Introduction

This chapter focuses on capability assessment. By assessment, I mean any mode of inquiry aimed at informing us about an individual’s (or a group of individuals’) capability, and especially if capability is found to be lacking, how this may be explained. Such an inquiry may be conducted for a variety of reasons, for instance, to learn about a programme’s impact, to see whether specific (groups of) individuals are structurally disadvantaged compared with their peers, and, if so, what sort of measures might be enacted to remediate this. Researchers conducting this type of inquiry face several challenges. Normatively, they need to make decisions regarding the content of the capability of their research subjects: what is it, exactly, that they should be able to do or be? Analytically, they need to make decisions regarding the factors that are likely to play a role in the development (or lack thereof) of capability in their research subjects. Finally, they need to make decisions regarding the methods that they are going to employ to collect the relevant empirical information (e.g., surveys, participatory observation, questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, or a combination thereof). The purpose of this chapter is to examine and discuss these challenges, specifically in relation to capability assessment in the workplace.

The chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section, the investigational requirements associated with adopting capability as the informational focus of a theory of justice are discussed. An apparent paradox will be foregrounded: whereas the CA has been dismissed as an unworkable idea by some, Sen himself has stated that capability deprivations can be readily observed by those who are willing to do so. Obviously, the issue is relevant to capability assessment: is it overwhelmingly complex, or fairly straightforward, as Sen himself seems to suggest? On the basis of what Sen has to say about capability deprivations and human rights violations and drawing on insights from policy sciences, I suggest that the apparent paradox can be resolved by distinguishing between two different stages in policymaking processes: listening and structuration. After pointing out that work can both help people develop their capabilities and act as a severe constraint in this regard, two case studies are presented. The first serves to illustrate in more detail the types of decisions that capability researchers need to make, both normatively and analytically as well as methodologically, and how such decisions can be taken into account during a structuration process. The case study is an example of how work can act as a strong promoter of capability. The second case study concerns forced labour and, as such, works as a potential constraint on capability development. It presents some data from globally conducted surveys and some of the critiques that these surveys have engendered. The following section presents an approach that can be used in the structuration process when findings from multiple sources are difficult to reconcile and appear to support different, incompatible actions. In the final section, it is argued that when making decisions in the context of capability assessment, we need to consider the realist and non-idealist nature of Sen’s CA.

Two disclaimers are in order. First, the work of Van der Klink et al. on the development of an instrument to assess workers’ capability (the capability set for work) will not be covered here since it is dealt with thoroughly in Chapter 2 of this volume. Second, this chapter does not intend to provide a systematic review of the literature of empirical studies of the relationship between capability and work, since this information was provided by Lessmann [Reference Lessmann1] and Julhe [Reference Julhe2]. Instead, it follows a case-study approach that is purposively meant to explore some of the challenges associated with applying the capability approach (CA) for empirical research in the area of work.

The Apparent Paradox Associated with Capability Assessment

Capability is the informational focus of the theory of justice developed by Amartya Sen [Reference Sen3]. This means that, according to this theory, people’s relative advantages and disadvantages should be assessed in terms of their capability. Capability refers to the real opportunities that people have to be and do things they have reason to value. The actual outcomes of the opportunities are called functionings. The focus on human capability has been developed by Sen as an alternative to other informational focal points of theories of justice, notably resources and utilities. Sen is critical of utility-based accounts of justice (utilitarianism) for various reasons, including the reduction of everything that can be of value to human beings into a single metric that is not possible or desirable. In his own account, the plurality of diverse values is preserved since the functionings (the doings and beings that people have reason to value) are left unspecified, and no attempt is made at commensuration.

Sen is critical of resource-based accounts of justice, primarily because these theories do not sufficiently acknowledge the substantial variation (“diversity”) across humans and over the life course in their ability to transform resources to achieve something that is of value to them. The focus on resources (usually commodities) without recognising human diversity leads to or further entrenches inequality in what people are supposed to enjoy from using these resources. In his own theory of justice, such human variation is explicitly taken into account by considering capability as a result of the dynamic interplay between the individual’s biopsychological characteristics (“endowments”), the external environment, including resources and conversion factors, and the ultimate functionings. Conversion factors here include how social environments address personal factors (e.g., age, gender, disability, proneness to illness), the physical environment (e.g., environmental conditions such as temperature ranges and flooding), the social climate (e.g., public health and healthcare, public educational arrangements, and the prevalence of crime and violence), and relational perspectives (e.g., the personal resources needed for taking part in the life of a community or to fulfil the elementary requirements of self-respect) [Reference Sen3].

The focus of the CA is not only on what people actually end up doing and being (achieving functionings) but also and primarily on what they are in fact able to do, irrespective of whether they choose to make use of such an opportunity [Reference Sen3]. To illustrate the conceptual and ethical differences, Sen offers the following example:

This “freedom to choose how to live” aspect of the CA has significant implications for empirical inquiry into people’s capability. Taking the earlier example, an assessment of this specific capability – the ability to retain parts of ancestral cultural traditions and lifestyles – among a group of non-Western migrants in some jurisdictions could plausibly include the following:

• An assessment of the arguments for which parts of ancestral culture (if any) would be reasonable for non-Western migrants to retain after they have settled in Europe or America (the ‘significant argument’). This initial part of the inquiry would serve as a justification for deciding which parts of ancestral culture do and which parts do not qualify as doings and beings that people have reason to value.

• Second, there would need to be some sort of empirical inquiry into the current level of achievement of such functionings: is there any evidence suggesting that non-Western migrants actually retain or would like to retain such parts of their ancestral cultural traditions and lifestyle after they have settled in Europe or America? Which practices, so to speak, would count as supporting evidence? Equally importantly, is achievement fairly straightforward as a matter of course, or at great pains for individuals, and constantly contested by the new surrounding environment?

• Third, it involves empirically exploring the levels and reasons for current non-achievement, specifically the extent to which non-achievement results from individual reasoned choices and the extent to which other factors are at play. In other words, is non-achievement evidence of capability deprivation?

• Finally, and particularly if the exercise also aims at remediating observed capability constraints, it would include an inquiry into potential causes of the capability constraints, focusing on resources, conversion factors, functionings, and their interplay to identify potentially effective and appropriate avenues for remediation.

The challenges and complexities associated with such an inquiry can hardly be overstated. For this reason, some authors have dismissed the CA as an “unworkable idea” [Reference Rawls4, p. 13]. However, this apparent complexity in assessing capability is in sharp contrast with what Sen has to say on this matter when discussing the obligations associated with having capabilities: “if someone has the power to make a difference that he or she can see will reduce injustice in the world, then there is a strong and reasoned argument for doing just that” [Reference Sen3, p. 271].

The phrasing suggests that injustices (in terms of capability deprivations) are out there for us to be seen, and if we can do something to make a difference, we should do just that. None of the complexities mentioned in the earlier example seems to be at play here. Rather, it is a matter of acknowledging that having the power to do something about which one can see will reduce injustice in the form of capability deprivation. To be sure, it might require considerable moral courage, stamina, and discernment. However, a complex inquiry along the lines suggested earlier is not needed. There appears to be a paradox here, with capability assessment being tremendously complex and demanding (even ‘unworkable’) on the one hand and surprisingly simple to address on the other hand. This paradox is obviously relevant to the investigational requirements associated with capability assessment: how complex, or simple, may we expect it to be? In the following, I explore this apparent paradox. To this end, I briefly discuss the congruences between capabilities on the one hand and human rights on the other. The reason for this link is that Sen makes several observations regarding the determination of the violation of human rights that, in my view, are quite relevant and transferable to capability assessment as well.

Capabilities, Human Rights, and Investigational Requirements

There are some conceptual congruences between capabilities on the one hand and human rights on the other. International human rights law identifies certain basic human freedoms (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear) and the corresponding social obligations to promote or safeguard these freedoms [Reference Sen3]. The contents of such freedoms (what is it that humans should be free to be or do?) can arguably be conceived as functionings as defined by Sen (doings and beings that people have reason to value). Since capability is the freedom to achieve certain functionings, a clear parallel between capability and human rights emerges. There are, however, some differences. First, a distinction needs to be made between the opportunity aspect of freedom and the process aspect of freedom [Reference Sen3]. While the former refers to freedom to be or do X, the latter refers to how freedom is exercised. That is, a person forced to do X or doing X because there is no other choice would both be seen the same as someone wilfully doing X if the process aspect is also not recognised as important. Capability would be a good way of formalising the opportunity aspect of freedom and human rights, but as Sen says: “Issues related to the process aspect of freedom demand that we go beyond seeing freedoms only in terms of capabilities” [Reference Sen3, p. 371]. Second, in the CA, freedom is seen to result from the dynamic interplay between personal endowments, resources, conversion factors, and function in a way that is not usually seen in accounts of human rights [Reference Sen3]. Third, while human rights and capability are both linked to the obligations of others, the former can be viewed as levers of political articulation [Reference Critchley5], whereas the latter seems to focus on individual obligations. That is, there is Sen’s earlier quote about individual power and injustice. There is this further quote: “Freedom in general and agency freedom in particular are parts of an effective power that a person has, and it would be a mistake to see capability, linked with these ideas of freedom, only as a notion of human advantage: it is also a central concern in understanding our obligations” [Reference Sen3, p. 271]. In both, Sen seems to focus on individual obligations, whereas human rights are first and foremost obligations of governments towards their citizens.

Because of these parallels between capabilities and human rights and Sen’s own discussion on capabilities as the basis of some moral human rights, it is of interest to the present paper to understand what Sen has to say in the public discourse on human rights. Sen holds that different avenues exist for promoting human rights: “The ethical pronouncements, with distinct political content, that belong to a declaration of human rights may come from persons or institutions, and they may be presented as individual remarks or as social pronouncements” [Reference Sen3, p. 359]. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch, Médecins sans Frontières, and Amnesty International, as well as the media and social movements, can play an important role in exposing, advocating for, and informing public discussion. An important question is how moral claims with reference to specific human rights can be tested for their validity and acceptability. For Sen, this would require “an interactive process of critical scrutiny with open impartiality” [Reference Sen3, p. 385]. In the following, some insights from policy sciences are presented that could help shed more light on what such an interactive process might look like.

Listening and Structuration: Two Distinct Stages in the Policymaking Process

Sen distinguishes, then, between, on the one hand, a process where human rights, especially perceived violations of human rights, are brought to the attention of a wider public and, on the other hand, a process where such claims are adopted more formally and transformed into collectively binding policymaking or legislation. In the policy sciences literature, these two processes have been designated ‘listening’ and ‘structuration and decision-making’, respectively [Reference Bächtiger and Parkinson6]. According to these authors, claims and concerns that are voiced in the public sphere belonging to the listening stage of the policymaking process include: 1) narratives and experiences that are considered to have implications for the community at large; 2) statements calling attention to perceived breaches of specific norms; 3) ontological claims as to who and what is being recognised to exist in the world and how; and 4) proposals for collective action or inaction, all of which are bundled with evidence and experience. In a deliberative democracy (Sen mostly uses the term democracy by discussion), it is a relatively wild, open, inclusive, and uncontrolled type of public debate. For such claims to be accepted as the basis for formal and collectively binding policy, some type of channelling of the arguments is needed, testing and filtering them in a structuration process that is both a transmission and a transformation.

Based on the foregoing, I will now make two suggestions. First, because of the parallels between human rights and capability, I suggest that what Sen has to say in the process of articulating and formally adopting human rights also holds for capability. Specifically, all sorts of claims may be made regarding capability and especially capability deprivations as long as they are considered part of the listening stage of the policy process. For such claims to be taken seriously, in the sense of being considered the basis for formal and collectively binding decisions, some sort of structuration is needed. This leads to my second suggestion, to wit that the proposed distinction helps to understand the apparent paradox signalled at the beginning of this chapter. In a deliberative democracy, it is important that claims regarding capability and capability deprivations can be made in relatively uncontrolled, wild, open, and inclusive ways. No specific restrictions or demands should be made, acknowledging that the ability to articulate such claims may differ across citizens and that relatively weak voices in particular may have something to say that is of significant importance to the community at large. However, some mechanisms should be in place, allowing for a publicly observable and defensible way of selecting, with reason, which of the ‘sounds’ that are being heard are to be taken seriously, in the sense of serving as a basis for collectively binding decisions and legislation. Whereas the former may, in a way, be considered relatively simple (even though it requires significant courage and stamina), the latter involves more complex types of inquiry into the validity, consistency, relevance, and coherence of the expressed claims and concerns. In the following, I explore how such critical scrutiny may be conducted by discussing claims or concerns regarding capability and human rights in relation to work.

Capability and Work: Complex Relations

The relationships between capability and work are complex. First, work has been, and continues to be, a battleground of glaring violations of human rights. Forced labour and exploitation are likely to constitute sources of momentous deprivations of people’s capabilities. Indeed, present-day instances of forced labour, exploitation, and unsafe and unhealthy work environments have been designated instances of modern slavery [7]. However, in the absence of structural and overt violence and force, work may also act as a significant constraint on capability development. The late anthropologist David Graeber coined the term ‘bullshit jobs’ for meaningless and numbing work [Reference Graeber8]. More poetically, the Argentinian filmmaker Rodrigo Moreno draws our attention to this phenomenon in his film Los Delincuentes (2023). We meet Morán (Daniel Elias), a bank employee. His days pass by, drab and cheerless. At some point in time, he concludes that the bank is, in fact, robbing him of his time. To settle the bill, he decides to rob, in turn, the bank of its money. He does this in such a way that it is clear that it was he who did the robbing (cameras). After a few days spent in bliss, he turns himself in at a police station. However, the money is gone. Three years, he reckons, will be his sentence. An offering that he is willing to make to regain his freedom. In addition, it seems, to clear his conscience. Time in prison is challenging and not without violence. However, he finds his way, and after his release, we see him relating to the people around him, to the world, and to himself in an entirely different manner.

Tragic (and humorous) this may be, we need to acknowledge, of course, that work can also be a means for people to develop important capabilities [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma9]. Indeed, the very fact that work is considered a human right [10] may imply that work can be considered a valuable capability as defined by Sen. In the following, I turn to the question of what can be done to assess how work impacts individuals’ capability or human rights.

Two Case Studies: Microcredits and Capability Expansion and Forced Labour and Human Rights

To explore the challenges associated with the assessment of capability in the context of work, I present two case studies. First, the research objective was to determine whether there was any evidence suggesting that a specific intervention (microcredits) had resulted in an expansion of the capability of its beneficiaries. The second case study is more complex and involves two distinct approaches to explore the violation of human rights in the workplace context.

Structuration in the Case of Incongruent Evidence: Reconstructing Interpretive Frames

In line with the logic I have set out, if governments were to decide to formally adopt such recommendations, some sort of structuration would be needed. Given the diversity in types of research, findings, and recommendations, this could be a challenging task. On the one hand, there are global research efforts (such as the one producing the Global Slavery Index), revealing and drawing attention to the wide and increasing prevalence of modern slavery while recommending its complete eradication to be achieved, among others, by criminal justice and by making it socially unacceptable. On the other hand, small-scale research efforts suggest that phenomena such as child migration in West Africa should, at least to some extent, be accepted and that the key issue is not complete eradication but rather protection of migrating children from harm as much as possible. The question is what policymakers can do when confronted with such apparently diverging perspectives. One approach could be to appraise the validity of the available evidence critically and determine whether some studies should carry more weight than others do. In such cases, such an approach is unlikely to bring the question close in a satisfactory way. The reason for this is that there is a certain incongruence between the various studies; they do not fit well. The studies do not merely differ in terms of their methods; they also differ in terms of how the problem is conceptualised. On the one hand, forced labour is considered an exceptional problem in an otherwise well-functioning global economy, mainly owing to the greed and moral shortcomings of its perpetrators. Solutions are sought in the area of criminal justice and raising awareness. On the other hand, structural poverty is considered to be the driving force of forced labour, originating from global political‒economic inequity.

In policy sciences, the method of reconstructing interpretive frames has been developed as a means of structuration in the case of incongruent evidence [Reference Fischer22, Reference Dodge and Metze23, Reference Mendoça, Simões, Ercan, Asenbaum, Curato and Mendoça24]. It consists of making explicit the following elements in the available evidence (see Figure 4.1):

Figure 4.1

The four elements constituting an interpretive frame.

Figure 4.1 Long description

The four quadrants are labelled as follows. Problem Definition asks, What is it that is not as it should be. Judgement of Solutions asks, What sort of measures are most likely to help improve the situation. Background Theory asks, What are the major causes contributing to the onset and persistence of the problem. Background Values ask, What are the values that need to be fostered.

Jointly, these four elements constitute an interpretive frame. By making interpretive frames explicit, the mutual coherence between the various elements comes into view: a judgement of various solutions makes sense in view of how the problem is defined and vice versa; in turn, judgements of solutions and problem definitions are constituted by background theories and values. Stakeholders may reason and act from different interpretive frames; when they do, this will usually give rise to incongruent types of evidence. Importantly, a different approach is required for the process of structuration.

Although the global survey that gives rise to estimates of national rates of modern slavery and a study such as the one by Howard et al. [Reference Howard and LeBaron20] both testify, each in their own way, of a strong commitment to protect humans from the various types of forced labour, the underlying interpretive frames differ in a number of important ways. For example, in the study by Howard et al. [Reference Howard and LeBaron20], the problem is not so much that these children are on the move; the problem is that when they are on the move, they are subject to harm, including physical violence, robbery, and exploitation (problem definition). Potentially effective measures for resolution (judgement of solutions) include ensuring that, on their journey, children are accompanied by a relative and that if they run into trouble, they can continue to rely on their family for support. Additionally, when on the move, children should have easy access to safe and affordable places where they can sleep. Finally, as a journey into adulthood, the quality and relevance of apprenticeships should be enhanced, and there should be easy ways for children to keep their little money safe. In terms of background theory, poverty is considered among the main driving forces, resulting in failure of parents to sustain a family. Poverty itself is considered a result of global political and economic dynamics. Among the background values is a commitment to respect, at least to some extent, local culture: in Western African countries, it is not uncommon for children to leave their family home around the age of 15 as a ‘journey into adulthood’.

Importantly, interpretive frames define what is and what is not relevant evidence. For example, if the problem is not that these migrating children should be better protected but should not occur in the first place, the solutions of the sort proposed earlier are entirely misguided, and the associated background theory is largely irrelevant. Moreover, any research that aims to determine whether proposed solutions are effective is essentially a waste of money. The main lesson here is to resist the tendency to limit structuration to a critical scrutiny of the validity of the various evidentiary elements. Such scrutiny is important but may not be enough. The reason for this is that evidence is always produced in the context of some interpretive frame. As observed by Genevieve LeBaron: “The way that the problem of forced labour is framed and understood – who or what is demonstrated to bear responsibility, the way that data is collected and presented, and especially whether and how its causes are foregrounded or obscured – is shaped by researchers’ choices, whether they are aware of it or not” [Reference LeBaron and LeBaron18, p. 11].

Interpretive frames may, but need not, be widely shared. An important task of researchers in this respect is, then, to determine whether a specific issue (such as child migration and the associated risks of enforced labour and exploitation in Western Africa) is framed in multiple ways and, if so, what implications this might have for the interpretation of the available evidence. Importantly, this means that we should acknowledge that specific evidence is relevant only within a particular interpretive frame. Reconstructing interpretive frames as part of a structuration process is useful for several reasons:

• It broadens the scope from a focus on the assessment of the validity of evidence to include an assessment of the relevance of evidence.

• It offers the opportunity to assess and discuss the coherence of the interpretive frame in use.

• It offers the opportunity to assess and discuss the reasonableness of the way that general notions (background theory and background values) are brought to bear on concrete situations (e.g., practical reasoning).

• It offers an opportunity to assess and discuss the plausibility of background theory and support background values.

• Finally, it offers an opportunity to suggest how the parties involved might proceed while acknowledging differences in their interpretive frames.

Clearly, this renders the task of the researcher who is conducting and assisting the structuration process more complex and demanding but also more interesting and relevant to the policy process. In fact, it results in a shift away from the authoritative appraisal of evidence towards the promotion of mutual learning among various stakeholders [Reference Fischer25, Reference Grin and Graaf26]. In addition, relevant to the present discussion, the method could be particularly useful in the context of capability assessment. The problem definition would specify the nature of the capability deprivation: what is it that (a group of) individuals are not well able to do or be? Solutions that are considered potentially effective in expanding or restoring capability typically refer to (lack of) resources, (deficits in) conversion factors, or both. Background theory would specify how, in a more general way, capability deprivation or capability expansion work, and background values would include the freedom to aspire and achieve and the associated responsibilities towards others.

Discussion and Conclusion

Starting from the observation that capability is the primary informational focus of the theory of justice developed by Amartya Sen, I have explored some of the investigational requirements that are associated with such choice. I have argued that there seems to be a paradox here, with capability assessment being prohibitively complex (if not unworkable) on the one hand and surprisingly simple on the other. The paradox can be understood, or so I have tried to argue, if we take into account the context in which capability claims or concerns are expressed. Specifically, when capability claims or concerns are intended as a basis for some sort of collective action (that is, politically), they should be able to withstand some test of criticism. I have presented two case studies to illustrate the strategies researchers may adopt to operationalise the capability concept or the related concept of human rights. Such strategies cover a wide range, varying from calculating national indices to questionnaires and focus groups, resulting in a wide diversity of data. I have offered some suggestions as to what may be done in terms of the structuration of such a variegated body of evidence, emphasising the importance of assessing both the validity and relevance of evidence, and I have argued that we may need to go beyond evidence to examine frameworks.