In the aftermath of World War I, journalist and political commentator Walter Lippmann believed that the public needed to be managed by experts. His views developed in an era of rich intellectual debates about propaganda, conceptions of democracy, and the role of an increasingly mass public in American politics. In 1922, Lippmann argued that in an increasingly complex world, government could not work without “an independent, expert organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions.” For Lippmann, this expert elite would “allow us to escape from the intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public affairs.” Not everyone agreed with Lippmann, but many progressives did, believing that the problems of modern society required technocratic solutions.Footnote ¹

Frustrated by the inward postwar turn in American foreign policy after 1918, Lippmann’s concerns were especially pronounced in relation to foreign affairs. He argued that debates relating to domestic issues involved parties who spoke the same language and shared the same political environment. As a result, differing viewpoints could scarcely be avoided and were generally understood if not fully accepted. In foreign affairs, however, opposing voices came from a different country, spoke a different language, and held different traditions and experiences. The complex diplomatic issues of the modern world therefore required educated and knowledgeable leadership from informed insiders who understood the matters at stake. Dismissing the wider public entirely, Lippmann concluded that “on questions as complex as those awaiting settlement in the world today, it is utterly impossible to rely on the mysterious wisdom of the people.” Given the lack of public knowledge on issues such as foreign trade, war debts, or the League of Nations, he argued that “the only possible means by which democracy can act successfully in foreign affairs is access to the knowledge which the insiders possess.” While they were almost certainly not the insiders Lippmann had in mind, leading figures in the rapidly expanding public relations (PR) industry were perfectly positioned to engage in the new expert opinion-shaping process.Footnote ²

The expansion of the PR industry and America’s global power ran in parallel, but these concurrent and seemingly disconnected trends were in fact closely related. The PR industry developed in the early twentieth century, evolving from press agents and publicity firms. The earliest PR firms (even if they were not yet referring to themselves as such) began in the early 1900s prior to World War I, often helping businesses respond to the criticisms of muckraking journalists. The industry grew dramatically in the years after the war, led by industry pioneers such as Edward Bernays, Carl Byoir, and Ivy Lee. Reflecting American economic growth, the industry expanded still further after World War II through firms such as Hill and Knowlton. By the end of the twentieth century, PR was big business, still building upon the techniques developed throughout the century, albeit through increasingly vast global corporate entities.

As the PR industry expanded in the twentieth century, so too did America’s role in the world. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898, the nation became the dominant military power in the Western hemisphere. The United States joined World War I in 1917, engaging with European power politics for the first time since the nation’s revolutionary origins. Despite the subsequent decision not to join the League of Nations, American economic and cultural interests continued to expand overseas during the 1920s and 1930s. Once the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drew the nation into World War II, the United States rapidly became the world’s most powerful nation, in both military and economic terms. As the Cold War developed with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, American leaders worked for four decades to protect the nation from communist enemies, both real and imagined. By the end of the century, following the collapse of the USSR, the United States was the world’s sole remaining superpower. The PR industry played a key supporting role in helping the United States reach that position.

An examination of the complex relationship between American foreign relations and the field of PR reveals a hidden hand of influence on US foreign relations. Business interests played a significant part in shaping the broader national interest. PR companies engaged with foreign policy throughout the twentieth century, even as they remained largely hidden from public view. They did so for a variety of reasons. PR firms developed economic interests in foreign relations issues, working for clients who paid their bills. PR firms also had political interests in international affairs; some companies only worked for causes they supported, while others worked for any available client in ways that caused considerable controversy. PR had a pervasive role in the evolution of twentieth-century US foreign relations, touching almost every key incident, conflict, and debate. The PR industry is inextricable from American foreign relations since World War I.

It is no surprise that the PR industry engaged with foreign relations issues. While the main focus of PR activity remained on domestic business matters, foreign policy issues represented a unique opportunity for PR companies. Critics of democracy such as Lippmann viewed foreign policy issues as ones that required leadership and particular expertise, even more so than domestic politics. PR firms were quick to respond to those issues with specific viewpoints and agendas in attempts to signify public opinion. Of course, Lippmann was not alone in believing that democracy and foreign policy were ill-suited. In his classic mid-nineteenth-century assessment of American life, Alexis de Tocqueville famously stated that “foreign policy does not require the use of any of the good qualities peculiar to democracy but does demand the cultivation of almost all those which it lacks.” In particular, he saw the open and drawn-out nature of democratic decision-making as contrary to the practice of good diplomacy, especially given the nature of a democracy to “obey its feelings rather than its calculations.” This represented an opportunity for PR leaders who sought to bring clarity to complex foreign relations issues. Ironically, in their efforts to do so, PR efforts often appealed directly to the nation’s feelings to achieve a particular outcome.Footnote ³

Oddly, the PR industry is one of the more overlooked nonstate actors that have historically influenced American foreign relations. PR firms were neither the public nor the government, but the industry’s leading practitioners firmly believed they could quietly influence both. By convincing the American people to think in certain ways about world affairs, PR firms engaged in efforts – for their clients and also themselves – to sway public opinion, broadly construed, in ways that might affect the foreign policy of the nation. In promoting specific foreign policy positions, PR firms encroached upon the turf of the US government, sometimes (though not always) with official backing. As a hidden technocratic elite, PR firms had limited accountability. Unlike political leaders, they could not be voted from office at the next election. The industry may not have held the formal power of government, but it still held a position of power in American political culture that enabled it to influence the public.Footnote ⁴

The complex relationship between PR actors and the state has proven to be the most controversial aspect of the role of PR in foreign relations. That relationship varied by company and across time, leading to both consensus and controversy. The hidden hand of PR frequently enjoyed close connections to the actual US government, which only enhanced the power of PR businesses. Many PR firms looked to the government for guidance and advice, wary of straying too far from government policy. Particularly close connections existed during periods of war. However, American PR businesses did not always serve the needs of US foreign policy. At times, PR firms cared less about aligning with their own government. They adopted overseas businesses and foreign governments as clients in ways that created problems at home. Such instances saw the hidden hand of PR become visible in the wake of concerns regarding excessive private influence.

For PR to work most effectively, it should be invisible. The acts involved in winning favorable opinion should never be obvious to the public audience, and the public must not be aware of the efforts being made to persuade them. Yet as the twentieth century progressed, numerous cases occurred where the role of PR became all too visible to the public. It is no coincidence that these instances led to controversy over the role of PR. In these instances, fear of misleading propaganda arose. When faced with evidence that PR efforts had been undertaken to lead (or mislead) the public, the press and Congress stepped forward to express concern about the excesses of PR and its political power. Congressional investigations into the PR representation of foreign interests took place in the 1930s and 1960s, and the government introduced legislation forcing PR firms to register if they represented foreign interests. However, the legislation has barely been enforced, and PR firms have largely acted without restriction.

Still, the influence of PR on foreign relations remained controversial. Persuading the American people to buy products as consumers was one thing. Persuading them to think differently about the national interest as citizens was something else altogether. The century saw recurring concerns regarding the involvement of PR firms in foreign propaganda. Anxieties in the 1930s about the manipulation of public opinion in ways that might not conform to the national interest led to the passage of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) in 1938. Concerns resurfaced in the 1960s about the ways PR actors framed the world for American consumption and the potential implications of such framings. Those concerns appeared all too justified with the outbreak of the Vietnam War, before fading once more until unease at PR involvement in foreign relations resurfaced in the 1990s with the first Gulf War. At best, it appeared foreign-funded propaganda was trying to influence American public opinion; at worst, those PR efforts seemed to be dragging the United States into war.Footnote ⁵

Fears about the misuse of PR were exacerbated by tension between the democratic desire to use PR to seek broad democratic legitimacy, and the more cynical desire to use PR to either lead public opinion or manipulate it for particular purposes. Leading PR counsellors shared a common view regarding the developing concept of public opinion. Building on the work of Walter Lippmann, early PR leaders such as Bernays and Lee focused on shaping opinion. In the absence of mass popular support, the appearance of mass popular support would suffice. PR executives worked with opinion leaders within the American public rather than with the mass public. The next generation of PR executives followed the same pattern: focus on securing the elite and the rest will follow. This approach can be seen in the way PR figures made close connections to the press for publicity purposes. It can also be seen in the way PR leaders encouraged citizens’ organizations to make links with the leaders of various key representative sectors of society (e.g., business, labor, and religion) rather than society as a whole. In this sense, many PR appeals to the public were only superficially democratic.

Governmental efforts to restrict the power of PR reflected anxieties that PR had the power to undermine American democracy. In representing foreign interests, especially those that did not align with American interests, PR work looked increasingly like propaganda. Concerns expanded about propaganda in the post-1918 world. Harold Lasswell concluded his classic study of propaganda with Anatole France’s observation that “democracy (and indeed, all society) is run by an unseen engineer.” In his 1928 book, openly entitled Propaganda, PR pioneer Edward Bernays wrote about “invisible governors” who manipulated the opinions of the masses. The potential for Lippmann’s expert elites, France’s unseen engineers, and Bernays’s invisible governors to mislead the public seemed too great. As one British author later observed, “it is chiefly because public relations specialists are paid propagandists that society has to take any cognizance of them.” In the face of ongoing suspicion of propaganda, PR firms frequently appeared as an undemocratic elite that sought to manipulate public opinion on vital issues of national security.Footnote ⁶

For all the fears that PR could undermine American democracy, the simple fact that PR firms engaged with foreign relations did not guarantee influence. Attempting to quantify the success of PR influence is an almost impossible task, in part because of the hidden nature of PR activity. In addition, even when a cause supported by a PR campaign succeeded, it is difficult to measure the exact extent of that PR campaign’s influence, especially when numerous other factors are often involved. It is easy to mistake correlation for causation. As a result, measuring the effectiveness of PR campaigns is not the primary focus of this book. What is clear is that the direct influence on issues varies over time and by issue.

Nonetheless, the PR industry successfully convinced others of its influence and power. This success came despite a lack of hard evidence to support the bold claims of key figures such as Edward Bernays. The PR industry believed the public could be engineered to think and act in certain ways. It promised results and sometimes delivered. Believing PR support to be effective, or even just fearing the consequence of rejecting it, citizens’ organizations, businesses, the US government, and foreign governments paid handsomely for PR assistance. Even if PR lacked the rather conspiratorial persuasive power attributed to it by critics such as Vance Packard in his 1957 book The Hidden Persuaders, it achieved enough (and appealed to people’s fears sufficiently) to expand dramatically as an industry as the century progressed, and to exert regular influence on foreign relations issues.Footnote ⁷

Defining Public Relations

Despite the numerous connections between PR and American foreign relations, there has been almost no assessment of the relationship between the two. Historians have examined the history of American foreign relations in vast detail. However, even as they have broadened the focus of the field to consider economic interests and nonstate actors, they have rarely considered the role of PR firms. There have been calls for more analysis in this broad area: in 2014, historian Emily Rosenberg argued that “to the extent that carefully crafted PR campaigns now frame so much of the media coverage and public discourse about the world, foreign policy historians need to understand more about mass consumerism and marketing.” Similarly, classic political science literature on the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy shows no interest in the role of corporate PR. An assessment of the relationship between PR and US foreign relations is long overdue.Footnote ⁸

There is a growing amount of scholarship on the history of PR, both in the United States and in the wider world. In addition to a handful of older works of business history, the history of PR is a burgeoning field of interest. However, historians of PR, communications, and business have focused largely on the impact of PR firms on the domestic corporate world. PR historians have certainly touched upon foreign relations issues more than foreign relations historians have considered the PR industry, but it has not been their primary focus. While some of this literature is extremely critical of the industry, much of it is sympathetic to PR activity. In addition, some recent work on PR adopts a broad definition of the term that goes beyond the PR industry itself.Footnote ⁹

The focus of this book is on the PR industry, as represented by those companies and actors who defined themselves (or eventually did so) as PR professionals, whatever their exact definition of PR. The main actors are the major PR firms and their leaders and individual PR consultants. Thus, the main emphasis is on PR as a profession rather than the practice of PR in its broadest sense. This emphasis is for the sake of scope and coherence, and not to suggest that a broader definition is not worthy of analysis. Indeed, there are other aspects of the broader concept of PR that could be considered here. For example, the adoption of PR methods and bureaucracies by government agencies and businesses is worthy of consideration but beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, while scholars of American foreign relations have increasingly examined “public relations” in a broader sense through governmental propaganda and public diplomacy overseas, that is quite different from the story of how PR firms worked inside the United States and even beyond. Of course, PR professionals frequently worked with government, sometimes even joining it.Footnote ¹⁰

Referring to PR as a profession raises additional questions about terminology and bigger questions about the very nature of PR. The issue of whether those who conduct PR are part of a profession is open to question. In many ways, PR counsellors can be seen as part of a profession, as there are organizations that set ethical standards and provide development opportunities, such as the Public Relations Society of America. Notably, at least one PR figure disagreed with this characterization. Burson-Marsteller’s Robert Leaf claimed that it is not a profession but an industry or a business. While medical and legal practitioners can be struck off, PR executives are beyond accountability, and “as long as I have a phone and you want my help, nothing can stop me from plying my trade, whether my clients and peers consider me professional or not.” In the absence of a consensus, this book uses the terms interchangeably.Footnote ¹¹

Even with a clear definition of PR as a profession rather than a practice, defining the aim and role of the profession is a further challenge. The fact that the industry itself struggled to produce a satisfactory definition for “public relations” suggests that it might be an impossible task. In 1947, Public Relations News editor Glenn Griswold sought to find one truly effective definition. After being sent hundreds of definitions by his subscribers, he turned to his editorial board, asking them to choose their preferred three from a shortlist of nineteen. Some definitions were more abstract (“any activity or non-activity which advances human welfare by fostering a spirit of understanding and cooperation …”), while others were more corporate (“the continuing process by which management endeavors to obtain the good will and understanding of its customers …”). Hill and Knowlton’s John Hill replied with his preference: “public relations is the technique of winning and holding favorable public opinion.” Even then, Hill conceded that he had “never seen what seemed to me to be a satisfactory definition of public relations, and I am not sure that one is possible.” His preferred definition offers nonetheless the most effective summary of PR work.Footnote ¹²

The PR industry was very much a product of its time. Its leaders were inspired by contemporary debates regarding the potential of mass psychology and the power of persuasion to solve the problems of modern society. PR efforts certainly employed vivid emotional appeals to win over the minds and especially the hearts of the American people. In addition to the work of his uncle Sigmund Freud, Edward Bernays found books such as Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd and William Trotter’s Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War useful in thinking broadly about crowd psychology. The innovation of Bernays and Ivy Lee was to turn these broader social theories into everyday practical solutions that could be applied to a variety of issues, including those relating to foreign relations.Footnote ¹³

At a more concrete level, the role of PR in foreign relations has been broad in nature. As Edward Bernays described it, a PR executive functions “primarily as an adviser to his client, very much as a lawyer does.” However, while that strategic description is true, it does not do justice to the amount of hands-on service work undertaken by PR firms. That advice and work could be on any number of issues relating to the winning of public opinion. The work that defined PR counsel included broad strategic advice on various issues, supporting the staffing of PR campaigns, organizing fundraising, creating publicity, working with the press, arranging events, designing organizational structures, writing pamphlets and press releases, and much more.Footnote ¹⁴

Even though PR firms produced slogans for some clients, there is a distinction between PR and advertising. The focus here is on the former rather than the latter. Advertising is a small part of PR, and there is clearly overlap between the two, but it is the bluntest tool in the PR armory. Advertising can create visibility and get a message across very clearly, but it is clearly paid for and produced by the advertiser. For PR specialists, more subtle ways of achieving publicity include press releases and the creation of events to ensure coverage from the media that is not directly purchased and appears independent. The more covert messaging strategies adopted through PR are more effective than simple advertising, and far more suited to dealing with foreign relations issues, but as will be seen, they also led to more criticism.Footnote ¹⁵

The early generations of PR leaders certainly perceived a clear difference between PR and advertising, as seen in the composition of the “Wise Men,” a self-selected group of leaders of the PR industry that met informally on a monthly basis from 1938 onward through the 1950s. Starting with around fifteen men, the group eventually comprised up to thirty, including John Hill and other industry leaders, including Arthur Page, James Selvage, (Ivy Lee’s business partner) James Ross, Pendleton Dudley, and G. Edward Pendray. The group’s informal rules confined membership to “individuals employed in a public relations capacity by a single corporation, or retained as outside public relations counsel by one or more clients.” Advertising specialists were not included, and major advertising firms of the day, such as Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborn, or Benton and Bowles, were not represented.Footnote ¹⁶

Similarly, there has always been a distinction between PR and lobbying, although the line between them also blurred considerably as the century progressed. If PR traditionally focused on persuading the public, lobbying focused on directly persuading legislators. Once again, though, there was overlap here, particularly when PR firms looked to promote citizens’ organizations and foreign governments. Much of the PR work relating to foreign relations could be characterized as indirect lobbying, as it sought to influence the public to pressure the government to adopt a particular position or policy. In recent decades, advertising, lobbying, and PR have increasingly been included under the broader umbrella term of “communications,” though observers had acknowledged that all three “belong to the same family” for many years before.Footnote ¹⁷

The PR actors under examination here were some of the most significant of their era. Ivy Lee, Carl Byoir, and John Price Jones (and the firms that bore their names) were particularly significant in the 1920s and 1930s. In the years after World War II, figures such as Arthur Page, John Hill, William Baldwin, and Harold Oram were especially prominent. The work of Edward Bernays spanned almost the entire century. Together they represent some of the biggest names in the growing PR world of the twentieth century. Their positions of power in the business world ensured that they were able to play a role in foreign relations matters, and their privileged social positions and connections also helped. These figures were instrumental in creating the PR industry.

When it came to international affairs, the PR leaders who engaged with foreign relations in the twentieth century were mostly outward-looking and internationalist by inclination. As supporters of Woodrow Wilson, the first generation were not isolationists of any kind. Ivy League educated and business-minded, Ivy Lee, Edward Bernays, John Price Jones, and Arthur Page were all sympathetic to what Emily Rosenberg has called “liberal–developmentalism.” As well as believing that other nations should replicate America’s experience, they supported free enterprise, free trade, the free flow of information and culture, and (to varying degrees) a supporting role for government in accelerating “international economic and cultural exchange.” While the next generation had slightly more diverse backgrounds, they continued to expand the reach of American business and indeed, the American nation.Footnote ¹⁸

There are, however, clear risks in focusing on these “great men” of PR. These men were unquestionably important in the development of PR as an industry. Yet their position as leaders is reinforced by their decisions to donate their personal papers to archives. The ability to study the materials of such individuals makes it much easier to tell their stories (even if they might disagree with some of the conclusions presented here). This ease does not mean that there are no other stories to be told. This book does not claim to be comprehensive in coverage and will hopefully lead to the examination of other business voices in this area. Other challenges in dealing with business histories include the fact that business archives are not always available, and even if they are accessible, little recent material is printed. While this book’s examination ends where the archival record ends, the story of PR and foreign relations does not end there.Footnote ¹⁹

One of the issues with a focus on the biggest names in the early evolution of PR as a profession is that it leads to a focus on men. The PR industry was unsurprisingly dominated by men in its earliest decades. As late as 1968, women still made up just 10 percent of the Public Relations Society of America. Predictably, no women were invited to be part of the “wise men.” Henry Goldstein, who worked for Harold Oram, later observed that some early firms, like that of John Price Jones, actively discouraged women as employees and did not want them in professional positions. However, there were some early exceptions. Doris Fleischman had a significant (if insufficiently recognized) role working with Edward Bernays, and the all-women agency Flanley and Woodward worked on foreign relations in the 1950s.Footnote ²⁰

There was greater political diversity than gender diversity among PR leaders, but not much, and there was even less diversity in their foreign policy views than their domestic politics, especially in the Cold War years. Prior to World War II, most PR leaders who engaged with foreign affairs thought the United States could act as a positive force in the world, and that their powers of persuasion could work even on the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. After 1945, the conservative, pro-business nature of most PR firms ensured they held a staunchly anti-communist stance regarding events in both Europe and Asia. The political views of PR leaders could also be seen in decisions about whom they would represent. Some PR leaders drew a line regarding the clients they took on. In part, they recognized the potential PR backlash that might come their way, but such decisions also reflected their own personal politics. However, not all PR firms showed such principles, and some would work for any client who came their way regardless of their politics.

Layers of Influence

The invisible hand of PR influenced foreign relations in several ways. As the United States engaged with global affairs in the twentieth century, PR firms stepped forward to act as intermediaries between interested parties and the general public. PR firms engaged with foreign relations in three main ways: through support for private groups of American citizens with foreign policy agendas, through support for corporate interests (both domestic and foreign), and through support for governmental interests (both domestic and foreign). All were potentially controversial, but none more so than support for foreign businesses and governments.

Throughout the twentieth century, Americans created citizens’ organizations to promote particular foreign policies (like the Committee for the Marshall Plan) or to educate the American public about foreign policy issues (like the American Association for the United Nations). Those organizations were often supported by PR firms. That support came in different forms, including strategic, organizational, and fundraising assistance. Some PR firms specialized in fundraising (including the John Price Jones Corporation and Harold L. Oram Inc.) and helped organizations that relied heavily on public donations and subscriptions to survive. Organizational support came in different forms, from mapping out organizational structures and bureaucracies to providing personnel to help run the organizations. These organizations were usually genuine groups of interested citizens, although occasionally PR firms encouraged artificial “front” organizations (sometimes referred to as an “Astroturf” organization rather than a genuine grassroots one) to give the appearance of popular support for ideas.Footnote ²¹

A second way that PR engaged with foreign policy was through the support of business interests. At times, PR firms reflected business interests overseas in a way that aligned perfectly with US foreign policy. In Guatemala, PR support for an American company’s overseas interests became entangled with a dramatic US government policy. The role of Edward Bernays in supporting the United Fruit Company in Guatemala ahead of the 1954 CIA-led coup that overthrew Jacobo Árbenz is perhaps the most well-known instance of PR overlapping with foreign affairs. It is another example of where PR and government leaders worked for similar aims. However, PR support for business interests did not always reflect US interests, as seen most clearly in the 1930s when PR involvement with German companies led to a significant backlash against the work of Carl Byoir and Ivy Lee.

Finally, PR firms worked directly with governments. At home, numerous connections existed between PR firms and the US government. The origins of such links date back to World War I, and it is not surprising that PR and government worked together directly during the Cold War. Sometimes this work took place in the guise of supporting an ostensibly independent citizens’ organization, such as the CIA-funded National Committee for Free Europe. At other times, PR leaders acted as consultants to the government to provide advice on public diplomacy matters such as the United States Information Agency. The relationship between PR firms and the US government was not uncontroversial, but generally accepted.

In addition to working with the US government, PR firms also represented foreign governments. From the end of World War I, but particularly as the industry expanded after 1945, firms including Hill and Knowlton, Edward Bernays, and the Hamilton Wright Organization promoted the interests of foreign governments in the United States. They represented nations as diverse as Colombia, Japan, India, Ghana, and South Vietnam. As these efforts became more common, they became increasingly controversial in the early 1960s as American journalists and congressmen questioned the origins and motives of the information – or propaganda – regarding the wider world being spread in the United States. These efforts, whether to promote the United States or foreign nations, represented what might now be called nation branding.Footnote ²²

These distinct types of engagement show the complicated relationship between the American PR industry and the interests of the US government. For much of the century they worked closely together, but at other times they were in conflict, and sometimes both simultaneously. The relationship began with some of the early leaders of the PR industry selling the idea of America in the Committee on Public Information, the government’s World War I propaganda agency. The links were just as close during the Cold War as pro-business PR leaders joined the global fight against communism. At the same time, from the very end of World War I, industry leaders were willing to promote other nations and their interests in the United States, creating a tension between business interests and the national interest that has never been fully resolved. By the end of the century, as PR firms took on clients from all manner of foreign regimes, it seemed clear that corporate interests were the dominant factor. Where capitalism clashed with nationalism, the former invariably won.

This book opens with an examination of the progressive origins of the relationship between PR and foreign relations. Chapter 1 examines World War I, notably the Committee on Public Information, revealing how PR experts became part of the efforts to sell the war to the American people and even promote the American war effort behind enemy lines. Edward Bernays, Carl Byoir, Arthur Page, John Price Jones, and Ivy Lee all experienced their first connection between the nascent PR industry and foreign relations. All went on to use PR in ways that related to international affairs. While the war created close links between PR and government, the following decades saw tension between the growing PR industry and government. Chapter 2 situates the growing involvement of PR firms in international affairs within the debates of the 1920s over the role of public opinion in society. It also examines how the private business interests of PR firms did not always fall in line with the interests of Washington. The work of Ivy Lee in Europe, and with the Soviet Union in particular, brought him into conflict with the State Department. However, it was Lee and Byoir’s work for Nazi Germany in the 1930s that created the most controversy in this period. As Chapter 3 shows, Congress publicly investigated their work, raising questions about the nature and ethics of PR in the realm of foreign relations, leading to legislation aimed at limiting the influence of foreign propaganda in the United States.

Unsurprisingly, war brought PR and the government closer together again. As Americans debated how to engage with a world at war, PR firms worked with citizens’ organizations on both sides of the political debate from 1938 to 1941. Chapter 4 shows how the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and the America First Committee were merely the two most prominent organizations to receive varying degrees of quiet PR support from the John Price Jones Corporation and James Selvage, respectively. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended the great debate over entry into the war, arguments shifted to consider the nature of US involvement in the world. Chapter 5 shows how the 1940s saw citizens’ groups, ably supported by the John Price Jones Corporation and Harold L. Oram Inc., lead the charge to support government planning for international organization and postwar reconstruction in Europe.

The early Cold War years saw the PR industry expand and engage with foreign relations on an unprecedented scale. Chapter 6 shows how PR continued to align with US foreign policy aims. Arthur Page threw his efforts behind the various Crusades for Freedom of the 1950s, which helped fund the National Committee for Free Europe, which ran Radio Free Europe. In addition to raising money to promote freedom, one of his tasks was hiding the fact that the National Committee for Free Europe was a creation of the CIA. Other leading PR figures including John Hill (of Hill and Knowlton) assisted the United States Information Agency in its efforts to spread propaganda overseas. PR and government interests also aligned with wider business interests in this period. As Chapter 7 shows, the work of Edward Bernays helped shape American attitudes toward Guatemala in 1954.

Yet the Cold War did not always see PR and the US government on the same side. As PR expanded in the 1950s, firms took on numerous overseas governments as clients. The main purpose of these contracts was to influence public opinion in the United States, whether to increase tourism or secure foreign aid. Chapter 8 shows the extent of growing PR involvement in branding foreign nations. It also highlights the concerns raised by the not-quite-invisible PR efforts to influence domestic opinion about faraway lands. Those concerns became increasingly prominent in the 1960s in the face of fears that the “Vietnam lobby” drew the nation closer to war. As in the 1930s, congressional investigations reflecting those concerns followed. As before, they had little lasting impact on the work of PR firms for foreign interests.

The fact that PR leaders influenced foreign affairs created a tension within American democracy. As an invisible elite, they worked largely hidden from public view. Yet the issues they sought to influence mattered tremendously in the nation’s history, including questions of war and peace. The twentieth century saw the United States engaged in numerous global fights, attempting to make the world safe for democracy, and free from fascism and communism. The American people did not always agree on how best to go about these missions – or even whether they should undertake them at all – but the PR industry was always there to justify them in a particular fashion. More often than not, PR made a case for an American-led century. It always sought a future in which business could prosper.