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Industrial Policy, National Security, and the Perilous Plight of the WTO. By Petros C. Mavroidis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2025. Pp. 329. Index.
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Industrial Policy, National Security, and the Perilous Plight of the WTO. By Petros C. Mavroidis. New York: Oxford University Press, 2025. Pp. 329. Index.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2026
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- © The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law
References
1 Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology 137–40 (2022).
2 White House Press Release, Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit (Sept. 16, 2022), at https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies-project-global-emerging-technologies-summit. Export controls were also applied to European, Japanese, and Korean producers through the foreign direct product rule.
3 Chad P. Bown & Dan Wang, Semiconductors and Modern Industrial Policy, 38 J. Econ. Persp. 81, 96–100 (2024). Bown and Wang also note that the subsidy could be used to support non-American assembly and testing.
4 Chad P. Bown, National Security, Semiconductors, and the US Move to Cut Off China, Trade Talks (Nov. 2, 2022), at https://tradetalkspodcast.com/podcast/170-national-security-semiconductors-and-the-us-move-to-cut-off-china [https://perma.cc/ENK5-W66J].
5 Tony Romm & Ana Swanson, After U.S. Takes Stake in Intel, Trump Pledges “Many More” Deals, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2025).
6 GATT Article XXI provides exceptions for other situations as well. The TRIPS, GATS, and GPA agreements also have a national security exception. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 UNTS 194.
7 Nicolas Lamp, At the Vanishing Point of Law: Rebalancing, Non-violation Claims, and the Role of the Multilateral Trade Regime in the Trade Wars, 22 J. Int’l Econ. L. 721 (2019). Warren Maruyama and Alan Wolf also argue that complaining states should be able to retaliate immediately for claims involving the national security defense. See Warren Maruyama & Alan Wm. Wolff, Saving the WTO from the National Security Exception (Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 23-2, May 2023).
8 Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Let’s Agree to Disagree: A Strategy for Trade-Security, 25 J. Int’l Econ. L. 527 (2022).
9 For a discussion of the Appellate Body crisis and the MPIA, see Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO’s Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA): What’s New?, 22 World Trade Rev. 693 (2023).
10 Kristen Hopewell, Beyond U.S.-China Rivalry: Rule Breaking, Economic Coercion, and the Weaponization of Trade, 116 AJIL Unbound 58 (2022).
11 Weijia Rao, Signaling Through National Security Lawmaking, 59 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 797 (2025).
12 Chad P. Bown, Europe Is Pushing Back Against Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs. Here’s How., Wash. Post (Mar. 9, 2018).
13 Monica Hakimi & Jacob Katz Cogan, The End of the U.S.–Backed International Order and the Future of International Law, 119 AJIL 279 (2025).