The science-fiction film The Matrix (the first in a trilogy) generated a great deal of philosophical interest. There are already three collections of philosophical papers either published or in the pipeline devoted to the film (all are aimed at the general public, not academics). Here, Colin McGinn takes a closer look at the film and comes up with some rather surprising conclusions.

Chris Horner questions whether a ‘meritocracy’ is something for which we should really be aiming.

‘The class war is over. But the struggle for true equality has only just begun.’

Tony Blair

In this article and the following one, Susan Blackmore and Michael Bradie take contrary positions on the ‘science of memetics’, an approach to explaining human behaviour and culture based on the idea that our minds and cultures are in large part determined by self-replicating gene-like entities called ‘memes’. Memes would seem to allow the application of evolutionary ideas to both biology and culture. Many find that thought exciting and appealing. Others consider it arrogant and scientistic. Who is right?

Michael Bradie does not share Blackmore's enthusiasm for the ‘new science of memetics’.

Richard Swinburne here defends the view that mind and body are distinct substances capable of independent existence. For a very different approach to the question of how mind and body are related contrast Rowland Stout's ‘Behaviourism’, which follows this article.

Behaviourists take the view that mental states are essentially behavioural: to be in pain, for example, is just to behave, or be disposed to behave, in certain ways (to writhe and go ‘Ow!’, and so on). Behavourism, if true, would neatly explain how mind and body are related. Minds are not queer, ethereal entities that exist in addition to our physical bodies, and that are hidden behind our behaviour. Rather, to have a mind just is to be disposed to behave in certain ways, and that is something even a physical object can be. Nowadays behaviourism, as a philosophy of mind, is philosophically out of fashion. But here, Rowland Stout explains why he still believes it may be true.

Is your mind in your head? The answer, surprisingly, may be ‘no’. Guy Longworth sets out the philosophical case for accepting that our minds extend much further into the world than that.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously. Here we get to grips with an everyday reasoning error: the gambler's fallacy.

Mr Jarvis, a Christian, was asleep in bed, dreaming of the Last Judgement. In his dream, Jarvis found himself seated next to God in a great cloud-swept hall. God had just finished handing down judgement on the drunkards, who were slowly shuffling out of the exit to the left. Angels were now ushering a group of nervous-looking men through the entrance to the right. As the men were assembled before Him, God began to speak.

Emrys Westacott explains one of the most famous and ubiquitous of all philosophical dilemmas.

In this regular series Michael Clark, editor of the journal Analysis, presents a number of the most intriguing philosophical paradaoxes. Here we examine the paradox of Bertrand's box.

Alan Montefiore explains how Kant's moral philosophy fits into and depends on the wider sweep of his work.

Peter Cave explains why he believes we can and should treat people well, even after they have ceased to exist.

We should treat people well;

therefore, we should treat dead people well.

In this article it is argued — contentiously — that tourist photography is not ethically neutral but bad and wrong according to the fundamental principles of all the main theories propounded in moral philosophy.

In issue 4, Mark piper presented the famous problem of evil, which appears to show that there is no God, that is to say, no all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being. Here James Franklin suggests that there may, after all, be a solution to the problem.