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Acts, ideas, and objects in Berkeley's metaphysics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Melissa Frankel*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa Ontario K1S 5B6,

Abstract

Berkeley holds that objects in the world are constituted of ideas. Some commentators argue that for Berkeley, ideas are identical to acts of perception; this is taken to proceed from his view that ideas are like pains. In this paper, I evaluate the identity claim. I argue that although it does not follow from the pain analogy, nonetheless the texts suggest that Berkeley does think ideas and acts are identical. I show how Berkeley can account for objects persisting over time and being perceivable by multiple observers, even if the ideas that constitute them are intermittent and dependent on particular actors.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2013

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