Democratic Transgressions

The first problem that arises from the wave of scholarship on polarization and democratic attitudes is that these studies employ a wide array of democracy measures without adequately theorizing what different measures can tell us about prospects for democratic backsliding. Typically done through a survey or candidate choice experiment, respondents are asked whether they approve of acts or positions that contradict democratic principles (refer to the online appendix for a full list of treatments used in the studies referenced). However, though all studies purport to measure democratic attitudes in general, the range of treatments reveals a high level of heterogeneity in the nature of the transgressions examined, both within and across studies.

The problems arise due to the lack of differentiation between transgressions in terms of their categorical and contextual attributes. On the categorical front, these studies conflate several distinct categories of transgressions: violations of the law; violations of democratic norms; violations of democratic ideals; and power-consolidating changes to democratic institutions. Each represents a different kind of threat and public attitudes towards them will tells us something very different about the potential for backsliding. In terms of contextual attributes, these studies elide factors necessary to understand the extent to which different transgressions represent a retreat from the status quo and thus an instance of backsliding. Accounting for both the categorical and contextual differences between transgressions can help us make better sense of public attitudes.

I will discuss the different transgressions used in these studies with a view to classifying them along these lines and developing a sensibility towards the level of threat each represents. The goal of this exercise is not to dictate a particular hierarchy of transgressions. Rather, it is to show, through my own attempt to order them, the benefits of theoretically grounded classifications, and conversely, the dangers of an undifferentiated view of transgressions.

Navigating Diverse Measures

Bringing together both the categorical and contextual factors at work in these measures, a clearer picture emerges regarding the level of threat various transgressions present to democracy. In figure 1, a visualization is offered combining these two dimensions and placing the treatments used in these studies in terms of the level of threat they represent. Those actions deemed most egregious according to this classification are centered and enlarged and those that are less threatening are reduced and located further out in the periphery. All else being equal, violations of the law would typically be at the center and violations of ideals farthest out, with violations of norms and power-consolidating changes falling somewhere in between. Factoring in contextual considerations, we may further decide to move acts within these categories based on their prevalence.

Figure 1

Mapping Transgressions

Note: The level of threat of a given act is indicated by the text size and its location either closer to the center (more threatening) or periphery (less threatening). Specific acts are marked with a star (*) if any study found support for partisan bias effecting evaluations of transgressions.

Classifying transgressions in this way can help us make sense of the findings within these studies. For example, in the study reporting the strongest findings, Graham and Svolik (Reference Graham and Svolik2020) examine partisan support for candidates engaged in a range of transgressions that would fall under 1) violations of norms (prosecution of journalists, judicial deference); 2) violations of ideals (executive orders, protests bans for far right/left groups); and 3) power-consolidating institutional changes (gerrymandering and ballot access). Considering the categorical and contextual attributes of these trangressions, we might order them in terms of threat as follows: judicial deference > prosecution of journalists > ballot access > protest bans > executive orders > gerrymandering. Importantly, the study reports the strongest findings for items considered least threatening and the weakest findings for items posing the greatest threat: “Respondents most severely punish candidates who want to prosecute journalists (16.1%) and ignore court rulings (14.1%). Respondents are least sensitive to candidates who endorse gerrymandering (by 2 seat, 10.6%) and suggest that the governor ban protests or rule by executive order (10.2 and 10.5%, respectively)” (Graham and Svolik Reference Graham and Svolik2020, 402). While there is a positive finding for all items, this suggests that the overall threat represented in these findings may not be as severe as it would appear based on an undifferentiated view of transgressions.

Such a heuristic can also help us make sense of findings across studies. Looking at how these studies assess attitudes towards executive constraint, for example, we see that authors operationalize this in ways that reflect different categorical attributes: McCoy, Simonovits, and Littvay ask if respondents would support impeachment for criminal misconduct—a violation of law; Graham and Svolik ask if they would support leaders who rule by executive order—a violation of ideals; and Touchton, Klofstad, and Uscinski ask about increasing executive power through the constitution—power-consolidating institutional change. Combined with this categorical delineation, contextual factors may lead us to conclude that a willingness to increase the president’s constitutional powers would pose a greater threat than both a reluctance to impeach for criminal activity, which enjoys some ambiguity depending on legal interpretations of the terms of impeachment, and the use of executive orders, which is highly prevalent. This means that even if these studies were all accurately measuring public attitudes for the items they identify, they are not all measuring the same thing. Again, across these studies, we find the strongest findings for items representing the weakest threat—executive orders (Graham and Svolik Reference Graham and Svolik2020, 402)—and no significant findings for the item representing the most serious threat—executive aggrandizement through constitutional changes (Touchton, Klofstad, and Uscunski Reference Touchton, Klofstad and Uscinski2020), suggesting that the public’s democratic commitments may not be as weak as it might at first appear.

It should be stressed that this exercise is not meant to impose an artificial uniformity either within or across studies. It is understandable that scholars would want to speak to different issues and it is important that they pursue whatever questions they think worthwhile. But just as important is that they precise the theoretical claims to match the specific treatments. The problem here is not that these studies are measuring different things but that they all purport to be measuring the same thing, which can lead to misleading interpretations, exaggerating the threat in some areas and downplaying it in others.

Certainly, scholars may disagree on the categorical and contextual attributes of specific transgressions. Some may develop different classifications altogether depending on the theory of democratic breakdown they adopt. The purpose of the classification offered in this analysis is not to dictate a specific hierarchy of transgressions, but rather to demonstrate the benefits of adopting a theoretically grounded and systematic approach to conceptualizing democratic transgressions and choosing measures to reflect that. Of course, many acts will blur the lines. But, imperfect as our classificatory schemes may be, attending to the categorical and contextual differences across transgressions is important in understanding what our treatments are actually measuring and what it might mean for democratic backsliding.

Macro versus Micro Backsliding

A second and related area of difficulty we encounter has to do with the level of analysis in these studies, and specifically the slippage that takes place between a macro view of backsliding and the micro-level of analysis offered through survey experiments. The macro view is what is typically utilized in institutional analysis of backsliding, and it is meant to assess in aggregate whether a polity is moving away from democracy. However, in order to apply the concept of backsliding to the study of public attitudes, scholars have had to focus on discrete acts and query respondents about them in isolation. This micro-level analysis is in many ways incommensurable with the nature of backsliding, which often consists of acts that are on their face democratic.

The problem stems from the fact that the focus of many of these studies is democratic backsliding, typically understood as a process that moves a country away from democracy but does not cross the line into a different regime type (Haggard and Kaufman Reference Haggard and Kaufman2021; Waldner and Lust Reference Waldner and Lust2018). According to Waldner and Lust this mode of backsliding “makes elections less competitive without entirely undermining the electoral mechanism; it restricts participation without explicitly abolishing norms of universal franchise seen as constitutive of contemporary democracy; and it loosens constraints of accountability by eroding norms of answerability and punishment” (Waldner and Lust Reference Waldner and Lust2018, 95). Though backsliding can also refer to movement across regime types or degradation of autocracy, democratic backsliding typically refers to changes that remain within the bounds of democratic politics. This has been alternately conceptualized as a form of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg Reference Lührmann and Lindberg2019), de-democratization (Agh Reference Agh2015), regression (Tomini and Wagemann Reference Tomini and Wagemann2018), erosion (Haggard and Kaufman Reference Haggard and Kaufman2021), or a general loss of quality in democracy (Erdmann and Kneuer Reference Erdmann and Kneuer2013).

The nature of democratic backsliding presents certain challenges when trying to understand attitudes. Since the individual events that would constitute backsliding may not be explicitly undemocratic, they are hard to identify. This has made backsliding notoriously difficult to measure (Lueders and Lust Reference Lueders and Lust2018; Waldner and Lust Reference Waldner and Lust2018). Bermeo has described a “vexing ambiguity” in understanding backsliding within discrete institutions, and notes that, in isolation, many events may not appear to be threatening (Bermeo Reference Bermeo2016, 19).

The solution for many scholars is to move to the macro level when determining instances of backsliding. That is, while the analysis of institutional change may focus on specific events, the determination of whether this constitutes backsliding is made at the systemic level, taking into consideration what is happening in other arenas. This typically yields aggregate measures of backsliding assessed across multiple dimensions (Lührmann and Lindberg Reference Lührmann and Lindberg2019; Skaaning Reference Skaaning2020). In fact, most studies of backsliding have measured it at either the national level or globally, with some further specifying “episodes” rather than discrete observations as the appropriate level of measurement (Lührmann and Lindberg Reference Lührmann and Lindberg2019; Pelke and Croissant Reference Pelke and Croissant2021). Waldner and Lust offer a strategy for coding backsliding that would look across the political system, and require degradation in at least two out of the three dimensions of democratic governance they identify: competition, participation, and accountability (Waldner and Lust Reference Waldner and Lust2018, 95). This macro-level analysis gives greater confidence that micro-level findings are meaningful indicators of backsliding.

However, this is part of the difficulty in applying the concept of backsliding to understanding public attitudes. It is one thing to evaluate backsliding through the lens of institutional change and draw conclusions about whether, in aggregate, the observed changes move a polity farther from democracy. It is another thing entirely to evaluate public attitudes about discrete acts that are on their face democratic but may combine to constitute backsliding. This is effectively what happens in many of these studies when respondents are asked to make determinations about actions in isolation. When asked about gerrymandering, while respondents may recognize it as an undesirable practice, there is no reason to conclude that it could compromise democracy. When asked about the use of executive orders, while they may recognize that interbranch compromise is preferrable, they can express support for this and see no conflict with upholding democracy. As discrete acts, it becomes difficult for respondents to evaluate them as part of a pattern of backsliding. And because these acts are on their face democratic, it is difficult for researchers to draw solid inferences about respondents’ attitudes toward democracy or support for backsliding.

For that reason, measuring public attitudes about various transgressions may not reveal an un/willingness to uphold democracy per se. It may be used to assess overall systemic stability—the greater the support for acts that may contribute to backsliding, the more unstable the regime overall. But this would not necessarily reflect the public’s democratic commitments. If instead we want to assess support for backsliding, a different approach is necessary to bring the macro perspective into the micro-level analysis of attitudes. One strategy would be to design treatments that connect discrete acts to a broader context of democracy erosion. In other words, we would need to prime respondents to think about the potential for backsliding. Instead of allowing respondents to assume a situation of democratic stability, we could portray a situation in which some of the pillars of U.S. democracy are fraying. Instead of asking in a general sense about judicial deference, we could indicate that defying the courts might bring about a constitutional crisis. Instead of asking in general about ballot access and redistricting, we could specify that changes to ballot access would reverse some of the major gains of the civil rights movement.

What allows us to make determinations of backsliding in the institutional realm is an understanding of the broader context and the way in which seemingly innocuous acts can contribute to an overall pattern of democratic decay. Similarly, if we want to make determinations about support for backsliding in the attitudinal realm, the treatments used must provide the relevant context for the actions as well as the stakes. Such questions can be constructed in a way that avoids response bias associated with the desirability of democracy, but still indicate the interconnectedness of the specific act with broader patterns of decay (Kiewiet de Jonge Reference de Jonge and Chad2016; Zaller and Feldman Reference Zaller and Feldman1992). Of course, this does not resolve the problem that in the real world, where respondents do not have this context constructed for them, they may support actions that further backsliding. But these limitations are inherent to the backsliding paradigm. It is a concept derived to understand an in-between stage, a form of political change that remains within the realm of democratic politics but moves us farther away from democracy. However we choose to approach these questions, there will necessarily be trade-offs.

Democracy and Contention

The final area of concern and that which can be the most difficult to tackle is the question of contention within the category of democracy itself. Many of these studies of public attitudes proceed as if there were a stable notion of democracy within the public sphere that we can measure attitudes against, ignoring sometimes fundamental disagreements about what constitutes a democratic act or which is the more democratic course of action. This is not a question of whether they employ the appropriate benchmarks for democracy. Rather the problem is that they assume a fixed status for democracy, which belies the fundamental ambiguity that exists within this category. For any given question, there may be multiple and competing democratic principles that actors can appeal to in order to justify a preferred course of action. And there is no natural hierarchy that would help us determine which principles should be prioritized.

Take an issue that has been at the center of public debate and appears in many studies examining public attitudes on democracy: ballot access. In these studies, this appears as questions about voter ID laws (Carey et al. Reference Carey, Helmke, Nyhan, Sanders and Stokes2020), purging voter rolls (McCoy, Simonovits, and Littvay Reference McCoy, Simonovits and Littvay2020), the length of time polling places are open (Graham and Svolik Reference Graham and Svolik2020), as well as general questions about voting access (Stolle, Gidengil, and Bergeron-Boutin Reference Stolle, Gidengil and Bergeron-Boutin2019). Though in these studies there appears to be a clear democratic position, one aimed at increasing voter access, we know that in the public sphere, these issues are debated through different democratic lenses, pitting those seeking to make voting more accessible against those who fear that ease of access will translate into corruption. This is precisely what happened with the issue of mail-in-voting that captured public attention during the 2020 election. The circumstances of the pandemic in the context of the 2020 election intensified polarization around these questions and heightened the urgency of resolving them, but the contours of the debate were familiar, with one side identifying voting access as the core democratic principle and the other emphasizing electoral integrity.Footnote ⁴

It may be tempting to dismiss appeals to electoral integrity as insincere or illegitimate, perhaps even revealing undemocratic intent at their core. We know of course that actual instances of electoral fraud are rare, and thus such claims may be seen as merely masking partisan motivations. But whatever the intent of the elites making these claims, for the purpose of understanding public attitudes, the important thing is that these actors do make appeals to democratic principles and do so convincingly to their audiences. Certainly, there may be an element of “partisan motivated reasoning” at work here (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook Reference Bolsen, Druckman and Cook2014; Edelson et al. Reference Edelson2017), but that could be true on both sides of the debate. The push to increase access to voting is no doubt a noble one in principle, but in practice, we know that parties only target their own voters for such efforts, voters who they can identify with ever greater precision thanks to advances in voter databases and micro-targeting efforts (Panagopoulos Reference Panagopoulos2016). Therefore, the push to increase voter participation surely has partisan implications as well, and this can be seen as playing a role in support for voting access. In both cases, partisanship is enmeshed with democratic ideals in ways that are difficult to tease apart.

In dealing with the question of ballot access then, the problem is not that these studies choose to focus on one set of democratic principles and not others, but that they proceed from the assumption that there is a single clear democratic position, dismissing the contestation that takes place through democratic claims-making. Even more problematic is that some attempt to settle this contest by imposing a specific interpretation of events. For example, many introduce questions of ballot access as measures of voter suppression. More than just a label, this suggests that the controversy over this interpretation is immaterial. Whether or not we share this interpretation (I do), it is not helpful for our analysis to ignore differing interpretations, or to assume that our social scientific determinations of what the correct position is constitutes the relevant benchmark.

All this points to the need for alternative methods of grappling with regime contention in the United States, and a recognition that there are in fact multiple modes of contention taking place. Certainly, we can find traditional forms of regime contention and actors who would seek to establish autocratic practices and institutions. But alongside that, there is an equally consequential struggle over the very meaning of democracy. This is not a struggle of democrats versus autocrats, or even democrats versus partisans, but rather between democrats appealing to one set of principles and democrats appealing to others. This kind of regime contention in many ways is more difficult to grapple with than traditional forms because at its core there is a contest of values that are not subject to scientific adjudication but are fundamentally political questions of what kind of democracy we wish to achieve.

Though the issues underlying the contention are not themselves resolvable in this manner, however, there are tools that may help introduce some conceptual clarity. Daniel Slater has identified similar forms of regime contention in other democracies, leading to what he describes as a kind of democratic “careening” rather than backsliding (Slater Reference Slater2013). Democratic careening is defined as “political instability sparked by intense conflict between competing visions of democratic accountability” (Slater Reference Slater2013, 731). Slater notes that there has been a tendency to collapse this form of regime contention into more traditional forms, obscuring the fact that they operate according to very different logics. Slater is especially interested in the question of accountability, which has been at the heart of regime contention in Thailand. There, he argues that careening has led to a struggle, not between democrats and autocrats, but between those advancing populist visions of accountability resting on inclusivity and those advancing a more oligarchical vision emphasizing constraints. This accountability dimension in Slater’s formulation rests orthogonal to the democracy/autocracy dimension (Slater Reference Slater2013, 739–40).

While the specifics will differ, this mode of conceptualization may also be fruitfully deployed to add much needed complexity to the analysis of regime contention in the United States. Most important is that it opens up the possibility of understanding the competition over democratic principles as separate axes of regime contention, related to but not reducible to the competition over democracy and autocracy as systems of governance. We can envision many such dimensions, some of which may rest closer to the democracy/autocracy axis depending on how closely they align with those structures (see figure 2).

Figure 2

Dimensions of Regime Contention

Such a scheme might also allow us to move past political democracy as the only sphere of contestation. If we understand democracy as a system designed to resists or ameliorate structures of domination, we can consider multiple modes of domination. In the context of the United States, we may wish to think about the ways in which different acts impact not just the domination of one political group over another (political democracy), but also relations of domination between racial groups (racial democracy) or economic groups (economic democracy). The same act may register differently given these different considerations. Take again the question of ballot access, still examined as a different dimension of contestation, but one that will align with democracy differently depending on the sphere. Given the differential impact of restrictions on ballot access for racial minorities and lower income groups, we can make a claim that electoral inclusivity aligns more closely with racial and economic democracy because of its importance in resisting those structures of domination (see figure 3).

Figure 3

Spheres of Regime Contention

However we may wish to populate the dimensions of regime contention relevant to a specific context, it is important to stress that this is at best an analytical tool and not a means of resolving the contest of values at the heart of these controversies.

This recognition need not dissolve into a nihilistic view, or the idea that we are helpless in the face of contrasting visions of democracy. U.S. history is rife with such forms of regime contention. At each stage, the direction that has been taken, either toward more inclusionary democratic reforms or toward exclusionary constraints, has been determined not by reference to some absolute value of democracy, but by the ability of different groups to form viable coalitions that advance their preferred visions of democracy and of democratic peoplehood (King and Smith Reference King and Smith2011, Reference King and Smith2014; Mettler and Lieberman Reference Mettler and Lieberman2020; Smith Reference Smith2003, Reference Smith2015). Those seeking to better understand these dynamics of regime contention would benefit from greater engagement with a significant literature on American political development that has returned to these themes time and again to show how such ideational struggles have been resolved historically in favor of greater or less inclusion. A long line of work has shown the importance of coalitions in moving democracy both towards inclusionary expansion (King and Smith Reference King and Smith2011; Mickey Reference Mickey2015; Noel Reference Noel2012; Rhodes Reference Rhodes2017; Schickler Reference Schickler2016; Teele Reference Teele2018) and toward exclusionary retrenchment (Ahmed Reference Ahmed2013; Bateman Reference Bateman2018; Keyssar Reference Keyssar2009; Rana Reference Rana2011; Valelly Reference Valelly2009). These works show the contingency of the struggle for democracy, and demonstrate that, while there are no assurances that inclusionary visions will prevail, inclusive coalitions can be forged under even the most hostile circumstances (Gilmore Reference Gilmore2008; Krochmal Reference Krochmal2016). This might also help us better understand how coalitions might be formed today to fight for more inclusive visions of democracy.

The challenge of understanding different forms of regime contention in the United States also points to the need for different approaches to understanding public attitudes. Rather than just looking at attitudes and asking if they are democratic, we need to better understand the construction of different attitudes as democratic. Here we can tap into work that has shown the heterogeneity of ideas and practices associated with democracy in order to understand the variety of meanings ordinary people attach to this concept (Bratton Reference Bratton2010; Schaffer Reference Schaffer2000). We can also benefit from work that has utilized ethnographic methods to study public opinion (Cramer Walsh Reference Cramer Walsh and Schatz2009). Such work can help us better understand the political associations that allow for the denial of ballot access to be constructed as democratic, political violence as patriotism, and the rejection of election results a defense of democracy. In addition, a significant body of scholarship has shown how the politics of ideational construction has shaped critical junctures in the history of U.S. democracy (Hattam and Lowndes Reference Hattam, Lowndes, Skowronek and Glassman2008; King and Smith Reference King and Smith2014; Lieberman Reference Lieberman2002; Orren and Skowronek Reference Orren and Skowronek2004; Skowronek Reference Skowronek2006). This approach, which sees ideas as essentially unstable, shaped and reshaped by political forces, in some way runs counter to an approach that treats ideas (via attitudes) as stable enough to measure through survey research. But there can be fruitful dialogue between the two insofar as both seek to understand how ideas about democracy can impact democratic outcomes. Indeed, this kind of dialogue, across intellectual traditions and methodological perspectives, may be the key to understanding regime contention in the United States.