For many years it has been recognized that serious contradictions exist in Polybius’ theory of the Roman constitution, as he expounds it in Book VI. The position has been summarized in a review of a recent publication which attempts, not very successfully, to dispose of these inconsistencies. ‘The only point of controversy’, writes De Sanctis, ‘can be whether these contradictory elements were innate in Polybius’ political philosophy and in his judgement on Rome, or whether they repre-sent two successive stages in the historian's thought, and two successive drafts of the book itself, which either the author or the editor failed to co-ordinate.’ De Sanctis’ own view is, of course, the second; and indeed, ever since 1902, when Cuntz, following hints thrown out by La-Roche, Meyer, and Susemihl, first propounded the theory of a revised edition of Polybius’ Staatstheorie, it has exercised a dominating influence over all work on the subject.

Annals, i. 31. 4: ‘implere ceterorum rudes animos: uenisse tempus quo…’. Implore has been suspected and impellere has been suggested. Andresen says ‘implere… womit, zeigen die folgenden Reden. Curt. x. 1. 28 credulas regis aures implebat’. The passage of Curtius continues not with an accusative and infinitive but with the words dissitnulans causam irae. A better defence is to be seen in Livy, xlv. 31. 6.

The poem to which Callierges attached the title Hρακλσ ΛεοντοφῸνοσ from the narrative which occupies its last hundred lines falls into three sections, of which two have still, and all no doubt had originally, separate titles. In the first (Hρακλσ πρῸσ γροîκον) Herakles is found in conversation with a rustic who describes to him the estates of Augeias and accompanies him in search of that king. In the second ('EπιπÎλησισ) the hero, in attendance on Augeias and his son Phyleus, inspects the royal flocks and herds as they return at night to their folds and byres, and astonishes the spectators by the ease with which he repels the attack of a mighty bull. In the third Herakles and Phyleus are discovered on their way to the neighbouring town. Phyleus has heard from an Achaean stranger some account of the death of the Nemean lion, suspects that its slayer may have been his companion, and questions him. Herakles in reply tells the story. The poem exhibits the same conception of epic narrative as is seen in the authentic works of Theocritus. There is the eye for landscape and the attention to setting conspicuous in Id. 13 and in Part 2 of Id. 22: the keying down of the miraculous and heroic conspicuous in Id. 24: the easy command and constant memory of Homer which is in T. not confined to epic subjects. There is, too, at leaste point of contact with Callimachus. Part 1, as has been said, is occupied by a conversation between a friendly rustic and Herakles, who, we must suppose, is seeking Augeias in order to clean out his cattle-byres. We know next to nothing of what passed in the Hekale of Calhmachus between that heroine and Theseus on his way to deal with the bull of Marathon, and nothing of what passed in the Aetia between Molorchos and Herakles on his way to kill the lion of Nemea; but both Hekale and Molorchos were treated as poor countryfolk who befriend a hero bound on a heroic mission, and, whatever may have been the divergences of handling, the agreement between the two poets in this far from obvious method of attacking an epic theme is noteworthy.

Blockhead or or Baldhead?

(i) Petron. Sat. 39. 12: ‘in Aquario (nascuntur) copones et cucurbitae’.

(ii) Apul.Met. I. 15: ‘nos cucurbitae caput non habemus ut pro te moriamur’.

Cucurbita in its literal use is the name of many varieties of the numerous family of Cucurbitaceae, as one may learn, e.g. from Plin. Nat. Hist. xix. It is also the name of the cupping instrument called by Juvenal, xiv. 58, uentosa cucurbita, for which see Mayor's note ad loc. For other metaphorical uses of the name, Forcellini and the Thes. Ling. Lat. cite only the two passages quoted above; of these two, Lewis and Short cite only the former. Lexicographers and editors,1 comparing the one passage with the other, concur in the view that the cucurbita is the symbol of stupidity, and that a stupid man may be called a cucurbita, as in Petronius, or be said cucurbitae caput habere, as in Apuleius. At first sight their interpretation of the Apuleian phrase is plausible, for it makes tolerable sense in the context and appears to be supported by such modern expressions as ‘pumpkin-head’ and Kürbiskopf and κεχλι κολοκνθνιον, all of which liken the head of a stupid man to a pumpkin or other gourd which, though bearing some resemblance to a human head, encloses not a brain but an insensate mass of pulp and seeds. But ‘to have a pumpkin-head’ and ‘to be a pumpkin’ are prima facie very different, for the latter equates the man himself with the cucurbita, whereas it is only qua substitute for a head that the cucurbita can typify stupidity; and when it is further observed that in the Petronian passage cucurbitae so interpreted accords ill with the context, it becomes clear that some other explanation must be sought.