Kissinger :What is Cambodian Attitude?
Chatchai :The Cambodians want salt and fish. They wanted to barter for these items.
Kissinger :Did Ieng Sary impress you?
Chatchai :He is a nice, quiet man.
Kissinger :How many people did he kill? Tens of thousands?
Mr. Habib :Nice and quietly!!
Chatchai :Not more than 10,000. That’s why they need food.
If they had killed everyone, they would not need salt and fish.
…
Kissinger :We are aware that the biggest threat in Southeast Asia at the present time is North Vietnam. Our strategy is to get the Chinese into Laos and Cambodia as a barrier to the Vietnamese…You should also tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in our way.Footnote 1
-U.S. Department of State. 26 November 1975-
Introduction
After more than 32 people—soldiers and civilians—have been killed and nearly 200,000 displaced in a renewed border clash between Thailand and Cambodia, Thailand’s Ministry of Defense spokesperson posted the following message on Facebook on 4 August 2025:
In 1979, hundreds of thousands—perhaps even millions—of Cambodians fled a living hell under the Khmer Rouge regime. Exhausted, starving, barely clinging to life, they crossed the border into Thailand.
The Thai people opened their doors. At that time, Thailand was not just a “neighbor.” It became a last refuge. We sent food. We opened refugee camps.
Some came to Thailand with nothing… but left with the strength to stand again.
But who would have thought… just a few decades later, Cambodia would forget it all. (Ministry of Defense Spokesperson, 4 August 2025)
Yet this evocative narrative of compassion and sacrifice tells only part of the story. What is absent from this account is equally striking. While Cambodians fled across the border to escape the Khmer Rouge, it was the Thai state that continued to provide political, logistical, and diplomatic support to that very regime for more than a decade after its crimes had become widely known.
In this sense, it was not only Cambodia that “forgot.” Thai authorities—and much of the Thai public—have also forgotten that Thailand sustained the Khmer Rouge long after the genocide, helping to keep the movement alive along the Thai–Cambodian border. The consequences of this erasure were profound. The process of justice was delayed for decades, and Pol Pot died in 1998 without ever standing trial. Today, this chapter of history remains largely unknown to many in Thailand. This paper begins from that silence.
The Cambodian conflict remains one of the most perplexing geopolitical struggles in Cold War Southeast Asia. When the Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, they ushered in one of the deadliest regimes of the 20th century. Under Pol Pot’s leadership, the Cambodian Democratic Kampuchea engaged in mass executions, forced labour, and systematic purges, leading to the deaths of an estimated 1.6 to 1.8 million Cambodians—approximately 21% to 24% of the country’s population (Kiernan Reference Kiernan2003: 587). This catastrophe ended only when Vietnam invaded in December 1978, collaborating with Khmer Rouge defectors to overthrow Pol Pot and establish the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in 1979.
Yet despite global recognition of its crimes, the Khmer Rouge did not disappear. Instead, it regrouped along the Thai-Cambodian border, receiving logistical and material support from Thailand and forming what scholars have described as an “informal military alliance” with the Thai government (Deth Reference Deth2020; Puangthong Reference Pawakapan2017).Footnote 2 Even more striking, the Khmer Rouge retained Cambodia’s United Nations seat until 1982, and a Khmer Rouge-led coalition continued to hold it until 1993. Pol Pot died in 1998, never having been held accountable in court.
The Puzzle
This paradox raises a deeply moral and political question: How did the international community, particularly the United Nations, an institution ostensibly committed to peace and human rights, come to legitimise and support a regime widely condemned for genocide? Existing scholarship has rightly emphasised the decisive roles of global superpowers, especially the United States and China, in sustaining the Khmer Rouge for geopolitical reasons (Jones Reference Jones2007; Kiernan Reference Kiernan, Breslauer, Kreisler and Ward1991). In a telling 1975 conversation, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described Khmer Rouge leaders as “murderous thugs,” yet noted, “we will be friends with them,” citing strategic concerns about containing Vietnamese influence by aligning with China in Cambodia and Laos (U.S. Department of State 1975).
By late September 1977, a striking image appeared on the front page of Renmin Ribao—the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party and a key mouthpiece for state policy. The photograph showed Pol Pot shaking hands with the Chairman Hua Guofeng, greeted by a parade in front of Tiananmen Square (Renmin Ribao 1977). The symbolism was unmistakable. Pol Pot had firmly established himself on the international stage—not only as the head of the ruling party and Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea, but also as Beijing’s closest ally.
In the 1980s, when Australia and Japan proposed prosecuting Khmer Rouge leaders, their efforts were dismissed by U.S. officials as either “stupid” or likely to “introduce confusion into the international peace effort” (Kiernan Reference Kiernan and Stone2008: 481–482). However, beyond superpower maneuvering, Thailand’s support was both instrumental and strategic. As Jones (Reference Jones2007: 6) argues, “Without Thailand’s assistance, the KR could not have survived as a threat to the PRK. Chinese and Thai aid allowed the KR to rebuild its forces from under 2,000 to around 40,000.”
Most existing accounts explain Thailand’s support in terms of realpolitik—that is, as a rational strategy to counterbalance Vietnamese power in the region. Funston (Reference Funston1998) described Thailand’s Cambodia diplomacy as a “success of realpolitik,” emphasizing military cooperation and economic self-interest. Deth (Reference Deth2014) highlighted internal factional politics, while Puangthong (Reference Cook2006) focused on how national security imperatives and cross-border trade transformed the Khmer Rouge from a threat into a useful ally and partner. These studies offer answers to why Thailand aligned with the Khmer Rouge—but less attention has been paid to how this alliance was morally and politically justified, both within elite circles and among the public.
Indeed, Thailand—often self-described as a peace-loving Buddhist nation—actively supported a regime widely recognised for its genocidal violence. The persistence of this support across successive Thai administrations invites further scrutiny. This paper argues that Thailand’s evolving policy toward Cambodia was not merely guided by cold strategic calculus but was also enabled through strategic framing and narrative construction. These discursive practices did not replace realpolitik; rather, they constituted it. Strategic narratives were deployed to legitimise decisions that might otherwise have appeared morally indefensible or diplomatically costly.
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Focus
To understand not why but how of the puzzle, we must look beyond material interests and consider the role of discourse in shaping foreign policy legitimacy. Framing theory (Entman Reference Entman1993; Goffman Reference Goffman1986) provides a foundational tool for analyzing how elites selectively emphasise certain aspects of reality while downplaying others. Entman (Reference Entman1993: 52) defines framing as “selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text,” with the goal of promoting a particular interpretation, moral evaluation, and proposed remedy.
Frames are not neutral; they shape perception, structure meaning, and guide political choices. As Oxley (Reference Oxley and Oxley2020) and Slothuus (Reference Slothuus2008) argue, framing effects function cognitively by making particular considerations more cognitively accessible than others. By doing so, effective frames not only direct attention but also influence how individuals reason about issues. In this sense, framing is both a rhetorical practice and a cognitive mechanism—it determines what people think about, and how they think about it.
Building on this foundation, strategic narrative theory (Miskimmon et al. Reference Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle2014; Reference Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, Roselle, Kaarbo and Thies2024) deepens the analysis by situating framing within broader struggles over political meaning and legitimacy. Strategic narratives are defined as “means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors” (Miskimmon et al. Reference Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle2014: 2). These narratives help states project coherence, forge alliances, and secure legitimacy both internationally and domestically.
Narratives do more than justify actions; they constitute the logic of policy itself. During times of war or crisis, strategic narratives answer key questions: Why are we involved? Who is the enemy? What is at stake? And what is the path to resolution? (Miskimmon et al. Reference Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle2014). As Miskimmon et al. (Reference Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, Roselle, Kaarbo and Thies2024: 11–12) argue, these narratives are not always unified; they can be multiple and contested within a society. Competing interpretations of the same event can profoundly influence public opinion, elite debate, and the legitimacy of state behavior.
In the Thai case, strategic narratives provided coherence and justification for supporting the Khmer Rouge across radically different administrations. These narratives helped construct “common sense” understandings of Cambodia’s conflict and Thailand’s role within it. They framed the Khmer Rouge as a lesser evil, recast Vietnam as the greater threat, and reimagined Cambodia as either a humanitarian crisis, a Cold War battleground, or an economic opportunity. As such, strategic narratives became a central mechanism for reconciling Thailand’s realpolitik with its normative commitments.
Using a combination of primary sources—including Thai diplomatic archives, political memoirs, newspaper reports, and academic commentary—this paper explores how Thai elites constructed strategic narratives to legitimise their shifting Cambodia policy, and how these narratives were received and contested in public discourseFootnote 3. This study argues that successive governments deployed shifting frames to align evolving geopolitical circumstances with evolving public sentiments. Rather than abandon its support for the Khmer Rouge in the face of overwhelming evidence of genocide, the Thai state instead reframed the conflict itself. Under Prime Minister Kriangsak (1978–1980), the conflict was framed as a regional “situation”, which emphasised neutrality and humanitarianism while allowing cross-border military cooperation to continue. Under Prem (1980–1988), the crisis was redefined as an “international conflict”, aligning Thai policy with ASEAN, the United States, and China in the strategic containment of Vietnam. Under Chatichai (1988–1991), the Khmer Rouge problem was depoliticised as the administration promoted an “economic opening” narrative, branding Indochina as a “marketplace” rather than a warzone, engagement was promoted over confrontation. Consequently, each regime interprets the existence of Khmer Rouge differently, leading to varied policies and strategies over time.
Each of these frames offered a different interpretation of the Khmer Rouge’s role and legitimacy. Each also reflected a strategic recalibration of both foreign and domestic policy priorities. While the content of Thailand’s Cambodia policy changed over time, the underlying discursive strategy remained consistent: reshape the narrative to make continued support for the Khmer Rouge appear legitimate, necessary, or even beneficial.
Kriangsak’s Framing of the “Situation in Cambodia” (1977–1980)
Thailand’s policy toward the Khmer Rouge regime shifted markedly with each change of government. When the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh and established Democratic Kampuchea on 17 April 1975, the Kukrit administration promptly recognised the new regime the following day. In a notable act of diplomatic engagement, Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary was welcomed for an official visit in October of the same year. Kukrit’s foreign policy was characterised by three key goals: the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Thailand, normalisation of relations with the People’s Republic of China, and the pursuit of friendly relations with all states, irrespective of ideological orientation. This inclusive approach extended to newly socialist Vietnam and Laos as well as Cambodia (Suphannika Reference Savirasarid1983: 46–49).
This posture shifted dramatically under the Thanin administration (October 1976–October 1977). Coming to power in the wake of the 6 October 1976 massacre—when right-wing mobs and police violently attacked thousands of student protesters branded as communism—Thanin intensified domestic suppression and adopted a confrontational foreign policy toward Indochina’s socialist regimes. By early 1977, his government banned official visits to communist countries, and border disputes with Cambodia became more frequent.Footnote 4
A new direction emerged after the coup of October 20, 1977, which installed General Kriangsak Chomanan. Kriangsak’s “national reconciliation” policy sought to heal Thailand’s internal divisions between left- and right-wing factions, while promoting a more pragmatic diplomatic approach to Indochina. At this time, the region was caught in the Sino-Soviet split: Pol Pot’s Cambodia aligned with China, while Vietnam deepened its ties with the Soviet Union. Concerned about Hanoi’s expanding influence in Laos and Cambodia, Kriangsak’s government increasingly viewed Cambodia as a “buffer state” critical to counterbalancing Vietnam’s regional ambitions (Puangthong Reference Cook2006: 82).
This fragile balance collapsed on December 25, 1978, when Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia, later joined by the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS)—a coalition of Cambodian exiles who had fled Pol Pot’s purges. By January 1979, the Khmer Rouge regime was toppled, and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established under Heng Samrin. Supported by a decade-long Vietnamese military occupation, the PRK would remain in power until 1989.
Vietnam justified its intervention on multiple grounds: self-defense against cross-border attacks by Democratic Kampuchea, the moral imperative to dismantle a genocidal regime, resistance to Chinese hegemonic ambitions, and the goal of securing a neutralised Southeast Asia (Ichiyanagi Reference Ichiyanagi1996). Scholars remain divided over which motivations were most decisive, underscoring the contested and complex nature of the conflict.
Loss of the “Buffer State”
When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak framed the crisis as the “Situation in Cambodia,” acknowledging its implications for Thailand but presenting it primarily as a matter for neighboring states (Sayamrat 1979). Guided by this framing, his government adopted a policy of strict neutrality: maintaining friendly relations with both Vietnam and China, while backing United Nations resolutions that emphasised Cambodian self-determination (Pinthong Reference Pinthong1995: 86; Suphannika Reference Savirasarid1983: 86).
The loss of Cambodia as a “buffer state”, coupled with the influx of Indochinese refugees, pushed Thailand to coordinate with ASEAN. On 12 January 1979, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint statement stressing neutrality, peaceful conflict resolution, respect for Cambodian self-determination, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. ASEAN soon submitted a resolution to the UN Security Council, but repeated Soviet vetoes blocked progress (Ichiyanagi Reference Ichiyanagi1996).
In line with his neutralist framing, Kriangsak sought dialogue with Vietnam. Meeting Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in June 1979, he rejected the need for a non-aggression pact, insisting that neither side harbored hostile intent since the two countries did not even share a border (Matichon 1979). Official Thai rhetoric carefully avoided blaming Vietnam directly, framing the conflict instead as the “Situation in Cambodia” and describing Vietnamese soldiers as “foreign troops.” Such language allowed Bangkok to preserve Vietnam’s status as a “friendly nation,” while reassuring the Thai public that there was “no need for excessive alarm” (Sayamrat 1979; Sayamrat Sapdawichan Reference Sapdawichan1980).
China, however, interpreted Vietnam’s invasion in starkly different terms—as the first step in a plan to annex Cambodia and establish an “Indochina Federation” under Soviet patronage (Ie Reference Ie1981: 102). In January 1979, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong pressed Kriangsak to cooperate by supplying materials and facilitating the travel of Khmer Rouge leaders through Thailand. Bangkok agreed, but extracted significant concessions in return: China was required to cease its support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and shut down the Yunnan-based Voice of Thai People radio station, which broadcast propaganda into Thailand (Chulacheeb Reference Chinwanno and Tsunekawa2009: 91). The station closed on 11 July 1979, and by 1981 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang pledged to end material aid to the CPT, offering only moral support (Hiratsuka Reference Hiratsuka1982: 249). Though framed publicly as part of a neutral “situation,” this cooperation effectively bound Thailand to sustaining the Khmer Rouge as a military force against the PRK.
The outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese War in February 1979 further complicated matters. Thailand’s balancing act between neutrality and alliance-building grew increasingly difficult as Cold War rivalries deepened and regional tensions escalated.
Strict Neutrality? The Sino-Vietnamese War
In January and February 1979, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visited the United States and publicly declared the need to “punish” Vietnam for its actions in Cambodia. This warning materialised on 17 February, when Chinese forces crossed into northern Vietnam, initiating the Sino-Vietnamese War (Ie Reference Ie1981: 104). In response, the five ASEAN nations, including Thailand, issued a joint statement three days later reaffirming neutrality in the Indochina conflict and calling for disputes to be settled peacefully. Despite intensifying regional tensions, the Kriangsak government maintained its stance of “strict neutrality.”
Yet neutrality did not mean indifference. The outbreak of the war generated intense debate within Thai society. Newspapers, magazines, and newly published books (e.g., Chakrit Reference Pitsanurak1979; Dara & Prayoon Reference Duangdee and Pitnaka1979; Thawit Reference Seniwong Na Ayutthaya1979) offered extensive analysis, while Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science launched the Asia Parithat (Asian Review) journal to cover the Cambodia–Vietnam–China disputes.
Although policymakers maintained formal neutrality, Thai media often framed China’s invasion as a justified response to Vietnamese aggression. For example, Sayamrat Sapdawichan ran articles describing Vietnam’s actions as “counter-revolutionary” and portraying China’s invasion as a “revolutionary and just war” aimed at resisting expansionism (Sayamrat Sapdawichan Reference Sapdawichan1979). Another article insisted that “China retaliated against Vietnam’s border provocations—nothing more” (Sayamrat Sapdawichan Reference Sapdawichan1979).
A recurring theme was the preservation of China’s “dignity and authority.” Former Defense Minister Thawit Seniwong Na Ayutthaya argued in Limited War? (China–Vietnam) that although China appeared militarily unprepared, it invaded to protect its status and strategic interests (Thawit Reference Seniwong Na Ayutthaya1979: 6). Similarly, Chumporn (Reference Sangkapricha1979: 60) suggested the war sent a message to ASEAN that China would not tolerate superpower interference in Southeast Asia, a region it claimed as its sphere of influence.
While some commentators cautioned against China’s use of force, most continued to view Vietnam and the Soviet Union as greater threats to Thailand’s security. This perspective positioned China as a pragmatic “balancer” in Indochina. As one Thai analyst argued: “Although ASEAN declared neutrality and was wary of China’s use of force, ASEAN was more concerned about Vietnam’s expansionism than China’s actions. This explains why they supported China’s punitive actions against Vietnam” (Suebsaeng Reference Promboon1979: 25).
In summary, by labeling Vietnam’s occupation as a mere “situation in Cambodia” rather than an invasion, policymakers avoided moral judgments and sustained cooperative relations with both sides. Framing Vietnam as a manageable actor rather than a hostile adversary allowed Kriangsak to pursue diplomatic engagement with Hanoi while simultaneously leveraging China, Vietnam’s rival, as a regional “balancer.” Within this discourse, the Khmer Rouge were seldom described in terms of genocide. Instead, they were reframed as fighters against Vietnamese aggression and as a nationalist force resisting occupation. In practice, however, Thailand’s policies—serving as a conduit for Chinese aid to the Khmer Rouge and granting them sanctuary along the Thai border—contradicted its proclaimed neutrality. Neutrality thus functioned as a strategic narrative: it legitimised indirect support for the Khmer Rouge while avoiding the moral costs of overt recognition and preserving Thailand’s image as a peace-seeking state. Yet this framing began to unravel as Vietnam’s actions escalated, culminating in its invasion of Thai territory in 1980.
Prem’s Reframing of “International Conflict” (1980–1988)
After Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the Khmer Rouge leadership collapsed and sought refuge in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. These camps, seen by Vietnam as strongholds for anti-government forces, became frequent targets of cross-border incursions. On 23 June 1980, Vietnamese troops crossed into Thailand, clashing with Thai forces and occupying seven villages, including Nong Mak Mun (Ornanong Reference Noiwong1998: 65). Between 1981 and 1985, Vietnamese forces carried out at least 12 attacks on camps, schools, and hospitals along the border (Ornanong Reference Noiwong1998). These incursions magnified Thailand’s sense of vulnerability and elevated Vietnam as its greatest threat.
Thailand Becoming a “Frontline State”
The Cambodian refugee crisis had already weakened Kriangsak Chomanan, forcing his resignation. His successor, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980–1988), prioritised national security and adopted a harder line toward Vietnam. Under Prem and his Foreign Minister, Siddhi Savetsila, Thailand’s narrative of the Cambodian conflict shifted decisively. No longer a regional “situation,” the conflict was reframed as an “international crisis” that demanded ASEAN unity, Chinese and U.S. support, and a global diplomatic response.
Foreign Minister Siddhi outlined four guiding principles for addressing the Cambodian conflict: The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; the Preservation of Cambodia’s neutrality; A peaceful resolution to the conflict; Respect for the Cambodian people’s right to self-determination (MFA Thailand 2015: 21). Guided by these principles, Thailand aligned itself with ASEAN, anti-Vietnamese Cambodian factions, the United States, and China, while opposing the Heng Samrin regime, Vietnam, and the Soviet bloc. The overarching aim was to end Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia and to rebalance the regional order.
Prem and Siddhi’s position rested on a stark interpretation of Vietnam’s intentions. They rejected Vietnam’s claims that its invasion was self-defense, a mission to eliminate the genocidal Pol Pot regime, or a bid to neutralise Southeast Asia against Chinese influence. Instead, Thailand viewed the conflict as a direct result of Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia. They portrayed Vietnam as a belligerent power with hegemonic ambitions, intent on building an Indochina Federation through its occupation of Laos and Cambodia under Soviet patronage. Rumors of Vietnamese plans to annex 16–17 Thai provinces into such a federation further amplified Thai fears (Institute of Asian Studies 1985: 8, 27). The Heng Samrin regime was dismissed as a puppet government installed solely to legitimise Vietnam’s occupation, and thus unworthy of recognition. From the Thai perspective, the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces is a non-negotiable condition for resolving the issue
Siddhi’s memoirs highlight this antagonism. He repeatedly characterised Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, as “cunning, rude, and aggressive.” Thach’s remarks to Thai leaders reinforced perceptions of Vietnam as hostile. To Prime Minister Kriangsak, he reportedly warned, “We know everything Thailand is doing, so watch out,” and later told Siddhi, “China cannot help Thailand, so only Vietnam can guarantee Thailand’s sovereignty” (MFA Thailand 2015: 26). Siddhi countered these threats by invoking Thailand’s long history of independence and stressing reliance on alliances: “While Vietnamese soldiers are skilled at fighting, they are no match for a larger nation like China” (MFA Thailand 2015: 26).
Negotiations with Vietnam proved fruitless. Vietnam proposed establishing a demilitarised zone, halting Thai support for the Khmer Rouge, withdrawing troops, and signing a Thai-Vietnamese non-aggression pact. Crucially, Vietnam insisted that China be excluded from talks. Siddhi categorically rejected this as “entirely unacceptable and contrary to the facts” (MFA Thailand 2015: 85). To Siddhi, the Cambodian crisis was not a bilateral dispute but an “international conflict” shaped by superpower dynamics among China, the U.S., and the Soviet Union. Vietnam’s efforts to exclude China were interpreted as attempts to weaken Thailand’s alliances and to obscure the larger geopolitical stakes.
Thailand’s proactive stance was justified through the framing of geography and circumstance. Officially, Thailand insisted that it had no intention of interfering in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet its proximity to Cambodia positioned it as a “frontline state” directly threatened by Vietnam (Institute of Asian Studies 1985: 6). The influx of over 250,000 Indochinese refugees further intensified security and economic pressures (Theera Reference Nuchpiam1983: 28). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that “Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia is an act in violation of international law,” a position that legitimised Thailand’s leadership role within ASEAN and its push for international conferences to resolve the crisis (Institute of Asian Studies 1985: 7–8; MFA Thailand 2015: 85).
Despite their awareness of Khmer Rouge atrocities, Thai leaders considered them an indispensable ally. Militarily, the Khmer Rouge remained the strongest anti-Vietnamese faction, and Thailand’s survival as a “frontline state” appeared to require their cooperation. This support, however, created serious ethical and reputational challenges.
Siddhi’s own accounts reveal that Thai policymakers were not ignorant of the regime’s brutality. In a 1975 meeting with Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea, Siddhi confronted him with evidence of forced labour, mass starvation, and the persecution of intellectuals—later recalling that Ieng Sary had “the eyes of a cannibal” (MFA Thailand 2015: 20). By the early 1980s, international exposure of Khmer Rouge atrocities intensified. Documentaries such as Year Zero: The Silent Death of Cambodia (1979) and films like The Killing Fields (1984) generated global condemnation.Footnote 5 Siddhi later admitted that these portrayals complicated Thailand’s diplomacy, making its position “more troublesome” (MFA Thailand 2015: 20). However, strategic considerations and antagonism toward Vietnam outweighed moral concerns. While Thai leaders understood the extent of Khmer Rouge crimes, they nonetheless framed the faction as a necessary “buffer” against Vietnam, supporting the Khmer Rouge was portrayed as a necessary evil—what Thai policymakers likened to swallowing “bitter medicine” (MFA Thailand 2015: 20, Sukhumbhand Reference Sukhumbhand Paribatra1985: 38).
Reframing the “Patriotic” Khmer Rouge and Building of the CGDK Coalition
To counter the Khmer Rouge’s negative international image, Thailand turned to strategic diplomacy. Alongside ASEAN, the Thai government pushed for the creation of a coalition government in exile that would unite three previously rival factions: the Khmer Rouge, Norodom Sihanouk’s FUNCINPEC royalists, and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, which had been formed in 1979 to oppose the Vietnamese-installed PRK. This coalition, known as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), diluted the Khmer Rouge’s infamy and enabled international aid to flow under the guise of a legitimate, unified Cambodian resistance (MFA Thailand 2015: 90). With backing from Thailand, ASEAN, China, and the United States, the CGDK retained Cambodia’s United Nations seat until 1992.Footnote 6
The coalition served as a political shield for the Khmer Rouge, allowing them to survive while Thailand advanced its broader strategy of countering Vietnam. To further justify this stance, the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs recast Pol Pot’s earlier regime as “patriotic,” claiming it had resisted Vietnam’s domination while other states, such as Laos, submitted. In 1985, the Ministry characterised Pol Pot’s overthrow as the punishment for his “patriotism” and framed the CGDK as a continuing “patriotic force” with the right to liberate Cambodia from Vietnamese occupation (Institute of Asian Studies 1985; Thongchai Reference Winichakul1985: 55). As the Ministry argued: “The CGDK coalition government is a patriotic force with the right to liberate Cambodia from Vietnam, which is why ASEAN and other nations supported it” (Institute of Asian Studies 1985: 12).
Thailand also justified its policy by framing support for the CGDK in terms of self-determination. Policymakers insisted that Pol Pot’s fate should be decided through national elections, maintaining that “If the Cambodian people truly detest Pol Pot, they will not vote for him” (Institute of Asian Studies 1985: 25). This narrative allowed Thailand to present itself as respecting Cambodian sovereignty while continuing to support a coalition that included the Khmer Rouge—without explicitly endorsing Pol Pot himself.
Framing itself as a “frontline state,” Thailand claimed it had little choice but to resist the threats posed by the Heng Samrin regime, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. This strategic narrative emphasised Thailand’s vulnerability to regional instability and the necessity of international collaboration. Within this logic, the Khmer Rouge’s military strength was reframed not as a liability but as a patriotic force essential to resisting Vietnamese occupation, despite the regime’s genocidal legacy.
Yet cracks in this strategy were evident. Within ASEAN, states such as Malaysia and Indonesia, more concerned about China than Vietnam due to their large ethnic Chinese population, were less urgent in addressing the Cambodian conflict, often frustrating Thai policymakers. Similarly, while the United States condemned Khmer Rouge atrocities, by 1977 it increasingly viewed Vietnam as the greater regional threat and regarded the Khmer Rouge as the only faction with the military capability to counter it (Puangthong Reference Cook2006: 84). Washington offered Thailand military aid, arms, and joint exercises such as Cobra Gold, but the lingering “Vietnam Syndrome” constrained its willingness to fully commit (MFA Thailand 2015).
Thus, while ASEAN unity was uneven and U.S. support was limited, Thailand reframed its partnership with China as indispensable to its Cambodian strategy. The next section explores the origins of this “informal strategic partnership” and the crucial role China played in sustaining both Thailand’s policy and its narrative framing of the conflict.
China as an “Informal Strategic Partner”
The communist takeover of Indochina in 1975 deepened Thailand’s anxieties about Vietnam, which, together with the Soviet Union, was increasingly perceived as the region’s greatest threat. This threat perception became the basis for Thailand’s rapprochement with China. Incidents such as the Vietnamese incursion into Nong Mak Mun in June 1980 only reinforced the alignment, transforming China from a former adversary into what Thai leaders described as an “informal strategic partner” united in opposition to Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Surachat Reference Bamrungsuk1987b).
Thailand’s framing of its relationship with China emphasised shared interests and cast China as a stabilizing force rather than a revolutionary threat. Prasong Soonsiri, Secretary-General of the National Security Council, captured this shift: “China will not pose a threat to Thailand in the near future. China and ASEAN face a common threat, and that threat is Vietnam” (Prasong Reference Sunsiri1983: 8). Thailand’s framing of China as a trustworthy ally also aligned with China’s rhetoric. By repeating China’s assurances that it prioritised modernisation and economic development rather than exporting revolution, Thai leaders presented China as a reliable ally. Foreign Minister Siddhi actively adopted this framing, defending Chinese actions and reinforcing Chinese narratives—such as portraying Vietnam as ungrateful for Beijing’s wartime support—to legitimise closer Thai–Chinese ties (MFA Thailand 2015: 11).
This partnership was not only rhetorical but also practical. Chinese leaders including Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng repeatedly pledged to defend Thailand against Vietnamese aggression, providing both reassurance and leverage. Hua Guofeng’s 1980 statement—“China fully supports Thailand in countering Vietnam’s aggression” (Sayamrat Sapdawichan, 20 July Reference Sapdawichan1980)—and Deng Yingchao’s promise that China would “stand side by side with the Thai people” (Chulacheeb Reference Chinwanno and Tsunekawa2009: 92) reinforced Thailand’s narrative of China as a trustworthy partner. These assurances were matched by military cooperation with China supplying artillery, tanks, and other weapons throughout the mid-1980s. The announcement of a major arms deal in 1987 further cemented this strategic partnership (Chulacheeb Reference Chinwanno and Tsunekawa2009: 93).
Symbolic gestures also reinforced the alliance. Reciprocal visits by leaders and royalty projected the image of “genuine friendship” and “mutual trust.” King Rama IX himself framed the relationship in strategic-narrative terms: “Our relationship is no longer just a typical political and diplomatic relationship; it is one of genuine friendship. … We are fortunate and honored to have a sincere friend like China” (Renmin Ribao 1987).
China’s own foreign policy shift after 1978 strengthened the convergence. Deng Xiaoping’s prioritisation of modernisation meant an end to material support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), once considered a major domestic threat. With the Kriangsak and Prem governments pursuing national reconciliation—exemplified by Prime Ministerial Order No. 66/2523 (1980), which reintegrated communist defectors as “co-developers of Thailand”—China’s withdrawal of support for the CPT further dismantled the movement. By 1985, the CPT had collapsed from an estimated 12,000 members in 1978 to just 625 armed fighters (Surachat Reference Bamrungsuk1987a: 43). The end of China’s sponsorship fractured the CPT internally, signaling a decisive reorientation of Sino-Thai relations.
Taken together, these developments redefined Thailand’s strategic alignment. While ASEAN and UN diplomacy provided an international platform, their limitations underscored China’s central role as a “balancer” in Thailand’s Cambodian conflict strategy. Framing China as an indispensable and benevolent partner enabled Thai leaders to reconcile the contradiction of supporting a communist great power while claiming to defend regional independence. In strategic-narrative terms, this reframing turned a former adversary into a “close friend” and legitimated Thailand’s Cambodian policy as both pragmatic and principled.
The “Standard View”: Unified Intellectuals and Thai Public Opinion
The Prem administration’s framing of the Cambodian conflict as an “international crisis” resonated widely, gaining support from intellectuals, media, and the broader public—even from groups traditionally critical of military rule. This convergence produced what Thongchai (Reference Winichakul1985: 56) termed the “standard view,” a dominant narrative that aligned with government policy.
Shortly after the conflict began, numerous books and debates reflected divergent perspectives. Somsak (Reference Jiamtheerasakul1981) categorised them into three broad camps: conservatives (anti-communist and pro-American), pro-Vietnam voices (critical of China and favoring the status quo), and pro-China factions. By the early 1980s, the last camp had become dominant, reinforcing the state’s framing. The “standard view” downplayed the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, instead locating the origins of the crisis in Vietnam’s 1979 invasion. Vietnam was framed as the aggressor, Heng Samrin as a puppet, and the Khmer Rouge as a necessary bulwark against expansionism.
This framing created unprecedented consensus. Khien observed that “Vietnam united Thais across all societal levels,” from academics to students to former communists, who now aligned with the government’s anti-Vietnam stance (Khien Reference Theeravit1981: 71). In 1985, 765 Thai scholars signed a petition condemning Vietnam’s occupation and calling on the UN to act against it. Even the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), traditionally opposed to the state, retreated from border zones to facilitate Thai cooperation with Khmer Rouge forces (Puangthong Reference Cook2006; Thongchai Reference Winichakul1985;). Media reinforced this framing: Vietnamese leaders such as Nguyen Co Thach were depicted as “arrogant, insincere, and cunning,” while Vietnam itself was described as the “Soviet Union’s springboard in Southeast Asia” (Thananon Reference Bunwanna2022: 122). By contrast, the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal crimes were conspicuously absent from mainstream debate.
Prominent scholars, such as Khien Theerawit, gave intellectual weight to this position. Khien defended Thailand’s pro-China alignment as essential for national security and dismissed reports of Khmer Rouge atrocities as politically motivated or emotionally exaggerated “Vietnamese propaganda” designed to justify aggression:
“Vietnam amplified the evils of Pol Pot to justify its aggression. Uninformed individuals became unwitting spokespeople for Vietnam. Slides and films showing mountains of skeletons were broadcast, claiming these were victims of Pol Pot’s regime, some even blindfolded. Their basis for this claim was Vietnam or Heng Samrin saying so, or endorsements by the United States and Moscow. (…) Regardless of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities, no one appointed Vietnam as the world police.” (Khien Reference Theeravit1982: 60–61)
Such views effectively reframed the Khmer Rouge from perpetrators of genocide into symbols of resistance, further legitimizing Thailand’s strategic choices. Ironically, while critics of the Khmer Rouge were labeled “Vietnam’s spokespeople,” scholars like Khien became, in effect, “spokespeople for China.”
Although dissent existed, it was marginalised. Critics were dismissed as “superficial,” “imperialist,” or “Vietnam’s mouthpieces” (Theera 1989: 37; Thongchai Reference Winichakul1985: 55). Mainstream intellectual discourse thus echoed state framing, reinforcing a shared sense of threat and necessity. Nelson et al. (Reference Nelson, Oxley and Clawson1997) argue that framing shapes both elite and popular perceptions by defining stakes and narrowing alternatives—exactly what happened in Thailand during this period.
Two factors underpinned this nationalist consensus. First was what Funston (Reference Funston1998: 77) terms a “perception of vulnerability”, what I call a “small-state mentality”—a self limited view that acknowledged its structural weakness in international politics, economics, and defense (Pattajit Reference Tangsinmunkong2025: 32). This vulnerability narrative legitimised reliance on major powers, particularly the United States and China, and justified framing the Cambodian crisis as an international conflict beyond Thailand’s unilateral control. Second was a pervasive “sense of crisis.” Thongchai (Reference Winichakul1994: 167) describes this as an “effective paranoia”: the fear of Vietnam as an existential threat. This heightened sense of danger rationalised extraordinary measures, including alignment with China, ASEAN, and even the Khmer Rouge, while relegating humanitarian concerns to the background.
Strategic narrative theory helps explain why this framing proved so powerful. By constructing a shared story of national vulnerability and imminent threat, elites fostered a sense of unity and urgency across diverse social groups. Narratives positioned Thailand as the besieged small state, Vietnam as the aggressor, and the Khmer Rouge as a necessary evil in defending sovereignty. In this way, discourse did not simply reflect realpolitik calculations—it actively legitimised them by embedding strategy in a moral narrative of survival.
However, this strategy was not without consequences. While Prem’s refusal to negotiate with Vietnam could be interpreted as a principled stand against hegemonic aggression by the Soviet Union and Vietnam, it also prolonged the Cambodian conflict for a decade. Thailand’s alignment with the CGDK, the US, ASEAN, and China, while refusing to engage with Heng Samrin, provided the Khmer Rouge with a lifeline and international legitimacy, cutting off much-needed aid to the people in Cambodia. Ultimately, Thailand’s strategic narrative—effective in unifying domestic opinion and securing international support—helped entrench a policy that privileged geopolitical alignment over humanitarian accountability.
In sum, the 1980 Nong Mak Mun incident crystallised Thai fears of Vietnam and reinforced the framing of Cambodia’s conflict as an “international crisis” rooted in Vietnamese aggression. Recognizing its small-state vulnerability, Thailand leveraged alliances with ASEAN, the U.S., and China, while China’s policy shifts further undercut Thailand’s communist adversaries and deepened bilateral ties under the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This discursive framing produced what scholars later termed the “standard view,” a dominant narrative that legitimised Thailand’s policies by subordinating humanitarian concerns to security imperatives. Yet, with Prem’s departure and the rise of Chatichai, this seemingly stable consensus would give way to a new strategic narrative—one that reframed Indochina less as a battlefield and more as a marketplace.
Chatichai’s Reframing of the “Indochina Marketplace” (1988–1991)
By the mid-1980s, the regional and global context was shifting decisively toward détente. Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika in the Soviet Union and Vietnam’s doi moi reforms under Truong Chinh in 1986 signaled a turn toward market-oriented economics and international cooperation, creating a more favorable climate for resolving the Cambodian conflict. These changes were reflected in diplomacy: during Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda’s visit to Moscow in May 1988, peace initiatives advanced, and Vietnam began the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia the following month (Kawamori and Okamoto Reference Kawamori and Okamoto1989).
At the same time, global economic shifts were reshaping Thailand’s domestic priorities. The Plaza Accord of 1985 triggered a sharp depreciation of the baht against the yen, fueling a surge in exports and attracting substantial Japanese foreign direct investment. Thailand’s rapid industrialisation drove GDP growth rates of 9.5% in 1987 and 13.2% in 1988, marking an era of unprecedented prosperity (Buszynski Reference Buszynski1994: 723). Yet this success also brought rising trade tensions with the United States, particularly over intellectual property rights and tariff policies (Kawamori and Okamoto Reference Kawamori and Okamoto1989).
In 1988, Thailand entered a new political phase with the resignation of Prem and the election of Chatichai Choonhavan, the first popularly elected prime minister in twelve years. Chatichai reoriented Thai foreign policy away from ideological confrontation and toward economic pragmatism, encapsulated in his call to “turn Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace.” This strategic narrative marked a profound reframing: Cambodia and its neighbors were no longer defined primarily as threats or buffer states, but as economic opportunities within a regional order increasingly shaped by globalisation.
Ending the “Cambodia Quagmire”
Upon taking office, Chatichai boldly declared: “Neighboring countries like Laos and Vietnam must no longer be battlefields; they must become marketplaces” (Sunai Reference Phasuk1996: 17). Recognizing the rapidly changing international landscape, he called for ideologically diverse neighboring states to integrate into “the regional economic development process.” His vision sought to transform Indochina from a conflict zone into a region of peace and economic cooperation, linked to Southeast Asia through trade, investment, and infrastructure (Khao Piset, 28 December 1988, cited in Sunai Reference Phasuk1996).
With Vietnam, Thailand’s long-standing adversary, Chatichai prioritised reconciliation. He aimed to “restore the exchange of visits between leaders” and foster dialogue, emphasizing that Vietnam was now focused on economic survival and exiting the “Cambodian quagmire” (Khao Piset, 28 December 1988, cited in Sunai Reference Phasuk1996). On the same day, he declared: “The era of bamboo diplomacy is over” (The Nation 1988). This statement symbolised a break from past policies of military confrontation and dependence on external powers, repositioning Thailand as a regional leader using trade diplomacy to pursue both stability and prosperity.
Chatichai’s approach was also pragmatic. He feared that delays in engaging with Indochina would allow competitors such as Japan and Singapore to dominate its emerging markets. He argued that Thailand deserved economic benefits from Indochina’s reconstruction, having borne the costs of conflict by hosting refugees (Kawamori and Okamoto Reference Kawamori and Okamoto1989: 289). To support this strategy, Thailand allocated 200 million baht annually for technical assistance to Indochinese countries, framing itself as a “leader, helper, and savior” in regional development (Pongphisoot Reference Pongphisoot2009: 126).
Reformist Diplomacy and New Narratives
To implement this vision, Chatichai emphasised bureaucratic reform. He criticised traditional foreign policy institutions as too rigid and slow to respond to rapid global change. As an elected leader without entrenched support within the bureaucracy, he bypassed traditional bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Economic and Social Development Board. Instead, he created a seven-member policy advisory council under the Prime Minister’s Office, known as the Ban-Pitsanulok group. Among its key members was Sukhumbhand Paribatra, a prominent foreign policy expert who became central to shaping Chatichai’s innovative diplomacy (Sasithorn and Methipat Reference O-Charoen and Chongwarothai2020).
From the mid-1980s, Sukhumbhand had been a vocal critic of Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila’s rigid diplomacy, which framed the Cambodian conflict as an ideological struggle best managed through containment. He warned that isolating Vietnam risked turning it into a “desperate dog” dependent on the Soviet Union, escalating border tensions, and destabilizing the region (Sukhumbhand Reference Sukhumbhand Paribatra1985: 29–30). Instead, he advocated economic and trade engagement with both Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia to build trust and lay the groundwork for peace.
This reframing contrasted sharply with Prem and Siddhi’s narrative. Whereas they depicted the Cambodian conflict as an “international dispute” initiated by Vietnam, Sukhumbhand identified the Khmer Rouge as the true root of the crisis, arguing that “Cambodians’ fear of the Khmer Rouge and their continued strength legitimised Vietnam’s occupation (Sukhumbhand Reference Sukhumbhand Paribatra1985: 38, 42–43). He insisted that eliminating the Khmer Rouge was “not just one of the solutions, but a problem that must be addressed” (Sukhumbhand Reference Sukhumbhand Paribatra1985: 38, 42–43). Continued support for the Khmer Rouge, he warned, created “moral dilemmas” and risked undermining Thailand’s long-term relationships with the United States and ASEAN.
Prem and Siddhi had justified Khmer Rouge support as a temporary compromise, to be resolved through post-conflict elections. Sukhumbhand rejected this as ideological rigidity rooted in fear of antagonizing China, distrust of Vietnam, and the vested interests of the bureaucracy (The Nation 1988). He reframed the conflict around the lived experiences of ordinary Cambodians, urging ASEAN to prioritise stability and peace over Cold War ideological alignments.
For Sukhumbhand, ASEAN’s alignment with China and the Khmer Rouge represented a form of “containment” that disregarded the immediate needs of the Cambodian people. He viewed Cambodia as nearing a state of “normalcy” for the first time since the 1960s and emphasised that peace and stability should take precedence over Cold War-driven ideological strategies (Sukhumbhand Reference Sukhumbhand Paribatra1985: 42–43). Sukhumbhand’s reframing of the conflict challenged the “standard view” of the Prem era, shifting the focus from geopolitical rivalry to the lived experiences of Cambodians and the structural roots of instability. In February 1988, Sukhumbhand began openly criticizing the Prem-Siddhi diplomatic stance, advocating for a more flexible approach toward Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime, while adopting a stronger stance toward China and the United States (MFA Thailand 2015: 45-47).
His critique resonated with Kraisak Choonhavan, the Prime Minister’s son and advisor, who also downplayed Vietnam’s threat and pressed China to end its support for the Khmer Rouge (Puangthong Reference Cook2006: 93).
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Army Commander-in-Chief since 1986, also played a critical role in reshaping policy. By bypassing the Foreign Ministry, Chavalit pursued “military diplomacy” to improve ties with Vietnam, Laos, and the Soviet Union. He framed the Cambodian conflict as a “civil war” rather than an international dispute, signaling a break from the Prem administration’s narrative (Kawamori and Okamoto Reference Kawamori and Okamoto1989: 288). Chavalit’s “Golden Peninsula” vision, which positioned Bangkok as the economic hub of mainland Southeast Asia, aligned with Chatichai’s policy of transforming Indochina from a “battlefield into a marketplace” (Sunai Reference Phasuk1996: 57; Tosa Reference Tosa1993: 156).
This shift in Cambodia policy reflected the influence of reform-minded actors like Sukhumbhand, Kraisak, and Chavalit, who prioritised economic integration and flexibility over rigid ideological posturing. Taken together, their interventions illustrate how the Chatichai administration actively constructed a new strategic narrative: one that reframed Indochina as a zone of economic potential rather than ideological conflict. By shifting the narrative terrain from war to development, these reformist voices laid the intellectual and political foundations for Chatichai’s “marketplace” diplomacy. The following section examines how this vision translated into concrete policies.
New Diplomatic Approach and Its Mixed Reception
Under Prime Minister Prem and Foreign Minister Siddhi, Thailand’s foreign policy during the Cambodian conflict was framed through a hardline strategic narrative that emphasised multilateral diplomacy via ASEAN and the United Nations, alignment with China, and unwavering support for the anti-Vietnamese coalition (CGDK). The Heng Samrin regime and Vietnam were depicted as existential threats to regional stability, warranting uncompromising opposition. By contrast, Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan reframed this narrative upon taking office in 1988, adopting a more flexible approach that prioritised engagement with Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime.
A pivotal moment in this diplomatic reframing was the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM), initiated by Indonesia and co-chaired with France from 25-29 July 1988. For the first time, all stakeholders—including the four Cambodian factions, Vietnam, Laos, and ASEAN countries—convened for dialogue. Although symbolically significant, the first JIM revealed entrenched divisions between the CGDK coalition, the Heng Samrin-led PRK government, and figures such as Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. Internal disputes within the PRK further exposed rifts between hardliners and moderates, underscoring the difficulties of consensus (Matsui and Sato Reference Matsui and Sato1989: 441; Tosa Reference Tosa1993: 155).
Breaking with ASEAN’s established line, the Chatichai government initiated direct contact with Hun Sen of the PRK government—a significant departure from Thailand’s longstanding policy of delegitimizing the PRK. Chatichai argued that a decade of supporting the CGDK had produced limited results and that engaging the PRK was essential for advancing peace. Parallel to JIM discussions, Army Commander-in-Chief General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh secretly met Hun Sen in Vientiane in October 1988, paving the way for Hun Sen’s official visit to Thailand in January 1989 (Tanaka Reference Tanaka2007: 73).
Hun Sen’s visit, accompanied by 24 senior officials, marked a historic moment in Thai-Cambodian relations. Chatichai encouraged Hun Sen to participate in the second Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM2) scheduled for February 1989, while also maintaining dialogue with the anti-Vietnamese coalition. Yet JIM2 revealed the limits of compromise: disagreements over Vietnam’s troop withdrawal and measures for genocide prevention led to another stalemate. Nevertheless, these meetings institutionalised dialogue and laid important groundwork for eventual negotiations.
Between 1989 and 1991, Thailand assumed a mediating role, with Bangkok emerging as a hub for backchannel talks. Baan Phitsanulok, the office of Chatichai’s Policy Advisory Council, served as a neutral site where Cambodian factions, ASEAN diplomats, and international actors met. Through three JIM meetings, the Tokyo Conference of June 1990, and sustained informal diplomacy, Thailand helped to create the conditions for the October 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, which formally ended the Cambodian conflict.
Chatichai and his advisor, Sukhumbhand Paribatra, viewed Hun Sen’s visit to Thailand as a breakthrough, framing it as a step toward reconciliation and peace (Puangthong Reference Cook2006). However, this shift provoked resistance from established actors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), aligned with the ASEAN-China-U.S. coalition, boycotted Hun Sen’s official ceremonies (Sunai Reference Phasuk1996: 21). Foreign Minister Siddhi condemned Chavalit’s invitation as an act of “informal recognition” that emboldened the PRK and undermined the Jakarta Informal Meetings (MFA Thailand 2015). Critics such as Khien Theeravit dismissed Chatichai’s initiative as a “diplomatic coup” driven by “humanitarian and emotional biases,” arguing that it weakened Thailand’s credibility and strained relations with allies (Khien Reference Theeravit1989: 8). Both the United States and Singapore voiced dissatisfaction, while Deng Xiaoping reportedly described Chatichai’s strategy as “immature” (MFA Thailand 2015: 39; Tosa Reference Tosa1993: 156).
Despite these criticisms, Chatichai’s reframing helped break entrenched stalemates. In 1989, Thailand and Vietnam resumed reciprocal visits between foreign ministers, signaling a thaw in bilateral relations. Later that year, Vietnam began its troop withdrawal from Cambodia—a turning point in the peace process. Ultimately, the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement concluded the Cambodian conflict, with Chatichai’s policies playing a critical role in enabling this outcome.
Theoretically, Chatichai’s diplomacy illustrates the power and risks of strategic narrative innovation. By reframing Cambodia not as an ideological battlefield but as part of a regional “marketplace,” Chatichai departed from the entrenched hardline narrative of the Prem era. This opened new pathways for peace but also provoked domestic and international resistance from actors invested in the older narrative frames.
Conclusion
Pulitzer Prize-winning author Viet Thanh Nguyen once said, “All wars are fought twice—the first time on the battlefield, the second time in memory” (Nguyen Reference Nguyen2016: 4). So too, every conflict is lived twice: first as a contest of power, and again as a struggle over narrative. Was Vietnam’s invasion an act of “liberation” or “aggression”? Was the Khmer Rouge a genocidal dictatorship or a nationalist resistance force? These contested questions lie at the heart of competing narratives.
The Cambodian conflict was not only a geopolitical struggle but also a clash of narratives, in which Thailand played a decisive role. Over three administrations—Kriangsak, Prem, and Chatichai—Thai leaders employed framing strategies that transformed the meaning of the conflict and legitimised shifting policies, both domestically and internationally. Within Thailand, debates centred on who was to blame for the conflict, what roles foreign actors played, and whether the Khmer Rouge should be judged as genocidal villains or nationalist revolutionaries. Some interpreted the crisis as a Cambodian situation, civil war, others as a Cold War proxy, and still others as an economic opening.
This study contributes to constructivist international relations theory by showing that strategic narratives were not rhetorical embellishments but constitutive elements of policy itself. Narratives defined the stakes (“situation,” “crisis,” or “marketplace”), identified enemies and allies, and provided the discursive legitimation necessary for controversial alignments, including cooperation with the Khmer Rouge. As Oxley (Reference Oxley and Oxley2020) and Slothuus (Reference Slothuus2008) argue, frames shape cognition by making certain considerations accessible and legitimate, while sidelining others. Thailand’s evolving discourse exemplifies how states construct meaning to rationalise policy shifts and reconcile contradictions between realpolitik imperatives and normative commitments.
Table 1 below summarises the dominant narratives under each administration, showing how discursive framing functioned as a strategic tool to navigate Cold War geopolitics:
Table 1. Thailand’s Strategic Narratives of the Cambodian Conflict
Source: Compiled by the author.
Thailand’s Cold War diplomacy illustrates the power of narrative as both a cognitive mechanism and a political instrument. Narratives not only reflected material realities but also actively enabled, enlarged, and constrained policy choices. They unified domestic audiences, secured international legitimacy, and rationalised controversial alignments—most notably Thailand’s pragmatic cooperation with the Khmer Rouge.
Yet these narratives carried enduring ethical costs. By reframing the Khmer Rouge as “patriots” or as necessary partners, Thailand and its allies prolonged their survival, delayed justice, and sidelined the voices of ordinary Cambodians. Nearly two million Cambodians perished under Pol Pot, and justice for these atrocities was delayed for decades. In prioritizing national security and economic opportunity, Thailand, like many states, chose to sideline principles of justice and humanitarianism. The repercussions of these choices underscore the enduring challenge of balancing strategic pragmatism and moral responsibility.
Thailand’s case demonstrates how state behavior cannot be fully explained by material threats, balance-of-power logics, or elite bargaining alone. Strategic narratives provided the meaning structures through which policy was justified, contested, and sustained. In other words, power was exercised not only through military or economic means, but also through the politics of interpretation. Thailand’s framing of Cambodia—whether as a “situation,” an “international crisis,” or a “marketplace”—shows how narratives both construct reality and constrain alternatives.
The lessons extend beyond Cold War Southeast Asia. They force us to reconsider how states justify their actions when caught between competing imperatives. How do we ensure that the demands of security and economic gain do not eclipse the voices of the vulnerable or the pursuit of justice? And how does history judge those who, in the name of strategic necessity, align themselves with the architects of human suffering?
The Cambodian conflict may be resolved, but its legacies—of narratives constructed, ethical compromises made, and justice delayed—persist. They remind us that foreign policy is never neutral; it is always a reflection of the values we choose to prioritise, the interests we seek to protect, and the humanity we are willing—or unwilling—to defend.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Professor Puangthong Pawakapan for generously sharing materials and for her intellectual support and inspiration. I am also grateful to Dr. Sam Bamkin for generously proofreading the manuscript, and to the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading and valuable comments, which significantly strengthened the manuscript.
Declaration of AI Use
This paper was prepared with limited AI assistance for language refinement. All research design, analysis, and conclusions are entirely my own.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
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