Hostname: page-component-77f85d65b8-v2srd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-04-20T12:56:36.658Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Does Firm Size Matter? Analyzing Business Lobbying in the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Jeffrey M. Drope  and
Wendy L. Hansen
Jeffrey M. Drope
Affiliation:
University of Miami
Wendy L. Hansen
Affiliation:
University of New Mexico
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In the study of corporate political activity in the United States, scholars have consistently relied on samples comprised entirely or principally of large firms. While scholars have raised the issue of bias in these samples, there have been no systematic examinations of the consequences for causal inference. We address this issue directly by comparing the results of comprehensive models that examine corporate lobbying using both large-firm and randomly-generated samples. We find that while there are some notable differences, they are certainly not so large as to lead us to question fundamentally the results of decades of scholarship. In short, the results generated using a random sample lead to causal inferences largely consistent with those in the theoretical and empirical literature. In particular, firms' resources and interactions with government condition both their decisions to lobby and the level of their activity.

Keywords

lobbyingsample-selection

Information

Type
Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , August 2006 , pp. 1 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2006 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Ansolabehere, Stephen, de Figueiredo, John M. and Snyder, James M. Jr. 2003. “Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 1: 105–130Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David and Wright, John R. 1994. “Counteractive Lobbying.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (February): 25–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andres, Gary. 1985. “Business Involvement in Campaign Finance: Factors Influencing the Decision to Form a Corporate PAC.” PS: Political Science & Politics 18 (Spring): 215–19.Google Scholar
Boies, John L. 1989. “Money, Business, and the State: Material Interests, Fortune 500 Corporations, and the Size of Political Action Committees.” American Sociological Review 54 (October): 821–33.Google Scholar
Brasher, Holly and Lowery, David. 2006. “The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity.” Business and Politics 8, 1: 1–23.Google Scholar
Center For Responsive Politics. 2006. Who's Giving. www.opensecrets.org. Washington DC: Center For Responsive Politics.Google Scholar
Environmental Working Group. 2006. Report Archive. www.ewg.org. Washington DC: Environmental Working Group.Google Scholar
Epstein, Edwin. 1969. The Corporation in American Politics. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Galbraith, John K. 1954. “Countervailing Power.” The American Economic Review 44: 1–6.Google Scholar
Grier, Kevin B., Munger, Michael C. and Roberts, Brian E. 1991. “The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation.” Southern Economic Journal 57: 727–38.Google Scholar
Grier, Kevin B., Munger, Michael C. and Roberts, Brian E. 1994. “The Determinates of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986,” American Political Science Review 88 (December): 911–926.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansen, Wendy L. and Mitchell, Neil J. 2000. “Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics.” American Political Science Review 94 (December): 891–903.Google Scholar
Hansen, Wendy L., Mitchell, Neil J. and Drope, Jeffrey M. 2004. “Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff: Corporate Activity or Inactivity in Politics,” Political Research Quarterly (September/October) 57, 3: 421–29.Google Scholar
Hansen, Wendy L., Mitchell, Neil J. and Drope, Jeffrey M. 2005. “The Logic of Private and Collective Action,” American Journal of Political Science (January) 49, 1: 150–167.Google Scholar
Humphries, Craig. 1991. “Corporations, PACs and the Strategic Link between Contributions and Lobbying Activities.” Western Political Quarterly 44 (June): 353–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowery, David, Gray, Virginia, Anderson, Jennifer and Newmark, Adam J. 2004. “Collective Action and the Mobilization of Institutions.” Journal of Politics 66, 3: 684–705.Google Scholar
Masters, Marick F., and Keim, Gerald D. 1985. “Determinants of PAC Participation Among Large Corporations.” Journal of Politics 47 (November): 1158–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mergent Online. 2006. U.S. Company Data & U.S. Company Archives Data. New York: Mergent Incorporated.Google Scholar
Mitchell, Neil J., Hansen, Wendy, and Jepsen, Eric. 1997. “The Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Corporate Political Activity” Journal of Politics 59 (November): 1096–1113.Google Scholar
Mizruchi, Mark S. 1989. “Similarity of Political Behavior among Large American Corporations.” American Journal of Sociology 95: 401–24.Google Scholar
Mizruchi, Mark S. 1990. “Determinants of Political Opposition among Large American Corporations.” Social Forces 68: 1065–88.Google Scholar
Mizruchi, Mark S. and Koenig, Thomas. 1991. “Size, Concentration, and Corporate Networks: Determinants of Business Collective Action” Social Science Quarterly 72, 2(June).Google Scholar
Office of the Clerk-House of Representatives. Form LD-1DS Line-by-line Instructions (Lobbying Disclosure guidelines). Available at clerk.house.gov.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Public Citizen. 2006. Advanced Search. Available at www.citizen.org. Washington DC: Public Citizen.Google Scholar
Rehbein, Kathleen. 1995. Foreign-owned Firms’ Campaign Contributions in the United States: An Exploratory Study. Policy Studies Journal 23:41–61.Google Scholar
Sabato, Larry J. 1984. PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees. New York: WW Norton.Google Scholar
Schuler, Douglas A., Rehbein, Kathleen and Cramer, Roxy D. 2002. “Pursuing Strategic Advantage Through Political Means: A Multivariate Approach.” Academy of Management Journal.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Standard and Poor. 2006. Compustat. New York: Standard and Poor.Google Scholar
Truman, David B. 1951. The governmental process; political interests and public opinion. New York: Knopf.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1972. “The Purchase of Politicians.” Western Economic Journal 10: 354–55.Google Scholar
U.S. Census Bureau. 2006. Various business censuses available at Google Scholar
www.census.gov. Washington DC: US Census Bureau.Google Scholar
U.S. General Services Administration. 2006. Federal Business Opportunities database available at www.fedbizopps.gov. Washington DC: USGSA.Google Scholar
Vogel, David. 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Westlaw. 2006. Allfeds & Federal Agency. St. Paul: the West Group.Google Scholar
Zardkoohi, Asghar. 1985. “On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Electoral Process. Southern Economic Journal. 51 (January): 804–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar