Defining maritime security

Maritime security, just as any other boundary concept in international studies, has remained vague and undefined with myriad interpretations beyond the general agreement on its abstract form (Bueger Reference Bueger2015). Some scholars like Klein (Reference Klein2011) and Germond (Reference Germond2015) define it as the absence of (or security from) threats or crime in the maritime domain, while others see maritime security as the presence of a stable order on the oceans in keeping with the laws of the sea (Till Reference Till2013; Kraska and Pedrozo Reference Kraska and Pedrozo2013). Bueger (Reference Bueger2015) observes these two conceptualisations of maritime security as negative and positive respectively. Threats to maritime security generally include inter-state maritime disputes; terrorism and piracy; trafficking of narcotics and humans; arms proliferation; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; environmental crimes; or maritime accidents and disasters. To Germond (Reference Germond2015), maritime security includes a set of “policies, regulations, measures and operations to secure the maritime domain” from the above mentioned threats. However, there is a lack of consensus on what counts as a threat to maritime security, or on how to prioritise these threats; as well as what is meant by ‘good’ or ‘stable’ maritime order, along with who defines it, on what basis, and for whom (Bueger Reference Bueger2015).

Maritime security is multidimensional and understanding its varying dimensions helps bring some clarity to what the concept entails. Bueger (Reference Bueger2015) in introducing what he calls the maritime security matrix delineates four dimensions to maritime security - marine environment, economic development, human security and national security. It is within this matrix where the myriad concerns of maritime security manifest. Till (Reference Till, Bradford and Chan2023) underlines three separate but interconnected dimensions of maritime security - namely, safety from threats emerging from insentient sources such as navigational hazards, pandemics and climate change, threats from other states against one’s maritime strategic interests and territories, and threats of non-state actors such as pirates and terrorists. Basil (Reference Germond2015) emphasizes that there is an undeniable geopolitical dimension to maritime security. The geographical location and features of the state determines its maritime security interests, threats, and strategies.

In this article, we approach maritime security primarily in the negative sense but infuse an inescapable positive aspect to it. Much like Till (Reference Till, Bradford and Chan2023), we understand maritime security as the absence of threats that may be sponsored by a state, a non-state, or a non-human entity. We include threats to the oceans and maritime domains of states that are both traditional and non-traditional in nature. We emphasise how non-traditional threats such as climate change and its impacts - sea level rise and rise in sea surface temperature causing frequent and intensified weather events - are as critical as traditional security concerns such as sea-power of states, sovereign jurisdiction, and strategic advantages. Challenges to maritime security, especially those occurring beyond the immediate nautical boundaries of states, are matters of the global commons. Further, the evolving nature of threats to maritime security are beyond the capacities of states to address unilaterally. Therefore, the realisation of maritime security has increasingly come to warrant cooperative endeavours among states. This brings us to the positive element in our understanding of maritime security, that is, the presence of, and the need for, cooperation and coordination among states towards good (and safe) order at sea.

Climate change and maritime security

While there are contested ways of framing the nexus between climate change and security, it is now commonly agreed that climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’. Climate change impacts worsen existing vulnerabilities and insecurities of individuals, societies, and in the long run, states, especially those with weak coping capacities and power (Goodman and Baudu Reference Goodman and Baudu2023; Scheffran et al. Reference Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, Link and Schilling2012; Thomas Reference Thomas2017). UN Secretary General António Guterres in a speech to the United Nations Security Council in 2021, stressed that climate change is an aggravating factor to instability, terrorism and conflict, and that these must be addressed collectively and in an integrated manner in order to attain a sustainable and peaceful future. Goldstein (Reference Goldstein Joshua2016, p. 96) opines that, if one’s concept of ‘global security’ were to “…encompass human security and economic security rather than strictly military security, then humanity seems likely to face its greatest threats not from the weapons of war but from the inexorable and devastating effects of climate change.”

Of course there are others who have framed climate change as an existential threat to humanity and the cause of future violent conflicts (Zimmerer Reference Zimmerer2014; Gleditsch Reference Gleditsch, Crocker, Hampson and Aall2015; Ide Reference Ide2022). Zimmerer (Reference Zimmerer2014), for instance, went to the extent of arguing that climate change impacts will dramatically increase the likelihood of collective violence, including genocide in regions at risk. Given that the security implications of climate change is a study into the future, or as Baldwin et. al (Reference Baldwin, Methmann and Rothe2014) term it, a futurology, drawing direct linkages between climate change impacts and violent conflict is at best speculative as it is still difficult to arrive at reliable and empirically-backed predictions. We therefore approach linking climate impacts and maritime security within the framework of climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’.

Studies and policy strategies that link climate change and maritime security, although still nascent, are growing. Germond and Ha (Reference Germond and Wa Ha2018) have argued that a narrative linking climate change impacts and the occurrence of maritime criminality or insecurity is still lacking as the subject suffers from neglect by both academics and practitioners alike. However, several critical aspects of the issue have been studied by scholars such as Brennan and Germond (Reference Brennan and Germond2024); Mazaris and Germond (Reference Mazaris and Germond2018); Germond and Ha (Reference Germond and Wa Ha2018); Germond (Reference Germond2015), and Kaye (Reference Kaye, Warner and Schofield2012). These studies share a common understanding that climate change threatens maritime security and that there is a need to understand the interconnection more deeply in order to aid in framing policies and strategies to secure the domain. Germond and Mazaris (Reference Germond and Mazaris2019, p. 263) found that the academic discourse on climate change and maritime security has established “synergies between the impacts of climate change on natural systems, pre-existing socio-economic vulnerability of communities and the possible occurrence of maritime criminality”.

How climate change causes instability and insecurity at sea warrants discussion. It is too soon to speculate if climate change would cause violent conflict at sea directly. However, it is largely agreed that climate change alters maritime security even though it may not cause violent conflicts or threaten the integrity of states directly (Mazaris and Germond Reference Mazaris and Germond2018). The physical implications of climate change such as rise in sea level and sea surface temperature will cause geophysical alterations to the maritime world which ultimately will be detrimental to life and resources at sea. The myriad dimensions in which climate change impacts manifest in the maritime domain result in multiplying existing insecurities and threats to communities and states concerned.

Germond and Mazaris (Reference Germond and Mazaris2019) have described how climate change causes insecurity in the maritime domain. They show that climate change first affects natural systems through rising sea temperatures and sea levels which causes extreme weather events, resource scarcity and changes in fish stock. These, in turn, impact human systems causing food insecurity, widening inequality and rising poverty, which increases mass resentment and grievance against their governments. Weakened socio-economic conditions can then incentivise maritime crime such as illegal fishing, piracy and trafficking. All of this results in the creation of a cycle of insecurity and criminality in the maritime domain (Germond and Mazaris Reference Germond and Mazaris2019). Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the relationship between climate change and maritime security.

Figure 1:

Climate change impact on maritime security.

Adapted from Germond and Mazaris (Reference Germond and Mazaris2019, 264).

Additionally, climate change-induced extreme weather events at sea have direct and devastating effects on human habitats and livelihoods along the coastal regions and can potentially trigger mass migration (Baldwin A et al. Reference Baldwin, Methmann and Rothe2014; Ide Reference Ide2022). In a recent study, Qiao et al. (Reference Qiao, Gao, Liu, Xia, Zhang, Meng, Liu, Wang, Zhou and Wu2024) show that exposure to climate induced elements such as hydrological intrusion is the primary migration driver surpassing socioeconomic factors, while existing socio-economic disparities further intensify the exposure’s impact. Rapid climate change is bound to drive mass migration and affect the pattern of mass movement in the Indo-Pacific region (Ide Reference Ide2022). Mass migration, coupled with reduced resources and livelihood opportunities will create environments conducive for criminal activities to proliferate.

The economic costs of climate change on the oceans are gauged to be extremely high. The annual value of the global blue economy is estimated at roughly 2 trillion USD (Estes et al. Reference Estes, Muller-Karger, Forsberg, Leinen, Kholeif, Turner, Cripe, Gevorgyan, Fietzek, Canonico, Werner, Bax, Kappel, Juniper, Seeyave, Smith and Visbeck2021). As per the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, climate-induced impacts on ocean health will cost the global economy $428 billion per year by 2050 and $1.98 trillion per year by 2100 (IPCC 2019). Sea routes and maritime chokepoints are vulnerable to disruptions and blockades due to climate change induced extreme weather events. These will consequently disrupt global supply-chains and trade, causing deep losses to economies globally. Loss of occupation and livelihoods due to strained movements of goods and trade at sea have been seen to drive a rise in maritime criminality including piracy, trafficking and illegal fishing (Robinson Reference Robinson2024). Just as in other aspects of climate impacts, economically too, countries with weaker economic and governance structures will suffer disproportionately.

All of these direct and indirect impacts of climate change on the marine environment will further complicate existing geopolitical vulnerabilities. Ongoing conventional maritime contestations among countries such as maritime boundary disputes, naval power build up, competition for spheres of influence at sea, etc. will be further intensified in the face of unconventional risks and challenges induced by climate change such as natural calamities, food insecurity, rising poverty and overall break-down of law and order in particularly vulnerable and weak states (IMCCS 2020).

Climate Change and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific region faces myriad maritime insecurity issues arising from the climate change impacts discussed above. The 2020 report of the International Military Council on Climate and Security states that the Indo-Pacific region is on the front lines of acute climate-related challenges which make it susceptible to instability, forced migration and conflict (IMCCS 2020). Similarly, the Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2023 of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) underlines the remarkable vulnerability of the Indo-Pacific, stating that it is the most disaster-prone region globally, where natural disasters have killed 2 million people since 1970. In 2022 alone, the region faced over 140 disasters, causing over 7,500 deaths, affecting over 64 million people and causing economic damage estimated at US$ 57 billion. The report further notes that fatalities and economic losses attributed to disasters are unevenly distributed across the region - poorer and less developed countries are worse affected due to their pre-existing vulnerabilities which limit their capacities to prepare and cope with environmental hazards. The ESCAP report further warns that “climate-induced disaster risk is outpacing the region’s resilience” (ESCAP 2023, p. 2).

More recently, the 2024 UNDP Regional Human Development Report titled, “Making our Future: New Directions for Human Development in Asia and the Pacific”, termed climate change a ‘profound existential threat’ to the region. It underlined that the region has witnessed numerous extreme weather events, a rapid decline of biodiversity, and rising sea levels, all of which have triggered internal climate migration accounting for 70% of the total global mass movement (UNDP 2024). Similarly, the 2024 Asia-Pacific SDG Partnership Report titled “People and Planet: Addressing the Interlinked Challenges of Climate Change, Poverty and Hunger in Asia and the Pacific”, predicts grimly that the region’s anticipated frequent and severe climate-induced extreme weather events will reduce agricultural and labour productivity, leading to loss of livelihood, food security, and trigger mass migration (UNDP 2024a). In fact, climate change has already caused a decline in fish stock and quality (Colombo and MacNeil Reference Colombo and MacNeil2023; Sushma Reference Sushma2023; Jiang and LaFree Reference Jiang and LaFree2023), impacting livelihood and socio-economic conditions of millions of people living in coastal regions.

In addition, as discussed in the preceding sections, climate change is anticipated to increase maritime criminality such as piracy, trafficking, and Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Changes to natural systems and frequent catastrophic weather events in the Indo-Pacific region have coincided with a rise in maritime crime especially in its chokepoints such as Bab-el-Mandab, the Red Sea, the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait (Hancock 2024; Bellabarba Reference Bellabarba2024; Panneerselvam and Ramkumar Reference Panneerselvam and Ramkumar2023; ICC-IMD, 2023).

An uptick in maritime criminality in the Indo-Pacific region in the form of piracy, looting and trafficking has been attributed to the loss of livelihood and economic decline suffered by communities dependent on marine resources (Robinson Reference Robinson2024; Jiang and LaFree Reference Jiang and LaFree2023; Chapman Reference Chapman2024). Semi-skilled and unskilled labourers in poorer nations are particularly susceptible to the lure of illegitimate ways of earning a living when their only source of income, such as fishing, becomes disrupted. While these are only some of the recorded observations that draw a connection between climate change and rising maritime criminality, they suggest that climate change will have a continuing and worsening impact on the maritime security of the region.

Climate change can also affect the nature of existing power competition among key players in the Indo-Pacific region. The impacts of climate change such as sea level rise and rise in surface temperature on sea life and geophysical formations have the potential to obliterate markings of political boundaries including exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Many existing maritime boundaries are demarcated by fragile atolls or coral reefs which are vulnerable to climate change. The impact climate change has on these formations could lead to new uncertainties in legal maritime zones and further complicate geostrategic conflicts. (Fellowes et al. Reference Fellowes, Anggadi, Byrne, Vila-Concejo, Bruce and Baker2022).

Existing maritime disputes in the Indo-Pacific region such as in the South and East China Seas, and surrounding Taiwan, could become more complex as climate change-induced physical changes alter existing strategic geographical formations (Kapetas Reference Kapetas2023). Increasing militarisation in these fragile marine ecosystems does not bode well for the ecological health of the region, while the impact of climate change itself will have debilitating impacts on the strategic options of parties involved in the conflict. Maritime sovereignty of countries, especially those of small island developing states (SIDS), is threatened by sea level rise and extreme weather events. Not only are these states at risk of losing sovereign control over their maritime domains, but their precarity could also set off fresh competition among big powers to establish dominance in the region. There are instances in the recent past of China securing deepened ties with SIDS in the regions such as the Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka Reference Kabutaulaka2022) and Kiribati (Jennings Reference Jennings2019). SIDS facing imminent threats of inundation and loss of livelihood due to hydrological intrusion and extreme weather events could potentially become sites of power competition among great powers - particularly China and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific allies.

Climate change will affect security operations and establishments in the Indo-Pacific region. It can meddle with and derail defence strategies, missions and plans, and weaken capabilities, material equipment, transportation, and even personnel (Da Costa et al. Reference Costa, Gusty and Reyes2023). Sea level rise and rising sea surface temperatures potentially threaten the regions’ military and naval installations thereby necessitating states to relocate or reinforce their security infrastructures. The IMCC report, for instance, highlights how U.S. military establishments in the Marshall Islands and Diego Garcia are facing imminent threats from inundation and salt water intrusion (IMCC 2020). Across the Asia-Pacific region, governments including the U.S., Japan, Indonesia and Singapore are taking measures to adapt and fortify security installations against the existential threat of climate change (Da Costa et al. Reference Costa, Gusty and Reyes2023). Climate induced extreme weather events put additional pressure on the military and paramilitary forces that are usually the first responders to calamities. It has been seen that in developing countries, as evident in India and Indonesia, the military has been engaged with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and ecological restoration activities (Laksmana 2011; Jayaram 2020). In fact, climate change is redefining the role of the military from being a general agent of security to an agent of climate security (McDonald Reference McDonald2013) - as in being a provider of security from threats emanating from climate change.

Thus, the above discussion shows how the collective goal of the Quad of securing a free and open Indo-Pacific is threatened by the physical implications of climate change as these are bound to have debilitating and destabilising effects. We now turn to the case of the Quad as a minilateral grouping and its collective efforts in addressing the climate challenge in the Indo-Pacific. We begin by providing a brief overview of the nature and purpose of the Quad.

The Quad – nature and purpose

The Quad’s origin lies not in geopolitics but in a cooperative humanitarian effort of the four partners comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 as the Tsunami Core Group (Grossman Reference Grossman2005). The four coordinated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in the form of financial, material, and human resources, mobilising more than 40,000 troops and emergency responders, cargo ships, and several helicopters and planes, to help offset the economic and human costs of the disaster (Grossman Reference Grossman2005). Even though the group disbanded in the following years as their humanitarian actions waned, this cooperation on public goods heralded a new kind of diplomacy template that was both successful and effective to address issues of regional and transnational concerns (Buchan and Rimland Reference Buchan and Rimland2020). Japan’s former prime minister, the late Shinzo Abe, is widely credited for shaping this grouping into the Quad through tactical hedging over the years as evident in his championing of Australia’s initiative for a U.S.–Japan–Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in March 2006 to his historic ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ speech at the Indian Parliament in August 2007 (Koga Reference Koga2024). However, the initial iteration of the Quad was short-lived. It drew staunch opposition from China, which issued official demarches with each of the four countries. South Korea and other East and Southeast Asian countries also expressed pessimism over the intention of the minilateral arrangement (Buchan and Rimland Reference Buchan and Rimland2020). These sharp reactions stymied the emerging minilateral, as the U.S., India, and Australia became reticent about pursuing the Quad, and the mission went into a decade-long dormancy.

The Quad’s revival began in 2017 when its senior officials met at Manila on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit (Saran et al. Reference Saran and Pant2024). This renewed interest in resurrecting the Quad stemmed from their shared concerns over China’s aggressive foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region, such as the One Belt and One Road initiative and its belligerent behaviour in maritime disputes and the South China Sea (Saran et al. Reference Saran and Pant2024; Madan, Reference Madan2017; Cannon and Rossiter Reference Cannon and Rossiter2022). These triggered an alarm among the Quad and revived the need to promote strategic cooperation.

The Quad is essentially a loose and informal grouping of four like-minded, democratic powers brought together by common strategic interests and threat perception in the region. It is certainly not a monolithic body but a voluntary coalition of sovereign states, each with its own respective set of domestic and international imperatives that influence their foreign policy objectives and actions. The Quad’s key character is being a grouping of equals, having equal stake as well as voice in setting the agenda, goals, and strategies. While this may seem to lend a democratic element to the group, it potentially narrows areas for cooperation as every agenda and policy action has to be backed by consensus. Further, the Quad is a minilateral group with no rigid structures or institutionalised processes such as a secretariat or headquarters. The Quad leaders meet at regular intervals, sometimes annually, while the Foreign Ministers hold more frequent meetings. The flexible nature of the group is seen as a strength by most experts interviewed by these authors, as this provides the group ample room to broaden, manoeuvre, and pivot its agenda as required.

Officially, “the spirit of the Quad”, as the 2021 Joint Declaration of the Quad Leaders states, “lies in its goal of establishing the Indo-Pacific as a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion” (MoFA 2021). However, it is evident through literature and conversations with experts that, even though there is never any mention of China in its official documents, the Quad is, in fact, a coalition of forces premised on the ultimate goal of countering China’s rise and expansionist policies in the region. Former Secretary of State of the U.S., Mike Pompeo’s remark that the Quad would “prove very important in…ensuring that China retains only its proper place in the world” seems to clearly elucidate the group’s core aspiration and intent (Smith Reference Smith2020).

Even though the Quad’s core purpose lies in the traditional strategic domain, it has grown to broaden its agenda to include several key non-security related issues deemed pivotal to the broader interest of the Indo-Pacific region. These include climate change, critical and emerging technology, space, cybersecurity, health security, and resilient infrastructure. The Quad’s commitment to these security-adjacent issues is evident through the six dedicated Leaders’ Track Working Groups it has instituted for each of the above domains (DoPMC, n.d.). Thus, the Quad has evolved, especially up till 2024, into a regional minilateral that is not only concerned with containing China’s growing influence in the region and globally, but also with promoting regional security defined in the broader sense to encompass several key non-security challenges. It is within this broadening scope of concern that we find the Quad engaging on climate change and its maritime security challenges.

The Quad’s Q-CHAMP and other initiatives

The Quad recognises climate change as a collective threat with ‘tremendous social, environmental, and economic challenges’ for the region (The White House 2024) and has sought to incorporate those concerns into its larger policy agenda. This cognisance shaped the development of the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package, colloquially known as Q-CHAMP (MOFA 2022). The Quad climate package was a unanimous decision to support the developing and evolving efforts of the group on climate related issues in the region, ranging from clean energy, to maritime decarbonisation, to resilience. Unveiled at the Quad leaders’ meeting in Tokyo on May 24, 2022, Q-CHAMP is a preliminary roadmap to advance practical cooperation among the Quad countries and their Asia-Pacific partners in transitioning towards a net-zero economy and enhancing regional climate resilience. It strives to “steadfastly implement the Paris Agreement” of 2015 (MOFA 2022). Guided by the Quad’s Climate Working Group, Q-CHAMP is designed to address both mitigation and adaptation/resilience through its three pillars - climate ambition, clean energy, and adaptation/resilience. The package seeks to facilitate deeper partnership among the Quad countries and its Indo-Pacific partners to enhance climate and clean energy cooperation and promote adaptation and resilience (MEA 2023).

To these ends, the Q-CHAMP has several specific goals and missions. On mitigation, the package includes programmes such as the Quad Shipping Taskforce geared towards greening the shipping sector. It promotes knowledge sharing on new technologies and energy processes such as clean hydrogen, clean ammonia, methane reduction, carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) and carbon recycling. It aims at building responsible and resilient supply chains and seeks to enhance knowledge sharing on subnational climate actions. The mitigation measure under the Q-CHAMP extends to a Quad mission for implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to enable participation in high integrity carbon markets and support capacity building in the region (MOFA 2022).

The Q-CHAMP’s adaptation and resilience plank includes such missions as the establishment of the Climate and Information Service Taskforce, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), the Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate (AIM for Climate), and the International Coral Reef Initiative. It aims to enhance research, development and innovation, and augment ecosystem-based adaptation and resilience advanced by nature-based solutions (MOFA 2022).

Beyond the adaptation and mitigation measures laid out in the Q-CHAMP, the Quad made inroads into strengthening collaborative climate action in the Indo-Pacific. At the 2022 Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo, the Quad introduced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) to “better monitor their waters; counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; respond to climate change and natural disasters; and enforce their laws within their waters” through near-real-time, effective radio frequency data” (Mizo Reference Mizo2024b; DoPM, 2022). In 2024, they decided to introduce another layer of technology leveraging electro-optical data and advanced analytic software to enhance IPMDA with sharper images and accuracy in monitoring the waters. Further, Quad leaders initiated a new regional Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) to maximise the technology available through IPMDA. India had agreed to host the first-ever MAITRI workshop in 2025 (PMoA 2024).

Other climate and maritime-related initiatives include the Quad maritime legal dialogue aimed at strengthening efforts to uphold the rules-based maritime order in the region by engaging more deeply with regional maritime law enforcement agencies (Department of State 2025). The Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network of 2024 aimed at enhancing the group’s HADR capacities, such as shared airlift capacity and other logistic strengths, for efficient deployment across the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad Ports of the Future Partnership 2024 was geared towards developing sustainable and resilient port infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific in collaboration with regional partners. The Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience 2024 was meant to strengthen and insulate undersea cable networks in the Indo-Pacific. Further, the Quad in 2024 agreed to launch the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission in 2025, which will see the Coast Guards of India, Japan, the US, and the Australian Border Force undertake a collective exercise on board a US Coast Guard vessel in the Indo-Pacific “to improve interoperability and advance maritime safety” (Mizo Reference Mizo2024b; PMoA 2024).

Shortcomings and looming uncertainty

While Q-CHAMP is a welcome move towards enhancing climate security in the region and a necessity in realising a genuinely free-and-open Indo-Pacific, some shortcomings have been glaring. First, the document does not address the issue of fossil fuel production and reliance in its mitigation program. It is unclear how climate mitigation can be significantly enhanced without addressing the heavy dependence on fossil fuel based energy by the four countries. The exclusion of fossil fuel reduction as part of its mitigation programme could be explained by the fact that the Quad countries are among the largest producers or consumers of fossil-based energy in the world (Energy Institute 2025), and that it has yet to forge a collectively agreeable policy measure for decarbonisation. The QUAD would be leading by example if it could devise measures to address fossil fuel reliance and collaborate on finding feasible and sustainable alternatives.

Further, Q-CHAMP has hardly any mention of cooperative measures to enhance renewable energy, and in particular solar energy. It is curious why the Quad ignores incorporating solar energy harnessing given that India has led a global initiative through its International Solar Alliance. The renewable energy sector is certainly one area where the Quad can mobilise to meet the challenge of an emerging Chinese monopoly. It must be noted, however, that the Wilmington Declaration of 2024 does “emphasise the benefits of transitioning to a clean energy economy” and expresses the collective’s intention “to strengthen our cooperation” in creating clean energy supply chains (PMoA 2024).

Further, one finds that there is no established centralised finance mechanism to support the measures and missions under the Q-CHAMP. Perhaps this is because of the informal nature of the Quad but in the absence of a finance mechanism, the measures under the Q-CHAMP might at best remain ad hoc. More recently, the 2024 Joint Declaration does promise to secure public finance to “operationalize our commitment to catalysing… private sector investment in… clean energy supply chains” (PMoA 2024). The parties individually commit varying sums for several clean energy projects in the region, adding up to nearly 700 million USD. While this is still far from an institutionalised collective fund, the group appears to be showing enhanced commitment towards climate mitigation through clean energy development in the region.

The Quad lacks an administrative or executive agency that would oversee the implementation of its programmes and measures contained in the Q-CHAMP. The coordination and implementation of policy initiatives under the Q-CHAMP are designed to be within the purview of the Quad Climate Working Group. While this is in keeping with the informal, non-institutionalised nature of the Quad itself, we observe that such an institution would help streamline and enhance the effectiveness of the initiatives undertaken towards the larger goals of mitigation and adaptation/ resilience.

The Q-CHAMP also misses another important factor in climate cooperation, that is, the military/ strategic aspect. That climate change will have a debilitating impact on the defence and security strategies of countries has been discussed above. Maritime security and the efforts to secure the maritime domain, especially in the context of a free and open Indo-Pacific, suffers immense uncertainty from climate change. Countries cannot address these challenges on their own. The Quad must join resources, capabilities, and power to ensure that their military and strategic infrastructure, installations and establishments (such as air and naval bases, ports and docking points) in the Indo-Pacific are safeguarded from the many threats from climate impacts.

In addition to these shortcomings, the Quad’s climate agenda is shrouded in uncertainty with the ongoing political shift. Speculations are rife on the future of the Quad itself. President Trump is expected to gauge the group’s utility to the U.S. in light of its costs (Hall Reference Hall2024). It could be a challenge to make a compelling case for Trump to continue to support the Quad’s partnership agenda for the coming years (Andrews Reference Andrews2025). Further, the U.S. economic competition with China, with whom the other Quad partners continue deep economic ties, could complicate the group’s internal dynamics, affecting their collective initiatives and agenda. More particularly there could be a palpable shift in the Quad’s broader agenda focus as it is likely to reorient attention towards strategic concerns. This pivot is already evident in the Joint Statement of the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting held just after the U.S. presidential inauguration of Trump in January 2025. The noticeably brief statement had no mention of non-security matters as it seeks to ensure “regional security in all domains” (MfFA 2025). It also aims not only to uphold the “rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity” but also to “defend” them (MfFA 2025).

The possible shift in the Quad’s agenda, which expanded significantly to include non-traditional security issues under President Biden (Pant and Haldar Reference Pant and Haldar2025), could derail the initiatives and significant inroads into the progress that the group had secured on climate mitigation and adaptation, and related non-traditional security concerns over the past few years. Trump and U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegseth have made it clear that the U.S. military will not address issues of climate change (Waldman Reference Waldman2025). The question then, is will the other Quad partners allow the U.S. leadership to alter the course of the group’s agenda? Further, what compromises can the group arrive at not to completely undo the achievements and plans on climate change and maritime security? Answers to these will be indicative of the nature of the Quad’s integrity as a group, which, in principle, is a grouping of equals with shared values, interests and aspirations. Keeping these challenges in context, the remaining section discusses some cooperative measures and strategies that Quad can devise in order to enhance maritime security in the time of changing climate in the Indo-Pacific.

The path ahead: beyond Q-CHAMP

Because climate change is an emergent phenomenon, and the Quad is a continuing dialogue, Q-CHAMP is necessarily a work in progress. As evidenced by the 2024 Joint Declaration, the nations of the Quad are in a process of learning, by doing, how to pursue security in a world where climate change is increasingly an existential threat to sea routes, critical regional ports, communities and nations, and at the same time a threat multiplier to traditional security concerns. This is a challenging task calling for innovations in perception and practice. Today the Quad acts primarily to coordinate activities of its four participating nations (U.S. Embassy, India 2024).

Securing the Indo-Pacific maritime domain from climate-related threats will require the Quad to further evolve and coalesce its resources, capabilities and power to transform cooperation into collaboration. Further, for such a collaborative agenda to actualise, the Quad needs to embrace a sustained political will and strategic approach that acknowledge the value of climate action on broader security agenda of the region.

However, this begs the question if the Quad is the right platform to address non-traditional security issues such as climate change induced maritime security threats? Or has it bitten off more than it can chew given its nature and original motivations? The Quad is an informal and continuing dialogue of ‘likeminded, democratic’ states who share common interests and threat perception, with an ever evolving agenda responsive to the regional geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics. Its core priorities have evolved from the provision of humanitarian assistance in 2004 to strategic insulation against an increasingly aggressive and belligerent China in 2017, and broadened to include security-adjacent issues up till 2024. Given that its most sustained ‘spirit’ or ‘goal’ is the establishment of a “free, open, inclusive, healthy, Indo-Pacific that is anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion” (MoFA 2021), any threat that challenges this, emanating from a state or non-state entity, must automatically be a cause for concern for the group. The Quad, until 2024, evidently progressed along this line of thinking and took up the unlikely task of addressing climate change related issues through a host of policy measures and initiatives discussed above. Addressing climate change and related maritime security issues are then not antithetical the Quad’s original goals interpreted liberally. Further, the essentially malleable and dynamic nature of the Quad enables, if not warrants, it to constantly adjust its motivations and strategies in response to pressing and emergent dictates of regional geopolitical developments and challenges. As of 2023, the Quad commands a combined GDP of US $34.8 trillion approximately (DoPMC 2023). Therefore it has the collective technological and financial resources to address broader security concerns of the region, given conducive political will.

The path ahead for the Quad is uncharted, and to be relevant and successful in its mission, it must be a trail blazer, learning new techniques, testing new security practices, and gaining new understandings in the complex, emergent security domain. Progress will require the Quad to evolve from a forum for dialogue to an agent of security collaboration – not a traditional defence organization, but a new kind of actor that embraces an emergent security paradigm where global environmental phenomena interact with national rivalries and interests to create new and more complex security threats.

The core need is for creative institutional leadership for identifying, managing and integrating effective collaborative efforts for regional security, informed by a common focus on environmental security in a system defined by regional rivalry. Specific opportunities toward that end include:

• • Undertaking a leadership role in the reconceptualization of a regional security paradigm that understands the connections between climate change as an emergent existential threat and climate change as a multiplier of traditional threats. In this case it is an advantage that the Quad is not a traditional defence alliance with a focus on traditional military threats. Because its vision of the common security interest is more broadly conceived – a free and open Indo-Pacific – the Quad has the potential for new modes of perception and of understanding the nature of security in an emergent, complex, regional and global system.

• • Establishing a common Maritime Climate Security Policy Strategy. Because the Indo-Pacific is a maritime region, by both geographic definition and commercial activity, the Quad has the opportunity to develop and exercise special expertise and action at the intersection of climate change and maritime security.

• • Expanding Q-CHAMP to address response to climate-related change. Mitigation, prevention, response and recovery are the acknowledged elements of the disaster management cycle. The existential threat of climate change is a reflection of its capacity to increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters. Q-CHAMP today addresses only the first two parts of the cycle. The Quad has been concerned with issues of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from its inception, and in 2022, its foreign ministers signed into operation the Guidelines for the Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific (MoFA 2022). The guidelines do not mention climate change,Footnote ¹ and Q-CHAMP, while it addresses disaster risk reduction, does not specifically address disaster response, which is a clear aspect of security management. There is an opportunity here for reconceptualization of the security paradigm across these two categoric silos.

• • Expanding Q-CHAMP to sponsor targeted, collaborative research on climate change impacts on the maritime domain and the potential threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The nations of the Quad have impressive research, development and innovation resources. There is an opportunity and a need for single source management and funding of collaborative international research to explore and address emergent issues that should be a mission for the Quad. Such research initiatives should include opportunities for funded collaboration with institutions and agencies in vulnerable nations.

• • Incorporate new knowledge of climate related threats and scenarios into joint naval exercises. There is also an opportunity to establish a cross-ministerial, cross-sectoral QUAD climate security exercise to explore and disseminate knowledge and techniques to bolster maritime climate resilience. Such an exercise would bring development, health, and security agencies and actors at the national, international and local levels.

• • Build upon the experience of national assistance programs and experience to consider the potential value-added of collaborative support to Indo-Pacific Island states. Such plans and programs would take place within the context of geopolitical competition with rival powers.

• • Develop education and training materials and joint courses on climate security for Quad members and partners to disseminate the new knowledge of climate and Indo-Pacific security. The infrastructure for such a program already exists in military-to-military and government-to-government programs among the members of the Quad, for example in programs of the U.S. Defence Security Cooperation Agency and its Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

• • Restore consensus on the threat of climate change and its meaning for regional security. The new positions regarding the irrelevance of climate change to security, as expressed in the first months of the Trump administration, have yet to be presented to the Quad. As we have argued above and as the Quad has previously endorsed, climate change poses significant threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, threats that geophysical scientists assure us will increase, perhaps catastrophically, if not addressed. How will the Quad respond to climate denial by its formerly key member?

In September 2024, Navtel Sarna, former Indian ambassador to the U.S., observed, “There is a security element to the Quad but it’s not the only element.” The Quad’s value is in offering “alternative paradigms, both economic and technological than the ones that China may be offering” (Kine Reference Kine2024). A consideration of the complex interactions at the intersection of climate change and maritime security suggests there is also an opportunity for added value to the Quad in offering an alternative security paradigm – one that is especially relevant to its goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.