This volume explored some of the most essential transformative marine technologies and the law of the sea, including how ports accommodate autonomous ships, the use of autonomous ships as time charterparties, the interface between AI and seafarers, attributing “conduct” of autonomous surface ships to ship masters, the normative and doctrinal dimensions of shipping decarbonization at the IMO, protection against maritime cyber threats, satellite vessel tracking, blockchain in commercial shipping, seabed mining and underwater archeology innovations, SMART submarine communications cables, and the lacunae of IPRs in the governance of marine genetic resources in the 2023 High Seas Treaty.

Chapter 1, by Dr. Murat Sümer, maps the relationship between Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), particularly remotely controlled ships (RCS), and port State jurisdiction (PSJ). Removing human operators on ships and in ports represents a paradigm shift in marine technology, challenging established frameworks under the law of the sea. RCS highlights how technological innovations necessitate adaptations in international maritime law to ensure navigational safety, environmental protection, and compliance with global standards.

Ports, as gateways to international trade, handle over 80 percent of global commerce and are integral to State sovereignty under the UNCLOS. UNCLOS, while silent on explicit definitions of “port” or “port State,” affirms in Article 8 complete territorial jurisdiction over internal waters, including ports. This sovereignty allows port States to regulate foreign vessels voluntarily entering their facilities, encompassing inspections, detentions, and denial of access. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) serves as the oversight body for the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1974), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW, 1978). These treaties emphasize “no more favorable treatment” clauses to enforce standards universally, even on nonparty flag States.

Historically, PSJ evolved from customary law restrictions in the pre-1970s era to a robust mechanism in the 1980s, bolstered by UNCLOS and regional memoranda, such as the Paris MoU. This evolution addresses flag State inadequacies, positioning port States as supplementary enforcers. Marine technology introduces novel jurisdictional tensions for RCS, which are classified under IMO’s MASS degrees three and four, and are operated from remote operations centers (ROCs). Devoid of onboard crew, RCS rely on remote masters and AI-driven systems for navigation, but UNCLOS was drafted for manned vessels. His chapter suggests that the flexible “rules of reference” system in UNCLOS (e.g., Articles 211, 218, 219) can accommodate RCS by incorporating the IMO’s Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards (GAIRS), treating them as “ships” at the discretion of the flag State (Article 91).

Key challenges arise from ROC locations. If situated outside the flag State’s territory, effective flag State jurisdiction (FSJ) under Article 94 may be compromised due to overlapping sovereignties, potentially violating UNCLOS obligations for control over vessels. The chapter proposes extending the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) from viewing the ship as a unit (e.g., M/V Saiga (No. 2) and M/V Virginia G) to include ROCs as integral components, akin to a ship. This change could mitigate jurisdictional gaps, supplemented by enhanced PSJ through port State control (PSC) inspections of ROCs, especially if digitized certificates and remote audits were adopted through the IMO’s Facilitation Committee guidelines.

Access to ports for RCS is not a right but a privilege (UNCLOS Article 25(2)). States may impose construction, design, equipment, and manning (CDEM) standards in ports, provided they are nondiscriminatory and publicly announced (UNCLOS, Article 211(3)). Potential extraterritorial effects may conflict with WTO principles, such as GATT’s freedom of transit, thereby risking the establishment of trade barriers. To incentivize skeptical port States, the chapter advocates compulsory pilotage for RCS in port approaches, leveraging local expertise to address high-traffic hazards. While IMO avoids comprehensive pilotage regulation due to regional variances, the draft MASS Code could mandate it for safety, aligning with SOLAS and environmental protections in UNCLOS (Article 211(4)).

PSC emerges as a critical compliance tool, evolving from inspections focused on construction, design, equipping, and manning to broader scopes that include human elements and cybersecurity. For RCS, PSC could extend to ROC verifications, ensuring alignment with ISM Code equivalents, such as the proposed Remote Operations Management (ROM) systems.

RCS integration hinges on harmonizing marine technology with the law of the sea. While flag States retain primary responsibility, the expanding role of port States serves as a safety net against jurisdictional fragmentation. Achieving consensus at IMO is imperative to prevent fragmentation and foster safe, sustainable, and autonomous shipping without hampering global trade. The universal application of a MASS Code can guide IMO decisions. This framework not only upholds the evolutionary spirit of UNCLOS but also positions port States as pivotal guardians in the era of remote maritime operations.

In Chapter 2, Ceren Cerit Dindar examines how time charterparty agreements interact with MASS. Charterparty contracts license the temporary use of vessels. The applicability of time charterparties to autonomous ships necessitates adaptations in standard forms, such as the New York Produce Exchange (NYPE) 2015, to align with advancements in AI, remote operations, and dynamic autonomy levels.

Fully autonomous ships operate without onboard crews, relying on ROCs for monitoring, control, and intervention. Marine technology enables seamless transitions between remote and fully autonomous modes, as seen in vessels. One of them is Yara Birkeland, an autonomous 120-TEU container ship that carries cargo between ports at Herøya and Brevik in Norway. The development of the MASS Code aims to address navigational safety, but private contractual law, governed predominantly by English principles, must evolve concurrently.

Time charterparties, unlike bareboat charters, allocate possession and operational control to shipowners while granting charterers commercial employment rights. For MASS, ROCs, and vessel personnel, arrangements should be made by shipowners or third-party managers (e.g., through BIMCO’s AUTOSHIPMAN form), preserving the charter’s essence. Key obligations necessitate revisions: Shipowners must ensure seaworthiness, encompassing ROC infrastructure, cybersecurity, and AI systems, which extend traditional duties under NYPE Clause 2. Under the NYPE form (Clause 2), items such as port charges and usual expenses shall be for the charterers’ account. To mitigate breaches, descriptive clauses (preamble and Annex A) should incorporate autonomy capabilities, such as automated cargo-handling.

Charterers’ obligations, including compliance with safe port warranties (NYPE Clause 6), necessitate a redefinition of “safety” to encompass digital resilience against cyber threats, compatible automated berthing infrastructure, and real-time data integration. Ports deemed unsafe due to persistent technological deficiencies (e.g., inadequate V2X communication) could trigger liability. Off-hire provisions require expansion to cover ROC failures, software glitches, or connectivity issues, potentially with de minimis thresholds to avoid disputes over minor disruptions.

Ultimately, while freedom of contract allows amendments, standardized updates to NYPE forms are essential to prevent fragmentation. This evolution harmonizes the benefits of marine technology while emphasizing uniform standards in the law of the sea. MASS integration is ensured without compromising global trade or liability regimes. As IMO progresses in developing the MASS Code, charterparty law must adapt to foster innovation while upholding navigational freedoms under UNCLOS.

In Chapter 3, Khanssa Lagdami explored AI at sea. The integration of AI into marine technology is reshaping the maritime industry, enhancing operational efficiency, safety, and sustainability while posing significant challenges to the law of the sea and labor regulations. Her chapter examines AI applications in shipping, such as autonomous navigation, predictive maintenance, voyage optimization, and cybersecurity. The application of AI in these roles has implications for seafarers. Adaptive legal frameworks will have to be crafted under UNCLOS, the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC, 2006), and STCW, 1978.

Marine technology advancements, including MASS, leverage AI for real-time data processing from sensors, big data analytics, and machine learning to enable collision avoidance, route optimization, and energy management. Projects like Yara Birkeland exemplify degree-three autonomy (remotely controlled without an onboard crew), which reduces human error and fuel consumption. However, these innovations disrupt traditional seafaring roles, potentially displacing low-skilled jobs while creating demand for upskilled positions in ROCs. Studies suggest AI will redefine rather than eliminate seafarer roles, necessitating competencies in data analysis, AI oversight, and cybersecurity.

Flag State responsibility (UNCLOS, Article 94) requires reassessment for AI-driven vessels, where liability for accidents complicates attribution among human operators, software developers, and flag States. For example, sensor degradation or algorithmic failures may lead to collisions. The IMO addresses this dilemma through its E-Navigation Strategy (MSC.1/Circ.1595) and the ongoing development of the MASS Code. This framework aims to harmonize AI integration with safety and environmental protections, potentially mandating human oversight at high autonomy levels to align with navigational freedoms and pollution-prevention duties (UNCLOS, Articles 87 and 192–194).

Labor law implications are profound. AI surveillance via digital monitoring raises concerns over privacy, technostress, and occupational safety and health. The MLC’s provisions on working hours, rest, and repatriation (Regulations 2.3–2.5) may not adequately cover shore-based remote operators, prompting calls for amendments to prevent excessive monitoring and to ensure the right to disconnect. STCW revisions are essential to incorporate AI-related training, focusing on competencies for MASS degrees one to four. The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), which entered into force in August 2024 and will be fully applicable by August 2026, classifies maritime AI as high risk. This designation mandates transparency, data governance, and human oversight. This aligns with the MASS Code, which requires EU-linked vessels to comply with bias mitigation and cybersecurity protocols, potentially influencing global standards through collaboration with IMO member States.

Challenges include cybersecurity vulnerabilities, as evidenced by breaches such as the NotPetya attack on Maersk in 2017, and data leakage risks, underscoring the need to align with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to protect seafarers’ personal data. Opportunities lie in the ethical deployment of AI, fostering human–AI collaboration to enhance safety without exacerbating isolation or mental health issues aboard ships.

While AI propels marine technology toward decarbonization and efficiency, aligning with the sustainable use mandate in UNCLOS, it demands evolutionary reforms in maritime labor laws. International cooperation, including tripartite ILO–IMO dialogues, is vital to safeguard seafarers, prevent fragmentation, and ensure an equitable technological transition, striking a balance between innovation and human-centric principles.

Maral Javidbakht considered the attribution of conduct for MASS in Chapter 4. The emergence of MASS represents a transformative leap in marine technology, enabling vessels to operate with varying degrees of human independence through sensors, AI algorithms, and ROCs. Her chapter examines the attribution of MASS shipmasters’ conduct to flag States under the law of the sea, emphasizing that technological advancements do not erode traditional accountability.

Marine technology allows shipmasters to retain overall command remotely, even in high-autonomy scenarios (IMO MASS degrees 3–4). In such cases, navigational and operational duties may be conducted via ROCs. However, international law rejects masterless navigation. Shipmasters must remain human, exercising overriding authority for safety (e.g., SOLAS, UNCLOS Article 98). UNCLOS treats ships as units (ITLOS jurisprudence in M/V Saiga (No. 2)), linking masters to flag States jurisdictionally, irrespective of location (Article 94). MASS qualify as “ships” under UNCLOS, subject to flag State obligations for effective control and due diligence in preventing wrongful acts.

Attribution is reflected in the rules of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. For government-operated MASS, masters are de jure organs (Article 4), and their conduct is directly attributable to the flag State. For privately operated vessels, attribution arises if the master exercises governmental functions (Article 5) or acts under flag State instructions/effective control (Article 8). Remote locations pose enforcement challenges – for example, extraterritorial ROCs – but do not negate attributability, as jurisdiction stems from the ship’s flag, not its physical presence. Flag States bear due-diligence duties to ensure that masters comply (UNCLOS Articles 94, 217), with breaches attributable to State omission if preventive measures are not taken. Ultimately, MASS integration requires harmonized marine technology in accordance with the principles of the law of the sea. While AI reduces the need for onboard human roles, human masters safeguard predictability and safety. Flag States must enhance due diligence – for example, cybersecurity for ROCs – to avert responsibility gaps, thereby fostering innovation without compromising navigational freedoms or environmental protections under UNCLOS.

In Chapter 5, Sindhura Polepalli adds normative concepts of justice and equity to the discussion of shipping decarbonization. The imperative for decarbonization in international shipping is closely tied to advancements in marine technology and evolving interpretations of the law of the sea. Her chapter critiques the sector’s transition toward net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by mid-century, emphasizing procedural and legal disparities hindering a “just and equitable transition” (JET).

Shipping handles over 80 percent of global trade but relies on fossil fuels, contributing 3 percent of anthropogenic GHG emissions. Maritime emissions are projected to grow by 90–130 percent of these figures by 2050, compared to 2008 levels. Marine technology innovations – such as zero-emission vessels (ZEVs), alternative fuels (e.g., ammonia, hydrogen), energy-efficient designs, and digital optimization tools – offer pathways to reduce carbon intensity. However, adoption of these “green” technologies requires equitable global frameworks to avoid exacerbating vulnerabilities in developing States.

UNCLOS frames anthropogenic GHGs as marine pollution (Article 194(1)), obliging States to prevent, reduce, and control emissions with due diligence and a precautionary approach. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’s (ITLOS) Advisory Opinion of May 21, 2024, reinforces this duty, linking UNCLOS obligations to the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C goal and invoking the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). ITLOS mandates assistance from developed States to developing States – those with lesser capabilities (Articles 202–203). This mandate ensures continuous support until parity is achieved. This human-centric lens addresses the risks posed by climate change, including sea level rise that impacts Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

As the competent international organization, the IMO stewards sector-specific measures via the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). The 2023 Revised IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships targets a 20–30 percent reduction in vessel source emissions by 2030, a 70–80 percent reduction by 2040, and net-zero emissions by 2050. Short-term measures under MARPOL Annex VI, such as the Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI) and Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII), leverage marine technology to achieve a 40 percent reduction in carbon intensity from 2008 baselines. However, mid-term proposals, including a GHG Fuel Standard (GFS), universal levies, and emissions trading systems, reveal gaps. The Comprehensive Impact Assessment (CIA) highlights the disproportionate burdens on developing fleets, yet it lacks transparency and broad stakeholder input.

To address these challenges, SIDS advocate revenue recycling for adaptation. Developed States push levies under the polluter-pays principle. These are often flag-neutral but ignore the nuances of CBDR-RC. Hybrid mechanisms, such as feebates that incentivize ZEVs, integrate marine technology (e.g., onboard carbon capture) but risk trade distortions without equitable revenue distribution. As of August 2025, the IMO approved the Net-Zero Framework in April (MEPC 83), which combines GFS with economic incentives, was slated for formal adoption in October 2025, and is expected to enter into force in 2027. This advances UNCLOS obligations, but critiques persist, including from the US Federal Maritime Commission on economic impacts.

The chapter urges reforms – including revising IMO member State groupings, explicitly embedding the polluter-pays principle, and elevating JET to the Legal Committee – to harmonize marine technology deployment with law of the sea principles. Without addressing CBDR-RC and assistance obligations, decarbonization risks perpetuating inequities and contravening UNCLOS’s mandate for sustainable ocean governance. Ultimately, JET demands leadership from developed States, public–private partnerships for technology transfer, and inclusive coalitions to foster resilient, low-carbon shipping ecosystems.

Many of the technologies for shipping and autonomous vessels require reliable communications between the ship and shore, between the ship and other instruments or devices in the water, and within the ship. Raul “Pete” Pedrozo explores the vulnerability of these communications in Chapter 6. Maritime cyber threats, particularly the jamming and spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), pose escalating risks to navigation reliant on marine technology, undermining safety and efficiency in international shipping. This chapter examines vulnerabilities in systems such as GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, and Galileo, which provide critical Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) data. Low-power GNSS signals are susceptible to intentional interference, which can degrade accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability. Malign actors – primarily China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea – employ electronic warfare to disrupt commercial vessels, with incidents surging: over 5,800 vessels affected in Q2 2025 alone, including persistent Baltic jamming attributed to Russia, Persian Gulf AIS spoofing since mid-2025, and disruptions during the Israel–Iran conflict impacting nearly 1,000 ships daily. Such attacks, often near oil terminals or conflict zones, compromise safety under UNCLOS, which mandates pollution prevention and navigational freedoms (Articles 192–194).

UNCLOS implicitly requires States to ensure navigational safety (SOLAS integration), while ITU Radio Regulations prohibit harmful interference in navigation. Jamming and spoofing are violations of these duties. The IMO addresses these issues through the Maritime Safety Committee, which has established guidelines (MSC.1/Circ.1526) and adopted Resolution A.1045(27), which urges resilient PNT. In March 2025, IMO, ICAO, and ITU issued a joint statement expressing “grave concern” over rising incidents, calling for safeguards to protect radionavigation services. US measures, including DHS advisories and NCAGS reporting, emphasize the use of real-time alerts and multilayered defenses.

Marine technology mitigations include enhanced receivers, encrypted Satellite Time and Location (STL) signals offering 30–50 m accuracy, eLoran backups, and anti-jamming antennas such as the Veripos GAJT-710MS. Emerging innovations, such as laser-based positioning (e.g., CyScan GeoLock) and quantum navigation, may bolster resilience. In 2025, the US Space Force’s X-37B mission tested quantum sensors for GPS-free PNT and laser communications, while Q-CTRL’s gravimetric trials and French/Chinese laser systems may advance secure, high-bandwidth alternatives. Quantum clocks promise orders-of-magnitude precision.

Ultimately, resilient PNT architectures must integrate defense-in-depth and cybersecurity to uphold the rules reflected in UNCLOS. As cyber threats proliferate, international cooperation must evolve to prevent navigational disruptions and ensure safe, spoof-proof maritime operations amid geopolitical tensions.

There is a fusion of space and ocean technologies. In Chapter 7, Richard Kilpatrick discusses space-based vessel tracking and its impact on maritime operations. Vessel-tracking innovations represent a convergence of marine technology advancements and evolving obligations under the law of the sea, enhancing maritime domain awareness while introducing new vulnerabilities. His chapter traces the evolution from early twentieth-century radio communications, which were codified in the 1914 SOLAS Convention following the Titanic disaster, to the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) in 1988. Contemporary tools, such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT), now rely on space-based satellites. These SOLAS-mandated systems (1974, as amended) integrate satellite infrastructure for real-time PNT, aligning with navigational safety imperatives (UNCLOS, Articles 94, 98) and IMO guidelines (MSC.1/Circ.1307).

Contemporary marine technology leverages AI, machine learning, and satellite imagery to process AIS data, which is cross-referenced with radar and drone data. This combination enables better detection of “dark” vessels evading tracking through spoofing or deactivation. As of August 2025, innovations include blockchain for secure cargo tracking, AI-driven analytics for sustainability (e.g., wind-powered vessels), and autonomous ship operations, as highlighted in the MASS Code developments. These tools bolster enforcement against IUU fishing, sanctions evasion, and maritime piracy and terrorism, and support pollution prevention (UNCLOS, Article 194) and flag State duties.

However, enhanced transparency risks misuse. Houthi militants, for example, have exploited AIS for targeting and sinking vessels and hijacking others. This action prompted US advisories (MARAD, March 2025) recommending AIS deactivation in high-risk areas, which has to be reconciled with SOLAS mandates for continuous broadcasting, except in the event of security threats. IMO guidelines and flag State rules must strike a balance between transparency and protection, potentially by using encrypted signals or selective data sharing. Evolving threats require standards aligned with UNCLOS and harmonized with IMO AIS guidelines. As AI and quantum navigation advance, vessel tracking promises safer oceans but necessitates ethical safeguards against exploitation, ensuring equitable maritime governance.

In Chapter 8, Krisztina Tilinger unpacks how blockchain interacts with the law of the sea. Blockchain technology (BCT), as an innovative marine technology, intersects with the law of the sea to advance sustainable ocean governance, aligning with UN SDG 14 and UNCLOS. The oceans absorb 23 percent of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions and are vital for regulating the climate and supporting biodiversity, yet face threats from pollution, overfishing, and climate change. UNCLOS mandates the conservation of marine living resources (Articles 61–62), environmental protection (Part XII), and the preservation of biodiversity (Article 194), emphasizing community interests over State-centric exploitation.

BCT’s decentralized, distributed, and immutable ledger ensures data authenticity, reducing fraud, bureaucracy, and costs while enhancing trust in public administration. UN recommendations advocate for BCT integration in achieving the SDGs, with applications in commodity tracking, refugee aid, and peer-to-peer financing. In ocean governance, BCT enables transparent total allowable catch (TAC) allocation, real-time pollution monitoring, MARPOL-compliant waste management tracking, and marine protected area (MPA) surveillance via smart contracts and token incentives for sustainable practices.

Challenges to broader integration of BCT include high energy consumption, scalability issues, legal recognition as evidence, and data privacy under GDPR equivalents. The EU’s 2023 European Blockchain Regulatory Sandbox (EBRS) addresses these through regulatory dialogues, with the 2025 EU Blockchain Ecosystem Report highlighting growth in finance, government, and supply chains, led by Estonia and Lithuania. As of August 2025, advancements include the UN Ocean Conference’s “Digital Oceans” agenda and side events, such as Sea2See’s blockchain-based seafood transparency, alongside Ocean Protocol’s mid-year updates that enhance data monetization for marine research. BCT harmonizes marine technology with UNCLOS, promoting equitable resource use without the need for new treaties, as national laws and best practices are sufficient. By automating compliance and incentivizing conservation, BCT accelerates SDG 14, striking a balance between innovation and environmental stewardship to achieve resilient oceans.

Chapter 10 by Digvijay Rewatkar examines seabed-mining technology and its material impact on implementing the precautionary approach. Seabed-mining technology intersects critically with the law of the sea, balancing resource extraction in Part XI with environmental safeguards in Part XII of UNCLOS. His chapter examines how States may use technology to access minerals in the Area beyond national jurisdiction. Seabed minerals include cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements. Projections indicate that demand will surge by 2050. Risks associated with seabed mining include sediment plumes, noise pollution, and loss of biodiversity and habitat. Marine technology may help mitigate these risks.

The UNCLOS negotiations from 1973 to 1982 reflected a North–South divide, with developing States advocating technology transfer under the common heritage principle (UNCLOS, Article 136) amid technological uncertainties. The precautionary approach, initially nascent but formalized in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration (1992), mandates risk aversion when scientific uncertainty persists (UNCLOS Articles 145, 194). The International Seabed Authority (ISA), established under UNCLOS Part XI, operationalizes this normative approach in its Draft Exploitation Regulations, emphasizing best available technology (BAT) and environmental impact assessments (EIAs) to minimize harm.

Marine technology advancements include collector systems for nodules (e.g., suspended noncontact robotics by Beijing Pioneer and BGR, reducing seafloor traction), cutters for sulfides/crusts (e.g., Patania II), and riser-lift systems for ore transport. Impacts on the marine environment appear to vary. Benthic disturbances destroy habitats, mid-water plumes affect nutrient cycles and respiration, and surface emissions mimic shipping pollution. Studies post-2024 collector tests (e.g., NORI-D) show short-term plume dilution, but knowledge gaps in mid-water ecosystems persist.

The forthcoming Mining Code incorporates precautionary measures, such as adaptive management and regional environmental plans, for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. Meanwhile, thirty-four States, including France and Chile, have called for a moratorium on commercial exploitation. Challenges include the dynamic evolution of BAT, uncertainty about how to implement equitable tech transfer (UNCLOS Article 144), and how to integrate the BBNJ treaty into planning and operations. Seabed-mining technology must align with the evolutionary framework of UNCLOS, prioritizing precaution to reconcile mineral needs with the integrity of ecosystems. Scalable, experimental approaches could optimize trade-offs, fostering sustainable deep-sea governance amidst climate imperatives.

In Chapter 10, Youri van Logchem analyzes the relationship between Sensor Monitoring and Reliable Telecommunications (SMART) submarine communications cables and the legal regime governing marine scientific research. SMART cables exemplify innovative marine technology, integrating oceanographic sensors into submarine fiber-optic cables to enhance data collection on climate change, aquatic environments, and disaster warnings. His chapter uncovers the dual functionality of SMART cables, which transmit international communications while gathering environmental data. This dual purpose may create tension between the cable regime and the rules for marine scientific research (MSR) in UNCLOS.

Submarine cables carry approximately 99 percent of the world’s global data traffic. SMART systems retrofit existing cables or design new ones with sensors (e.g., accelerometers, pressure gauges) for real-time monitoring of seismic activity, tsunamis, and ocean warming, thereby addressing deep-ocean knowledge gaps that are unattainable via buoys or satellites. Under UNCLOS, cable laying is a high-seas freedom (Article 87), with coastal States exercising limited jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and on the continental shelf (Articles 58, 79). However, SMART cable data collection may activate the MSR regime in Part XIII, requiring coastal consent in the EEZ and on the continental shelf (Article 246). Transit cables (nonlanding) may evade full coastal State jurisdiction, but sensor integration may classify their activity as MSR. Coastal State sovereignty applies in territorial seas (Article 2). Security concerns abound. Following the attack on the Nord Stream pipeline and the associated cable damage, concern has grown that SMART cable data could be at risk. Routing on the high seas or through stable, consenting States may reduce the conflicts among the different legal regimes.

In Chapter 11, Natalia Perez examines advances in underwater archaeology and their implications for the regime under UNCLOS. UNCLOS addresses archaeological objects at sea, including in the contiguous zone (Article 33), the Area (Article 149), and general duties of States (Article 303). UNESCO estimates that there are 3 million undiscovered wrecks, including many warships, in foreign waters, prompting debates over flag State versus coastal State rights. Technical and information breakthroughs in underwater archaeology are transforming the discovery, study, and preservation of shipwrecks. As more finds are discovered, questions have arisen about ownership, sovereign immunity, and cultural heritage. Technologies like remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and sonar-enabled deep-sea exploration beyond diver limits (e.g., 90 m) facilitate noninvasive imaging and eDNA analysis for historical insights. The 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (UCH) prohibits commercial exploitation, designates wrecks as gravesites, and mandates in situ preservation.

Marine technology democratizes access but risks the looting of sunken wrecks. The UNCLOS and UNESCO frameworks should evolve to promote equitable governance, prioritizing cooperation and technology transfer (UNCLOS Article 202). This approach strikes a balance between heritage preservation and innovation, thereby preventing commercial overreach in contested areas.

Chapter 12 by Marc Fialkoff turns toward the legal regime of Floating Nuclear Power Plants (FNPPs) and the law of the sea. FNPPs embody cutting-edge marine technology, enabling decarbonized energy for offshore platforms subject to complex, intersecting regimes under the law of the sea and nuclear nonproliferation. His chapter examines jurisdictional ambiguities in EEZ deployments, reconciling the sui generis nature of the EEZ (Article 55) with IAEA safeguards and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM).

In the EEZ, UNCLOS balances coastal rights (Article 56) and high-seas freedoms (Article 58), classifying FNPPs as ships, installations, or artificial islands, depending on the circumstances. Fixed FNPPs may qualify as installations (Article 60), thereby extending coastal jurisdiction for nonproliferation purposes, including Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) under NPT Article III and nuclear security, as per ACPPNM Principle 2A(3). Disputes continue to surround FNPP, especially their use within foreign EEZs. Some proposals advocate for coastal responsibility for fixed FNPPs, which attempts to align UNCLOS evolution with the peaceful use (Article IV) provisions of the NPT. Harmonizing regimes ensures nonproliferation without impeding maritime innovation, fostering sustainable ocean energy amid climate imperatives.

In Chapter 13, James Kraska questions whether the regime for marine genetic resources (MGR) in the 2023 BBNJ agreement is sufficient to protect legal rights to intellectual property or naval technology. MGR encompasses genetic material from marine organisms with potential market or naval value. For example, marine genetic resources have been used in biotechnology to develop pharmaceuticals such as remdesivir. These organic materials require advanced marine technology for collection. This technology includes deep-sea submersibles, genomic sequencing, and AI-driven analysis, which is predominantly held by developed States. These new technologies are not unrelated to military risk at sea.

Under UNCLOS, high-seas freedoms (Article 87) evolve through BBNJ to balance exploitation with conservation (Articles 192–194). This has imposed notification, assessment, and equitable sharing obligations without protecting IPRs. This transparency risks exposing proprietary data, thereby deterring innovation in marine technology sectors, such as synthetic biology. National security concerns are also present. DARPA and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) fund civilian vessels for bio-naval research to detect underwater threats. Related research would be posted on the ClHM. Although the BBNJ Agreement exempts warships, this may nevertheless conflict with UNCLOS’s military exemptions under Article 298(1)(b).

To enhance implementation, the Conference of the Parties (COP) should prioritize monetary/in-kind benefits (e.g., capacity-building funds) over full disclosure of research on the ClHM. This approach would preserve IPR to incentivize participation without compromising distributive justice. Furthermore, broadening the warship exemptions to include defense-funded research aligns with UNCLOS’s structure, which favors sovereign immunity.

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The chapters in this volume illuminate the dynamic interplay between advances in marine technology and the law of the sea, navigating challenges ranging from autonomous shipping to deep-sea resource governance. Collectively, these chapters highlight the potential of marine technology to revolutionize shipping, exploration, and sustainability while also exposing legal fissures in jurisdiction, equity, and security. UNCLOS’s evolutionary spirit must adapt to foster innovation without exacerbating divides, ensuring that benefits like enhanced safety and biodiversity protection accrue globally.

Future marine technologies warrant exploration in quantum navigation for spoof-proof PNT, AI-driven predictive maintenance for zero-emission vessels, hydrogen/ammonia fuels for decarbonized propulsion, deep-sea robotics with bio-inspired designs for minimally invasive mining, and integrated ocean observatories using blockchain-secured IoT for real-time biodiversity monitoring. These could align with the IMO’s MASS Code and BBNJ, promoting equitable and secure ocean stewardship.

Marine technology cannot be categorized into a single basket. It is more accurate to refer to “marine technologies,” each with its own ecosystem of hardware and software and distinct yet overlapping legal regimes. Furthermore, the international maritime law applicable to each technology must be considered within the context of its use. Commercial uses, government uses, and marine scientific research purposes are each discrete activities with specific legal regimes. This means that future lines of inquiry focused on the intersection of marine technology and the law of the sea might fragment into separate epistemological communities. On the other hand, there are benefits to selecting the most critical or transformative technologies and testing their application to legal regimes that evolve more slowly. This cross-pollination yields insights across subfields of ocean law and policy.