1.5.1 Highlighting U.S. Allies’ Agency, Trailblazing, and Significance Historically and Today

Much of the decades-old U.S.-centric academic and policy-oriented literatures regarding Taiwan- and Taiwan Strait-related issues has treated the agency, positions, and policies of key U.S. allies as an afterthought, if not neglecting them entirely. This oversight matters for two primary reasons: First, Beijing’s increasingly coercive posture vis-à-vis Taipei and a rapidly changing balance of power today all but guarantee that several major U.S. treaty allies (e.g., Japan) and economic partners (e.g., the EU) are and will continue to be essential partners for Taipei and Washington in achieving core strategic and policy objectives. Accordingly, understanding where these governments stand on key issues, as well as what they have been willing to do and say over time in support of Taiwan and the cross-Strait status quo, has real-world implications for policy.

Second, overlooking the agency and significance of U.S. allies is also profoundly ahistorical. Contrary to the widespread impression today that the U.S. has always been in the lead, with allies grudgingly following (or not), throughout the post-1949 period Western Pacific and European allies made significant contributions to enabling Taiwan’s international space and cross-Strait peace and stability even as they sought to develop ties with the much larger PRC. Importantly, they have done so variably in concert with and independently from the United States – at times even over Washington’s direct opposition. At critical historical moments now often forgotten, allies’ political leaders effectively blazed trails that the U.S. would later follow.

Not only did most major U.S. democratic treaty allies switch official diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC many years before Washington did. As the case studies in Sections 2–4 demonstrate, it was also a major U.S. ally – not the U.S. government – that first implemented each of several measures designed to square the difficult circle of establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing while supporting continued engagement with Taiwan and cross-Strait peace and stability. Of particular note: it was a U.S. ally that first (1) recognized the PRC government without endorsing Beijing’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan and (2) negotiated a bilateral communique with Beijing that avoided any mention of Taiwan. And it was also a U.S. ally that, even after switching official diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, first (3) linked recognition of Beijing to “peaceful resolution” of the cross-Strait dispute; (4) implemented the “do not endorse, do not challenge” framework that later became the heart of the U.S. position on “One China”; (5) insisted on a de facto representative office in Taipei; (6) initiated robust engagement with KMT leaders through legislative exchanges that functioned as stand-ins for direct high-level government-to-government engagement; (7); sent a cabinet-level official to Taipei; (8) allowed a visit by a sitting ROC foreign minister.

1.5.2 Highlighting the Politically Contingent Variability of Allies’ Effective Taiwan Policies

This study also adopts a unique comparative approach. It reveals important variation across and within cases concerning how political leaders have chosen to operationalize “unofficial” relations with Taiwan, including how to speak publicly about or act in support of Taiwan’s international space or cross-Strait peace and stability. This analysis helps reveal the under-appreciated ambiguity, dynamism, and political contingency at the heart of the “One China” framework that for decades has shaped the contours of the U.S. and many of its allies’ approaches. Short of a widely understood red-line – official recognition of the ROC/Taiwan as a sovereign state – the empirical record across these cases reveals that a country’s “One China policy” is, as far as official rhetoric regarding and practical engagement with Taiwan is concerned, largely whatever government leaders choose to make of it.

The diversity of effective Taiwan policies even among the United States and its closest democratic treaty allies revealed by this comparative approach throws into sharp relief the strikingly weak correlation between a government’s abstract, usually static, official position on “One China” (form) and its effective official policies and rhetoric regarding Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait (substance). In any practical sense, even after recognizing Beijing major allies’ effective policies on Taiwan-related matters have varied widely, with significant real-world implications for Taiwan’s international space and cross-Strait vicissitudes.

Importantly, this variation manifests both across and within the cases examined in this Element. Regarding the former, even ally and partner governments adopting identical – or nearly identical – official positions on “One China” have engaged in widely divergent conduct in terms of bilateral engagement with or public expressions of support for Taiwan and/or cross-Strait peace and stability. Concerning the latter, despite the general contemporary trends among major U.S. democratic allies and partners toward closer unofficial ties with Taipei and greater outspokenness regarding Taiwan’s international space and the Taiwan Strait, history suggests that these trends are not inevitably linear or unidirectional. Several case studies reveal that shifting domestic and international political winds have intermittently caused some political leaders to reevaluate the pros and cons of more robust engagement with and outspokenness concerning Taipei, and to adjust their approaches accordingly.

In aggregate, the case studies introduced in Sections 2–4 highlight the underappreciated and immense historical significance of U.S. allies’ positions and policies vis-a-vis Taiwan: for Taiwan itself, for cross-Strait dynamics, and even for the U.S.’ own positions and policies. They also highlight their practically consequential variability – across and within cases.

2.1.1 Origins and Cold War Manifestations of “One China” across the Taiwan Strait

Although some historical records suggest that key CCP and KMT leaders did not even consider Taiwan part of China before the 1940s, by 1949 the political meaning and significance of Taiwan for both sides had fundamentally changed. The idea that Taiwan was “inherent Chinese territory” had become nonnegotiable (Hsiao and Sullivan Reference Hsiao and Sullivan1979; Wachman Reference Wachman2007, chaps. 4–5).

The concept of “One China” originated internationally in opposition to two alternatives for resolving the post-1949 cross-Strait dispute, both anathema to PRC and ROC leaders during the Cold War: “two Chinas” (liang ge Zhongguo), which envisioned the international community recognizing the legitimacy of both the PRC and ROC, and “one China, one Taiwan” (yi Zhong yi Tai), which envisioned the international community recognizing Taiwan as an independent state disconnected from both the PRC or ROC regimes.

In theory, Taiwan’s legal status could have been resolved after 1945 during the negotiations over a peace treaty with Japan – Taiwan’s colonial occupier from 1895 to 1945. However, different views among the allies concerning which to invite meant neither the PRC nor the ROC government was represented at the 1951 San Francisco Conference. The text of the resulting treaty stated only that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.” Critically, it said nothing about to which entity sovereignty over them was subsequently transferred (“Treaty of Peace with Japan” 1951). Nor was this ambiguity explicitly resolved in Japan’s subsequent peace treaties with the ROC (“Treaty of Peace”1952) and PRC (“Treaty of Peace and Friendship” 1978).

After North Korea’s (PRC-supported) invasion of South Korea in June 1950 threw into sharp relief the risk of a hot war of unification in East Asia, U.S. President Truman stated that Taiwan was not yet part of China and should be considered an issue of continuing international concern, and that the people on Taiwan should have some say in their future. The U.S. continued to recognize the ROC government – a UN founding member state – but, importantly, did not recognize its “ownership of the island” (Bush Reference Bush2004, 95). Generally speaking, the United States, the UK, and other key U.S. allies either judged that Taiwan’s status remained “undetermined” or avoided publicly taking any explicit legal position on Taiwan’s relationship to the PRC. Unsurprisingly, both the PRC and ROC governments took issue with these positions, instead claiming sovereignty over Taiwan for themselves.

Although in policy discourse today the “one-China principle” is generally associated with the PRC’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, to understand how the contemporary status quo came to be one must not forget that throughout the Cold War the ROC government in Taipei also enforced its own version of the “one-China principle.” In the view of Chiang’s KMT, it was the ROC, not the PRC, that was the sole legitimate government of a single “China” including both Taiwan and the mainland.

Given the two sides’ irreconcilable “one-China principles,” throughout the Cold War all foreign governments had to make a choice: recognize either the PRC or the ROC as China’s sole legal government. Accordingly, and of profound historical and contemporary significance, both Beijing and Taipei repeatedly rejected efforts before 1971 by the United States, the UK, Japan, Canada, and other foreign governments to explore possibilities for a “two Chinas” or a “one China, one Taiwan” solution. As Bush points out, the world will never know whether, if the KMT had been more receptive to the U.S. and others’ efforts to facilitate dual presence in the UN for both the PRC and ROC, Taiwan “might still be represented in international organizations today” (Reference Bush2004, 120).

Two major turning points in the history of the “one-China principle” were particularly consequential internationally. The first – in the 1970s – witnessed a cascade of foreign governments switching official recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Two major catalysts were U.S. President Richard Nixon’s surprise July 1971 announcement of his intent to visit the PRC, which signaled a historic rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, and, three months later, a resolution granting PRC representatives seats in the UN Security Council and General Assembly and expelling “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek.” Between 1970 and 1973, dozens of foreign governments recognized the PRC, including U.S. allies Canada, Italy, Japan, (West) Germany, Australia, and New Zealand. (The UK, which had recognized the PRC in 1950 but not yet established full diplomatic relations, also exchanged ambassadors with Beijing for the first time.) The consequences for the ROC’s international recognition were profound: in accordance with the two sides’ irreconcilable “one-China principles,” all these foreign governments either severed, or saw Taipei sever, diplomatic relations.

2.1.2 Taiwan’s Democratization and Its Impact

The second major turning point occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s, a period which witnessed both the Cold War’s end (1989–1991) and Taiwan’s rapid democratization after four decades of martial law and single-party KMT rule. Democratization gave the long-oppressed Taiwan-born majority a central role in Taiwan’s politics, including greater influence over Taiwan’s complicated relationships with both the mainland and the “One China” concept itself. The consequences for cross-Strait relations were profound.

The first breakthrough occurred under KMT President Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000) – the ROC’s first Taiwan-born, first post-martial law, and, after 1996, first democratically elected leader. In 1991, the ROC government declared the end of the Period of Mobilization against Communist Rebellion, effectively ending the Chinese civil war from Taipei’s perspective and identifying the PRC as an “equal political entity” with which it could engage. It also recognized that the government in Taipei effectively controls only the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, while the PRC government exercises authority over mainland China (Chen Reference Chen2022, 1031–32; Somers Reference Somers2023, 693). This facilitated cross-Strait contacts and economic linkages, as well as massive investment from Taiwan into the mainland. Later, as a clear indication of generational change and increasingly open political contestation within rapidly democratizing Taiwan regarding “One China,” in 1999 Lee publicly referred to Taiwan and the mainland as having “special state-to-state relations.” His successor, Taiwan’s first DPP president, Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), took such rhetoric even further. Chen, who was also Taiwan-born, referred to “one country on each side” (of the Strait) (Chen Reference Chen2022, 1033). He even pursued a controversial referendum on Taiwan’s UN membership. Such moves, widely seen as flirting with a unilateral declaration of de jure independence – a potential casus belli for Beijing – generated significant blowback, including from the United States and key allies. Based in part on this experience, Taiwan’s second DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen (2016–2024), adopted a more moderate, status quo–oriented stance. Her successor, William Lai (2024–), says that he plans to follow suit.

Beyond the consequences for cross-Strait relations, the implications of Taiwan’s democratization for more flexible engagement with foreign governments were also significant. The era of Taipei’s rigid assertion of the KMT’s version of the “one-China principle” internationally was effectively over. In 1989, the ROC for the first time allowed a foreign government (Grenada) to normalize diplomatic relations without requiring it to sever diplomatic ties with the PRC (Mengin Reference Mengin1997, 240).

Thus, when reflecting on the origins of the U.S. and its allies’ decades-old positions on “One China,” one should not forget that throughout the Cold War both the PRC and ROC governments actively enforced their respective positions that Taiwan is part of one “China.” Both considered any proposal to treat it as anything but unacceptable, thereby forcing a choice on all foreign governments. In contrast, today, only the PRC actively enforces a version – its version – of the “one-China principle” internationally. Though differences today between Taiwan’s major political parties on cross-Strait issues are significant, none accepts Beijing’s contention that the ROC/Taiwan is part of, or subordinate to, the CCP-led PRC (see Table 1).

Although under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016) Taiwan significantly deepened cooperation with Beijing based on the KMT’s and CCP’s shared conviction that there is only one “China” and Taiwan belongs to that “China,” the fundamental disagreement between the two parties regarding to which “China” (ROC vs. PRC) Taiwan belongs persists. Whereas the KMT openly acknowledges this reality based on the formula of “one country, respective interpretations,” the PRC does not (Chen Reference Chen2022, 1034–35; Somers Reference Somers2023, 695–96). As noted earlier and summarized in Table 1, the party of Ma’s DPP successors has a very different view, even as both Presidents Tsai and Lai have adopted a moderate stance in office.

Beyond the Strait, one major consequence of Taiwan’s democratization and its leaders’ post–Cold War shifts toward greater flexibility and pragmatism on “One China” was to further expand space for the U.S. and its democratic treaty allies to, in the words of Klintworth, “stretch the principle of one China into the reality of a one China, one Taiwan policy” (Reference Klintworth1993, 87–90). The past three decades have witnessed deepening economic and other ties across the Taiwan Strait, an increasingly robust “Taiwanese” identity within Taiwan, and a major expansion of foreign governments’ “unofficial” engagement with Taipei. Even so, support for the “status quo” remains widespread (Election Study Center 2024).

2.2.1 The “One China Framework”

Informing this Element’s analytical approach is the idea that the “One China” framework functions in international politics as something akin to what political scientists call an “informal institution” (Liff and Lin Reference Liff and Lin2022). Put simply, U.S. allies’ effective policies toward Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are contingent on leaders’ interpretations of largely unwritten, socially constructed, and domestically and internationally contested rules that shape “many of the ‘real’ incentives and constraints that underlie [leaders’] political behaviour” (Helmke and Levitsky Reference Helmke and Levitsky2003). Short of the widely understood red line of formal recognition of the ROC/Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. allies’ respective “One China” policies are largely what their leaders choose to make them. The caveat, of course, is that certain actions have consequences, and certain moves may elicit Beijing’s wrath. But where even that line is, or how likely Beijing is to back up its often fiery rhetoric with costly punishment, is often unclear.

Far from being based on any legally binding, clearly articulated, or explicit commitment to Beijing, it is subjective and politically conditioned interpretations of what “One China” means in principle and practice – and what their government’s interests are – that determine how political leaders choose to operationalize their respective positions in terms of actual policies vis-à-vis Taiwan. Judgments about where the “appropriate” or “acceptable” bounds on engagement with Taiwan and on cross-Strait issues lie and what policies best serve national interests effectively define the “rules of the game.” Political leaders must decide how proactive (or passive) their respective Taiwan policies should be, and in which domains – economic, cultural, political, military, etc. – they can or should engage Taipei.

No case better illustrates the flexible, politically conditioned bounds of a foreign government’s “One China” policy than that of the United States, Taiwan’s closest international partner and the ROC’s erstwhile treaty ally.

2.3.1 The “Canadian Formula” (1970)

After becoming prime minister in 1968, Pierre Trudeau launched normalization negotiations with Beijing – over Washington’s opposition. Consistent with Ottawa’s 1950s-era position that Taiwan’s status remained “an undetermined international issue,” however, Canadian diplomats were tasked by Trudeau with “avoid[ing] any commitment that would deny Canada the possibility of recognizing Taiwan as an independent state at some time in the future if circumstances should make that feasible” (Cabinet 1969; Simon Reference Simon2023, 4). Though initially hoping to avoid severing official ties with Taipei altogether, Canada eventually agreed to end de jure recognition of the ROC government. Even so, Canadian negotiators repeatedly rejected Beijing’s demands to recognize the PRC’s sovereignty claim (Frolic Reference Frolic2022, Ch. 2).

In the landmark October 1970 Canada–PRC normalization communique, Ottawa “recognizes” the PRC “as the sole legal government of China” but merely “takes note of” Beijing’s position on Taiwan. As Mitchell Sharp, then Canada’s foreign secretary, explained to the House of Commons, Ottawa intentionally neither “endorsed” nor “challenged” the PRC’s position. Sharp’s contemporaneous exchanges with opposition party leaders elucidate both how the ROC government’s insistence that it represented “all” of China tied Ottawa’s hands and that, despite that fact, Canada still did not endorse Beijing’s sovereignty claim. Asked whether recognition of the PRC meant Ottawa would break off relations with “the government of Taiwan,” Sharp replied, matter-of-factly, that “there is no government of Taiwan.” He added that Ottawa and Taipei agreed that it is “not possible to recognize simultaneously more than one government as the government of China.” A comment from the New Democratic Party’s leader drove home the broad political support for Canada’s non-endorsement of Beijing’s “one-China principle.” After volunteering that he was “very glad” to support Canada’s diplomatic relations with “mainland China,” he added that “when the government of Taiwan is prepared to state that it is the government of that area, and of that area only, it will be time for the Canadian government to negotiate with that government for diplomatic recognition” (House of Commons (Canada) 1970, 49–51).

Thus, in 1970 Canada became the first democratic U.S. ally to mention “Taiwan” explicitly in a normalization communique – a condition imposed by Beijing to avoid a repeat of what happened with France in 1964 (see Section 4). Even so, even the fairly China-friendly Trudeau government refused to endorse Beijing’s sovereignty claim. Thenceforth, the “Canadian Formula” would become the basis for the U.S. and other democratic allies’ future, similarly ambiguous, positions on “One China.” The long-term consequences for Taiwan’s international space and the cross-Strait status quo were profound.

2.3.2 The 1979 U.S. Position

The U.S. government’s limited acknowledgment (and non-endorsement) of the PRC position in its own normalization communique with Beijing nearly nine years after Canada’s amounted to a political (but not legal) commitment not to actively support a “One China, One Taiwan” or “Two Chinas” framework, or a declaration by Taiwan of de jure independence. Importantly, however, the U.S. formula neither endorsed as a goal nor ruled out the possibilities of either (1) eventual unification with the mainland or (2) independence for and U.S. recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. It is a policy statement implying that Washington is officially neutral on the negotiated outcome, provided it is reached peacefully by the two sides (Romberg Reference Romberg2003, 35).

Accordingly, core pillars of U.S. policy were (and remain) opposition to the use of force and any unilateral change to the status quo – by either side. In 1982, the Reagan administration reaffirmed that “the United States government takes no position on Taiwan’s sovereignty. We regard this as a matter to be determined by the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait” (Bush Reference Bush2004, 121). More than forty years later, at a November 2023 meeting, Biden reportedly conveyed a similar message directly to Xi Jinping, noting, “We do not take a position on the ultimate resolution of cross-Strait differences, provided they are resolved peacefully” (Lawrence Reference Lawrence2024). In short, and as noted later, U.S. administrations of both parties have long considered Taiwan’s current status undetermined and take no position on what its future status should be.

2.3.3 The U.S.’ Effective Taiwan Policy: Substance over Form

In candid moments, even high-ranking U.S. officials such as Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan admit that U.S. Taiwan policy is “not a model of clarity” and is “built on a series of internal tensions.” Yet the U.S. government’s vague position is by design. It has in practice enabled significant policy flexibility in support of what Sullivan defines as the long-standing “practical objective” of U.S. “One China” policy: to “ensure that there are no unilateral changes to the status quo from either side and that we maintain that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” (CNN 2023).

Given Beijing’s long-standing refusal to forswear the use of force or coercion to realize what it calls “reunification,” to achieve these objectives the 1979 TRA authorized “defensive” arms sales to Taiwan and declared it U.S. policy “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States” (“Taiwan Relations Act” 1979).

Meanwhile, the U.S. declaration of an “abiding interest” (Department of State 2022) in the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences not only suggests the possibility of U.S. intervention if Beijing were to use “other than peaceful means” against Taiwan, it also suggests that PRC aggression could be a game-changer in other ways. For instance, after what were then the largest-ever PLA military exercises around Taiwan in March 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated not only that the United States remains committed to “robust unofficial relations” with Taiwan but also that “our ‘one China’ policy is predicated on the PRC’s pursuit of a peaceful resolution of issues between Taipei and Beijing” (Christopher Reference Christopher1996).

2.3.4 Defining Unofficiality

To say U.S. relations with Taiwan are “unofficial” is one thing; to define what “unofficial” – or “robust” – means in practice, and where the effective bounds on “appropriate” policy are, is something entirely different. As Bush notes, “In between the clearly official and clearly unofficial, there are a lot of grey areas.” He highlights four factors that affect U.S. decision-making: consideration of national interests, expected reaction from Beijing, Taiwan’s own policies, and domestic political pressures. (Bush Reference Bush2017, 15–18) As Sections 3 and 4 attest, the same basic logic applies to major U.S. democratic allies.

Early examples of U.S. efforts to preserve what Bush refers to as “the façade of unofficiality” included the decision to set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in 1979 as a private, nongovernmental organization – rather than an official embassy – and the facts that AIT employees for many years had to formally separate from their government agencies before taking up their posts and had to meet their Taiwan counterparts outside government offices (Bush Reference Bush2017, 15). Although by most measures U.S.-Taiwan engagement has become far more robust and transparent over the past forty-five years, efforts are still made to keep up the officially “unofficial” nature of exchanges. For example, recent high-level meetings involving Taiwan’s sitting foreign minister and national security advisor were held not in the U.S. capital of Washington, D.C. but a few miles outside it (Financial Times 2024).

Within the broad and amorphous framework of the U.S.’ post-1979 “One China policy,” U.S. leaders have had ample room to decide practical policies toward Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. These decisions are fundamentally political. They have been shaped by an unavoidable tension between a desire to support Taiwan’s effective autonomy internationally on the one hand, and the twin strategic imperatives to maintain stable ties with the nuclear-armed PRC – today the world’s largest trading state, second-largest economy, second-most powerful military, and a U.S. top-three trading partner – while also reducing the risk of Beijing taking destabilizing actions across the Strait on the other.

Analytically, therefore, one must distinguish between the “form” of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, whereby in officially recognizing only the PRC government the U.S. government since 1979 has adhered to a “One China” policy, and its “substance,” whereby U.S. “unofficial” relations with Taiwan have become increasingly robust over time (Bush Reference Bush2004, 121–22).

In short, U.S. recognition of the PRC in 1979 as the “sole legal government of China” was not tantamount to a U.S. commitment to silence or disinterest about Taiwan or cross-Strait stability; nor did it lock in a particular level or type of engagement with Taipei. On the contrary, over time successive U.S. administrations – often with significant pressure from Congress – have chosen to deepen practical cooperation, including militarily. Seen from Washington, these effective shifts generally have been aimed at maintaining a precarious status quo amid some profound changes, including Taiwan’s democratization, a rapidly changing military balance of power, and Beijing’s increased coercive pressure against Taipei – especially during periods of DPP rule.

The cumulative effect of irregular internal policy reviews, ad hoc executive decisions, and legislation spearheaded by the U.S. Congress, inter alia, is that U.S. efforts to support Taiwan’s international space and peace and stability across the Strait are demonstrably more extensive today than in 1979, 1999, or even 2019. Especially since the 1990s, so, too, are the frequency, level, and nature of bilateral exchanges between government officials and the depth and breadth of military, security, and intelligence cooperation.

Unfortunately, what the overwhelmingly U.S.-centric academic and policy discourse often misses is that key U.S. allies have played a critical support, and at times even leading, role in engaging Taiwan, bolstering its international space, and contributing to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

2.4.1 Step 1: Identify the Government’s Official Position on Taiwan’s Status

What is the allied government’s official position on “One China” as it relates to the sovereignty question? Most fundamentally: upon recognizing the PRC, did the allied government endorse Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan?

Given Beijing’s frequent assertions that the U.S. and its major democratic treaty allies are violating past commitments to the PRC’s “one-China principle,” whether each government actually endorsed Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan upon recognizing the PRC is fundamental to any objective analysis of U.S. allies’ positions and policies. Indeed, the U.S. case demonstrates how an ambiguous position can be a key enabler of “robust unofficial” relations with Taiwan and how Washington pursues its “practical objective” vis-à-vis the Taiwan Strait. It may also have potential legal implications if China were ever to openly aggress against Taiwan.

In most cases examined in Sections 3 and 4, the allied government’s official position on “One China” is formalized in a unilateral declaration or joint communiqué with the PRC. Regardless of the form, the positions themselves are unilateral statements of policy; that is, they are political positions, not consensus or legally binding agreements with or commitments to Beijing. This matters not only in the abstract or when thinking about potential futures, but also because a few cases reveal subtle but noteworthy shifts – even decades after recognizing Beijing.

2.4.2 Step 2: Identify How Leaders Have Chosen to Operationalize That Official Position

In the absence of official diplomatic relations with Taipei, to what extent and how have subsequent generations of political leaders in the allied government developed unofficial relations with Taiwan in terms of concrete policies and official rhetoric, the nature, degree, and extent of bilateral or multilateral engagement and cooperation, and as measured in statements/actions in support of Taiwan’s international space and the cross-Strait status quo?

The second step entails a significantly higher empirical hurdle: examining the historical and contemporary record in each case to identify the practical substance of the allied government’s rhetoric and effective policies toward Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

The U.S. example is again illustrative of why this second step is also essential. Though in terms of having major domestic legislation (the TRA) at the heart of official policy the U.S. case is sui generis, Washington’s evolving approach across successive administrations nevertheless provides a useful baseline and menu of candidate metrics upon which to assess variability in allies’ approaches. Though each ally’s approach has unique features, in the interest of space, policy relevance, and analytical tractability – especially, the importance of comparing apples to apples – this study’s analysis privileges several key indicators (Table 2).

Given the extreme sensitivities in Beijing regarding what its leaders consider to be “at the heart of China’s core interests,” intentional ambiguity and subtlety permeate U.S. positions and policies vis-à-vis Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Unsurprisingly, the same is generally true to even greater degree for U.S. allies and partners – almost all of whom can today be considered objectively “weaker” relative to Beijing in terms of material power and, in several cases, have far deeper economic interests vis-à-vis China than the United States. Empirical clarity is further frustrated by the unique circumstances of each case, widely varying domestic politics, the strong preference of all U.S. allies to avoid unnecessarily provoking Beijing on the extremely sensitive “issue” of Taiwan, the tendency of some governments to quietly do more than they are willing to say on-the-record, and the not infrequent public statements by politicians at odds with official policy. Given these challenges, the scholar can only do their best, inevitably imperfect though it may be. Simply put, Step 2 is an inherently messy, but necessary, business.

2.4.3 The Necessity of Both Steps

To enable a complete understanding of U.S. allies’ effective policies toward Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, both steps of the analytical framework are necessary. In this and future studies of these or additional cases, it is extremely important to treat the second question as analytically distinct from the first.

Conflating the two would be problematic in both principle and practice. As the evolution of effective U.S. engagement vis-à-vis Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait after 1979 shows, the form a static, decades-old official position on “One China” takes can be a poor predictor of the future substance of actual policy. Accordingly, scholars should not “prebake” into the analytical framework an assumption of direct or consistent correlation – much less causation – between an allied government’s abstract, decades-old official position on Taiwan’s status and the extent of its willingness (or lack thereof) to develop robust “unofficial” and practical ties with Taiwan, support its international space, or assert an interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

As Sections 3 and 4 demonstrate, some allied governments maintain an official position on “One China” similarly vague to that of the U.S. but choose to severely limit practical engagement with and support for Taiwan. Conversely, some allied governments have shifted official rhetoric on Taiwan’s status closer to Beijing’s preferences than the United States has but nevertheless adopt relatively forward-leaning policies and rhetoric in support of Taiwan. In short, neglecting either of the two steps risks potentially erroneous prejudgments about a determinative causal link between official position (form) and effective policy (substance) that risks inappropriately skewing the analysis.

3.1.1 The Origins and Post-1972 Evolution of Japan’s Approach to Taiwan

In signing a separate peace treaty with the ROC government in 1952 and seeking out a possible “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” solution to the cross-Strait dispute, during the early Cold War Japan’s leaders firmly aligned with Washington. Nevertheless, Nixon’s shocking July 1971 announcement that he planned to visit China the following year, about which Japan’s prime minister had mere minutes’ advance warning, caused Tokyo to significantly accelerate the increase of its unofficial engagement of the PRC. Tokyo switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing more than six years earlier than Washington. Although the September 1972 Japan–PRC normalization communique meant the end of official Japan–ROC diplomatic relations, four decisions by Japanese leaders immediately before and after carried profound long-term consequences for Taiwan’s international space and cross-Strait stability.

First, for historical, geopolitical, and geographical reasons it was especially meaningful that Japan’s government refused to explicitly endorse Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, despite a clear desire among Japanese leaders to expand economic and political engagement with the PRC (and significant political and business pressure to do so). Ultimately, in the 1972 communique Japan recognized the PRC as the “sole legal government of China” but merely expressed its “full understanding and respect” of Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan (Gaimushō 1972).Footnote ⁵ It did not endorse that position.

Second, even after recognizing the PRC Tokyo insisted on maintaining de facto, if officially “nongovernmental,” ties with Taiwan by establishing in Taipei a euphemistically named “Exchange Association” (kōryū kyōkai) to serve as a kind of de facto embassy. This was an extraordinarily significant development. An Australian secret cable three months later revealed that Beijing had been deeply concerned that Japan’s move would set a precedent for other U.S. allies to follow (Doran and Lee Reference Doran and Lee2002, 828). That concern proved well-founded. Indeed, the so-called “Japan Formula” set the precedent for, inter alia, the euphemistically named foreign representative offices that the United States and other U.S. allies would establish in Taipei years later (Hirakawa Reference Hirakawa2006; Liff Reference Liff2022b).

Third, in institutionalizing in 1973 a pipeline for frequent exchanges between ruling party legislators close to their respective governments – the Japanese Diet Members’ Council for Japan-ROC Relations (Nikka giin kondankai) – Japanese politicians carved out space for meaningful, if ostensibly nongovernmental, diplomacy and dialogue with leaders in Taiwan, despite the absence of official relations. It was another trailblazing move.

Fourth, as discussed in greater detail below, by the mid-1970s Japan publicly adopted an official position calling for “peaceful resolution” (heiwateki kaiketsu) of the cross-Strait dispute.

In all four of the aforementioned decisions, Tokyo acted years before the United States had even recognized Beijing, much less established AIT or sent its first post-switch congressional delegation to Taiwan.

Why did PRC leaders grudgingly “allow” Japan to circumvent Beijing’s initial conditions for diplomatic normalization as it concerned Taiwan? The answer is politics or, more precisely, shifting geopolitical and economic interests. In the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing’s twin desires to work with the United States and Japan to contain the Soviet Union and receive from Washington and Tokyo massive economic investment and knowhow trumped other concerns. The PRC’s grudging consent to omit Taiwan from all three post-1972 “political documents” that it regularly identifies as “defining” Japan–PRC relations further consolidated this effective status quo, which basically persists to this day. (Liff Reference Liff2022b) A half-century after the 1972 communique, Japan’s official position on the sovereignty question remains that it has no legal position (Matsuda Reference Yasuhiro, Shin, Urara, Yasuhiro and Yongming2020, 247).

Though Japan’s government today continues to state publicly that its relations with Taiwan are “non-governmental and practical” (hiseifukan no jitsumu kankei) (Gaimushō 2023a, 51), the idea that the relationship is exclusively economic and cultural is a convenient fiction. Especially since the 1990s, Japan and Taiwan have carried out incrementally more meaningful quasi-diplomacy and cooperation through, inter alia, the de facto embassies on each other’s soil and frequent exchanges of ruling party politicians. For instance, in the twenty-first century many former Japanese prime ministers and former Cabinet ministers have visited Taiwan after resigning their positions. Meanwhile, economic and people-to-people ties are also robust; in recent years, Japan has also been Taiwan’s fourth-largest source of FDI (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2023).

As for Japan’s policies vis-a-vis cross-Strait peace and stability, for most of the latter half of the twentieth century Tokyo effectively delegated deterrence to Taipei and Washington. Nevertheless, Japan contributed indirectly by allowing the United States to forward-deploy tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel on Japanese soil – especially in nearby Okinawa – and through rhetorical signals at key moments. For example, in a 1969 U.S.-Japan summit-level communique, Japan’s prime minister unilaterally stated “that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan” (New York Times 1969). Even after recognizing Beijing three years later, the Japanese government repeatedly asserted an interest in “peaceful resolution” of cross-Strait differences (Fujita Reference Naotaka2021). Its refusal to endorse Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan also enabled Tokyo to maintain a definition of “the Far East” – a key phrase in the 1960 U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty – that includes “the Taiwan area.” After 1972, Beijing pressured Tokyo to change the definition but Tokyo refusedFootnote ⁶ (Liff Reference Liff2022a, 136–41).

Major PLA military exercises in March 1996 in and around the Taiwan Strait included missiles splashing down in waters near Japanese islands. These provocative exercises, coupled with new frictions on the Korean Peninsula owing to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, contributed to Tokyo’s decision to negotiate new bilateral “Guidelines for Defense Cooperation” with its U.S. ally. These guidelines noted the possibility of allied cooperation in a “situation in areas surrounding Japan,” a vague phrase that left it deliberately ambiguous whether Japan might provide “rear-area” (read: mostly logistical) support to U.S. forces if a cross-Strait conflict occurred. (Barring an attack on Japan itself, however, a JSDF combat role remained off the table.) Although extremely limited, some unofficial security links developed subsequently. For example, in 2003 Tokyo began quietly dispatching a (retired) JSDF officer to Taipei to serve as a de facto defense attaché. And in 2005 it issued a joint statement with its U.S. ally identifying “peaceful resolution” of the cross-Strait dispute as a “common strategic objective” (Liff Reference Liff2022a, 141–44).

3.1.2 The Contemporary Situation

In recent years, the ambiguity of Japan’s unchanged 1972 official position has enabled a substantial expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation, significant flexibility in nominally “nongovernmental” engagements, official rhetoric more supportive of Taiwan’s international space, and more frequent expressions of concern about cross-Strait peace and stability. For example, Taipei and Tokyo have signed numerous bilateral agreements and launched annual maritime cooperation dialogues involving representatives from the two sides’ de facto embassies and government officials (Shimizu Reference Urara, Shin, Urara, Yasuhiro and Yongming2020). Meanwhile, exchanges between parliamentarians have become more frequent, higher-level, and increasingly substantive; for instance, visits by Japanese Diet members now often involve meetings with Taiwan’s sitting president. This was symbolically demonstrated when a 31-member delegation of Nikkakon members representing all Japan’s political parties (except Japan’s Communist Party) not only attended President Lai’s May 2024 inauguration but was also invited to a luncheon with both Lai and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (Fōkasu Taiwan, 2024).

Dialogue on security issues has also increased, albeit primarily through legislative channels. For example, the LDP and DPP held the first-ever inter-ruling party security dialogue in 2021. In 2023 then-LDP vice president (and former prime minister) Asō Tarō became the highest-ranking ruling party leader to ever visit Taiwan. Though representing his party and not Japan’s government, Asō’s visit included bold rhetoric on the threat to Taiwan and a meeting with President Tsai (Kyodo 2023a).

A shifting political calculus in Tokyo also means some steps previously dismissed as too provocative or connotative of “official” exchange or recognition are now judged “appropriate.” For example, in 2017 Japan dispatched the highest-level government representative since 1972 – a deputy minister – to visit Taiwan and added “Japan-Taiwan” to the Exchange Association’s official name. This followed a series of decisions after 2012 to stop referring to Taiwan in Japan’s official diplomatic bluebook as merely an “economic region” and instead grant it political status and agency as an “extremely crucial partner and an important friend, with which [Japan] shares universal values.” In recent years, Japan’s Foreign Ministry also has congratulated Taiwan’s president-elect after democratic elections and abandoned the practice of placing scare quotes around “president” (Gaimushō 2023a, 51; Liff Reference Liff2022b).

In terms of Taiwan’s international space, Japan’s leaders now regularly express support for Taipei’s participation in both international organizations for which statehood is not a requirement and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership – a major multilateral trade agreement. Tokyo has also ramped up coordination with the United States and other U.S. allies. For example, in 2019 Japan became the first non-founding member of the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), started by the United States and Taiwan in 2015 as a “platform through which Taiwan could contribute to global problem solving and share its expertise with partners across the region” (Liff Reference Liff2022b). And the 2023 G7 summit – of which Japan was host – released a statement calling for “Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations” (G7 2023a).

Regarding cross-Strait peace and stability, recent years have witnessed a remarkable mainstreaming in Japan of concerns about the risk a potential conflict poses to Japan. Following the April 2021 U.S.-Japan joint statement’s first-ever summit-level reference to “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” the allies have worked to multilateralize similar expressions of concern and, consistent with Japan’s half-century-old position, calls for “peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues” (e.g., White House 2021b). Japan’s authoritative national security and defense documents now regularly emphasize linkages between cross-Strait peace, Japan’s own security, and the stability of “the international community” (e.g., Bōeishō 2021). Japanese media have even claimed that the United States and Japan are developing their first-ever classified joint operational plan for a Taiwan contingency (Mainichi Shimbun 2023). Although an alleged plan’s mere existence would not indicate a concrete, much less binding, commitment to take any particular action in a conflict, it nevertheless suggests unprecedentedly severe concerns in Tokyo about cross-Strait stability and willingness to bolster deterrence jointly with the United States. In 2023 and 2024, Japan even reportedly took the historic steps of dispatching a civilian Ministry of Defense official to the Exchange Association in Taipei, sailing a destroyer through the Taiwan Strait, and holding a joint coast guard search and rescue drill (Kyodo 2023b; Yomiuri 2024).

Although all the aforementioned developments demonstrate practically meaningful shifts in Japan’s concerns about and approaches toward Taiwan and cross-Strait peace and stability, it is important to recognize that significant caution still obtains in Tokyo out of concern for possible backlash from Beijing, Japan’s next-door neighbor and top trading partner. For example, despite being widely considered Taiwan’s most important international partner after the United States, and France, Germany, Canada, Australia, and many other U.S. allies having dispatched their first Cabinet-level official to Taiwan by 1993, Japan did not take a similar step until 2017 – and only at the deputy minister level. Taiwan’s sitting president does not “transit” through Japan, as recent presidents have done through the United States. And although it has some new holes, the effective political firewall limiting direct military-military or security engagement between governments remains significant. Widespread media hype to the contrary, Japan has not carried out intergovernmental “2+2” security dialogues or seriously considered a “Japanese TRA.” Nor has it sold military platforms to Taiwan. And contrary to widespread claims since 2021 that Tokyo has somehow committed to defend Taiwan, the Japanese government continues to adopt a posture best summed up as strategic ambiguity and to view deterrence primarily through a U.S.-Japan alliance lens (Liff Reference Liff2022a).

In sum, this brief survey reveals the extent to which – even as Japan’s official position on Taiwan remains frozen in 1972 and its government continues to claim only “working relations at the non-governmental level” (Gaimushō 2023a, 51) – the “line” separating what is politically acceptable versus unacceptable to leaders in Tokyo vis-à-vis Taiwan is subjectively defined and subject to Japanese leaders’ evolving interpretations of international and domestic political dynamics. By any objective measure, the degree and nature of Tokyo’s engagement with Taipei, and with issues related to the Taiwan Strait, have changed in both symbolically and practically significant ways over the past half-century. Nevertheless, it is also important not to exaggerate the pace, scale, and significance of these changes. For this study, what matter most are Japan’s trail-blazing steps in the 1970s and the remarkable flexibility in Japan’s effective Taiwan policy and rhetoric, all of which remains – in the Japanese government’s official political judgment – fully consistent with the 1972 Japan–PRC communique.

3.2.1 The Origins and Post-1972 Evolution of Australia’s Approach to Taiwan

After the PRC was established in October 1949, Australia joined the United States and most other non-Communist nations in not recognizing the new Communist regime. Skepticism about and frictions with the authoritarian KMT regime in Taiwan, however, contributed to Canberra’s decision not to establish an embassy in Taipei until 1966. Nevertheless, Australia did support the 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty and the ROC maintained an embassy in Canberra and consulates in Sydney and Melbourne (Doran and Lee Reference Doran and Lee2002, 86; Klintworth Reference Klintworth1993, 1–6).

Australian skepticism of the ROC regime after 1949 should not be mistaken for a judgment that Taiwan belonged to the PRC, however. On the contrary, before 1972 Australian governments explored possibilities for “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” and self-determination for “Formosa” and “the people of Taiwan” (Atkinson Reference Atkinson2013, chap. 2; Doran and Lee Reference Doran and Lee2002, xxii–xxvi). Atkinson sums up Australia’s goal during the early Cold War as “centered on an effort to create an independent Taiwan, either Taiwanese-majority controlled or an independent Republic of China on Taiwan ruled by the Chinese Nationalists and the mainland Chinese minority.” In other words, many in Canberra hoped for “a government in Taipei that would assert de jure independent status for Taiwan – whether controlled by the Taiwanese majority or Chinese Nationalists that had dropped their claim” to the mainland. Indeed, in 1970 Australia’s UN representative declared that Canberra’s “objective” was to allow the PRC to participate in the UN “while preserving separate membership, under whatever name, for the [ROC] and Taiwan” (Atkinson Reference Atkinson2013, 2–3; 30–34; 38).

A secret February 1971 Cabinet decision stated Australia’s objective plainly: “It should be Australian policy that the interests of the people of Taiwan be upheld and that Taiwan should be preserved as a separate entity and as a member of the United Nations if it so desires.” Throughout 1971 and 1972 the Australian government repeatedly tried to defend the ROC’s membership in the UN General Assembly and pursued an “effective ‘two Chinas’ formula” (Doran and Lee Reference Doran and Lee2002, xvii–xxix; 395).

After Nixon’s February 1972 visit to Beijing, Canberra followed Japan and many others in switching official recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Nevertheless, Australian negotiators rejected Beijing’s demand that Canberra recognize the PRC’s position that Taiwan was “a province of China.” In the December 1972 Australia–PRC communique, Australia adopted the closest modification of the Canadian formula that Beijing would accept – “acknowledg[ing] the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China,” without endorsing Beijing’s claim. (Canberra considered Canada’s “take note of” and its “acknowledge” – the word the United States had used several months earlier in the Shanghai Communique – as basically synonymous.) A secret cable even highlighted “no direct grammatical connexion … between the territorial issue of Taiwan and the removal of official representation.” Canberra’s refusal to endorse Beijing’s position was no accident. The government’s position held that “the removal of representation is a necessary consequence of recognizing the PRC Government as the sole legal Government of China and has nothing to do with the territorial issue of Taiwan” (Doran and Lee Reference Doran and Lee2002, 827).

After 1972, it would thenceforth be left to Australia’s political leaders to determine how to operationalize Canberra’s ambiguous official position on “One China” and to define what it would mean in practice for “unofficial” Australia-Taiwan relations. The beginning was inauspicious for Taiwan. Against the backdrop of U.S.-PRC rapprochement and strategic realignment against the Soviet Union, Canberra unilaterally imposed numerous, strict restraints on exchanges with Taiwan, effectively limiting bilateral engagement to “the bare minimum required to sustain trade” (Atkinson Reference Atkinson2013, 41–47).

By the 1980s, however, Taiwan’s blistering GDP growth incentivized Australian leaders to engage Taipei more robustly as an economic and trading partner and source of investment. Furthermore, Beijing’s globally televised, deadly crackdown on protesters in June 1989 – most famously in Tiananmen Square – contrasted sharply with Taiwan’s end of martial law and rapid democratization. Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans predicted that “Tiananmen” would have consequences for foreign governments’ ties with Taiwan, suggesting – presciently – that countries “that already trade widely with Taiwan[] may feel less inhibited in increasing their contacts with Taiwan in other areas, though stopping short of switching diplomatic recognition” (Evans Reference Evans1989, 282).

Sure enough, Australia gradually loosened self-imposed restrictions on exchanges with Taiwan; for example, staffing its de facto representative office in Taipei – the euphemistically named “Australian Commerce and Industry Office” (ACIO) – with government officials “on leave.” Australia–Taiwan ties continued to deepen in the 1990s, as Canberra allowed “unofficial” ministerial visits and direct government contacts, sent a DFAT official to head ACIO, lifted restrictions on sales of nonlethal weapons to Taiwan, and signed multiple bilateral agreements with Taipei. In 1992, Canberra gave Taipei permission to open a Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) – a significant upgrade over the vague and euphemistic “Far East Trading Company” name given to its earlier representative offices in Melbourne and Sydney. Canberra allowed TECO staff to have direct contacts with Australian officials and granted them diplomatic privileges and immunities. TECO even began issuing visas with an “ROC” stamp. This de facto upgrading of Australia’s relations with Taiwan continued with the first “unofficial” Australian ministerial visit to Taiwan in 1992 (Atkinson Reference Atkinson2013, 47–57; Klintworth Reference Klintworth1993, 109–14).

Throughout this period support for Taiwan’s international engagement and cross-Strait peace and stability also grew. For example, Australia supported Taiwan’s involvement in the GATT and APEC (Atkinson Reference Atkinson2013, 55–56). And in 1996, Australia and Japan were the only two regional governments to publicly support the U.S. response to the PLA’s large-scale military exercises in the weeks leading up to Taiwan’s first-ever direct presidential election. Canberra also called on Beijing and Taipei to “resolve differences without a resort to military force” (MacKerras Reference MacKerras2000).

In aggregate, these incremental shifts marked the late 1980s/early 1990s as a practical inflection point in Australia’s officially “unofficial” ties with Taiwan. Importantly, these shifts all occurred nearly two decades after the Australia–PRC normalization communique, and without any changes to Canberra’s ambiguous official 1972 position on “One China.”

In short, by the end of the twentieth century Australia had in practical ways begun treating Taiwan as a political entity distinct from the PRC for all but official political and diplomatic purposes. Writing in 1993, Klintworth summed up Australia’s position thus: “officially one China, and unofficially one China and one Republic of China on Taiwan. It is a two Chinas policy presented as one China, the kind of practical policy approach that Australia has sought to implement since 1949” (Klintworth Reference Klintworth1993, 132).

3.2.2 The Contemporary Situation

The July 2020 U.S.–Australia “2+2” (AUSMIN) statement was a very public, high-level reflection of how much views of Taiwan in Canberra have changed since the Cold War. It contained a full paragraph about Taiwan, which granted Taipei political status and agency by noting “Taiwan’s important role in the Indo-Pacific.” It committed Canberra and Washington to “maintain strong unofficial ties with Taiwan; to support its membership in international organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite” and its “meaningful participation” where it is; and to “strengthen [their] … resolve to support Taiwan.” Lastly, it also stated that “any resolution of cross-Strait differences should be peaceful and according to the will of the people on both sides, without resorting to threats or coercion” (DFAT 2020).

In the years since, Canberra has released additional joint statements with the United States, France, and other U.S. allies making similar calls. It continues to quietly carry out Taiwan Strait transits with naval vessels and followed Japan to become the GCTF’s fourth official member in 2021. It has also reportedly increased engagement with the United States to consider possible coordination/cooperation in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Perhaps most famously, in 2021 Defense Minister Peter Dutton made global headlines when he stated in an unscripted moment that “It would be inconceivable that we wouldn’t support the US” if the United States came to Taiwan’s aid in a conflict (McGregor Reference McGregor2023). In terms of political and economic exchange, since 2020 cross-party delegations from Australia’s Parliament have increased and two-way trade has tripled. Australia became Taiwan’s top energy and mineral supplier, and Taiwan became Australia’s fourth-largest destination for exports and fifth-largest trading partner (Taiwan Today 2023).

Though these developments are undoubtedly significant, a comprehensive look at Australia’s post–Cold War approach to Taiwan reveals that the trajectory is neither inevitably linear nor unidirectional. As in other cases, the available evidence suggests that Australia’s political leaders remain cautious about engaging Taiwan in several areas – sometimes even more so than in the past. And consideration of how China – far and away Australia’s top trading partner – may react appears to loom large in Canberra’s calculus.

A few examples: Although Australian ministers with limited portfolios – for example, economics, trade, and/or energy – began visiting Taiwan in the mid-1990s, such public visits ceased after 2012. Whereas close neighbor New Zealand signed an FTA with Taiwan in 2013, Australia reportedly abandoned efforts to do so after warnings from Beijing, making Taiwan Australia’s largest trading partner with which it does not have an FTA. Nor does Canberra appear as openly supportive of Taiwan joining CPTPP as Japan. Security-wise, Dutton’s global-headline-generating 2021 comment has not since been repeated. And Canberra reportedly turned down requests from Taipei to exchange de facto defense attachés (McGregor Reference McGregor2023).

In short, there is an observable deepening of Australia’s engagement with and rhetorical support of Taiwan in some contexts and domains, but greater caution in others, especially bilaterally. This is hardly surprising or unique to Canberra. Rather, it is a testament to the complicated tradeoffs that all governments face when balancing interests vis-à-vis Taipei and Beijing. Simply put, with an official position on “One China” unchanged since 1972, the practical operationalization of the stated goals and means by which Canberra pursues “strong unofficial ties” with Taiwan have always been largely what Australian leaders judge they should be. Political calculation of national interests looms large.

The administration of Labor MP Anthony Albanese (2022–) is the latest to try to strike a balance as it seeks to improve ties with Beijing following a historically bad five-year period in Australia–PRC relations. As for the Taiwan Strait, administration officials have emphasized Australia’s role as convincing others to “lower the heat on any potential conflict.” In a major speech in April 2023, Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong highlighted that “war over Taiwan would be catastrophic for all,” adding,

3.3.1 The Origins and Post-1992 Evolution of South Korea’s Approach to Taiwan

After the Soviet Union’s collapse (1991) and the ROK’s and DPRK’s simultaneous admissions into the United Nations (1992), it was, ironically, Seoul’s first democratic government that switched diplomatic recognition from the rapidly democratizing ROC to the communist-led PRC. Adopting the by then well-worn playbook of Canada, Japan, Australia, and the United States, in the August 1992 ROK–PRC normalization communique Seoul accepted “that the PRC [is] the sole legal Government of China,” but refused to endorse Beijing’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Instead, Seoul allowed only that it “respects the position of the Chinese side that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” – without taking a clear position itself.Footnote ⁸

Seoul’s decision in 1992 not to endorse Beijing’s “one-China principle” was no accident. In his 2003 memoir, Korea’s foreign minister during the negotiations notes that Beijing pressured Seoul to explicitly recognize Taiwan as part of the PRC. But it refused to do so. (Lee Reference Lee2003, 215–16) Also important: Even after severing official diplomatic relations with the ROC, President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993) called for Seoul to honor its historically close ties with Taipei by establishing “the highest level of unofficial relations” that would be both “substantive” and the “best” possible (Chen Reference Chen2008) – an implicit recognition of the distinction between form and substance.

As the last-mover among major U.S. treaty allies, after 1992 Seoul had numerous models and precedents from which to choose when deciding what those “unofficial relations” would look like in practice. Or its leaders could establish their own. And they did, at least initially. Seoul became the only U.S. ally to name its representative office in Taipei a “mission” – a term with clear diplomatic connotations. It also maintained some military contacts with Taiwan, including a military officer exchange program that continued until Beijing forced its cancellation in 2011 (Taipei Times 2011). And the ROK military reportedly even continued to station a “liaison officer” at Korea’s Taipei-based mission (Cho Reference Cho2021).

3.3.2 The Contemporary Situation

Those notable developments aside, with the benefit of 30-plus years of hindsight the practical substance of Korea’s effective Taiwan policy today appears to have fallen short of Roh’s ambitious call for “the highest level of unofficial relations.” Seoul’s public engagement with Taiwan and advocacy for Taiwan’s international space and, at least until recently, cross-Strait peace and stability, have been relatively limited – even when compared to the other cases in this section, to say nothing of its U.S. ally.

Although Seoul and Taipei today are top-five trading partners (ITA 2023) and hold working-level dialogues, ROK leaders appear far more reluctant than their counterparts in Tokyo, Canberra, and several other major U.S. democratic allies to speak out in support of Taiwan or its international space. This holds even in the case of those international organizations where Beijing previously “allowed” Taiwan to participate as an observer – such as the World Health Assembly. Furthermore, recent ROK leader rhetoric and official diplomatic and defense white papers have conspicuously avoided substantive discussions of Korea–Taiwan relations, Taiwan’s international space, or ROK interests in either. Nor, and also in contrast to Canberra and Tokyo, does ROK official government rhetoric express a clear interest in deepening “nongovernmental” ties with Taiwan or supporting its “meaningful participation” in international organizations.Footnote ⁹ And in terms of political exchange, prominent visits by political leaders to Taipei are rare: The focus remains quasi-annual visits by the ROK-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Association (e.g., South China Morning Post 2023). Also distinct from several other U.S. allies, neither the Korean government nor Korea’s National Assembly has unambiguously expressed its support for Taiwan’s international space. (Lee and Liff Reference Chaewon and Liff2023)

Taiwan’s leaders appear to have taken note of Korea’s reluctance to publicly risk Beijing’s ire by engaging on these issues. In her 2021 National Day speech thanking “democratic friends willing to stand up for us,” President Tsai did not reference Seoul, but did mention Tokyo, Canberra, the EU, the G7, NATO, and Washington. (Tsai Reference Tsai2021) Taiwan’s foreign minister later publicly complained that “Korea has inked an economic agreement or engaged in related negotiations with all of its top 10 trading partners except Taiwan” (Korea Times 2024).

Regarding cross-Strait frictions the story was largely the same until 2021, when Biden and President Moon Jae-in released a joint statement that – while conspicuously avoiding any reference to Taiwan itself – included a sentence “emphasiz[ing] the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” (White House 2021c). While still avoiding specific reference to “Taiwan” in official statements, the unabashedly “pro-U.S.” and “pro-Japan” Yoon Suk-yeol administration (2022–) has gone even further, flagging the “importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” as both an international issue and one linked to “peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula” (ROK Government 2022, 28). At the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral summit in August 2023 Seoul for the first time signed on to a statement calling for “peaceful resolution” of cross-Strait issues – adopting language Tokyo and Washington have used for decades (White House 2023b). Although Korean leaders appear to still be reluctant to issue statements expressing support for Taiwan itself and/or its international space, since 2021 leaders in Seoul have begun aligning official rhetoric on the importance of cross-Strait peace and stability with that of other U.S. allies.

Even so, Seoul has long quietly resisted U.S. calls for the U.S.-ROK alliance to play a more robust regional security role, or to hold talks about possible coordination in an off-Peninsula contingency over Taiwan. Facing an existential threat from its nuclear-armed northern neighbor, since the Korean War – which has never officially ended – Seoul’s long-standing preference has been to keep the alliance’s strategic and operational focus on the Korean Peninsula while also avoiding rhetoric or policies that risk unnecessarily antagonizing China – on whose economy Korea is highly dependent and whose cooperation is necessary to address Seoul’s manifold concerns about North Korea (Liff Reference Liff2024; NEAR 2023, 57–58).

Although some scholars (e.g., Mastro and Cho Reference Mastro and Cho2022; Park Reference Park2022) now call for the ROK to support the U.S. military defending Taiwan through “rear-area” (noncombat) support of the sort that Japan has publicly considered since the mid-1990s, this concept is new to the US-ROK alliance and not something for which the allies have traditionally trained. Despite some recent claims to the contrary, there does not appear to be much mainstream political support in Seoul for this kind of cooperation, or even for U.S. forces in Korea to play a role in the event of a cross-Strait contingency. Public rhetoric from high-ranking Yoon government officials – including the president himself – has consistently emphasized that Seoul’s priority both for its military and for the U.S.-ROK alliance is deterring a possible North Korean provocation (e.g., CNN 2023; Liff Reference Liff2024).

4.1.1 The Origins and Post-1950 Evolution of the UK’s Approach to Taiwan

In January 1950, just three months after the PRC’s establishment, the UK government recognized the new communist regime headquartered in Beijing as “the de jure Government of China.” London’s reasons were manifold, and included its desires to protect its vast economic interests in China and to safeguard its colony in Hong Kong (Tsang Reference Tsang1994, 105–106). Given the UK’s own concerns about Communism and its unique status as the sole additional cosigner – alongside the United States and ROC – of the wartime Cairo Declaration,Footnote ¹¹ London’s public break with Washington was significant. It also gave the UK the distinction of being the first major Western power and first U.S. treaty ally to recognize Mao’s nascent communist regime. Given the UK’s unique “first-mover” status, this case study focuses primarily on the origins and substance of London’s position on Taiwan’s status after recognizing the PRC.

Although it is common knowledge that in recognizing the PRC London broke with its wartime allies (the United States and ROC), less widely appreciated is that the UK government did so without recognizing the PRC claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. In fact, the UK Foreign Secretary’s unilateral note conferring recognition on Beijing – there was no bilaterally negotiated communique – avoided even mentioning “Taiwan” (New York Times 1950). Furthermore, London’s maintenance of a diplomatic consulate near Taipei angered China’s leaders and severely damaged the nascent UK–PRC relationship. As a result, the UK and PRC would not reach a formal agreement to exchange chargés d’affaires until 1954, and they would not establish full ambassador-level diplomatic relations until 1972.

Whereas both the PRC and ROC have long sought to buttress their respective claims of sovereignty over Taiwan by citing the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the UK government’s official position is that this wartime document was “merely a statement of intention … [that] … cannot by itself transfer sovereignty.” As 1955 testimony in the House of Commons demonstrates, in London’s official judgment:

According to Michael Reilly, London’s representative in Taipei from 2005 to 2009, after 1945 the UK government considered Taiwan to be “under military occupation by China,” and “would not recognize that the government of China yet had a right to confer their nationality on the inhabitants of Taiwan” (Reilly Reference Reilly2020, 83). It considered Taiwan to be Japanese territory until 1952, at which point Japan renounced its title to Taiwan but – importantly – did not transfer it to either “China” (Bush Reference Bush2004, 93). As Reilly summarizes London’s official position then and now:

During the foundational 1950–1958 period, Steve Tsang notes that British leaders did not consider continued recognition of the ROC regime – an issue distinct from whether Taiwan and the people living on it were part of a greater “China” – essential for achieving their more fundamental objective: keeping Taiwan out of CCP control. Indeed, to both Mao’s and Chiang Kai-shek’s dismay, the UK initially sought to keep “all options open for a future solution to the problem of Taiwan, ranging from independent statehood, a United Nations trusteeship, to a continuation of the existing Kuomintang government under Chiang” (Tsang Reference Tsang1994).

Nevertheless, as introduced in Section 2, Chiang’s tight grip on power, his steadfast adherence to the KMT/ROC government’s own version of the “one-China principle,” and his stated desire to “reunify” China under the KMT banner made the prospect of Taiwan’s “independence” from China and/or “self-determination” for the people in Taiwan nonstarters in Taipei. Eventually, British policy “drift[ed] towards a de facto two-China situation,” with leaders prioritizing the cross-Strait status quo. Also contributing to this outcome were shifting geopolitics after the 1950–1953 Korean War (which saw British and Chinese troops fighting on opposing sides), London’s desire to maintain positive ties with its U.S. ally, and Chiang’s effective abandonment in 1958 of his goal to retake the Chinese mainland by force (Tsang Reference Tsang1994).

By the early 1970s, however, international political winds had shifted again. After PRC representatives were admitted into the UN (1971) and Nixon concluded his historic 1972 visit to China, London negotiated a bilateral communique with Beijing in which it agreed to remove its “official representation in Taiwan.” In return, Beijing allowed an exchange of ambassadors. Even so, UK leaders still refused to endorse the PRC’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan: In the March 1972 joint communique London adopted a version of the Canadian formula that merely “acknowledges the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the [PRC]” (emphasis added). (Hansard 1972) It avoids explicitly stating the UK’s own official position: that Taiwan’s status is undetermined.

Especially as a first mover, close U.S. treaty ally, and signatory of the Cairo Declaration, the UK’s choices before and after 1950 had profound consequences for Taiwan. If the UK had actually endorsed the PRC’s sovereignty claim in 1950 or 1972, perhaps due to concerns about Hong Kong or its extensive and growing economic interests in China, it almost certainly would have severely limited options for the United States and its other allies during their own normalization negotiations with Beijing – to say nothing of the significant implications for the people in Taiwan. But British leaders chose not to do so.

4.1.2 The Contemporary Situation

Fifty years after 1972, the UK and Taiwan maintain fruitful, if “unofficial,” ties centered on de facto representative offices, parliamentary exchanges, and trade, inter alia. London’s official position on Taiwan’s status remains unchanged since the 1950s. Nevertheless, reflecting trends that manifest across most U.S. ally cases, practical bilateral engagement has deepened – especially after the 1980s. Over the past decade, in particular, the UK government and Parliament have both become increasingly outspoken about Taiwan and cross-Strait peace and stability.

Since the late 1980s, London and Taipei have gradually expanded de facto ties, including upgrading unofficial representation in their respective capitals. In 1993, London renamed its “Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee,” which began issuing visas in June 1989, as “the British Trade and Cultural Office.” The latter was further upgraded and renamed “British Office Taipei” in 2015. The British-Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary Group, established in 1976, has expanded to roughly 140 members. Recent years have witnessed an uptick in high-level visits: for example, over the past decade the UK’s Lord Speaker and members of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee have visited Taiwan and the President of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has visited the UK (TRO UK 2024). Meanwhile, the UK trade minister met with President Tsai in Taipei in 2022, while Taiwan’s Digital Minister visited London in June 2023 and met with Britain’s security minister (Reuters 2023e).

Regarding support for Taiwan’s international space and cross-Strait peace and stability today, UK expressions of interest and concern are increasingly mainstream and appear basically aligned with the United States and other major allies. As an FCDO Minister noted in 2020, the UK and Taiwan have “a strong unofficial relationship based on dynamic commercial, educational and cultural ties,” adding that “We regularly lobby in favour of Taiwan’s participation in international organisations where statehood is not a prerequisite, and we make clear our concerns about any activity that risks destabilising the cross-strait status quo” (UK Parliament Reference Parliament2020).

Since that 2020 statement, the UK has championed multilateral statements of support, most notably when – as G7 host in 2021 – it drafted the first foreign minister communique to “support Taiwan’s meaningful participation” in the World Health Assembly, and the first summit communique to reference the Taiwan Strait and call for “peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues” (G7 2021a, b). London has also signed on to all subsequent, more forward-leaning G7 statements, and even released bilateral statements with other U.S. allies and partners, such as the 2023 Australia-UK 2+2 joint statement (DFAT 2023a).

Unsurprisingly, the UK remains deliberately ambiguous regarding how it would respond to a cross-Strait contingency. Nevertheless, London has reportedly approved an increase of defense-related exports to Taiwan – at least $200 million worth in the first nine months of 2022, more than the previous six years combined (Reuters 2023d). Taiwan’s largest military development program, its indigenous submarine project, reportedly relies on technology sourced from “at least seven countries,” including the UK (Reuters 2021b). London also sent military vessels through the Taiwan Strait in 2019 and 2021, with the latter, involving the frigate HMS Richmond, marking the first transit by a UK warship since 2008 (AFP 2021).

Since 2022, the year of both Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and massive PLA exercises around Taiwan in response to Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, British concerns have been repeatedly expressed at the highest and most official levels. For example, in November 2022 Prime Minister Rishi Sunak stated that “there should be no unilateral change to the status and there should be a peaceful resolution,” adding, vaguely, “We stand ready to support Taiwan as we do in standing up to Chinese aggression” (The Guardian 2022b). Five months later, the UK’s 2023 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy mentioned Taiwan for the first time. In the foreword, Sunak characterized the war in Ukraine and China’s actions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait as “threatening to create a world defined by danger, disorder and division – and an international order more favourable to authoritarianism.” The document also reiterated Britain’s stance: “The UK’s long-standing position remains that the Taiwan issue should be settled peacefully by people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait through dialogue, and not through any unilateral attempts to change the status quo” (HM Government 2023).

4.2.1 The Origins and Post-1964 Evolution of France’s Approach to Taiwan

In 1964, France became both the first major U.S. ally to recognize Beijing after North Korea’s PRC-backed 1950 invasion of South Korea and the first major Western power with which the PRC exchanged ambassadors, thereby establishing full diplomatic relations. Beyond President Charles de Gaulle’s reported desire to “recognize the world as it is,” French Gaullists also saw this conspicuous break with Washington as demonstrating Paris’ independence from America and a shift of international politics beyond the “East-West divide.” On the one hand, France’s move predictably infuriated the administration of U.S. President Lyndon Johnson. On the other hand, and of particular relevance for this study, Nixon would later credit de Gaulle for influencing his decision to move the United States toward recognizing Beijing. In marking the sixtieth anniversary in 2024, Xi Jinping judged de Gaulle’s move “a major event in the history of international relations” (Le Monde 2024). It was, and therefore deserves significant consideration for the terms under which it was carried out.

The fact that de Gaulle’s government refused to endorse the PRC’s claim to Taiwan despite his eagerness to demonstrate independence from Washington makes clear that Paris had its own reasons for doing so. According to a contemporaneous UK assessment, de Gaulle wished to avoid “go[ing] against the principle of self-determination by saying that Formosa was part of China without any indication of the wishes of the Formosa population.” Accordingly, before his departure to negotiate with Beijing, French Prime Minister Edgar Faure was reportedly ordered not to make any commitment regarding the future status of Taiwan (Shin Reference Shin2001, 127). France sought to maintain some official link to Taipei (such as a consulate, like the UK) after normalization, and to explore possibilities for a “two China” policy (Cabestan Reference Cabestan2001, 2). On the eve of France officially recognizing the PRC, de Gaulle even reportedly told Chiang Kai-shek that if the ROC leader would “declare the ROC a new state limiting its territory to the island of Taiwan, France would recognize the new State and the ROC as its legitimate government.” Fatefully, Chiang refused (Chiang Reference Chiang2017, 137). Chiang’s staunch nationalism and adherence to the ROC’s version of the “one-China principle” made dual recognition anathema.

Nevertheless, in the 1964 France–PRC communique Paris successfully parried Beijing’s demands to explicitly recognize the PRC “as the sole legal government of China” and to break off diplomatic relations with the ROC. The short statement conspicuously lacked any reference to “Taiwan” or even “One China.” Ultimately, it was the ROC government – despite last-minute efforts by Washington to persuade Chiang otherwise – that unilaterally severed diplomatic ties with France. As a result, for a short time France had diplomatic ties with both “Chinas” (Martin Reference Martin2008, 78) To prevent later U.S. allies from concluding from France’s experience that Beijing would accept “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” however, the PRC launched a propaganda campaign asserting that it would never again make similar concessions (Fukuda Reference Fukuda2012). Six years later, Ottawa would creatively square the circle through its path-breaking “Canadian Formula” (see Section 2), which mentioned “One China” and Taiwan explicitly but nevertheless avoided endorsing Beijing’s sovereignty claim.

As in other cases, how France–Taiwan unofficial relations would be operationalized in practice after Paris recognized Beijing would be left up to political leaders to decide. Despite the fact that France’s 1964 communique with Beijing did not even mention “Taiwan” or “One China,” the “unofficial” relationship between Paris and Taipei for many years following was hardly robust. After 1964, Taiwan was not a priority; French interests in Taipei were represented only by “a handful of businesspeople with the aloof assistance of the French consulate in Hong Kong” (Cabestan Reference Cabestan2001, 3–4).

By the 1980s, however, and against the backdrop of vastly changed political circumstances, a different generation of French officials emerged to lead Europe in pursuing unprecedented engagement with Taiwan – at times even moving ahead of Washington. As Shin sums up the decade, “the French government not only broke the ‘no-contact-with-Taiwan’ policy but also reinterpreted the meaning of “One China” (2001, 139). In 1978 and 1980, Paris established in Taipei French associations for economic development and culture and science, respectively (MOFA(ROC) 2022) Several years later, France became the first European country not recognizing the ROC to issue visas via its office in Taipei. (Other European representative offices soon followed). Within a year, the rank of the Association’s head of office was upgraded to a retired ambassador (Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 145–46). The 1989–1993 period saw a further deepening of ties as the Cold War ended in Europe, Taiwan’s democratization and economic growth accelerated, and France–PRC relations worsened in the wake of Beijing’s brutal crackdown on protesters in June 1989 – on which France took a very critical public stand. In Shin’s words, “deterioration in PRC-France relations … open[ed] up breathing space for ROC-France relations” (Reference Shin2001, 145).

In aggregate, Paris’ moves after 1989 exploded the myths that France–Taiwan relations were strictly economic and cultural and that there were nonnegotiable bounds on bilateral engagement locked in after Paris recognized Beijing. In July 1989, just one month after Tiananmen Square, ROC Foreign Minister Lien Chan was invited to Paris by the French Senate’s president to mark the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution. The French government soon allowed visits from multiple ROC ministers, including Taiwan’s minister of transportation in 1990 (Shin Reference Shin2001, 145–7). Meanwhile, Paris upgraded France’s “cultural” office to the status of “French Institute in Taipei” (FIT;Footnote ¹² mirroring AIT) with every consular function, and even appointed as its new director an ambassador-rank diplomat “who had taken early retirement.” Other European countries, including the UK and Germany, soon followed France’s lead and began appointing foreign ministry personnel to Taipei (Cabestan Reference Cabestan2001, 10–11; Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 145–6; Shin Reference Shin2001 138–9, 147).

In another precedent-setting step, in January 1991 France became the first government having diplomatic relations with the PRC to send a cabinet minister to Taiwan. Yet again, other European governments followed France’s lead. Over the next thirty months, more than twenty European cabinet members visited Taipei. In sending a cabinet minister to Taiwan, France was nearly two years ahead of the U.S. government, which did not send its first Cabinet-level representative until November 1992 (Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 145–6).

The trend continued: In 1993, Paris further upgraded the FIT director post to be filled by a career diplomat on “temporary secondment” (Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 145–46) and split the “China Desk” in France’s foreign ministry to allow a diplomat to focus on Taiwan. French and Taiwanese ministers also began to sign high-level joint legal declarations. Several secret visits by high-ranking military officials also reportedly occurred (Cabestan Reference Cabestan2001, 5–11).

Belying the contemporary myth that only the United States has dared to sell major military platforms to Taipei, during this period Paris even approved sales to Taiwan of six naval frigates (1991) and sixty fighter jets (1992). These sales further demonstrated Paris’ strikingly flexible interpretation of the 1964 France–PRC communique and the politically determined bounds of the “One China” framework. According to Cabestan, this “military co-operation” was driven by Tiananmen, Taiwan’s democratization, and the French defense industry’s need for new markets following the Soviet Union’s collapse (Cabestan Reference Cabestan2001, 5–6).

It was ultimately these arms sales that proved too much for Beijing, which responded by ordering France to close its Guangzhou consulate and banned French companies from participating in a major subway project. (Probably not coincidentally, the subway contract was awarded to a German company after the German chancellor vetoed a proposed sale of German warships to Taiwan (New York Times 1994).)

To control the damage, in 1994 a new French government that coveted China’s vast and growing market potential made a striking political concession to Beijing. It negotiated a new bilateral communique with Beijing that “recogniz[ed]” Taiwan as part of “Chinese territory” (une partie intégrante du territoire chinois). The new communique also committed Paris “not to authorize any French enterprises to participate in the arming of Taiwan” (Ministère des Affaires étrangères 1994). Although in using wording roughly consistent with the ruling KMT’s own view on “One China” France’s new leaders stopped short of endorsing Beijing’s view that Taiwan is part of the PRC, the new language appeared to go meaningfully beyond both the literal text and original intent of the 1964 normalization communique, as well as the intentionally vague “Canadian Formula” adopted by the United States and most U.S. democratic allies after 1970. The fundamentally political nature of Paris’ efforts to improve relations with Beijing and curtail arms sales in response to severe blowback was clear. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé (Reference Juppé1993–1995) publicly defended the shift as based on a “pragmatic” long-term assessment of national interests considering China’s international economic and political importance (Juppé Reference Juppé1993).

Though France’s 1994 political statement departed from its 1964 position on “One China” and effectively ended French willingness to sell major weapons platforms to Taiwan, Paris continued to deepen its practical engagement with Taiwan. Within a year France agreed to upgrade the ROC’s presence in Paris, which was newly named the “Taipei Representative Office in France” (Cabestan Reference Cabestan2001, 5–11). France also again upgraded the FIT director post, which thenceforth was filled by an ambassador-level career diplomat, who also oversaw an increasingly large staff (Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 145–46). In short, in exchange for a high-profile and largely political concession in 1994, Beijing effectively accepted a de facto new status quo: incrementally deeper France–Taiwan relations, all under a politically tolerable veneer of unofficiality.

As further evidence of the role of political interpretation defining practical policy bounds, even France’s official interpretation of the ambiguously worded 1994 pledge on “arming of Taiwan” was at odds with Beijing’s. Paris continued to allow a few additional (if smaller) deals and military and technical cooperation, including Taiwanese and French pilots on each other’s soil. Juppé and his defense counterpart even unilaterally asserted that France had committed only to show “reserve” (retenue) and not to sell “offensive weapons” – suggesting that U.S.-style “defensive” arms sales were still theoretically allowable (Cabestan Reference Cabestan2001, 13–15; Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 147). Thus, although France has not again sold new weapons platforms on the scale of 1991–1992, in unilaterally asserting this interpretation its leaders effectively carved out space to potentially allow them in the future. In other words, whether such sales occur was to be based not on legal or other commitment, but on political leaders’ judgment – one which will inevitably take into consideration, but not necessarily be beholden to, Beijing’s likely response.

4.2.2 The Contemporary Situation

More recent developments raise additional questions about the practical long-term significance of the 1994 France-PRC communique (which “recognized” Taiwan as part of “Chinese territory”). On the one hand, in the years following joint statements explicitly referenced Taiwan, and some French leaders occasionally reiterated the 1994 communique’s language on “One China,” such as when the Sarkozy government referenced it in a statement opposing DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s (2000–2008) pursuit of a referendum on UN membership (Reuters 2007).

On the other hand, under President Emmanuel Macron (2017–) the French government may be attempting to quietly distance Paris from its predecessors’ rhetorical concessions to Beijing. For starters, recent France–PRC joint statements have stopped mentioning “Taiwan” altogether. Furthermore, when asserting Paris’ “constant” “one China policy” France’s past three foreign ministers have avoided referencing the 1994 communique. Instead, they refer to the 1964 communique, which said nothing about Taiwan. Additionally, they have repeatedly emphasized constructive cross-Strait dialogue, opposed unilateral changes to the status quo, and expressed support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations (e.g., Drian Reference Drian2021; Libération 2022; Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères 2023).

This apparent shift occurs alongside what appear to be the Macron government’s more recent efforts to firmly align France’s position and policy with those of the EU, the United States, and other U.S. allies, even as Macron has also expressed concern about being seen as following the United States and/or risking a Chinese overreaction. In 2023, Macron asserted at The Hague that “The French and European position on Taiwan is the same one. We’re in favour of the status quo. This policy is constant and hasn’t changed,” adding, “It’s the One-China policy and a Pacific resolution of the situation. That’s what I said in my one-to-one meeting with Xi Jinping, that’s what was said everywhere, we haven’t changed” (Reuters 2023b). The French Office in Taipei asserted that “France’s position on Taiwan is constant,” while conspicuously avoiding a reference to the 1994 communique. Instead, it flagged various bilateral and multilateral statements, including from the G7, the EU’s High Representative, the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, and bilateral declarations with the United States, Australia, and the UK (Bureau Français de Taipei 2023). All these statements also avoid mentioning the sovereignty question or whether Taiwan belongs to “Chinese territory.”

Meanwhile, France’s Senate and National Assembly also appear eager to demonstrate their own support for Taiwan’s international space and efforts to deepen ties with Taiwan. For example, in 2021 both bodies (including the Senate by a striking margin of 304 to 0) passed resolutions supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Interpol, and the World Health Assembly (RFI 2021). That year, over the repeated objections of the PRC embassy in France, which alleged such visits “clearly violate the one-China principle,” multiple delegations of French senators and National Assembly members representing different parliamentary groups also visited Taiwan and met with President Tsai (e.g., France 24 2021).

Regarding cross-Strait frictions, especially since the Pelosi visit France has become remarkably assertive and frank. In a 2022 interview, France’s commander of Armed Forces in the Asia-Pacific identified France’s naval transits through the Taiwan Strait as a reaction to the PRC’s “completely wrong” assertions that it has “sovereign rights” over the “international strait” (Taipei Times 2022). The November 2022 National Strategic Review specifically highlighted China’s “increasingly assertive strategy, including on the military front … particularly with regard to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait” (“National Strategic Review 2022” 2022). That year, France also became the first European country to mention Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait in its Indo-Pacific strategy (MEFA 2022). Lastly, in 2023 France called for peaceful resolution and no unilateral changes to the status quo in multilateral G7 statements and bilateral statements with fellow U.S. allies Australia and Japan. The former additionally committed Paris to “support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the work of international organisations, where statehood is not a prerequisite” and to “deepening relations with Taiwan” (Gaimushō 2023b; MEFA 2023).

As further indication of French efforts, despite the 1994 communique, to present a united front with the EU, the United States, and other U.S. allies, at a major July 2023 international forum Macron’s diplomatic advisor Emmanuel Bonne stated that “the key components of our China policy, or Taiwan policy, are exactly the same as the US administration.” He specifically noted a “One China policy” and the desire for a “peaceful solution.” He also stated that France conducts Taiwan Strait transits “every year” and that France would “be with [the U.S.] in case of crisis,” adding that “in terms of principles, solidarity, and what needs to be done, we are exactly on the same page, and what matters most … is to deter China from taking action.” He further revealed that during Macron’s meeting with Xi the French president conveyed that if China acted, “that will have a big price [and …] will force us to go for massive sanctions etcetera and probably much more” (Aspen Institute 2023).

In short, beyond the abstract question of its official position on “One China,” Paris’ deepening engagement with and regarding Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait is, in practical terms, vastly different today than it was in 1964. As successive governments’ observable shifts on arms sales and variable willingness to reference the 1994 communique demonstrate, it has ebbed and flowed in the interim. Developments over the past thirty years make clear that the constraining power of past communiques is subjectively – and politically – determined.

4.3.1 The Origins and Post-1972 Evolution of Germany’s Approach to Taiwan

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG; aka “West Germany” until German unification in 1990) was born after World War II with no preexisting diplomatic relationship with either the ROC or PRC. Given Germany’s own Cold War–era division, FRG leaders originally opted not to recognize either “China.” In 1972, however, after PRC representatives had already been granted “China’s” UN seat and Nixon visited China, they decided to recognize Beijing.

Even so, the October 1972 FRG–PRC communique conspicuously made no mention of “Taiwan.” This fact gave Bonn the distinction of being the only major U.S. ally after France (1964) to avoid any reference to Taiwan or “One China” in a bilateral normalization communique. The reason, however, was less about Taiwan than the fact that Germany itself was divided. Both Beijing and Bonn wished to avoid taking a position on the other’s division (Mengin Reference Mengin1997, 241).

Although the 1972 communique did not articulate Germany’s position on the sovereignty question, especially after 1990 Beijing used the PRC’s support for German unification to pressure Berlin to support China’s “reunification” with Taiwan. With 1972 as the baseline, the ambiguity of Germany’s official position declined over time. Eventually, it adopted a public position like Paris’ in the 1994 France–PRC communique: Berlin has identified Taiwan as part of “China.” Nevertheless, it avoids endorsing the PRC’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.

One example is the 2004 joint statement released during PRC Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Berlin to meet Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder (1998–2005). Consistent with a recurring theme of this study – that positions and policies vis-à-vis “One China” are politically contingent – this statement was released at a moment of great optimism in Germany about China’s surging market potential, severe tensions between the Schroeder government and its U.S. ally over the Iraq War, and deepening concerns in Berlin about DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s flirtations with a possible declaration of de jure independence. Schroeder himself was also widely considered a relatively pro-China politician; for example, around this time he also famously pressed the EU to lift the arms embargo imposed after Beijing’s bloody crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in 1989 (Reuters 2018).

During Wen’s 2004 visit, Schroeder agreed to a 1,400-word “joint declaration” that included three sentences related to “One China.” It stated that Germany’s “federal government” will “support peaceful reunification of China” (friedliche Wiedervereinigung Chinas unterstützt) and “opposes the ‘independence’ of Taiwan” (‘Unabhängigkeit’ von Taiwan). It also opposed “all steps aimed at escalating tensions [Verschärfung der Spannungen] in the Taiwan Strait” (China.org.cn 2004). Taken at face value, the first two positions evinced meaningful differences with those of the United States and several other key U.S. allies, which avoid expressing preferences about the cross-Strait dispute’s ultimate outcome. A contemporaneous newspaper article judged that the statement meant the German government was “backing China’s position on the Taiwan question more clearly than ever before” (Der Spiegel 2004).

Nevertheless, Berlin’s official position on “One China” still differs from Beijing’s “one-China principle.” At a 2019 hearing in response to a petition demanding that the Federal Government “establish full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan),” Petra Sigmund, then the Foreign Office’s Director-General for Asia and the Pacific, explained that Germany “recognizes only the [PRC] as the only sovereign state in China” (nur die Volksrepublik China als einzigen souveränen Staat in China an), adding that “for us, Taiwan is part of China” (für uns ist Taiwan ein Teil Chinas). Notably, however, according to contemporaneous media reports she reportedly implied that “China” does not necessarily refer to the PRC. Sigmund stated matter-of-factly why Germany sticks to its ambiguous “One China” policy, noting that abandoning it “would seriously damage German-Chinese relations” (schwerwiegend beschädigen) and “That is not in our interest” (Das liegt nicht in unserem Interesse) (Deutscher Bundestag Reference Bundestag2019; DW 2019). Two legal scholars in Germany summed up Sigmund’s response as based partially on a judgment that the ROC government’s own official position is that it is not “a separate independent state” but part of “one ‘China’” (Sinha and Talmon Reference Sinha and Talmon2019).

Regardless, what consequence Berlin’s official “One China” position has for official rhetoric and policy toward Taiwan is far from clear-cut. For instance, in her 2019 testimony Sigmund highlighted positions on more practical matters clearly aligned with the United States and others. For example, she emphasized that the German government “wants to maintain the status quo of our relations with Taiwan without any conditions and … rejects any unilateral change to the status quo,” adding that it regularly tells Beijing “that unification between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan can only take place peacefully and on the basis of a dialogue characterized by mutual respect.” She further noted exchanges with Taiwan in many areas “beneath the level of diplomatic relations through the relevant specialist departments up to the ministerial level,” adding that “we do not always make it public when such contacts happen.” Notably, Sigmund also called for “expanding” the bilateral relationship “further” and stated that Berlin is “strongly committed to enabling Taiwan to participate meaningfully in international organizations” where appropriate. She continued, “We actively promote the continuation of these contacts with Taiwan and, even if this is not always seen favorably by Beijing, we confidently advocate this position because it reflects the current status quo with Taiwan” (Deutscher Bundestag Reference Bundestag2019).

Germany’s push to “expand” the bilateral relationship is now decades old. Indeed, especially after 1989 Germany’s efforts to deepen practical economic, political, and de facto diplomatic ties with Taiwan paralleled similar trends in the United States, France, and other major U.S. allies. Government officials at the central and federal state levels began to travel to Taiwan. In 1992, Germany’s economic minister became the first to visit Taipei. In 2000, the German government established the “German Institute Taipei (GIT),” which took over consular duties from what had been called the German Trade Office and functioned “as the unofficial representation of the FRG in Taiwan” (Schubert Reference Schubert2001, 9–10). Importantly, the newly upgraded Institute’s diplomatic staff were thenceforth considered “on duty,” no longer “on leave” (Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 145). In recent years, the Office has been headed by a career diplomat of “director general” rank (Sinha and Talmon Reference Sinha and Talmon2019).

Despite the post-1990s trend of incrementally deepening ties with Taiwan, some important qualifiers are also necessary. First, Berlin has placed stricter constraints than some other U.S. allies on the level of official exchanges – even publicly and explicitly forbidding officials in seven high-ranking positions from engaging their counterparts in Taiwan (e.g., Taiwanreporter 2018). Second, the trend has not always been unidirectional. For example, although some German cabinet members were authorized to visit Taipei beginning in the early 1990s, no such visits occurred between 1998 and 2022. This period overlapped almost entirely with the Schroeder and Merkel administrations. Perhaps not coincidentally, this was also a period during which German exports to China increased 19-fold (World Bank 2024).

Third, as in other cases, German leaders have granted different policy domains differing political significance. For Berlin, security engagement with Taiwan has always been particularly controversial. The aforementioned aborted early 1990s arms sale – around the time Paris was considering (and ultimately approved) frigate and fighter jet sales to Taipei – is a case in point. As Schubert summarizes: in the early 1990s, Taiwan unsuccessfully lobbied the German government to permit the construction and sale of ten submarines and ten frigates. Although several German federal state governments supported the deal, the Federal Security Council rejected it in 1993 because “Taiwan was considered a zone of military insecurity to which no German ‘dual use’-technology could be exported by law.” In addition, “Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel unequivocally ruled out at various occasions the selling of weapons to Taiwan in 1992.” Notably, this was not a formal or across-the-board ban, since subsequent reports revealed that the government agreed to the reexport of German missile components from the United States to Taiwan, and four German minesweepers were observed in Taiwan in 1992 (Schubert Reference Schubert2001, 8–9). More recently, the German Parliament’s Defense Committee chair has stated that Berlin will not provide weapons to Taiwan (Reuters 2023a). Similar to Japan, it is difficult to parse to what extent this self-imposed ban reflects concerns about arms sales to Taiwan rather than general reluctance to export arms to any “zone of military insecurity.”

4.3.2 The Contemporary Situation

Despite some subtle apparent daylight between Germany’s official position on “One China” and that of the United States and some other allies, the extent and nature of Berlin’s engagement with and official rhetoric regarding Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait have shifted notably toward greater alignment since late 2021. That this shift has occurred largely after the resignation of the long-serving and powerful Chancellor Merkel (2005–2021) makes Germany yet another case demonstrating the political contingency of major U.S. allies’ approaches to Taiwan in practice.

The tripartite coalition (Social Democrats, Free Democrats, and Greens) that took power after Merkel stepped down promptly became more forward-leaning on Taiwan. Its December 2021 Coalition Agreement was the first ever to refer to “Taiwan” and “the Taiwan Strait,” to insist that “any change in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait can only occur peacefully and by mutual consent,” and to “support democratic Taiwan’s substantive participation in international organizations” (Bundesregierung 2021). This was followed by several other remarkable “firsts” under the new government. A particularly high-profile example was Germany’s September 2022 progress report on the implementation of its Indo-Pacific Policy Guidelines. This document referred to Taiwan as a “partner,” expressed support for “issue-specific engagement by democratic Taiwan in international organisations,” and stated that “the status quo in the Taiwan Strait can only be changed by peaceful means and by mutual agreement.” It also clearly stipulated a national interest in such an outcome, noting, “Military escalation would also affect German and European interests” (Federal Government 2022). Two months later, Germany’s chancellor openly discussed Taiwan in Beijing, noting that one “expectation” of Germany’s “One China” policy is that changes to the status quo must be “by mutual agreement” (Bundesregierung 2022).

This trend of greater outspokenness continued in 2023 and 2024. In March 2023, Germany’s coalition government became the first since 1997 to send a cabinet minister (Minister of Education and Research) to Taiwan. (Not coincidentally, both the 1997 visit and the 2023 visit involved a Cabinet member from the Free Democratic Party, a founding member of Liberal International – a world federation of liberal political parties, of which Taiwan’s ruling DPP is also a member.) The following month, Germany’s foreign minister publicly stated in Beijing that neither Germany nor the EU can “be indifferent to the tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” adding that “free access” is in Germany’s economic interest (Politico 2023). Over the summer, Germany’s chancellor told the PRC’s premier that “We firmly reject all unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas by force or coercion. This is especially true for Taiwan” (Reuters 2023c). Meanwhile, a remarkable July saw the first meeting of Germany’s and Taiwan’s justice ministers (Focus Taiwan 2023) and the release of Germany’s first-ever China strategy. It mentioned Taiwan or the Taiwan Strait twelve times and expressed concern about “Chinese disinformation campaigns” (FRG 2023). Lastly, in September 2024, two German naval ships transited the Taiwan Strait for the first time since 2002. They were backed up by statements from Germany’s chancellor and defense minister that the Strait is “international waters” (Naval News 2024).

The coalition government has on at least one occasion gone out of its way to publicly emphasize the distinction between Beijing’s “one-China principle” and Germany’s “one China” policy. During a strikingly frank December 2022 speech, Martin Thümmel, Germany’s deputy-director general for Asia, directly rejected Beijing’s efforts to misleadingly conflate its “one-China principle” with Berlin’s “One China” policy, and to define for Germany what actions are or are not within bounds. In his words: “We [Germany] have our One China policy [and while maintaining its “basic pillars” …] it is us who have devised this policy and it is us who interpret this policy – no one else.” He additionally criticized Beijing’s “very selective interpretation” of UN 2758, which had done “nothing more” than “establish the PRC as the sole representative of China in the UN,” and its efforts to raise doubts about whether the Taiwan Strait is “international waters.” Thümmel went on to blame Beijing for the “turn for the worse” in cross-Strait relations and for “trying to isolate Taiwan internationally and prevent its participation … in international organizations and other frameworks.” Paralleling language from the United States and some other major U.S. allies, he additionally stated that “Taiwan is far more than just an economic or cultural partner. It is a value partner and … a leading or maybe the leading democracy in Asia,” and called for efforts to “counter” Beijing’s “economic coercion.” He closed by noting that “The federal government will continue to support and seek its own contacts and support contacts by others and to have a much more meaningful and long-lasting relationship with Taiwan on all levels” (Thümmel Reference Thümmel2022).

A Foreign Office official’s statement several months earlier, in the immediate wake of the PLA’s large-scale August 2022 exercises around Taiwan, further highlighted Germany’s alignment with the United States and other allies, stating,

The German case provides additional support for a core theme of this study: that the contours of “acceptable” rhetoric and policy vis-à-vis Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait under U.S. allies’ “One China” policies are – to paraphrase the Foreign Office official quoted earlier – up to their political leaders to devise and interpret; and “no one else.” Recent developments post-Merkel represent a striking shift in tone and, arguably, a subtle shift in practical policy and effort. A clear implication is closer alignment with the United States, EU, and other democratic partners of Taiwan. And all this despite no change in decades to Germany’s official position on “One China,” which leans closer to Beijing’s preferences than those of the United States, UK, or several other major U.S. democratic treaty allies. Even so, what matters most is its distinction with Beijing’s one-China principle and how it has been variably politically interpreted (and reinterpreted) in Berlin over the past half-century.

4.4.1 The Origins and Post-1975 Evolution of the EU’s Approach to Taiwan

The modern EU (“Brussels”) did not exist before 1992. Accordingly, it was its predecessor – the European Economic Community – that in 1975 established diplomatic relations with the PRC. This decision followed the first official visit to China by the Vice-President of the European Commission (EC), a visit during which Beijing – in Zhang Xiaotong’s words – demanded that the VP “formally and publicly declare that Taiwan was geographically an integral part of China” (Zhang Reference Zhang2014). This PRC pressure campaign failed, however. As the VP later reported to the European Parliament (EP), “recognition of states did not come within the responsibility of the Community” and he was “able to satisfy” Beijing with a vague, conspicuously present-tense, matter-of-fact statement that “the Community does not entertain any official relations with Taiwan or have any agreements with it” (Soames Reference Soames1975).

Neither then nor since has Brussels adopted a position endorsing Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of PRC territory. Nor has it agreed to any statement which would preclude certain policy options regarding the future treatment of Taiwan.

After the EU gained the authority to recognize states in the 1990s, its leaders continued to avoid explicitly endorsing Beijing’s sovereignty claim. For example, EU–China summit statements going back at least to the early 2000s contain either vague, unilateral assertions of “continued adherence to the one China policy” and “hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue,” or no such references at all (e.g., MFA(PRC) 2004). At least as early as its 2006 China strategy, the EC emphasized that “The EU has a significant stake in the maintenance of cross-straits peace and stability” and, “on the basis of its One China Policy,” pledged “to take an active interest, and to make its views known to both sides.” It emphasized the EU’s “opposition to any measure which would amount to a unilateral change of the status quo; strong opposition to the use of force; encouragement for pragmatic solutions and confidence building measures; support for dialogue between all parties; and, continuing strong economic and trade links with Taiwan” (European Commission 2006).

Although because they require EU member state approval EC or Council proclamations and actions can be considered more authoritative than those of the EP, the EP has also played an important role encouraging EU engagement with and on issues related to Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. In 1995, it condemned Beijing’s military exercises before Taiwan’s first direct presidential election and passed a resolution urging the PRC to abandon the threat of force. It has also supported Taiwan’s international space and Europe’s bilateral engagement with Taipei, including a call around the same time to improve Taiwan’s representation in international organizations. And in 2001 it called for the EC to set up an EU-level representative office in Taiwan (Mengin Reference Mengin2002, 153). The EU office in Taiwan began operation two years later. Now named the “European Economic and Trade Office,” its own website notably refers to it as “the official representation of the European Union in Taiwan” (emphasis added) and reveals that – despite its name – it has a political section (EEAS 2021b).

The EU has also been outspoken in support of Taiwan’s democracy. A 2008 declaration on cross-Strait relations by the EU presidency “on behalf of the European Union” welcomed Taiwan’s presidential election, expressed “its support for Taiwan’s democratic values,” vaguely “reiterate[d] its One China policy and its firm support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question,” and stated that it “will continue to support Taiwan’s practical participation in specialized multilateral fora where statehood is not a requirement” (Slovenian Presidency of the EU 2008). EU Council conclusions have similarly avoided endorsing Beijing’s claim to Taiwan, preferring instead to vaguely reference the EU’s “One China” policy.

In its 2016 China strategy, the EC again “confirm[ed] its ‘One China’ policy” – without stating what it is. In language more forward-leaning than even most major U.S. allies at the time, it included a full paragraph on Taiwan expressing the EC’s “commitment to continuing to develop [EU] relations with Taiwan and to supporting the shared values underpinning its system of governance,” “support [for] the constructive development of cross-Strait relations as part of keeping the Asia-Pacific region at peace,” “us[ing] every available channel to encourage initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue, co-operation and confidence-building between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait,” and “promot[ing] practical solutions regarding Taiwan’s participation in international frameworks, wherever this is consistent with the EU’s ‘One China’ policy and the EU’s policy objectives” (European Commission 2016).

Simply put, while repeatedly reaffirming its (vague) “One China” policy, the EU has conspicuously avoided endorsing Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is part of the PRC. (Further evincing the lack of a clear position on Taiwan’s status, the EC’s 1994 Asia strategy even referred to Taiwan as a “country” multiple times (European Commission 1994).) Regardless of the EU’s official position on “One China,” the long-term trend has been for the EU to gradually deepen its effective engagement with Taiwan, support Taiwan’s international space, and articulate support for Taiwan’s democracy and the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

4.4.2 The Contemporary Situation

The past five years have witnessed unprecedented levels of EU interest in, engagement with, and outspokenness regarding Taiwan. Importantly, there has been no change to the EU’s official position on “One China,” which the EEAS website today publicly defines as recognizing the PRC as “the sole legal government of China.” Nevertheless, it emphasizes the EU and Taiwan’s “solid relations and close cooperation,” and “regular consultations.” Regarding cross-Strait tensions, it stresses, “The EU has a strong stake in peace, security and stability in Asia”; “supports the status quo and peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, rejecting the use or threat of force”; and “continues to encourage dialogue and constructive engagement” (EEAS 2021a).

This coincides with Europe’s souring view on China, especially since 2019, when the EU took the remarkable step of identifying China as not only a “partner” and “competitor,” but also a “rival” (European Commission 2019). This followed the EP’s first-ever debate on cross-Strait relations (European Parliament Reference Parliament2019), which eventually led to the first-ever official EP delegation to Taiwan, and the first-ever report on “EU-Taiwan relations.” The latter, which was overwhelmingly approved in autumn 2021 (580 votes in favor; 26 against), called for “closer relations with Taiwan guided by the EU’s One China policy”; named Taipei “a key EU partner and democratic ally”; “stressed the urgent need” for moves toward a bilateral investment agreement; expressed “grave concern” over China’s “belligerence,” “pressure,” and “disinformation campaigns” against Taiwan; and called on the EU to “do more to address these tensions, to protect Taiwan’s democracy, and the island’s status as an important EU partner.” It also proposed renaming the European Economic and Trade Office in Taipei to the “European Union Office in Taiwan” – “in order to reflect the broad scope of EU-Taiwanese ties” (European Parliament Reference Parliament2021). In July 2022, EP Vice President Nicole Beer led a historically high-level delegation to Taiwan, where they met with President Tsai and Foreign Minister Joseph Wu. In June 2023, Wu visited Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Brussels, where he again met Beer. While in Prague, he even met the sitting Czech president (Focus Taiwan 2023; Taipei Times 2023).

The post-2019 period has also witnessed unprecedentedly frank and supportive rhetoric regarding Taiwan from the EC itself. In 2021, a speech written for High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell (the EU’s top foreign policy official) was titled “EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation” – conspicuously exploding the myth that Taiwan’s ties with Europe are strictly economic and commercial. Adopting language arguably even more assertive than the U.S. official position, which only calls for no unilateral changes to the status quo, it stated that Europeans “have an interest in preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” It identified Taiwan as a “like-minded partner,” observed that “exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan have intensified,” and noted that the EU is Taiwan’s largest foreign investor (Vestager Reference Vestager2021).

That same year, the EC’s Indo-Pacific strategy mentioned Taiwan for the first time, identified it as a “partner” multiple times, and even linked the Taiwan Strait directly to “European security and prosperity” (European Commission 2021). In the wake of China’s reaction to Pelosi’s August 2022 visit, official rhetoric from President Ursula von der Leyen and Borrell have reinforced this idea. In various venues, including in joint statements with the United States and U.S. allies, and even during visits to Beijing, these leaders have repeatedly highlighted Europe’s interest in maintaining the cross-Strait status quo.

For example, Borrell issued an unprecedented series of bold statements in April 2023. He stated that “any attempt to change the status quo by force would be unacceptable” (Borrell Reference Borrell2023a) and identified “Taiwan” as a “fundamental issue for Europe.” Regarding the latter, he gave “three main reasons”: the Taiwan Strait’s significance for trade; “a takeover of Taiwan by force would of course be unacceptable in principle, but it would also be unacceptable in economic terms” given Taiwan’s strategic role in the semiconductor industry; and Taiwan is part of the EU’s “geostrategic perimeter” and if the EU wishes to be “a geopolitical power” it must “guarantee peace” and “defend our interests.” Remarkably, he even called for European navies to conduct freedom of navigation operations (Borrell Reference Borrell2023b). Lastly, he argued in a French-language op-ed that the EU’s position on “One China” is consistent but not unconditional, noting that related issues concern Europe “economically, commercially, and technologically.” He even reiterated his call for “European navies to patrol the Taiwan Strait to signify Europe’s commitment to freedom of navigation in this absolutely crucial area,” and, in language that again seemed to go beyond the U.S. position, called for “enforcing” the status quo (Borrell Reference Borrell2023c).

Such remarkable statements from the EU’s top foreign policy official suggest that – contrary to the EU’s reputation as a primarily economic player – on issues related to Taiwan and maintenance of the cross-Strait status quo its leaders are increasingly eager to assert themselves, arguably even more so than leaders in most of its member states. That this has happened despite an institutional need for consensus, a vastly larger and more diverse array of member states today than in 1975, and the EU’s conspicuously large economic interests in China makes this space an extremely important one to watch. The days when many European governments viewed Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait dismissively as “America’s problem” or avoided putting related issues on the EU political and policy agenda appear to be gone.

Importantly, and despite Beijing’s assertions to the contrary, EU leaders identify their rhetoric and policies as fully compatible with the EU’s (intentionally vague) official position. What has changed in recent years is not the EU’s position, per se, but rather the international and internal political environment that leads the consensus-based union to reinterpret what “One China” means for Europe in practice, especially as it concerns substantive policies and rhetoric vis-à-vis Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

That said, it is important not to exaggerate recent developments. As in other cases, politics and consideration of China’s reactions still function as constraints on sensitive matters such as renaming the EU’s office in Taipei or pursuing a bilateral investment treaty with Taiwan, which was reportedly put on ice after prospects for an EU-China trade deal emerged. Nevertheless, the long-term trend is clear: substantive and meaningful engagement with Taipei coupled with outspokenness on cross-Strait peace and stability are vastly greater today than in 1975, or even upon the EU’s creation in 1993. That is true despite Brussels’ officially unchanging position on “One China.”

5.4.1 Variation across Cases

Whereas Step 1 of this study’s analytical framework reveals that Japan, Australia, and the ROK have similarly ambiguous official positions on “One China,” Step 2 demonstrates that their approaches toward Taiwan- and cross-Strait-related issues vary in practically significant ways. Though there is greater convergence among allies in recent years than decades ago (itself a testament to the theme of Section 5.4.2), important differences persist in the extent and nature of bilateral engagement and outspokenness in support of Taiwan’s international space and cross-Strait peace and stability. For instance, Tokyo in recent years demonstrates a willingness to take some steps – for example, expressing clear support for Taiwan to join CPTPP and dispatching a de facto defense attaché to its office in Taipei – that Canberra has not. On the other hand, until recently Canberra had a history of sending Cabinet ministers to Taipei. And it has for years quietly conducted naval transits of the Taiwan Strait – the latter something Japan had not done until just before this Element went to press.

Meanwhile, despite Seoul being the only U.S. treaty ally bold enough to call both its representative office in Taipei and Taipei’s office in Seoul “missions” – something even Washington did not do after switching recognition – Korean political leaders typically stand out for their relatively greater reluctance to take overtly public stands in support of Taiwan, its international space, or deepening bilateral ties. In addition to the examples noted in Section 3, Korea is also the only allied government examined in this Element not to have conducted a Taiwan Strait transit. Although since 2021 Seoul has become newly vocal about “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” its public rhetoric in this regard remains relatively anodyne. Government officials generally avoid potentially controversial expressions of support of Taipei or criticism of Beijing.

These brief examples illustrate not only variation across cases but also the importance of analytically differentiating between an ally’s abstract official position on “One China” and its rhetoric and practical policies vis-à-vis Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. In all three Western Pacific cases, the crucial factor is not a static decades-old position on Taiwan’s status but successive democratically elected political leaders’ judgments about what best serves their country’s interests. Given Seoul’s unique geopolitical situation, an understandable desire not to risk overly antagonizing Beijing – its huge and powerful next-door neighbor, most important trading partner, and essential partner for addressing Seoul’s manifold concerns regarding North Korea – appears to loom particularly large in Korean leaders’ political calculus and helps explain its relatively greater caution on Taiwan-related matters.

5.4.2 Variation within Cases (i.e., over Time)

Particular countries’ effective policies toward Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait also vary meaningfully over time. Put simply, shifting domestic and international political winds can cause political leaders in one country to intermittently reevaluate the pros and cons of more robust engagement with Taipei, and to consider changing effective approaches accordingly.

The case of France exemplifies practically significant variation within a single case.

As discussed in Section 4, Paris’ 1964 recognition of the PRC did not prevent French leaders from (eventually) significantly deepening ties with Taiwan. These efforts accelerated after 1989 against the backdrop of the Cold War’s end, Taiwan’s rapid democratization and economic development, and Beijing’s June crackdown on protestors. During the 1989–1993 period, France allowed the sitting ROC foreign minister to visit Paris; renamed and upgraded its de facto representative office in Taipei; became the first foreign government recognizing the PRC to send a cabinet minister to Taiwan (something not even Washington had done); and approved sales to Taiwan of fighter jets and frigates (a historical fact that undermines the widespread misconception today that only the United States has sold major military platforms to Taiwan). Yet shifting domestic and international political winds soon catalyzed a symbolic course correction. After the arms sales fomented major political and economic backlash from the PRC, and with a new government in France ogling China’s rapidly growing potential as an export market, in January 1994 Paris made a major concession to Beijing: it negotiated a new bilateral communique that took the remarkable steps of explicitly recognizing Taiwan as part of “Chinese territory” and pledging “not to authorize French companies to participate in the armament of Taiwan” (Ministère des Affaires étrangères 1994). Yet even the “new” 1994 position on “One China” did not cause Paris to undo or reverse the past deepening of “unofficial” France-Taiwan relations. Nor has that now three-decade-old political document prevented the Macron government from making the French government the first in Europe to mention Taiwan in a new Indo-Pacific strategy, to order the French navy to conduct multiple Taiwan Strait transits, to issue multiple official statements supporting Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in international organizations, and to call for “deepening relations with Taiwan.” Nor did it stop Macron’s policy advisor in 2023 from asserting that “the key components” of France’s “Taiwan policy … are exactly the same as the U.S.,” and even threatening “massive sanctions” if China took action against Taiwan.

In sum, regardless of abstract official positions on “One China,” how the United States and other key U.S. allies/partners choose to define, interpret, and operationalize their respective positions and policies vis-à-vis Taiwan are based on political judgments, themselves subject to changing domestic and international political forces and shifting evaluations of national interest. Thus, even those allies with strikingly similar official positions on Taiwan’s status manifest approaches to Taiwan that are (1) diverse across cases; and (2) variable (within each case) over time.