalizations across different democratic settings. South Korea’s distinctive political history, including its Cold War legacy and authoritarian past, may uniquely shape how citizens interpret martial law and populist appeals. Comparative research across diverse institutional environments would allow scholars to assess whether the conditional effects of populism observed here are consistent or vary across regime types, crisis scenarios and historical trajectories. As global democracies increasingly confront both populist pressures and illiberal temptations, understanding the conditions under which citizens resist or accept authoritarian governance remains a pressing scholarly and normative challenge.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2026.10032.
Data availability
The data and replication materials underlying this study are available from the authors upon reasonable request. Materials will be provided in accordance with journal policies and any relevant ethical or confidentiality considerations.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the colleagues who provided thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. We thank the participants at the 2025 Annual Conference of the Korean Association of Party Studies for their valuable feedback, and we also appreciate the insightful suggestions offered during the Information and Political Economy Workshop at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, in 2025. This input strengthened the clarity and analytical contribution of this study. Any remaining errors are our own.
Financial support
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Disclosure statement
The authors report that there are no potential conflicts of interest related to the research, authorship or publication of this article.
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