2. The modern paradigm: International law and the pursuit of universal progress

In Western modern thinking, time is generally conceived as an objective parameter that indicates movement between the past, present, and future.Footnote ¹³ Under this paradigm, time is viewed as a natural scientific fact, a basic feature of the physical world that is unitary, universal, and independent of human perception.Footnote ¹⁴ The primary function of time, in this view, is to serve as a neutral criteria that facilitates organization and coordination, enhancing the efficiency of social and economic interactions both within and beyond state borders.Footnote ¹⁵ A clear manifestation of this functional approach can be seen in the international standardization of time, which began in the nineteenth century with a view to ‘bring the world under one ticking clock’.Footnote ¹⁶

At the heart of the modern temporal paradigm is the assumption that time is linear, unfolding in a steady, predictable manner from the past through the present toward the future.Footnote ¹⁷ The idea of time moving incessantly forward in a rectilinear fashion was introduced into modern European thought by Christianity.Footnote ¹⁸ However, while Christian theology posits that earthly time began with creation and will end with Judgment Day, modern secular conceptions of time view it as proceeding infinitely without beginning or end.Footnote ¹⁹ Importantly, the Christian origins of linear temporality further suggest that, under this perception, the passage of time inherently carries the potential for social advancement.Footnote ²⁰ Just as, in Christian theology, individuals are expected to improve their conduct in anticipation of Judgment Day, so too, within the modern temporal paradigm, societies are perceived as capable of deliberate progress toward securing a better future for their members. Modernity, in this sense, represents a ‘shift from a “prophetic” engagement with the future’ to a science-based ‘rational prognosis’ that allows humans to increasingly predict and control their fate while learning from past events and experiences.Footnote ²¹

Notably, while the notion of linearity suggests that time flows incessantly between the past, present, and future, it does not conceive of these three temporal dimensions as continuous. Rather, they are seen as separate and distinguishable, with the passage of time and the changes it brings about disconnecting the past from the present and the future.Footnote ²² According to this view, ‘modern time proceeds by continually producing a radical rift (or hiatus) between “the space of experience” (or the past) and “the horizon of expectation” (or the future)’.Footnote ²³ Thus, while the past can influence the present and future and offer lessons for shaping them, it does not permeate them, nor dictate the way they unfold. The future, on its part, always contains a yet-to-be-realized opportunity to break the shackles of the past and the present in pursuance of individual and social betterment.

The modern temporal paradigm – along with its overarching narrative of linear progress toward a better future – is widely understood to have prevailed in social, economic, political, and legal thought and practice for a long time.Footnote ²⁴ As Helge Jordheim and Einar Wigen note, ‘[t]he idea of a homogenous, linear, global movement towards a common, unspecified, ever-receding goal’ has, since the late eighteenth century, served as the ‘key concept for structuring the relationship between past, present, and future in Western culture’.Footnote ²⁵ Increasingly, this conception of time has come to dominate not only the domestic sphere but also the international one, including the international legal domain.Footnote ²⁶

The prominence of the modern linear conception of time in the international legal sphere has been highlighted by many commentators.Footnote ²⁷ Under this paradigm, international norms and institutions are understood to develop in a rectilinear, incremental manner, ‘progressive[ly] unfolding through clearly separable past, present, and future’.Footnote ²⁸ This gradual development of international law over time is reflected in the piecemeal creation and expansion of various international legal regimesFootnote ²⁹ – from human rights law to criminal law, trade law, humanitarian law, and environmental law – with significant developments in each field catalysed by landmark historical crises and events that prompt international legal response.Footnote ³⁰ These chronological incidents, in turn, are said to provide international law with a code or sequence by which to orient itself toward the future, generating a sense of disciplinary movement and improvement over time.Footnote ³¹ In this view, the formation and operation of international law is conceived as a cumulative process aimed at bettering the present and future by learning from past failures and experiences – a process of ‘unstoppable’ universal progress attained through ‘linear regeneration’.Footnote ³²

The modern narrative of constant and universal improvement over time in and through international law is well reflected in what Thomas Skouteris has famously referred to as the ‘discourse’ or the ‘vocabulary’ of progress that dominates the discipline.Footnote ³³ In line with this rhetoric of progress, international law is presented as continually advancing toward some exalted ‘teleological destination… be it world peace, the triumph of human rights, economic prosperity, or the advent of the international rule of law itself’.Footnote ³⁴ According to this account, the advances brought about by international law are unitary and universal, benefitting ‘the entire community of states and their citizens’.Footnote ³⁵ As Skouteris demonstrates, the vocabulary of universal progress from a dark past to a brighter present and future is echoed in many international treaties, declarations, and resolutions, whose moment of adoption is framed as an ‘important episode[] in the long evolutionary march’ of international law ‘towards a superior state of development’.Footnote ³⁶ A notable example is the Charter of the United Nations, which begins by emphasizing the signatories’ determination to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which … has brought untold sorrow to mankind’.Footnote ³⁷ A similar rhetoric of movement ‘away from power, politics, injustice, war, [and] impunity… towards … predictability, justice, peace, [and] accountability’ often accompanies the creation of new international institutions.Footnote ³⁸ This is evident, for example, in the mainstream narration of the post-1990 proliferation of international courts and tribunals as ‘a story of disciplinary progress’ toward the achievement of substantive social goals, such as greater ‘rule of law, more justice, and less war’.Footnote ³⁹

One domain where the pattern of linear, incremental evolution of international norms and institutions as well as the rhetoric of universal progress are particularly noticeable is international human rights law.Footnote ⁴⁰ Commonly treated as the inception moment of this regime,Footnote ⁴¹ the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was loudly celebrated as marking a clear break from a history of ‘disregard and contempt for human rights’ to a new era of robust commitment to human rights protection.Footnote ⁴² Over the subsequent decades, the rights articulated in the non-binding Universal Declaration were gradually embedded in binding treaties, and various human rights committees, courts, and other bodies were established to monitor compliance with the applicable international rules and obligations. As Paul O’Connell notes, these developments are regularly described as a ‘progressive movement through stages, from a neglectful past, through an improved present and on to a brighter human rights future’.Footnote ⁴³ Anthony Langlois similarly observes that the history of human rights law is popularly told as a series of ‘incremental, evolutionary, hard fought gains’ achieved ‘in linear time’, with ‘one incremental gain happening after another’.Footnote ⁴⁴ All in all, as Kathryn McNeilly affirms, ‘a definite linearity dominates how this area of law is understood and narrated’.Footnote ⁴⁵

Alongside international human rights law, another area where the notion of linear development leading to continuous global improvement is vividly apparent is climate change. At the heart of the international climate change regime lies the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which established the core goal of the regime: to mitigate climate change and its adverse effects by stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.Footnote ⁴⁶ This broad goal has subsequently been translated into more concrete, state-specific emission targets, first in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and then in the 2015 Paris Agreement that replaced it.Footnote ⁴⁷ To facilitate the operation and ensure the continuous development of the climate regime, these instruments also authorized the Conferences of the Parties (COP) – a body composed of State Parties’ representatives that meets on an annual basis – to monitor compliance and adopt decisions necessary for the effective implementation of treaty obligations.Footnote ⁴⁸ Arguably, this incremental, step-by-step evolution of the climate regime has allowed states to gradually build consensus over highly contested issues concerning climate change mitigation.

Notably, throughout its various stages of development, the climate regime has been accompanied by a strong rhetoric of universal progress over time. The Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement were all hailed as landmark historical achievements that would improve the lives of future generations worldwide.Footnote ⁴⁹ In the same vein, COP annual meetings were repeatedly presented as significant steps forward, even when their outcomes were much less satisfactory than expected. To give a recent example, while many commentators expressed disappointment with the deal reached at the COP29 meeting regarding the financing of developing countries,Footnote ⁵⁰ the UN Climate Change Executive Secretary nevertheless described it as an ‘insurance policy for humanity’ that would help all countries ‘to share in the vast benefits of the clean energy boom’.Footnote ⁵¹ Similarly, despite vocal criticisms from scientists and activists, the agreements reached in preceding COP meetings on such issues as carbon trading and transition to renewable energy were each defined by the Executive Secretary as a ‘historic outcome’Footnote ⁵² or an ‘excellent achievement’Footnote ⁵³ that marked the beginning of a new climate era.Footnote ⁵⁴

The foregoing discussion suggests that the modern temporal paradigm, with its emphasis on linear progress from the past, through the present, to the future, serves a distinctive function in the international legal domain. It provides international law with ‘a clear teleological horizon … [and] a sequential trajectory’ by which to guide its development,Footnote ⁵⁵ imbuing the discipline with a sense of direction, meaning, and purpose. In this regard, the modern paradigm is ultimately premised on – and simultaneously constructive of – a fundamental assumption of agency, according to which states, international organizations, experts, judges, and other international legal actors can, through their free choices and actions, exert considerable control over present and future global developments and steer them in desirable directions. This assumption of agency, in turn, can motivate international actors to create and implement legal commitments intended to promote the ‘common values, goals, and interests’ of the ‘international community’.Footnote ⁵⁶ Put differently, by portraying a ‘remarkably optimistic’Footnote ⁵⁷ picture of collective advancement toward an improved future enabled by the informed choices of purposeful international agents, the modern paradigm arguably provides a significant driving force for states and other actors to develop and comply with international law. Yet, as discussed in the next section, despite its potential contribution to international cooperation, the modern paradigm’s endorsement of a one-size-fits-all linear temporal pattern coupled with a meta-narrative of unitary progress has been criticized as overly simplistic, biased, and even intentionally misleading.

3. The postmodern paradigm: A return to the past?

The modern temporal paradigm has drawn sharp criticism challenging its foundational assumptions – particularly its unequivocal depiction of time as linear, monolithic, universal, and neutral. In place of this model, critics have advanced non-linear, non-essentialist understandings of time, which we refer to here as constituting a ‘postmodern’ temporal paradigm, insofar as they resonate with key strands of postmodern thought – such as the rejection of the meta-narrative of continuous teleological progress,Footnote ⁵⁸ the embrace of heterogeneity and complexity,Footnote ⁵⁹ and the emphasis on the cultural, economic, and political contingency of seemingly neutral phenomena.Footnote ⁶⁰ Echoing this formulation, Russell West-Pavlov defines ‘postmodern time’ as ‘a temporal logic in which the suppressed aporias of absolute or universal time begin to re-emerge’.Footnote ⁶¹ In line with this logic, Gilles Deleuze, for example, advances the idea of non-chronological, multidimensional, subjective time, which does not merely contain or measure successive events but also shapes them and infuses them with multiple and shifting meanings.Footnote ⁶² Drawing heavily on Henri Bergson’s conception of time as the non-measurable duration of lived experience and as a creative force,Footnote ⁶³ Deleuze underscores the role of time in the construction – and dismantling – of identities, narratives, and ideologies, as well as the influence of these configurations on temporal imaginaries.Footnote ⁶⁴

In recent years, such postmodern temporal thinking has gained traction in the fields of international law and international relations. Scholars have argued that time is not ‘a stand-alone object detached from social relations’,Footnote ⁶⁵ but rather constituted by, and constitutive of, shifting circumstances, interests, beliefs, and norms.Footnote ⁶⁶ Thus, ‘time of political affairs is often at odds with … time of exception or emergency, with religious time … and with the various temporalities of displaced, oppressed, or marginalized groups’.Footnote ⁶⁷ That is to say, experiences and perceptions of time can vary across nations, societies, and communities, and also within them, depending on the context and situation.Footnote ⁶⁸

According to the postmodern critique, the modern paradigm and its unitary meta-narrative of linear universal progress overlook the plurality and diversity of times, which are particularly prominent in the international arena.Footnote ⁶⁹ Among other things, the modern paradigm dismisses non-linear perceptions of cyclical time, relativistic time, contingent time, and ‘thick time’, as well as the possibility of suspending time altogether or refusing to situate certain phenomena in time.Footnote ⁷⁰ This it does, according to the postmodern claim, because the possibility of multiple, seemingly disjointed temporalities threatens the pursuit of efficient, unceasing economic growth, which lies at the heart of the Western international liberal order.Footnote ⁷¹ The postmodern approach further contends that the modern narrative of linear progress seeks to synchronize the inherently diverse temporal concepts, patterns, and rhythms of the world and align them with a ‘European-emergent, but supposedly universally valid’Footnote ⁷² and allegedly superior ‘global time of commerce, technology and media’.Footnote ⁷³ In this sense, the growing use of the rhetoric of universal progress in international political and legal discourse since the mid-twentieth century can be seen as complementing the mid-nineteenth-century project of global standardization of time. While the latter imposed a direct, formal type of temporal synchronization driven by imperial powers and their international trade interests,Footnote ⁷⁴ the former represents a more sophisticated form of temporal domination by Western economic forces who benefit from the illusion of equal progress for all.Footnote ⁷⁵

Importantly, by emphasizing the plurality of temporal patterns and perceptions and questioning the uniform vision of time as ‘an arrow that runs irreversibly’ from the dark past to a brighter future,Footnote ⁷⁶ the postmodern paradigm further challenges the ‘emphatically modern mode of breaking up time … and cutting off the past’.Footnote ⁷⁷ As Alia Al-Saji points out, this ‘rectilinear schema of time’, in which the present is understood to succeed or replace the past, is viewed by writers associated with postmodern thinking as overly simplistic.Footnote ⁷⁸ Rather than presuming strict separation between past and present, the postmodern approach asserts that these temporal dimensions overlap and intertwine in multiple ways. This view is illustrated by Deleuze, who, following Bergson, argues that ‘[t]he past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist’.Footnote ⁷⁹ In this context, Al-Saji explains that in the ‘Bergsonian–Deleuzian theory, the threads that weave time are no longer mere horizontal lines of succession. Rather, they involve vertical transmissions within a duration that passes only because it also coexists with itself’.Footnote ⁸⁰ This account offers a deep, multilayered (‘vertical’), rather than flat (‘horizontal’), conception of time – one in which the past, ‘not only the immediate past … but the whole past at different levels and rhythms’Footnote ⁸¹ – haunts the present and continues to live within it, rather than simply remaining behind.

Endorsing the call to acknowledge the continued presence of the past within the present, critical international legal scholars have shown how the modern tendency to break from the past may be particularly detrimental to those who continue to bear the impacts of past injustices facilitated by legal acts and omissions – such as those associated with colonial domination, gender discrimination, or environmental degradation.Footnote ⁸² In this context, it has been argued that in its failure to adequately address many of these past misdeeds, international law effectively allows them to continue shaping the present and future conditions and opportunities of affected populations. As Anne Orford notes – echoing the Bergsonian–Deleuzian idea of multilayered, vertical relations between past and present – international law is ‘not governed solely by a chronological sense of time in which events and texts are confined to their proper place in a historical and linear progression from then to now’, but is ‘inherently genealogical, depending as it does upon the transmission of concepts, languages, and norms across time’.Footnote ⁸³ This means that, unless appropriate corrective action is taken, international legal norms, practices, and institutions that, at the time of their emergence, helped normalize discrimination and exclusion, are likely to perpetuate such biases over time.Footnote ⁸⁴

Against this backdrop, the postmodern approach foregrounds a call to treat the past not only as a background experience that offers lessons for designing and evaluating present and future advancements in international law – as it is viewed in the modern paradigm – but also as a direct source of present and future international legal rights and obligations.Footnote ⁸⁵ At its core, this call to assign greater weight to the past within international law may be seen as a plea to expand the concept of agency in the discipline. As noted above, under the modern temporal paradigm, international legal actors are viewed as purposeful agents capable of positively affecting the world’s future trajectory. Yet, under the same paradigm, the assumption that international actors have considerable choice and control over their potential actions is not always coupled with an attribution of responsibility for those actions once they are completed. Put differently, while the modern approach distinguishes itself from pre-modern approaches by rejecting determinism – and therefore cannot deny, as a factual matter, that past wrongdoings were for the most part freely and willfully conducted – it nevertheless asserts, as a normative matter, that such agency should not necessarily lead to the establishment of moral or legal responsibility. Instead, it contends that the passage of time can render the past irrelevant for determining rights and duties in the present and future. Preoccupation with the past, in this view, is often seen as unnecessary and counterproductive, and as distracting international law from the task of ‘liberat[ing] human beings from their chains’Footnote ⁸⁶ and allowing them to create a better present and future.Footnote ⁸⁷ By contrast, the postmodern approach insists that fully confronting the past is indispensable for ensuring that not only better-off countries and populations, but also developing countries, indigenous peoples, women, and others still haunted by past grievances would be able to engage with international law and enjoy its benefits as free and equal agents.

It is noteworthy that while the modern, linear temporal paradigm remains dominant in international law, postmodern calls to recognize the heterogeneity of time – and, in particular, to take more seriously the past and its lingering effects in the present – have not been the exclusive purview of critical scholars. Indeed, manifestations of postmodern temporal thinking, though still limited and far from mainstream, can already be discerned in the discipline. One illustrative (albeit controversial) example can be found in the UN climate change regime. As noted above, this regime often uses the modern rhetoric of linear progress, even with relation to treaties and decisions that many consider as disappointing and submissive to powerful economic interests.Footnote ⁸⁸ It could therefore be expected that the postmodern approach would criticize this regime and its misleading use of the progress rhetoric. Yet, in some respects, the climate regime seems to endorse the logic of the postmodern approach. Most notably, the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ endorsed in the climate treaties largely resonates with the postmodern call to acknowledge the diverse rhythms of economic and technological development among countries, while delineating their respective legal obligations in light of their past behaviors.Footnote ⁸⁹ Rather than drawing a clear line between the past, present, and future, this principle recognizes that ‘a certain level of warming and certain impacts are already “locked in”’ due to past harmful actions for which some states bear greater responsibility than others.Footnote ⁹⁰

Alongside international treaties, postmodern temporal thinking can also be observed in certain sites of international adjudication. A compelling example may be found in the case law developed by the late Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade. In a series of separate and dissenting opinions, first at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and then at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Judge Cançado Trindade developed a non-chronological, flexible, pluralistic conception of time, which underscored time’s socially constructed and culture-dependent nature.Footnote ⁹¹ Above all, this approach seems to have been used by Judge Cançado Trindade to prioritize the protection of vulnerable individuals and communities over the promotion of state interests and doctrinal stability.Footnote ⁹² In the ICJ Temple of Preah Vihear case, for example, Judge Cançado Trindade invoked postmodern temporal logic to affirm the timeliness of Cambodia’s request for interpretation – and for enforcement through provisional measures – of a half-century-old judgment that ordered Thailand to withdraw its armed forces from the Cambodian Preah Vihear Temple.Footnote ⁹³ Elaborating on the timelessness of religious monuments and emphasizing the indeterminacy and subjectivity of time measurements, Judge Cançado Trindade asserted that the lapse of 50 years since the original judgment, although unusual, should not prevent the court from indicating provisional measures necessary to protect the Temple and nearby communities.Footnote ⁹⁴ To further support his conclusion that legal obligations related to the Temple and its environment did not fade with time, Judge Cançado Trindade suggested that the passage of time serves to connect, rather than separate, past, present, and future events, thereby relating and extending the legal obligations that arose from these events.Footnote ⁹⁵

A similar notion of temporal continuity – especially between the dead, the living, and those who are yet to be born – was also invoked by Judge Cançado Trindade in his earlier jurisprudence at the IACtHR, particularly when seeking to strengthen human rights protection in countries emerging from military dictatorships. Among other things, Judge Cançado Trindade used this temporal analysis to explain the ongoing duty of states to return the mortal remains of victims of torture.Footnote ⁹⁶ He also applied it to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to acts of forced disappearance that occurred before the Court’s jurisdiction was formally established, emphasizing the enduring nature of such acts.Footnote ⁹⁷ This emphasis on the connection between the past, present, and future strongly echoes the postmodern idea that the past fundamentally affects – and to some extent continues to exist in – the present and future,Footnote ⁹⁸ and that it is ‘never entirely correct to refer to anything as ending’.Footnote ⁹⁹

It is remarkable that a similarly flexible approach to the question of ratione temporis jurisdiction – though not accompanied by elaborate temporal theorization – was also adopted by other judges at both the IACtHR and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Most notably, these courts have held that in certain circumstances they would have jurisdiction over violations of procedural human rights obligations, such as the duty to investigate unlawful killing, even if the killing itself occurred before the respondent state ratified the relevant human rights convention.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ In Šilih v. Slovenia, the ECtHR established that this kind of extended temporal jurisdiction could be justified by ‘the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner’.Footnote ¹⁰¹ According to Eric Wyler and Arianna Whelan, the Šilih precedent – which was reiterated and further developed in subsequent casesFootnote ¹⁰² – represents a remarkable willingness of the ECtHR to adopt a non-linear, diachronic temporal interpretation that ‘sacrifices legal certainty and non-retroactivity at the altar of concrete justice’.Footnote ¹⁰³

The examples above show that postmodern temporal notions have gained some traction in key sites of international law, such as climate treaties and the case law of the ICJ and human rights courts. As we have seen, these notions have also been endorsed by a growing body of scholarship dedicated to the critical examination of international law’s temporalities. Together, these practical and theoretical interventions have revealed fundamental flaws in the dominant modern paradigm, while carving a space for disrupting the disciplinary tendency to ‘flatten heterochrony’Footnote ¹⁰⁴ and resisting the power structures served by this temporal synchronization. However, while the postmodern paradigm is valuable for promoting a more diverse conception of time – one that accommodates the temporal experiences of less powerful actors in the international arena – this paradigm also has its limitations and blind spots. Most critically, its focus on reviving the past in response to its dismissal by the modern paradigm appears to have led the postmodern paradigm to forgo a serious critical examination of international law’s relationship with the future. In the next section we take up this challenge, offering such an examination and proposing a new temporal paradigm that appears more appropriate for navigating international law’s future path.

4. Moving beyond the modern and postmodern paradigms

As we have seen, the temporalities of international law are currently shaped by two distinct paradigms: the dominant modern paradigm, which emphasizes a unidirectional movement toward a better future, and the postmodern paradigm, which challenges the modern narrative of universal progress and advocates a return to the past in order to better address historical injustices. These two paradigms seem to steer international law in opposing directions, with the first ‘privileging … the future’Footnote ¹⁰⁵ and underscoring the role of international norms and institutions in facilitating progress and promoting humanity’s shared interests, and the second seeking to shift the discipline’s focus to its troubled and conflicted past and its ongoing effects in the present. However, although these two paradigms may appear to cover together the full temporal terrain in relation to which international law may operate, a closer examination reveals that they both induce a form of ‘temporal myopia’, limiting the discipline’s ‘ability to achieve a clear perception of the future’.Footnote ¹⁰⁶

Thus, even though the modern paradigm is apparently forward-looking and future-oriented, it presents a rather narrow vision of the future and of the place of law within it – a future that is essentially positive and develops in a linear, controllable, and predictable manner from a familiar past. Yet this vision fails to adequately capture the ‘real’ future for which international law must prepare in a world that becomes ever more accelerated: a future that radically diverges from the past and confronts humanity with unprecedented challenges and risks. The postmodern paradigm, on the other hand, although more accommodative of real-world complexities, also faces notable limitations when it comes to guiding international law through the accelerated future that lies ahead. Before elaborating on this mismatch, it may be useful to take a closer look at the challenge of acceleration.

As commentators have observed, we live in an exceptional era in human history, characterized by an accelerated pace and extraordinary volume of change.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ With each passing decade, the speed and scope of technological innovation increase exponentially, fundamentally transforming such fields as communications, trade, health, labour, outer-space exploration, and the conduct of hostilities.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Climate change, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and other types of environmental degradation are also unfolding in an unprecedented rate and scale.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ And the same is true for global population growth and urbanization.Footnote ¹¹⁰ At the same time, various social, cultural, political, and economic developments, such as privatization of governmental services or global power shifts, are quickening and becoming more complex.Footnote ¹¹¹ Together, these interrelated processes create a ‘maelstrom of change’, which, in different ways and to varying degrees, affects lives in every corner of the world.Footnote ¹¹²

To be sure, acceleration is not a new phenomenon and has been considered a defining feature of Western modernity at least since the Industrial Revolution.Footnote ¹¹³ However, the pace, scale, intensity, and effects of current technological, environmental, and social changes – and of those likely to occur in the future – are historically unparalleled, leading some commentators to describe the current era as one of ‘great-acceleration’ or ‘hyper-acceleration’.Footnote ¹¹⁴ A defining feature of this hyper-acceleration is that the timespan between major transformations in each domain has become significantly shorter, with advancements or deteriorations that once took decades now occurring in just a few years or even less.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Think about the example of computing: more than a century passed between the design of the first steam-driven calculating machine in 1821 and the construction of a room-size computer in the mid-twentieth century. Several more decades passed before early home computers entered the market. Today, however, ever smaller and more powerful computers are released at much higher frequencies, and this pace is likely to further accelerate as quantum computing technologies mature.

Moreover, alongside the rising speed of many innovations and changes, their reach and influence are nowadays amplified by global interconnectedness,Footnote ¹¹⁶ with developments in one location or domain regularly sparking further changes in others (e.g., deforestation in the Amazon affects weather patterns and food security in East Africa, while advances in artificial intelligence enhance both the potential and risks of synthetic biology).Footnote ¹¹⁷ Finally, and perhaps most crucially, some contemporary or upcoming advancements and changes are highly impactful and have the potential to positively or negatively shape the whole course of the future.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Artificial intelligence, for instance, can create enormous value for humanity by helping us predict and cope with a range of economic, social, and security problems. But it also raises serious risks, including the displacement of large segments of the workforce and the facilitation of mass surveillance. Similarly, synthetic biology holds promise for curing difficult diseases and ensuring food and energy security for the rapidly growing world population. Yet it could also pose an existential threat if, for example, a genetically engineered pathogen was to cause a disastrous global pandemic.

Given the inherently transboundary nature of many rapidly emerging developments and the high stakes involved, international law should play a key role in mitigating the risks and seizing the opportunities they present. The problem, however, is that the temporal paradigms currently at play in the discipline do not offer sufficient conceptual and methodological frameworks for regulating the complex global challenges on the horizon. This mismatch arises primarily from the gradual, step-by-step evolutionary and operative mode of many international norms and institutions, which is naturalized and reinforced by the dominant modern temporal paradigm. In an ever-accelerating world, this incrementalism leads international law to lag behind ‘real-life’ developments, leaving it out of sync with the pace of global changes.Footnote ¹¹⁹ Whereas in the not-so-distant past, the gradual development of international law may have aligned with the accelerated yet manageable pace of modern life, in the current age of great acceleration, this mode of linear, piecemeal legal progression can no longer keep up with the extreme velocity of technological, social, and environmental change.

Consider the case of international space law. Beginning with the adoption of the general Outer Space Treaty in 1967 and continuing in the following decade with a series of narrower treaties addressing specific aspects of space activity,Footnote ¹²⁰ this regime emerged hand in hand with the advancement of human space exploration. In some respects, international law even outpaced actual space activity, such as when the 1967 treaty prohibited the installation of nuclear weapons in space, a scenario that existed only as a theoretical possibility at the time.Footnote ¹²¹ Today, however, as space activities rapidly intensify and expand, concerns arise that while governments and private entities are ‘approach[ing] the technological tipping point to enable space mining and space tourism’,Footnote ¹²² international law will fail to keep pace with technological developments, resulting in the creation of ‘a new Wild West in outer space’.Footnote ¹²³

Clearly, the temporal gap between the accelerating global reality and the incremental evolution of international law is closely tied to the cumbersome nature and typical slowness of international lawmaking, most notably apparent in the creation and amendment of binding treaties and customary norms.Footnote ¹²⁴ But there are also other, less visible aspects of international lawmaking that contribute to this desynchronization. One such feature is the reactive nature of international law alluded to above,Footnote ¹²⁵ whereby international norms and institutions are regularly devised in response to past crises and events – whether wars, systemic abuses, natural disasters, or technological advancements.Footnote ¹²⁶ Resonating with the logic of the modern temporal paradigm, this reactive, problem-solving approach facilitates continual progress and improvement over time in international law. Yet its grounding in the near past and present exacerbates the discipline’s tendency to lag behind the rapidly evolving social and physical reality it seeks to regulate. More concretely, the reactive approach produces legal arrangements that are shaped by yesterday’s circumstances, based on the assumption that past problems and needs are good indicators of future ones.Footnote ¹²⁷ But in an era of extreme acceleration, where the future is increasingly less like the past and the ‘relevance of accumulated wisdom and experience is called into doubt’,Footnote ¹²⁸ this assumption often proves misguided, and over-reliance on past knowledge risks undermining international law’s effectiveness and resilience.Footnote ¹²⁹

Alongside its propensity for incremental and reactive normative development, the suitability of the modern temporal paradigm for shaping international regulatory endeavors in today’s and tomorrow’s world is further called into question by its unreserved adherence to the narrative of constant progress over time. This strong ‘confidence in technology and modernization’, which goes ‘hand in hand with a quasi-metaphysical glorification’ of the present and future as inherently superior to the past,Footnote ¹³⁰ may lead the developers and implementers of international law to underestimate the potential risks embedded in scientific and technological advancements like artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, or outer-space exploration. As a result, they may fail to take appropriate measures to mitigate these risks and be caught off-guard when they materialize.

Given the misfit between, on the one hand, the core features and assumptions of the modern temporal paradigm (linearity, incrementalism, reactiveness, and unwavering adherence to the narrative of progress), and, on the other hand, the regulatory demands of a rapidly accelerating global reality, it is time for international law to shift more decisively toward alternative temporal frameworks. In particular, it should embrace temporal notions and patterns that are more flexible, adaptive, and capable of dealing with the complex challenges looming in the future. Might the postmodern temporal paradigm offer such an alternative? Can it equip international law and institutions with adequate tools for navigating the unfamiliar dynamics of an increasingly volatile world?

As discussed above, the postmodern paradigm puts forward a non-linear, fluid conception of time that emphasizes the plurality and contingency of temporal experiences and perceptions. Favouring contextualism over naturalism and essentialism, this paradigm is not bound to any particular temporal narrative (such as unidirectional progress), pattern (such as incremental development), or epistemological method (such as planning the future based on past knowledge). Instead, it is open to ‘breaks, jolts, and ruptures that … shatter any orderly “progression” of time’,Footnote ¹³¹ and acknowledges that the future is turbulent and not fully predictable. In the words of David Harvey, ‘postmodernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change’.Footnote ¹³² In that respect, the postmodern paradigm seems well-positioned to inform international regulatory choices in an increasingly complicated and fast-paced world.

However, despite its openness to change and its embrace of diversity, complexity, and indeterminacy, in some important respects the postmodern temporal paradigm is not ideally suited to navigate international law and institutions through the uncharted waters of the future. As noted, the postmodern approach seeks to shift the disciplinary focus from the future to the past, in order to better address past injustices and their ongoing effects. It rejects the transformative view that ‘it is both possible and necessary to break with tradition and institute absolutely new ways of living and thinking’,Footnote ¹³³ emphasizing instead the various ways in which the past continues to shape contemporary social and legal structures. This past-oriented mindset, while valuable for promoting a more equitable future that avoids reproducing historical wrongs, in itself offers little guidance for enhancing international law’s capacity to anticipate and respond to novel global challenges of unprecedented scale and complexity.

Indeed, even when works aligned with the postmodern approach are explicitly future-oriented – arguing that acknowledging the persistent influence of the past is essential, above all, to achieving a more just and sustainable future – they often stop short of engaging with the future as such: assessing how it may evolve or what legal or institutional measures might be needed to shape it. A case in point is Julia Dehm’s analysis of how different ways of narrating the temporalities of the climate crisis can open up or foreclose present possibilities for mitigating future harm.Footnote ¹³⁴ While her appeal for a realistic approach – one that acknowledges irreversible damage without abandoning the struggle for change – is clearly future-oriented, her narrative-focused account refrains from addressing crucial operative questions such as how to enable swift and effective intervention in the face of accelerating degradation. A similar tendency is evident in Kathryn McNeilly’s call for an ‘untimely’ conception of human rights, which envisions the future as ‘unknown and out of control’ and ‘not necessarily follow[ing] progressively from the past or present’.Footnote ¹³⁵ Like Dehm, McNeilly eschews prescriptive guidance in favour of a focus on historical narrative, legal discourse, and democratic debate.Footnote ¹³⁶ Moreover, her critique of the modern illusion of predictability and control borders on portraying the future as entirely ungovernable, potentially discouraging valuable forms of anticipatory action.Footnote ¹³⁷ This is by no means to deny the value of either contribution. But to the extent that these works are representative of postmodern thinking about the future, they underscore the need to complement this paradigm with one more attuned to the challenges of legal and institutional design posed by a complex and accelerating global reality.

Yet another aspect of postmodern thinking that may hinder its capacity to guide international law through the risks and opportunities presented by an accelerated future is its general antagonism, perhaps even ‘deep aversion’, toward ‘any project that [seeks] universal human emancipation through mobilization of the powers of technology, science, and reason’.Footnote ¹³⁸ While in ‘modernist discourse’ these powers are often celebrated as objective sources of knowledge, authority, and progress, critical postmodern writing tends to see them as suppressing less powerful voices and narratives, reinforcing ‘hierarchies of class and meritocratic practices’, and ‘reify[ing] science over the humanities, men over women, and facts over values’.Footnote ¹³⁹

These concerns about technological progress have recently surfaced in international law scholarship associated with the postmodern temporal approach. Julia Dehm, for instance, warns that reliance on yet unproven future carbon removal technologies allows powerful economic actors to defer climate mitigation action through international law – a delay that may yield catastrophic consequences, particularly for climate-vulnerable populations.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ Technological advancement, on this view, not only historically benefited developed countries while inflicting climate harms on developing countries, but also risks creating an illusion of future mitigation opportunities at the latter’s expense. Ingo Venzke similarly critiques the ‘complacent faith’ in technological progress that enables industrialized countries to delay phasing out fossil fuels, arguing that this stance ‘expresses a situated privilege’ insensitive to developing countries’ experiences and concerns.Footnote ¹⁴¹ Adopting a broader historical perspective, Geoff Gordon suggests that international law’s promotion of globally standardized time and of transnational communication technologies enabled by such standardization – though presented as a ‘natural and neutral token of progress’ and accompanied by ‘powerful pretentions to universalism’ – has in fact served imperial and corporate interests, often at the expense of colonized people.Footnote ¹⁴² A critical assessment of state and market-led attempts to universalize and compress time while relying on real-time data processing technologies is also provided by Fleur Johns.Footnote ¹⁴³ Johns posits that despite growing pressures, international human rights law may still be capable of offering an alternative temporal experience that is more pluralistic and anachronistic, thereby helping ‘the proud, angry poor’ to ‘reactivat[e]… as political questions’ the technology-driven temporalities of nation-states and global markets.Footnote ¹⁴⁴

As these examples demonstrate, postmodern engagements with time in international legal scholarship carry forward postmodernism’s general skepticism toward technology, suggesting that the modern ideal of linear technological progress serves to align international legal arrangements with powerful economic interests. This skepticism arguably presents an inverted mirror image of the modern paradigm’s over-confidence in science and technology: whereas the modern paradigm tends to downplay the possible limitations, dangers, and biases of technological development, the postmodern paradigm risks dismissing technological possibilities before they materialize. Neither framework, therefore, seems suitable for preparing international law to adequately address the complexities of accelerating global changes driven by technological advancement.

5. The hypermodern paradigm: Back to the future

The foregoing discussion suggests that the extreme velocity and complexity of unfolding global challenges require international law and its institutions to look for a different temporal framework, neither modern nor postmodern, that is future-oriented and forward-looking, yet flexible and non-linear, and which steers a middle ground between the modernist over-confidence in universal progress and the postmodernist skepticism toward it. We believe that hypermodernism – an evolving concept emerging from turn-of-the-twenty-first-century socio-cultural scholarship – can point the way in the right direction.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ At the heart of hypermodernism lies the proposition that frantic acceleration driven by technological advances is the defining characteristic of our era. Therefore, to better understand and address contemporary social, cultural, economic, and geopolitical processes and challenges, we must focus on the notion of speed.

Among the first to engage with speed as a crucial lens for analyzing social and political phenomena was Paul Virilio, who introduced ‘dromology’ – the study of speed or race (dromos) – as a major field of philosophical inquiry.Footnote ¹⁴⁶ ‘If time is money … then speed is power’,Footnote ¹⁴⁷ Virilio observes, arguing that the power of speed is becoming increasingly dangerous.Footnote ¹⁴⁸ Throughout history, Virilio explains, technological advances such as the invention of electricity or the airplane have created significant value for humanity but have also led to various accidents.Footnote ¹⁴⁹ Until the not-so-distant past, however, such accidents were mostly local and limited in their impact, making them manageable. By contrast, in the current age of extreme acceleration – defined by Virilio as a move from ‘relative speed’ to ‘absolute speed’ – the risk associated with technological progress has shifted from localized accidents to a potentially ‘integral’ or ‘generalized’ catastrophe of a fundamentally different order, such as a global nuclear war that could affect the entire world population.Footnote ¹⁵⁰ To illustrate this dual nature of constant expedition, Virilio uses the example of massive particle accelerators like the Large Hadron Collider, which can help solve complex scientific problems, but at the same time (re)present, both concretely and metaphorically, potentially unknown and uncontrollable dangers or ‘black holes’.Footnote ¹⁵¹

Virilio’s concern that rapid technological development, while offering many benefits, may also pose serious and even existential risks to humanity, has been echoed by other writers, framing the ambivalent nature of acceleration as a central theme in hypermodern theory. As Sebastian Charles has put it: ‘Hypermodernity is the reign neither of absolute happiness, nor of total nihilism … it is neither the accomplishment of the Enlightenment project, nor the confirmation of Nietzsche’s dark predictions’.Footnote ¹⁵² Put differently, the hypermodern approach rejects the utopian narrative of inevitable progress, but it does not deny that progress exists and that it has both positive and negative aspects.Footnote ¹⁵³

The most detailed account so far of the hypermodern condition has been offered by Gilles Lipovetsky. According to Lipovetsky, the turn of the twenty-first century marks the beginning of an era characterized by hyper-connectivity, hyper-capitalism, and hyper-change, and by the logic of the excess and the extreme.Footnote ¹⁵⁴ In this hypermodern era, ‘the speed of operations and exchanges is accelerating’ in every domain of life,Footnote ¹⁵⁵ while a culture of hedonism and over-consumption exists in tandem with ambitious scientific attempts to ‘explore the infinitely great and the infinitely small, to reshape life, to manufacture mutants, to offer a semblance of immortality, to resurrect vanished species, [and] to programme the genetic future’.Footnote ¹⁵⁶ These interrelated trends, Lipovetsky argues, are ‘heavy with threats as well as promises’,Footnote ¹⁵⁷ encapsulating ‘a paradoxical combination of frivolity and anxiety, euphoria and vulnerability, playfulness and dread’:Footnote ¹⁵⁸ They can enhance individual freedom and welfare and safeguard the future of humanity and the planet, but they also involve risks of social disintegration, mass surveillance, and catastrophic accidents.Footnote ¹⁵⁹

Importantly, the recognition of the ‘Janus face of progress’,Footnote ¹⁶⁰ combined with the realization that acceleration is not entirely reversible, has led Virilio, Lipovetsky, and other theorists of hypermodernity to call for ‘responsible action’, which includes the development of ‘ethical regulation and codes of practice’ in various spheres of life.Footnote ¹⁶¹ These writers emphasize that, although the future is not entirely open and is to some degree already determined by past actions, it is certainly not fully fixed or closed.Footnote ¹⁶² The urgent task, therefore, is ‘to build it, together, in the present’;Footnote ¹⁶³ that is, ‘to foresee, to forestall, to plan, to prevent’,Footnote ¹⁶⁴ while relying on constantly developing forecasting models and risk assessment methods.Footnote ¹⁶⁵ Such future-oriented thought and action, in turn, involves some recalibration of the temporal organization of key social, economic, and legal institutions.Footnote ¹⁶⁶

In the context of international law, we argue, the call for temporal recalibration put forward by the hypermodern approach should be translated into greater diversity and flexibility in the discipline’s temporal assumptions and patterns. Such variation can foster development and experimentation with non-conventional temporal methods and approaches that may be more suitable for addressing global challenges in a hyper-accelerating world. Within this framework, the incremental and reactive evolutionary mode prevalent in international law, whereby norms and institutions develop gradually in light of past events, should be complemented and balanced more vigorously with non-linear and proactive models of normative transformation.

Under the hypermodern paradigm, then, international law and institutions should strive to prepare in advance for possible future technological, social, and environmental trends, seeking to actively influence the way they unfold and steer them in positive directions.Footnote ¹⁶⁷ Given the ever-growing complexity of global developments, such forward-looking regulation can no longer rely predominantly on past knowledge and experience. Instead, it should draw considerably from enhanced forecasting and modelling capacities.Footnote ¹⁶⁸ At the same time, the ‘adaptive capacity’Footnote ¹⁶⁹ of international law should be improved to facilitate quick normative and institutional adjustments in light of updated forecasts or new facts on the ground. This can be done, among other strategies, by adopting simplified treaty amendment procedures, delegating legislative authority to subsidiary bodies, or relying on informal lawmaking mechanisms.Footnote ¹⁷⁰ As Edith Brown Weiss observes, if international law is to retain its effectiveness and legitimacy in a rapidly changing, multifaceted ‘kaleidoscopic world’, it must remain alert, responsive, and open to new normative and institutional configurations.Footnote ¹⁷¹

Yet, rendering international law more dynamic and proactive and better capable of addressing upcoming global challenges further entails the extension of international law’s time horizons far into the future. In an ever-accelerating world, effective preparation for future technological, social, environmental, and other developments requires regulatory interventions well in advance, when it is still possible to influence future global trajectories. The relevant timeframes for such long-term planning and action may vary across different domains. While in some areas they may extend a few decades into the future, in others (e.g., climate change or nuclear waste management), regulatory measures should be designed to exert influence centuries, millennia, or even tens of thousands of years ahead.Footnote ¹⁷² In either case, the objective is to systematically ‘embed long-term thinking into our [global governance] systems, to improve global risk anticipation and foresight, and to take the interests of future generations seriously’.Footnote ¹⁷³ In designing such long-term-oriented interventions, however, international law- and policy-makers should also take into account and attempt to mitigate possible risks, such as unjust sacrifice of present generations’ interests.Footnote ¹⁷⁴

Although not widespread, hypermodern temporal elements such as adaptability, proactiveness, and long-term thinking are not entirely alien to international law and its institutions. To give but one example, the UN climate regime, which was mentioned earlier as blending both modern and postmodern temporal aspects, also displays some seeds of hypermodern logic. The declared goal of this regime is to address the long-term threat of global warming ‘for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind’.Footnote ¹⁷⁵ Within this framework, State Parties undertake ‘to further the understanding and to reduce or eliminate the remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of climate change’.Footnote ¹⁷⁶ To fulfill this commitment, the parties have established a designated body tasked with providing timely scientific and technological input to the COP.Footnote ¹⁷⁷ The COP, in turn, has been delegated expansive decision-making powers that enable it to adapt various elements of the climate regime to new scientific knowledge as well as to developments on the ground.Footnote ¹⁷⁸

However, notwithstanding these hypermodern glimpses, the UN climate regime is far from being sufficiently long-termist, proactive, and adaptive. As many have observed, despite its elevated rhetoric and good intentions, the climate regime has ultimately done too little, too late to mitigate the enormous threat of global warming.Footnote ¹⁷⁹ So far, this regime has failed to ensure adequate levels of emission reduction and temperature rise mitigation,Footnote ¹⁸⁰ with scientists warning that even the most ambitious goals set by the state parties (1.5 Celsius degrees of warming and net-zero emissions) are too vague and may cause ‘distraction and delay just at the point when climate action is most urgent’.Footnote ¹⁸¹

The constraints hindering effective forward-looking legal action on climate change are manifold, and some of them likely also play a role in addressing other rapidly unfolding global challenges, such as artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, or outer space commercialization. In addition to the challenge of overcoming knowledge gaps presented by ‘a dromological culture [that] eludes – or speed pasts – any attempt at systematic analysis’,Footnote ¹⁸² the main barrier to pursuing a hypermodern temporal approach in international law appears to be the lack of motivation among pertinent actors. As many have observed, governments and other international actors have few political incentives to invest resources or make concessions in the present for the benefit of people who will live in the future.Footnote ¹⁸³ Instead, they usually prioritize legal interventions that yield near-term benefits, which can immediately enhance their popularity – a consideration of particular importance for governmental decision-makers concerned with re-election, even when operating at the international level.Footnote ¹⁸⁴

Moreover, alongside such rational considerations, those creating and operating international norms and institutions may also be inclined toward reactiveness and short-termism, even when proactiveness and long-term thinking are more appropriate, due to various cognitive biases that distort their judgment. One such bias is over-optimism, which may cause international decision-makers to overestimate the likelihood that things will go well and underestimate the chances that things will go wrong, thereby hindering efforts to effectively reduce future risks and enhance future opportunities.Footnote ¹⁸⁵ Another common cognitive bias that may lead international legal actors to respond to immediate problems while downplaying more distant – albeit no less serious – future problems is the availability bias. This bias pushes decision-makers to focus on issues and scenarios that have already materialized and captured public attention, while paying less heed to potential upcoming developments that are not readily available in their minds and sight.Footnote ¹⁸⁶

However, despite such epistemological, political, behavioral, and other challenges, we argue that hypermodern temporal elements like dynamism, adaptability, proactiveness, and far-sightedness must be more vigorously integrated into mainstream international legal thought and practice. This requires those operating in the international legal sphere to regularly assess future developments of unprecedented speed and scope, and initiate early interventions to minimize potential harms and maximize benefits. Obviously, such a shift in the temporal orientation of international law requires significant conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional reforms. However, demanding as this endeavour may be, it is necessary for ensuring that international law and institutions remain fit for purpose in a hyper-accelerating and increasingly complex world.

Finally, it is noteworthy that while recalibrating international law’s temporalities toward greater proactiveness and long-termism is essential for enabling the international community as a whole to better handle the hyper-accelerated future, it is especially important for the less well-off members of this community, who usually bear the heaviest costs during a global crisis. Given that ‘the powerful are fast [and] the powerless are slow’,Footnote ¹⁸⁷ weaker states and societies are often unable to unilaterally devise effective last-minute responses to large-scale predicaments, whereas well-resourced societies enjoy greater maneuvering space. This disparity was vividly illustrated during the COVID-19 outbreak. While all countries suffered immense harm from the failure of international law and institutions to prepare in advance for the pandemic, developing countries and disadvantaged populations were hit hardest.Footnote ¹⁸⁸ Not only were they sidelined in the global scramble for medical supplies and vaccines,Footnote ¹⁸⁹ but they also lacked the resources needed to navigate their national health and economic systems through the crisis.Footnote ¹⁹⁰ Similarly, in the context of climate change, the most vulnerable countries are often those with the fewest resources to adapt, including large parts of Africa, South America, and the Pacific islands, where heatwaves and sea-level rise may render life uninhabitable.Footnote ¹⁹¹ And the same is true for other emerging global problems like population growth, food scarcity, and technologically-induced job loss – in all these domains, the countries and populations most dependent on timely global risk mitigation measures are those with the slowest reaction times and fewest resources for adaptation.