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Judgements about loyalty: A noise audit in the context of Swedish protective security vetting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 November 2025

Daniel Mats Olle Malmgren*
Affiliation:
Psychology, Lund University , Sweden
Mats Dahl
Affiliation:
Psychology, Lund University , Sweden
*
Corresponding author: Daniel M. O. Malmgren; Email: daniel.malmgren@psy.lu.se
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Abstract

Judging an individual’s loyalty in security-sensitive roles is a high-stakes task, yet little is known about the extent and sources of variability in such judgments. This study examined how 58 participants with experience in personnel security assessment evaluated applicant profiles connected to five different countries. Each participant reviewed five protocols and judged whether the case contained information relevant to a personnel security clearance, then rated the applicant’s loyalty on a 7-point scale. Using Bayesian probit regression and an ordinal item response model with hierarchical structure, we analyzed both binary judgments and rating patterns, accounting for country of connection, applicant gender, and participant-specific variability. Results revealed substantial between-participant variability (‘noise’) in how likely judges were to flag foreign ties as relevant. Pattern noise, reflecting idiosyncratic differences in how individuals interpret the same case, was evident in loyalty ratings. Connections to Brazil and Thailand were associated with systematically lower loyalty ratings and heightened disagreement between judges, reflecting both bias and pattern noise. Contrary to policy guidance, fewer than half of foreign connections were judged as relevant, and this tendency did not vary by participant gender. The findings underscore the risk of inconsistency in high-stakes assessments and highlight the need for structured conceptual calibration in personnel vetting.

Information

Type
Empirical Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Society for Judgment and Decision Making and European Association for Decision Making
Figure 0

Table 1 Participant demographics by job title (gender, mean age, and years of experience)

Figure 1

Figure 1 Prior vs. posterior for Brazil (b_CCL). The weakly informative prior in grey and the posterior distribution in blue. The figure shows how strongly the posterior distribution is informed by the data.

Figure 2

Table 2 Median rating per question by focal country, counts of ‘yes’ responses, and connection to a foreign country as justification

Figure 3

Figure 2 Between-judge variability in identifying a foreign connection as clearance-relevant. Countries ordered by increasing cultural distance from Sweden. Violin width = posterior density; points/lines = median and 95% CrI of the SD parameter (variability).Note: Between-judge variability in identifying a connection to one of the focal countries as relevant for a personnel security clearance. Violin plots show the posterior distribution of standard deviations for the random slopes of country effects (relative to Sweden), with 95% credible intervals overlaid. Wider violins indicate greater uncertainty in the estimate. Larger values reflect greater between-judge variability (i.e., less agreement) in how connections to that country were judged as relevant. Black dots represent posterior means; boxplots show medians and interquartile ranges.

Figure 4

Figure 3 Top panel (A): Fixed effects on latent loyalty (relative to Sweden). Violin width = posterior density; points/lines = median and 95% CrI. Middle panel (B): Between-judge variability captured as the posterior distribution of the SD across judges of country-specific random slopes (larger values = more disagreement). Wider posteriors indicate greater uncertainty, whereas larger SD values indicate more variability. Bottom panel (C): Expected loyalty ratings by relevance judgment (D). Violin width = posterior density of expected ratings on the 1–7 scale; points/lines = median and 95% CrI.

Figure 5

Figure 4 Participants’ general tendency in ratings of loyalty. Participant-level intercepts (latent scale) with 95% credible intervals, showing general leniency versus harshness in loyalty ratings. Participants above zero tend to give more favorable ratings, while those below zero are harsher relative to the average judge. Other judge-level characteristics (e.g., professional background as recruitment vs. protective security specialist) were tested in exploratory models and did not systematically explain this variability, suggesting that differences reflect individual judgment styles rather than professional role.

Figure 6

Figure C1 Posterior vs. prior plot for probit regression—UK.

Figure 7

Figure C2 Posterior vs. prior plot for probit regression—Germany.

Figure 8

Figure C3 Posterior vs. prior plot for probit regression—Brazil.

Figure 9

Figure C4 Posterior vs. prior plot for probit regression—Thailand.

Figure 10

Figure C5 Posterior vs. prior plot for probit regression—gender of applicant.

Figure 11

Figure C6 Posterior vs. prior plot for probit regression—intercept.

Figure 12

Figure C7 Posterior vs. prior plot for the IRM—the United Kingdom.

Figure 13

Figure C8 Posterior vs. prior plot for the IRM—Germany.

Figure 14

Figure C9 Posterior vs. prior plot for the IRM—Brazil.

Figure 15

Figure C10 Posterior vs. prior plot for the IRM—Thailand.

Figure 16

Figure C11 Posterior vs. prior plot for the IRM—gender of applicant.

Figure 17

Figure C12 Posterior vs. prior plot for the IRM—dichotomous decision.

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