In 2020, The European Commission (one of the three bodies of the European Union—EU) announced The Union of Equality program. This series of EU strategies and action plans was designed to build a Union of Equality where “all people can live free from discrimination” (European Commission n.d.). The program followed what the Commission called “a moment of reckoning” (EC 2020a, 1), recognizing that more than half of the EU citizens believe discrimination is widespread in their country. The Commission also saw the 2020 global Black Lives Matter movement as a “stark reminder” (EC 2020a, 1) of this reckoning. By drawing attention to widespread racism, the EU called upon Member States to condemn racism, adopt equality measures outlined in strategic frameworks and ensure that all people (especially EU citizens) can live free from prejudice, and thrive regardless of “differences based on gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, or sexual orientation” (European Commission n.d.). The Commission’s roadmap to equality is outlined in five strategic documents covering discrimination based on gender, race, Roma, disability, and LGBTIQ. Focusing on two of the framework documents—the EU Anti-racism Action Plan and the Roma Strategic Framework—and the European Parliament’s Resolution of June 19 2020 —the paper analyses how EU’s anti-racist policies racialize Romani communities and contribute to racism.
EU institutions have been attempting to make transformative interventions into the everyday realities of Roma people for decades, yet critics assert that the everyday realities only worsened (Lecerf Reference Lecerf2024). This paper shows how these interventions replicate society-wide racism and racialization of Roma and contribute to its failures. While the EU acknowledges that racism and antigypsyism are a problem for Roma communities (EC 2020b), it understands it as a problem of attitude towards the group. It pays scant attention to the role EU strategies and actions play in reproducing it or to historical injustices and social structures that continue to discriminate and bar equal access.
Considerable work has been done to understand race and racism in the EU. Goldberg (Reference Goldberg2006) and Lentin (Reference Lentin2004, Reference Lentin2008) show how racism in Europe is often externalized—either taking place elsewhere or temporally confined to historic events. Kantola et al. (Reference Kantola, Elomäki, Gaweda, Miller, Ahrens and Berthet2023) look at how racism and normative whiteness operate in the European Parliament and impact its agenda. Equally, a number of EU’s own bodies monitor equality and discrimination. For example, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) provides reliable data on discrimination and racism across EU Member States. Similarly, civil society exercises pressure on the EU institutions to promote anti-racism (Ruzza Reference Ruzza2000).
The recognition of antigypsyism as a specific form of racism came from civil society pressures (EC 2020b) in response to the inadequate and development-oriented EU Roma programs. Many scholars have written about the EU’s approach to Roma in relation to minority rights, freedom of movement (Sardelić Reference Sardelić2025), migration (Solimene Reference Solimene2022), or securitization (van Baar et al. Reference Van Baar, Ivasiuc and Kreide2019). However, work that examines the language and consequences of specific Roma-related EU policies is scarcer. Rostas (Reference Rostas, van Baar and Kóczé2020) shows how Roma integration aligns with the EU economic goals, van Baar et al. (Reference Van Baar, Ivasiuc and Kreide2019) analyze securitization strategies, Zevnik and Russell (Reference Zevnik and Russell2025) question Roma belonging, Kóczé (Reference Kóczé2018), van Baar (Reference van Baar, van Baar and Kóczé2020) and Vermeersch (Reference Vermeersch2012) explain how Roma framed EU accession negotiations, while drawing on Lentin’s work Fejzula (Reference Fejzula2023, 444) shows how Europe remains silent about race precisely to declare itself non-racist and claim “inherent moral superiority.” The works of Trehan and Kóczé (Reference Trehan, Kóczé, Haggan and Law2009), Ryder, Taba, and Trehan (Reference Ryder, Taba and Trehan2021), and van Baar and Kóczé (Reference van Baar and Kóczé2022), among others, intersect Roma and European identities and begin to address the positionality of Roma within Europe as a racialized community. However, with the exception of Rostas (Reference Rostas, van Baar and Kóczé2020) and van Baar et al. (Reference Van Baar, Ivasiuc and Kreide2019) who critique EU’s ignorance of Roma racism in official papers and McGarry (Reference McGarry2017) who speaks of acceptance of racism, few have analyzed how EU policies construct Roma racialization and contribute to racism, or how EU’s post-2020 frameworks (despite its acknowledgment of racism) continues to racialize and discriminate.
Drawing on critical race theory and Critical Romani Studies (CRS), this paper traces that racialized language in EU documents and actions. It utilizes ideas of racism and racialization to demonstrate how these policies and the following institutional (in)actions continually perpetuate racism towards the group. Further, the paper does not look at Roma communities in isolation. It pays particular attention to instances when EU documents align Roma with other racialized communities, how they do that, and with what effect. Such insight speaks to how the EU imagines Roma, an element that is crucial in understanding how strategies of racialization work in practice.
The paper contributes to the literature on critical race theory, as it positions Roma as one of the key racialized groups in the European context; to the study of racialization globally, as it draws out under-explored European and Central-Eastern European specific forms of racialization and deservedness; and to the literature on the European Union. The paper offers a critical reading of key EU documents on anti-racism, highlighting the inherent and implicit racialization of Roma present in them.
Grounded in Stuart Hall’s idea of race, where race is not only a floating signifier but a culturally sustained category, this paper offers a new account of how Roma experience in the EU can be read alongside those the EU names as “people of African-descent” (EC 2020b). Methodologically, the paper follows a critical discourse analysis of the EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020–2025, the EU Roma Strategic Framework 2020–2030, and the European Parliament’s Resolution from June 19 2020 on the anti-racist protests following the killing of George Floyd, with an aim to explain how EU anti-racism documents racialize its target groups. To help us analyze institutional racism in the EU documents, we follow Lentin’s (Reference Lentin2016) framework of deflection, denial, and distancing. Methodologically, the three selected documents are read in two stages. In the first stage, we focus on the use of race, racism, and antigypsyism as they appear in these documents. We critically explore the context within which these ideas are raised and how any relationship between the different communities of color is drawn out. Examining and comparing the language used when describing communities of color allows us to gain insight into the EU’s own practices of racialization and logics of exclusion. In the second stage, we explore institutional racism through Lentin’s framework. We focus on responsibilities for the actions taken and the allocation of jurisdiction between the EU and Member States (deflection), the place of agency and actors (denial), and imagined geographies of racism (distancing). We repeat the process when discussing Member States’ (in)actions. In doing so, we show how the EU continues to reproduce racist tropes in its documents and fails its most vulnerable communities.
The paper opens by locating the experience of Roma in discourses of race and racialization. Critical Romani scholars have recently put Roma in conversation with critical race theory, emphasizing the cultural dimensions of race (drawing on Stuart Hall), the spatial realities (e.g., Central-Eastern Europe) which produce forms of racialization that are different from Western European realities, and the long history of marginalization, discrimination, and racism. Antigypsyism as a specific form of racism becomes central to academic and activist understanding of Romani experience. The theoretical framework introduced in the first section offers an insight into how critical race theory can be utilized to make sense of Roma racialization. Secondly, the section introduces Lentin’s theoretical framework of deflection, denial, and distancing, which serves as a framework for the analysis of the selected EU policy documents. Section two of the paper offers a discursive analysis of the three EU policy documents, focusing firstly on how race and racialization feature in these documents, secondly on how Roma are represented in these documents, and finally on how these documents, despite their titles (e.g., EU Anti-racism Action Plan), continue to racialize and enforce racist structures. Finally, section three looks at the actions of the EU. In the case of the killing of Stanislav Tomáš, a Roma man from Czechia, the section tests how EU anti-racism documents and institutions operate in practice. In doing so, we show how the EU’s documents and institutional (in)actions continue to fail and negatively racialize Roma (and other racialized groups), portraying them as an undeserving and an unbelonging community. Despite commitment to antigypsyism the paper shows that the EU’s policies and actions continue to reproduce these racist and racialized realities.
Roma in Europe
Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority group. They originate from contemporary Rajasthan (India) and traveled west to Anatolia around 1000 CE, arriving in Europe in the 13th to 14th century (Richardson Reference Richardson2022). The First World Romani Congress of 1971 adopted Roma as the preferred term for “groups of people who share a common ancestry and language” (Selling Reference Selling2022, 1). However, not all groups commonly included in this umbrella term self-identify as Roma. Some groups use descriptions from the Romani word for “black” (kalo or calo), including Kaale in Finland and Sweden, specific endonyms are employed by the Manouche in France or Lovari in Central Europe, while Romanichal and Traveler groups in the UK and Ireland prefer to call themselves by different endonyms.
Roma are the most socio-economically vulnerable group in Europe. The 2021 FRA survey, which covers nine EU Member States with the highest % of Roma population, reported that 80% of Roma are at risk of poverty. Only 27% of Roma complete upper secondary education, while 71% of young Roma (ages 18–24) leave the educational system early (FRA 2021, 16). In primary schools, more than half of Roma children are in segregated schools where all or almost all classmates are Roma. Only 43% of Roma aged 20–64 are in paid employment, be it full, part-time, self-employed, doing occasional or ad hoc work (FRA 2021, 17). In health, there is a large gap in life expectancy. On average, Roma women live 11 years less than women in the general population, whereas Roma men typically live 9.1 years less than general population males (FRA 2021, 18). Meanwhile, more than a quarter of EU citizens do not want the majority children to have Roma classmates, with Italy (37%), Czechia (36%), Slovakia, Slovenia and Greece (33%), and France (32%) topping the table (Eurobarometer 2023). Similarly, 46% of EU citizens would not want Roma as their neighbors, with Lithuania (67%) and Greece (64%) exhibiting the highest levels of public prejudice (FRA 2021).
The term antigypsyism has been selected to highlight racism experienced by Roma. Cortés Gómez and End (Reference Cortés Gómez, End, Cortés Gómez and End2019, 21) note three complementary definitions circling political and academic fields. European Commissions against Racism and Intolerance (2011) defines antigypsyism as a “form of racism, an ideology founded on racial superiority, a form of dehumanization and institutional racism nurtured by historical discrimination, which is expressed, among others, by violence, hate speech, exploitation, stigmatization and the most blatant kind of discrimination.” The Council of Europe (2012) aligns antigypsyism with anti-semitism, emphasizing its historical and geographical prevalence, systemization, and permanence, while the Alliance Against Antigypsyism elaborated on who the term refers to. It states that antigypsyism denotes “customary racism against social groups identified under the stigma ‘gypsy’ [hereafter referred to as g****] or other related terms” (2016), which is reflected in homogenization and essentialization of the group’s identity, attribution of negative characteristics resulting in structural disadvantages and ostracization (Alliance Against Antigypsyism 2016). While the Alliance’s definition is perhaps the most widely used expression, the terminology remains disputed.
Scholars defending the use of antigypsyism state that “the racialised image of ‘g**** is at the core of antigypsyism ideology” (End Reference End, Gómez and End2019, 69). The term g**** is in many geographical spaces considered a racial slur. The World Romani Congress in 1971 elected to use the term Roma to refer to all groups that were pejoratively known as G****; however not all these groups would readily identify with the newly proposed term. Groups such as Sinti, Kale, and others experience antigypsyism but would not identify as Roma. Scholars advocating for the term antigypsyism state that they are not looking at how ethnicity or group identity is experienced or expressed by people themselves, but how it is represented (Mirga-Kruszelnicka Reference Mirga-Kruszelnicka2018, 11–12; Tremlett Reference Tremlett2014, 6–7; Surdu Reference Surdu2016, 13–14). However, others (Matache Reference Matache2026; Oprea and Matache, Reference Oprea, Matache, Cortés Gómez and End2019) disagree—for them, the term only reinforces Romani marginalization and racism. Instead, they propose to use anti-Roma racism or simply racism (Oprea and Matache Reference Oprea, Matache, Cortés Gómez and End2019, 284). They note that the existing definitions of antigypsyism highlight cultural difference and ignorance (Nicolae Reference Nicolae2006), which might be countered by Roma- focused education, while ignoring the global structures of racism. Drawing on Kendi, they argue that racist ideas did not derive from ignorance but were put in place to maintain and justify existing racial policies (Oprea and Matache Reference Oprea, Matache, Cortés Gómez and End2019, 294). Thus, extricating Roma racism from histories of oppression only reinforces the said racist foundations and gives legitimacy to white elites (Ibid). Acknowledging both arguments, this paper uses the terms anti-Roma racism and antigypsyism interchangeably. We do so to acknowledge the use of antigypsyism in EU policies and the political impact the term had on bringing to light the experience of Roma racism. Equally, locating anti-Roma racism in broader histories of racism and oppression and aligning it with the experience of racism across other racialized communities is crucial. While the proposed solution is lacking, it is crucial that the experience of Roma communities remains seen as racism rather than prejudice, discrimination or stigma.
Understanding Racism and Racialization in the EU: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations
Only with the emergence of CRS did Roma come to feature in the discourses of race and racism. By relying on categories of ethnicity or otherness, scholars and politicians did not seriously consider Roma as a group suffering from racism or imperialism (Brooks, Clark, and Rostas Reference Brooks, Clark and Rostas2022). Understanding race as a socially and discursively constructed phenomenon that operates on both individual and structural levels, leaving real material consequences, is essential when considering Romani racialization. Stuart Hall is central to this work. He states that “socially, historically and politically, race is a discourse” (2017, 45) which establishes systems of meaning. If “old racism” was reliant on biology, culture, or cultural particularities come to define new forms of racism. A shift to racializing and racialized culture normalizes whiteness as a value-free knowledge system (Hall Reference Hall2017, 80–127), and fetishizes, exoticizes, and ultimately excludes non-white cultures (Hall Reference Hall, Morley and Chen1996, 442–3).
Gilroy’s (Reference Gilroy2002) and Hall’s (2017) concept of “new racism” marks a shift from a biological to a cultural foundation of race. Similarly, Young (Reference Young1995) notes how culture has always already been racial and racialized. While the interconnectedness between race and culture is undisputed, there is a significant tension about the applicability of culture in a racial realm. In this paper, we distance ourselves from discussions of multiculturalism that most obviously adopt culture as a new expression of race (Lentin Reference Lentin2012). Instead, we follow Hall’s and Gilroy’s account on how everyday realities of racialized individuals become essentialized and represented as group culture. Drawing on Hall, Mirga-Kruszelnicka (Reference Mirga-Kruszelnicka2018, 17) challenges the assumption of the existence of a “true G****” as an example of an identity that can solidify and begin to represent the entire Roma population. Hall (Reference Hall, Gilroy and Gilmore2021, 367) writes: “It is the function of the discourse of race as a signifier, to make these two systems—nature and culture—correspond with one another. […] Once you know where the person fits in the classification of natural human races, you can infer from that what they’re likely to think, […] to feel, […] produce, the esthetic quality of their productions, and so on.” For as long as the expectation is that we can infer one’s cultural, religious, or political preferences from their biological traces, we have not escaped the biological foundations of race.
The significance of this is two-fold. By enmeshing nature and culture, the white majority or white institutions attempt to distance and hide racism expressed in relation to racialized communities. Political and institutional manifestations produce a unified homogeneous cultural community firmly embedded in the notion of whiteness (Gilroy Reference Gilroy2002, 85–8). Socially, this ensures that “common sense” is a reflection of whiteness, while politically, institutions enshrine whiteness in their policies. Secondly, other cultures and cultural expressions begin to function as either “less civilised” (Hall Reference Hall, Gilroy and Gilmore2021, 367), become fetishized, exoticized, excluded, or are being pathologized and turned deviant.
Racialization—as an analytical tool—offers a way into understanding civilizational discourses underpinned by exoticization of (cultural) difference. For Shilliam (Reference Shilliam2018, 4) racialization refers “to the way racist attributes and hierarchies come to determine the everyday meaning and common sense valuation of an entity or phenomenon.” In that sense, a normative framework in relation to which “a racialised group gains its cultural identity, its ‘deviant’ and other characteristics, is racialised as White and superior” (Zevnik and Russell Reference Zevnik and Russell2023, 56–7). Furthermore, Shilliam’s (Reference Shilliam2018, 4) draws a link between racialization and difference stating that cultural identities racialize between those considered to be deserving and others who remain undeserving.
There is a developing literature on the racialization of Roma, which draws comparisons with the racializing processes experienced by Black Americans (Bhabha Reference Bhabha, Bhabha, Mirga and Matache2017, Matache and West Reference Matache and West2018, Chang and Rucker-Chang Reference Chang and Rucker-Chang2020). But while anti-black racism receives at least symbolic attention through a discussion of police violence, structural racism, or colonial legacies, anti-Roma racism (or antigypsyism) remains largely excluded from these reflections (Cortés Gómez and End Reference End, Gómez and End2019, Fejzula Reference Fejzula2023) and is even normalized (Powell and van Baar Reference Powell, van Baar and van Baar2019). Recent examples include the stark oversight (if not ignorance) of the killing of the Roma Man from Czechia, Stanislav Tomáš, whose death (discussed in this paper later) remained institutionally ignored, while responsibility has been put not on the arresting officers who killed Tomáš, but on Tomáš and his alleged “deviant culture.” A Roma Lives Matter campaign, which emerged in its aftermath, remained publicly obscure, even though Roma NGOs, drawing on the mobilizing strategies used in the aftermath of George Floyd’s murder, pushed with a RomaLivesMatter campaign (Costache Reference Costache2021, D’Agostino Reference D’Agostino, Adam, Beaman and Jung2026, 22–24, Gay y Blasco & Fotta, Reference Gay y Blasco and Fotta2023). Citizenship is considered one of the key racializing factors in Europe. It is often seen as a mark of “white privilege” (Rucker-Chang Reference Rucker-Chang2021), yet Roma are not considered part of it (Matache Reference Matache2017). Citizenship (or the lack of it) exposes communities, also known as European Others, to racism (Sardelić Reference Sardelić2025). Roma, despite possessing EU citizenship and being born in Europe, are racialized into the European Other or alien category (Yildiz and De Genova Reference Yildiz and De Genoa2018). Anti-Roma racism and antigypsyism have been invisibilized, silenced, and crucially depoliticized in politics and in the academy (D’Agostino Reference D’Agostino, Adam, Beaman and Jung2026, 22; Kóczé Reference Kóczé2018). Cultural peculiarities are often marked as different from majoritarian normative ideals (Cohen Reference Cohen1999, 38), and insufficient development programs are blamed for Romani poverty, rather than racism and insufficient political solutions.
The analysis of racism and racialization of Roma in the context of the anti-racist EU frameworks opens up the question of blackness as a shorthand for the common experience of racism and marginalization and the emergence of “new politics of resistance among groups and communities with […] different histories, traditions and ethnic identities” (Hall Reference Hall, Morley and Chen1996, 441). Such an open notion of blackness aligns with the Roma experience in Europe significantly (Fejzula Reference Fejzula2021). Despite Crenshaw et al. (Reference Crenshaw, Andrews and Wilson2024) warning, political blackness acutely describes the Roma experience of racism and marginalization in particularly in the space of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE). Important work has been done on other white groups who were at first denied the “white status” but at particular points in time have “become white” (Baker et al. Reference Baker, Jacob, Imre and Mark2024). Barbarism, incivility, and ineducability often permeate discourses that aim to exclude other populations from whiteness (Balogun Reference Balogun, Baker, Jacob, Imre and Mark2024; West Ohueri Reference West Ohueri, Baker, Jacob, Imre and Mark2024). Shmidt and Jaworsky (Reference Shmidt and Jaworsky2021, 15) identify “(in)educability” as the main premise on which Roma become racialized in CEE. They state that “(in)educability has shaped pathways for racialization by melting together various analogies, between Roma and animals, children, indigenous populations of other countries, Jews and African-Americans” (Reference Shmidt and Jaworsky2021, 15), which resulted in forced assimilation, sedentary lifestyle, institutionalization of Roma children, or increased surveillance. The long history of policies that are hostile to Roma traditions encourages arguments “aimed at negating the possibility for Roma to [be seen] as ‘civilized’” (Shmidt and Jaworsky Reference Shmidt and Jaworsky2021, 15). In these discourses, Roma emerge not only as uncivilized, untamed, and unruly, but also as a social problem, a social ill that needs management, surveillance, and ultimately expulsion (Powell and van Baar Reference Powell, van Baar and van Baar2019, 93).
To operationalize the understanding of race as that which is subsumed in (racialized) culture for the analysis of institutions and institutional settings, we adopt Lentin’s (Reference Lentin2016, 37) framework for the study of public racism. The framework identifies deflection, distancing, and denial as strategies used by either states, institutions, or private bodies when encountering racism. Deflection stands for a “shifting foci,” such as emphasizing the positive vocabulary or anti-racism over language of race and racism or institutional policies (Lentin Reference Lentin2016, 44). Consequently, the debates focus on the accusations of racism rather than the structures that enable it (Kantola et al. Reference Kantola, Elomäki, Gaweda, Miller, Ahrens and Berthet2023, 186) or on shifting or deferring responsibility. Distancing works on at least three interrelated levels; it presents racist acts as abnormal and unusual, often undertaken by groups ideologically (the far right) or spatially removed from Europe (it happens in the United States). In the institutional context, distancing also locates racism in those who do not “represent a cultural or institutional norm” (Kantola et al. Reference Kantola, Elomäki, Gaweda, Miller, Ahrens and Berthet2023, 186) or in those who do not fulfill EU legislative obligations. Finally, denial can be expressed in at least two ways—in celebration of seemingly anti-racist policies and legislations, and in what Kantola et al. (Reference Kantola, Elomäki, Gaweda, Miller, Ahrens and Berthet2023, 186) call “a denial of their racist nature,” which often accompanies structurally white discussions of race.
Understanding Roma within the categories of race and racialization academically and politically enables researchers to make sense of Romani experiences. The key is how race and culture operate together to make a material difference to Romani’s everyday experience. In the following two sections, the paper draws on the strategies of deflection, denial, and distancing to analyze EU documents and its actions.
Racialization of Roma in the EU Documents: A Tale of Civilizational Discourses, Normative Whiteness and Fetishization
The understanding of racialization of Roma in Europe and in CEE provides the foundation for the analysis of the EU policy documents pertaining to Roma inclusion in Europe, specifically the EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020–2025, the European Parliament Resolution from June 19 2020, and the Second Strategic Framework for Roma inclusion 2020–2030. While the Anti-racism Action Plan is an overarching document covering all ethnic and racial groups, the latter two documents either respond to a particular event (the June 19 2020 Resolution is a response to the murder of George Floyd) or to a particular challenge (the inclusion of Roma communities) the EU faces. While the June 19 Resolution is not part of the Union of Equality framework, our analysis includes it because the Anti-racism framework directly refers to it.
A Union of Equality: EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020–2025
The Context: Race in the EU Action Plan
Adopted on September 18 2020, the Anti-racism Action Plan opens with the statement made by President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyer, at the opening of the European Parliament’s session dedicated to the murder of George Floyd. The document itself is perhaps the clearest statement on racism that the EU has adopted to date. It acknowledges the presence of racism in the European space and calls to action (EC 2020a, 1). The action plan draws a link between the values of the EU and racism, in that the persistence of racism marks a “failure to uphold core EU values” (EC 2020a, 1) of fundamental rights, freedoms, and equal participation in society regardless of one’s racial or ethnic origin. Further, the document importantly acknowledges the diversity and plurality of the EU society, its tolerance and non-discrimination, and crucially states that “upholding values starts at home, in our own institutions” (EC 2020a, 1).
The document continues by outlining the forms of racism experienced—from individual to structural racism—making it clear that racism is grounded in ethnic and racial differences. It names people of Asian and African descent, Muslims, Jewish, and Roma people as those who suffer “from intolerance” (EC 2020a, 1). Curiously, however, the word intolerance rather than racism is used. The document also names different forms of racism—“anti-black, antigypsyism, antisemitism, and anti-Asian racism” (EC 2020a, 2), and acknowledges links to religion and belief in anti-Muslim hatred (EC 2020a, 2). The document then continues to outline actions that should be taken to tackle “racism by individuals” (EC 2020a, 2–13) which include numerous legal mechanisms available for reporting discrimination, calls for a review of the existing legislation on anti-racism, measures to combat racism by means of criminal law, and calls for a full and correct implementation of these mechanisms (including the Racial Equality Directive of 2021). It also highlights the problem of under-reporting of racism, addresses policing, and actions taken against identifiable racist groups and their symbols.
Racism is also outlined in relation to four specific areas: education, employment, healthcare, and housing (EC 2020a, 9). For people of African descent, it highlights the disconnect between the quality of their employment and their level of education. It notes a much higher rate of young people of North African and African descent and Roma who are not in work or education compared to the general population (EC 2020a, 10). In health and housing, the action plan calls for nondiscrimination in accessing housing and health provisions. In health, the document notes how the Covid 19 pandemic “highlighted the consequences of existing health inequalities suffered by people with a minority racial or ethnic background” (EC 2020a, 12); whereas in housing the document shows that individuals who experience “racial discrimination are at a higher risk of poor housing conditions and residential discrimination” (EC 2020b, 12).
In terms of structural racism, the document acknowledges that “racism is often embedded in our societies’ history, intertwined with its cultural roots and norms. It can be reflected in the way society functions, how power is distributed and how citizens interact with the state and public services” (EC 2020a, 13). It suggests that the experience of state institutions and services can be tainted by the experience of racism. To that effect, the document states that racism “can be unconscious and is often felt through a failure to reflect the interests of the people affected by racism, even if not necessarily a direct attempt to exclude” (EC 2020a, 13). Finally, the document reflects on the EU’s own human resources and hiring strategies, committing the institution to collect diversity data, develop diversity and unconscious bias training, and improve its recruitment processes and tools (EC 2020a, 23–25).
Overall, the EU’s Anti-racism strategy is heavily grounded in adopting appropriate legislation, education, and awareness raising, providing additional resources for programs on anti-racism and in self-reflection on the working of its institutions. However, returning to Lentin’s analytical framework, two aspects of the action plan stand out. First is the inconsistent use of language when referring to racism. At times, the word racism is replaced by intolerance or discrimination (EC 2020a, 1). Such inconsistencies directly point to strategies of denial of racism taking place. The EU is unwilling or unable to consistently acknowledge that race is the defining factor that determines the everyday experiences of a large part of its citizens. These experiences result from structural oppressions or personal beliefs grounded in race. By interchanging the language, the Action Plan questions the centrality of race in the experiences of its racialized peoples. It replaces it with cultural differences or lack of education when using words such as intolerance, or with a distribution of resources when using words like discrimination. Secondly, the language used suggests awareness of whiteness and white norms in public life in the EU’s social policies (Peay Reference Peay2024). However, the reasons for this are attributed to unconscious or inadvertent racism (EC 2020a, 13) or to the lack of representation of negatively racialized people’s interests (EC 2020a, 13) and not to the structures or the policy designs of the EU institutions. According to Lentin’s framework, this represents another form of denial and distancing. Instead of looking at how policies are shaped, who is given a voice, and what normative assumptions underpin them, the EU’s solution to the rightly identified problem remains unconscious bias training, diversity initiatives, and hiring strategies (EC 2020a, 24).
Roma and Racialization
The Plan mentions Roma nine times. Initially alongside other communities (people of Asian and African descent, Muslims, or Jewish people) experiencing racism and “intolerance” (EC 2020a, 1), but there is also a recognition of antigypsyism as a specific form of racism equal to other forms of racism, such as anti-black racism or antisemitism. Roma are also used as an example to illustrate the prevalence of discrimination in Europe. It pinpoints Roma and people of African descent as those who face the highest levels of discrimination in accessing goods and services (such as shops, public transport, public administration, etc.) (EC 2020a, 3) or have the highest rates of youth unemployment (EC 2020a, 10). It singles out Roma as those facing the greatest discrimination in accessing healthcare (EC 2020a, 3). Interestingly, however, the language used is not that of racism but of discrimination for both Roma and Afro-descendants. A similar correlation between Roma and people of African descent is made when speaking of stereotypes and awareness-raising. The document speaks of the importance of commemorating the International Day of the Abolition of Slavery, and adds the need to promote the inclusion of Roma history in school curricula (EC 2020a, 14). The document also commits to developing a series of seminars on racial and ethnic stereotypes that will follow a blueprint of the so-called “seminars on Roma” (EC 2020a, 14). In the latter part, the document refers to Roma as a group to whom special measures should also apply. For example, as part of the Next Generation EU, the document states that Member States need to foster “the inclusion of vulnerable groups, including Roma and other people with minority and ethnic background” (EC 2020a, 19).
The EU Action Plan consistently racializes Roma. While it includes them with all other ethnic and racially-minoritized communities, recognizes antigypsyism as a specific form of racism, it also draws distinctions between these groups, aligning somewhat the experience of Roma and the people of African descent in Europe. When discussing historical harms and practices of commemoration, it either attaches Roma to the pre-existing practices of commemoration (Holocaust day or International day for the Abolition of Slavery) or uses the work that the EU institutions have done on Roma as a blueprint for other contexts. While this cross-pollination of practices is less problematic, it fails to acknowledge the agency these groups expressed when campaigning for the recognition of particular historical harms. For example, the Action Plan does not acknowledge decades-long campaigns for the recognition of the Roma Holocaust and efforts that went into securing August 2 as Roma Holocaust Remembrance Day (Hau Reference Hau2021). After all, it was only in 2015 that the European Parliament declared August 2 as the European Roma Holocaust Memorial Day, and only in the Second Strategic Framework 2020–2030 the EU called for its Member States to take action on its 2015 declaration (EC 2023a).
Racism and Deflection
The use of language in the Anti-racism Action Plan is also (at best) contradictory. Racism is noted as an individual and a structural phenomenon with negative implications on the socio-economic realities of communities experiencing it. However, when speaking of the actual experiences of Roma and the people of African descent, the Action Plan speaks of discrimination, even intolerance, rather than racism. This is particularly notable considering that the Action Plan attempts to draw attention to the problem of racism and how racism impacts the ability of these communities to be equal to other EU citizens. Deflection from the language of racism can be clearly noted. For example, instead of recognizing the impact of racism, the EU outlines existing good practices. Hall (Reference Hall, Morley and Chen1996, Reference Hall, Gilroy and Gilmore2021), Crenshaw, Andrews and Wilson (Reference Crenshaw, Andrews and Wilson2024), and others (El-Tayeb Reference El-Tayeb2011) continuously note Europe’s deflection and distancing when speaking about racism. When it happens in the European contexts, race and racism are located within specific temporalities (be that the space of the US, other non-EU countries, or right-wing populist movements) rather than being an everyday phenomenon (Goldberg Reference Goldberg2006; Lentin Reference Lentin2012). Kantola et al. (Reference Kantola, Elomäki, Gaweda, Miller, Ahrens and Berthet2023, 184) note that the concept of race has been removed from mainstream discourse and replaced by references to “ethnicity,” “diversity,” “culture,” “religion,” or “background,” or it is often conflated with migration. The analysis of this Action Plan supports that—the already mentioned imprecise and interchanging language when referring to the experience of racism, the lack of desire to reflect on the EU’s own governing practices and normative assumptions, and promotion of Human Resources and diversity initiative-based solution all testify to that. The reluctance to use the term racism when referring to the experiences of racialized and marginalized groups in the Action Plan reinforces the EU’s blindness to ingrained structural racism. Racism is discussed on a theoretical level, as a phenomenon that needs eradication because it is against the core EU values, because it endangers the cohesion of the Union, and prevents EU citizens from being fully equal (EC 2020a, 1–4). It is spoken about in relation to measures (legislation, monitoring bodies) that need to be taken or in relation to the resources that the EU will make available, but little is said about its consequences or its contemporary manifestations.
European Parliament Resolution of 19 June 2020 on the Anti-Racism Protests Following the Killing of George Floyd
The European Parliament’s resolution from June 19 2020, further outlines the logics of racialization present in the EU documents, in particular the relation between anti-Roma and anti-black racism.
The Context: Race in the EP Resolution of June 19
The Preamble to the Resolution names “Roma, individuals from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africans” as those who are “most affected by racism and discrimination in Europe” (EP 2020), highlighting the common experiences of these groups in the European space.
The Resolution reiterates its support for an array of general principles of justice and equality by invoking fundamental rights and equal treatment irrespective of race or ethnicity. The key points of emphasis are as follows (EP 2020):
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the protests following the killing of George Floyd have a long history of protests against police brutality and racism in the United States;
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Protests have strengthened the movement against racism against blacks and other non-whites, as well as recalling Europe’s colonial past and its role in the transatlantic slave trade;
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the heads of EU institutions should publicly and unreservedly condemn racism and police brutality that led to the loss of life of George Floyd and others;
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structural racism is also reflected in socio-economic inequality and poverty.
These commitments align with the Anti-racism Action Plan in that the institution acknowledges the underlying social and structural conditions that make some groups more vulnerable to violence than others. It recognizes structural racism as an important contributor to socio-economic inequality, and importantly, it acknowledges European colonial past and its role in the transatlantic slave trade as a contributing factor to racism and police brutality in the US and Europe. While the observation is a rare recognition of how social conditions and history perpetuate an impact on the affected communities, the EU continues to believe that this impact could be mediated through education. By stating that national governments and institutions have a responsibility to educate citizens on the European colonial histories and their effects (EP 2020), the EP deflects responsibility to its Member States.
Racism: Deflection and Distancing
The resolution considers the context of anti-black racism and discrimination in the European and global context. It makes reference to widespread racial “discrimination and harassment” (EP 2020), acknowledging that “racial and ethnic minorities are subject to harassment, violence and hate speech, both online and off-line” (EP 2020), as well as facing structural discrimination in the aforementioned areas of housing, healthcare, employment, and education (EP 2020). However, the language again uses distancing and deflection—the term racism is used to describe the experience of Black Americans, police violence and racial injustice, while terms like harassment, discrimination and hate speech are used to describe the daily realities of racialized groups in Europe.
The language in the Resolution describes racism as structural racism. It is invoked in the context of “fight against racism,” requiring cross-national and international collaboration to end it (EP 2020). Different words are used when referring to the experiences of racism in Europe. Following the deflection strategy, terms such as discrimination, intolerance, or hate speech again dominate the text. The language of the document departs from the language adopted in the Anti-racism Action Plan in one aspect—it uses the term “people of colour” rather than “ethnic or racial groups,” a term more commonly used in the EU documents. People of color is used when describing the incarceration rates and police violence against Black and Hispanic communities in the US (EP 2020), but also when speaking about European racism and colonial legacies, though the exact terms used in those contexts are “black people and people of colour” or even “black people, people of color and Roma,” drawing a distinction between Black and other racialized communities and in some cases Roma (EP 2020). Linguistically, the Resolution demonstrates how language from the US and the EU contexts is used interchangeably without much consideration for its contexts. On the one hand, this is an exemplar of distancing, portraying Europe as a space where contemporary racism is uncommon; on the other hand, it can also be read as denial or unwillingness to learn about the experiences of racialized communities “at home”.
Roma and Racialization
The Resolution invokes Roma in three important ways. It acknowledges that Roma (like Black and other non-white groups) are historic victims of the European “past violations and crimes”; that they continue to be the most discriminated group in the EU, and it calls upon Member States to “include black, non-white and Roma history in school curricula” (EP 2020). The alignment of Roma as victims of European historic crimes against humanity is significant. Point 14 directly invokes Roma (as well as Black and people of color) as victims of crimes against humanity. It then continues to declare slavery as a crime against humanity and calls for December 2 to be designated as European Day commemorating the abolition of the slave trade. This is the first recognition of Roma being subjected to enslavement across Europe in EU documents. The statement is not repeated in other—Roma specific—documents. The Resolution symbolically assumes responsibility for the crimes committed. However, the responsibility is contained to the past (distancing strategy), while a discussion of contemporary reparations remains entirely absent. The unwillingness to discuss what the EU can do today—beyond affirming numerous legislative frameworks—to alleviate historical and contemporary harms is striking, even more so as the institution calls on the United States government to take decisive action “to address the problem of structural racism and inequality in the country” (EP 2020).
The Second EU Framework for Roma Inclusion 2020–2030
The Second Framework adopted in October 2020 is a document that specifically addresses the situation of Roma in Europe. It responds to some of the criticism of the first framework (2011– 2020), explicitly the lack of Roma agency in the proposed Roma policies and structural conditions preventing Roma from successfully engaging with EU mechanisms.
The Context: Race and Antigypsyism in the Second Framework
The Second Framework opens by noting stark realities of antigypsyism and the need for an intersectional approach in addressing discrimination (EC 2020b, 10). It also promotes empowerment of Roma communities and their active participation in decision-making bodies. Maintaining the four sectoral areas—housing, education, employment, and health—the Second Framework adds three new “horizontal” areas—equality, inclusion, and participation. The Framework is a significant institutional step towards recognizing Roma agency and racism experienced by the community. For example, antigypsyism is finally recognized as a specific form of anti-Roma racism (EC 2020b). It also identifies two specific EU-level targets to decrease the proportion of Roma experiencing discrimination by at least half, and to decrease by at least one-third the proportion of the general population who would feel uncomfortable with having Roma neighbors (EC 2020b).
Racism: Distancing and Denial
The positive aspirations expressed on paper fall short when translated into Member States’ national strategies. The Commission reported that “most Member States had developed measures to combat discrimination, hate speech and hate-crimes, and, to some extent, to fight anti-gypsyism” and set to develop the infrastructure to promote awareness of Roma history and reconciliation (EC 2023b). France, for example, identified legal measures for tackling discrimination, and Romania adopted the Anti-gypsyism Law. But there are also concerns that align with Lentin’s framework on distancing and denial. Hungary’s National Program references antigypsyism, but it lacks explicit measures of fighting it (EC 2023b). Bulgaria mentioned combating anti-Roma attitudes, but its “proposed measures focus on discrimination rather than on antigypsyism” (EC 2023b). More generally, Member States were disappointingly “rather general and vague” or completely silent about budgets and funding mechanisms in the fight against antigypsyism (EC 2023b). Even when speaking about antigypsyism states remain focused on the measures for the Roma community rather than focusing on the majority. They are unwilling to speak of racism or antigypsyism, and following the example of the EU, prefer to stick to discrimination, intolerance, and hate speech. Such terminology attempts to distance Member States from being seen as racist, from recognizing that Roma experience racism within the borders of their state, and from assuming responsibility for it. Member States distance themselves and deny the existence of racism on their territory in relation to the Roma community, and they even blame the Roma for what they call negative attitudes towards the group. Van Baar (Reference van Baar and Agarin2014) calls this “reasonable antigypsyism,” where communities experiencing racism are blamed for racism because of their alleged difference. The unwillingness to use the term racism is indicative of a disinclination to assume the majority’s responsibility for effective Roma inclusion and to acknowledge that majority attitudes—anti-Roma racism—are the key barrier for Roma equality.
Roma and Racialization
If on paper the EU acknowledges the barrier that antigypsyism poses to the community, its Member States refuse to take meaningful actions. Endemic racism and national parties’ own agenda underscore this unwillingness. The discrepancy between the EU and the national level is notable in other areas. For example, Roma communities are awarded funds for the expression of Romani culture and identity nationally, which are often the only funds awarded directly to the community. Cultural expressions in music, dance, and Romani language or education programs that aim to increase visibility of Romani history become the sole legitimate representations of the community (EC 2023b). Such representations run a risk of fetishization of Romani culture as ethno-culture and lock the community into existing stereotypes (Guérard de Latour Reference Guérard de Latour2023). Campaigns which showcase positive stories and “role models” run similar risks as they reinforce the narrative of acceptability (Levine-Rasky Reference Levine-Rasky2022, 69). While such stories challenge the stereotype, they also define what kind of Roma life is deemed acceptable. They again draw attention to Roma culture and lifestyle, ignoring institutional and structural barriers that continue to impact Romani life. Lentin identifies such a positive role model campaign as a deflection strategy. Such programs create expectation and representations of an acceptable Roma identity. This is the kind of cultural empowerment that Hall (Reference Hall, Morley and Chen1996, 442–3) warns against—a particular form of cultural expression can become fetishized, discrediting other forms and identity expressions, as well as creating expectation as to what a respectable Roma identity might look like.
The three documents outlined tell a mixed story. While the EU acknowledges its problems with racism, in its response, the institution adopts strategies of deflection, distancing, and denial, barring positive development in the EU’s fight against racism. All three documents demonstrate the lack of in-depth knowledge about racism—they continue to see it as a conceptual external problem which can be addressed through legislation and education. The institution defers responsibility for implementation of its anti-racist measures onto its Member States, which, as Member States Action Plans for Roma show, epitomize institutional whiteness. Vague and inconsistent formulations of antigypsyism, lack of meaningful antiracist strategies, consistent refusal to put pressure on Member States to follow anti-racist frameworks, and depoliticizing approach fail to address the structural dimensions of anti-Roma racism (Fejzula Reference Fejzula2023, 447). While it is possible to say that this simply demonstrates how the EU works, we argue that the deflection of responsibility on a matter as important as racism is tantamount to denial. Distancing, denial, and deflection, as shown, become central strategies adopted not only by the Member States but also by the EU institutions.
EU Institutions in Action: Roma As a Racialized Undeserving Other?
In this section, we look at how racialization and racism come to light in institutional (in)actions, focusing on Stanislav Tomáš, a Roma man from Teplice, Czechia, who was killed during his arrest on June 19 2021. The death of Tomáš took place one year after the adoption of the EU Anti-racism Action Plan and the June 19 Resolution. These documents make a direct note of the excessive use of police force over racialized communities, including Roma.
The Context: The Killing of Stanislav Tomáš
On June 19 2021, Tomáš was restrained by two police officers holding his feet and body, while another knelt on his neck for more than five minutes. The police claims that Tomáš was still alive at this point but died in an ambulance thereafter. The incident bears a striking resemblance to the arrest and murder of George Floyd in June 2020. The event was caught on camera from an upstairs window directly above the street, and the video was subsequently shared on social media. After the killing, the authorities denied responsibility, citing meta-amphetamine use as the likely cause of death. The Czech Police even took to Twitter to proclaim Tomáš as “No Czech Floyd” but a “multiple recidivist who, under the influence of OPL, demolished cars in his neighborhood and ignored any calls from the police” (Czech Police 2021). Czech politicians were quick to support the arresting officers. The then Prime Minister of Czechia rushed to the defense of the Teplice Police, claiming that “they didn’t have it easy” and went on to claim that aggressive people “cannot be expected to be handled with kind gloves” (Ryšavý Reference Ryšavý2021a). Commenting on the provisional autopsy, the Prime Minister announced that “a normal, respectable person would have a hard time getting into such a situation” (Ryšavý Reference Ryšavý2021a).
The European Parliament took over three months to allow a debate on Tomáš’s case. In November 2021, after much hard work and organization by two Roma MEPs, Romeo Franz (Germany) and Peter Pollák (Slovakia), a discussion at a regular plenary session finally occurred. In the session, Pollák said of Tomáš, “He, too, like George Floyd, died after police officers knelt on his neck. As is the custom, the oversight bodies have failed, or rather, they have not really begun to look into this dubious police intervention” (EP 2021). Not a single MEP from Czechia attended the session. Alexandr Vondra, for example, claimed not to have known the discussion was taking place until he heard subsequent reports that “Some delirious left-wing MEP from Spain said something and somebody noticed it.” While Vondra proclaimed the case to be a “matter of political activism,” fellow Czech MEP Zdechovskÿ asserted that the left were using the death of Tomáš as part of an anti-Czech crusade (Ryšavý Reference Ryšavý2021b).
Roma and Racialization: The Culture of Deviance
Racialization impacted (in)actions in Tomáš’ case in at least two ways. The first concerns the level of the state (Czechia), the second the EU itself. The EU institutional structure puts the onus on Member States to operationalize EU policies and directives, making it the responsibility of the Member State to address the killing of Tomáš. The Czech Police and Czech political leadership deflected responsibility for Tomáš with talk of drug abuse and criminality. In effect, they presented Tomáš’s death as the result of his “culture of deviance.” The argument follows social determinism—whereby people “like Tomáš” choose to live the way they live and cannot expect a different treatment (Ryšavý Reference Ryšavý2021a). Czech Police portrayed Tomáš as a drug-abusing recidivist who was undeserving of respectable treatment. Czech national leaders actively empathized with the intervening officers, questioning not only Tomáš’s deservedness and life choices but also his humanity.
By putting the blame on Tomáš and “his” recidivist culture, the Czech national discourse attempted to cover their anti-Roma racism. At no point is racism considered a contributing factor to his death. In fact, it is blatantly denied that racism had anything to do with it. A similar discourse can be noted by those who aimed to justify the murder of George Floyd, or earlier Trayvon Martin, or Eric Garner. Alleged drug abuse, possession of counterfeit or arms, and wearing “gang clothes” (a hoodie) turn these individuals into legitimate targets. The culture of deviance becomes the justifying mechanism for repressive state institutions’ indiscriminate killing of its citizens of color (Gilmore Reference Gilmore2024). Criminalizing Roma culture aligns with Hall’s (Reference Hall2017, 82–120) observation—in contemporary nation state racism is expressed through/as culture. It applies not only to the individual in question but, as Gilroy (Reference Gilroy2002, 87) notes, to the community as a whole. In the discourse of the Czech government, Roma culture is read as a culture of deviancy. Racism was exposed by the events that took place a few months later, when another person was killed by the intervening officers. Reports state that a (non-Roma) man was drunk and destroying property, upon police arrival, he attacked the officers and was shot (Lazarova Reference Lazarova2022). On this occasion, the intervening officers were immediately suspended (Ibid).
The racialization of Roma in Czechia and more broadly in CEE runs in somewhat contradictory directions. Firstly, there is a denial that racism takes place in the CEE. Yet, secondly, Roma are made to represent the difference in relation to which CEE whiteness gets constituted. Following Kalmar (Reference Kalmar2022), historically, the racialization of Roma serves as a way of defining what it means to be white. The long history of policies that are hostile to Roma traditions encourages arguments “aimed at negating the possibility for Roma to [be seen] as ‘civilized’” (Shmidt and Jaworsky Reference Shmidt and Jaworsky2021, 15). In these discourses, Roma emerge not only as uncivilized, untamed, and unruly, but also as a social problem.
Racism: Distancing, Denial, and Deflection
In the European Union, the racialization of Tomáš became evident in their reluctance to even discuss the case or take action against the Czech Government. Kantola et al. (Reference Kantola, Elomäki, Gaweda, Miller, Ahrens and Berthet2023) looked in some detail at the operation of the European Parliament, concluding that systemic racism was institutionalized and perpetuated by the normative whiteness of the institution. Strategies of deflection, distancing, and denial are strong whenever racism is on the agenda. All three tactics are evident in how the European Parliament failed to address the death of Tomáš.
For example, the discussion of Tomáš failed to address the structural issues that led to his killing. If in the discussion about Floyd the EP acknowledged police violence that Black, Roma and other racialized communities experience in the US and Europe, and Europe’s role in slave trade and colonialism which directly feeds into contemporary racial injustices (EP 2020), in Tomáš’s case a reflection on the broader social conditions is completely absent suggesting a clear attempt to deflect attention from racism. Some MEPs connected Floyd and Tomáš, noting the lack of social movement and political mobilization in the case of the latter, and asked why that is the case (EP 2021). MEPs from Western Europe spoke of a Czech or a CEE problem with Roma, again distancing or deflecting the realities of racism from the European institutions to particular Member States, or from one Member State to another, while Czech MEPs saw the discussion as part of the “anti-Czech crusade” (Ryšavý Reference Ryšavý2021b). While condemning violence against Roma, Lóránt Vincze, a Romanian MEP, also stated that EU institutions need to be faster in condemning German authorities and their attempt to cover up violence against Roma (EP 2021). This form of distancing and deflection aligns with what Kalmar (Reference Kalmar2022) called the perceived sentiment that racist incidents get highlighted only when they happen in CEE.
In the debate, which lasted only 35 minutes (EP 2021), the term racism was only used in relation to the legislative measures. Anže Logar, at the time President of the Council of the EU from Slovenia, opened the discussion by emphasizing that only Member States have jurisdiction to address such situations, effectively ending any discussion about the EU’s responsibility in such circumstances. Logar listed various documents that set out a pathway to Roma equality and non-discrimination (EP 2021) and then drew attention to the police. He stated that “we cannot forget the work of 10.000 police officers across Europe who are doing their best to protect all European citizens regardless of their ethnicity” (EP 2021). Finally, speaking of the need to empower the Roma community, Logar stated: “empowerment goes hand in hand with responsible citizenship and here Roma need to assume their responsibility” (EP 2021). In a nutshell, Logar—like the Czech political elite—placed the blame for what happened on Tomáš and the community as a whole. Firstly, Logar deflects any responsibility of the EU for such situations. Secondly, he deflects responsibility from Czech institutions towards the Roma lifestyle or culture. Finally, referring to responsible citizenship, Logar invokes the racialized culture of deviancy that underpins the EU and Member States’ inaction. In this process of deflection, not only is responsibility for the actions firmly returned to Tomáš’s deviant culture, but it also embodies an example of “reasonable anti-Gypsyism” (van Baar Reference van Baar and Agarin2014). The term stands for a form of racial reversibility in which one is “rightfully entitled to act against the Roma and treat them differently” (Powell and van Baar Reference Powell, van Baar and van Baar2019, 95). Because of their supposed criminal and anti-social behavior, Roma themselves “violate rights and fail in their duties” (van Baar Reference van Baar2011, 243–4).
A handful of MEPs acknowledged that Roma experience racism or called out the lukewarm actions of the EU. Cornelia Ernst (a German MEP) drew attention to another example where police killed a Roma boy in Athens (Greece) only for the Greek Economic Affairs Minister to congratulate the police on a job well done. Ernst stated: “I’m really fed up with all the talk that we have to integrate them [Roma] as if we were dealing with aliens. These people have been living with us for ages. And somewhere in the EU’s mountains of paper, these people have been lost” (EP 2021). Romeo Franz also called out the EU institutions for intentionally misguided language. He calls for EU-wide legislation against antigypsyism.
In summary, the EU actions on anti-Roma racism reside behind the maze of frameworks and directives calling for inclusion and integration, equality, and even anti-racism, yet when called to action, they hide behind procedural limitations or defer responsibility back to the Member States. Within the confines of the European institutions, the structural inequalities that contribute to the marginalization of an individual like Tomáš are repeatedly downgraded, dismissed, and attributed to the racialized culture of deviancy. The inability of the Parliament to persuade (let alone demand) attendance from Czech MEPs to hear the discussion of the death of one of their citizens at the hands of the authorities is an effective illustration of such distancing: racism takes place elsewhere, in Member States, by some MEPs but not in the EU institutions, or not by MEPs who consider themselves progressive. MEP Ernst came closest to acknowledging the responsibility of the EP for enforcing its anti-racist legislation and calling out deflection, distancing, and denial that permeate other responses (EP 2020). Nevertheless, the entire construction of the European Union’s policy framework, which shifts demands of compliance with overarching objectives such as combating antigypsyism away from the institutions themselves and back to the Member States, is the epitome of distancing. The EU (in)action to the killing of Tomáš demonstrates deeply engrained institutional racism which—consciously or unconsciously—relies on deflection, denial, and distancing strategies. It is not that Europe ignores the issue (the EP eventually discussed the case), but that in its discussions, it hides behind existing (yet ineffective) legislation, equality bodies, and the responsibility of Member States. The EU (in)action to the killing also demonstrates how racism operates at the level of culture, drawing parallels between Roma culture and the culture of deviancy and racialized logic of deservedness, which again intersects with lifestyle choices.
Conclusion
The paper sets out to answer how the EU anti-racist policies continue to racialize Roma and perpetrate racism towards them. Drawing on Hall’s understanding of racism as a form of culture (2021), Gilroy’s idea of culture of deviancy (2002), racialization narratives and the study of institutional racism through strategies of deflection, distancing, and denial (Lentin Reference Lentin2016), the paper focused the analysis on the EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020–2025, the June 19 European Parliament Resolution following the killing of George Floyd and the Second Roma Framework. It highlighted how all three documents deflect, distance, and deny racism through either the use of language, proliferation and invocation of different anti-racism legislation and oversight bodies, as well as through a deflection of responsibility to Member States. The June 19 resolution also draws out important logics of racialization—it perhaps most strongly lends into political blackness and reads the experience of Roma alongside those from the people of African descent. The Second Framework for Roma is the strongest in its deflection of responsibility back to Member States. It also distinctly fetishizes and exoticizes Roma culture and creates a notion of a deserving Roma identity.
Finally, examining the response to the killing of Stanislav Tomáš, the paper looks at the EU and Member States actions. At the level of the state, we find arguments that equate Roma with the culture of deviance. Tomáš is portrayed as undeserving of better treatment. The responsibility for Tomáš’ death is laid squarely on the victim himself and the deviant community he belongs to. The police officers, in contrast, were afforded sympathy. Racism was denied, deflected, or portrayed as part of an ideological crusade of politically left-leaning MEPs and Western Europe against Czechia. On the EU level, the language of distancing and deflection firmly grounds the EU’s response. Such a response is unsurprising. Assuming responsibility at the institutional level would, we suggest, open up a significant challenge for the EU. It would question how far ideals of equality and anti-racism are shared between Member States. These ideals are negotiated differently in different parts of Europe, and are informed by the culture of whiteness, westernness, deservedness, or deviance. Equally, an effective anti-racist politics would need to interrogate how groups currently racialized in similar ways are imagined differently in different European spaces, and how racializing strategies use the perception of Europeanness to shape and deny access to equal rights. As this paper shows, Roma, as Europe’s largest minority group, are continually racialized as other and alien to the European space (Yildiz and De Genoa Reference Yildiz and De Genoa2018).
Locating this argument in CRS, the paper furthers the discussion of Romani racialization in Europe. It demonstrates how, at times, racialization of Romani and Afro-descendants goes hand in hand, but at other times, Romani are firmly seen as outsiders (permanent immigrants) to the European space. Such positioning organizes Romani communities into a distinct position of unbelonging, which renders communities viscerally visible (Zevnik and Russell Reference Zevnik and Russell2025). Drawing on the work of Romani scholars and scholars of critical race theory, the paper offers CRS an account of racialization and racism experienced by the Romani community attuned to the Roma-specific positionality in the European space. Further, the racialization of Tomáš’s death draws strong parallels to the experience of Black Americans and the deviant recidivist culture that has often been used to justify the killing of Black people in the United States. Such experience firmly positions the racialized realities of these two communities alongside each other, and opens important questions of common experiences of contemporary and historical racism.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank “Who is Europe for?” special issue editors and the two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments which greatly strengthened the overall quality of our paper.
Funding statement
The authors received no financial support for the research and authorship of this article.
Competing interests
The author(s) Professor Andreja Zevnik and Professor Andrew Russell declare none.
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