1 Gill, Terry D. and Fleck, Dieter (eds), The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 94–109Google Scholar, 143–149 and 199–200.

2 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), DPKO Publications, UN Secretariat, March 2008, p. 34, available at: http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. All internet references were accessed in March 2014.

3 Fleck, Dieter (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3^rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013Google Scholar, Sections 1213–1215, pp. 603–605.

4 Engdahl, Ola, Protection Of Personnel in Peace Operations: The Role of the ‘Safety Convention’ against the Background of General International Law, International Humanitarian Law Series, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 29–56Google Scholar; Fleck, Dieter (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 3–6Google Scholar and 487–506.

5 Crawford, James, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8^th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, p. 488CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Sinclair, Ian, The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments, Hague Academy of International Law, Collected Courses, Vol. 1980–II, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 1980, pp. 216–217Google Scholar.

7 Higgins, Rosalyn, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 94Google Scholar.

8 US Military Dictionary: The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001: ‘Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the missions. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training’ (emphasis added). Definitions set up in pertinent documents of the UN or regional organisations do not essentially deviate from this.

9 Ibid.: Full command includes ‘[t]he military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control’ (emphasis added).

10 See, for example, Capstone Doctrine, above note 2, p. 66.

11 See Gill, Terry D., ‘Legal Aspects of the Transfer of Authority in UN Peace Operations’, in Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 42, 2011, pp. 37–68Google Scholar, esp. 46–49 and 51–52. Insofar as peacekeepers are recruited and sent by an international organisation rather than a sending state, their immunity derives from the immunity of the international organisation. See e.g. United Nations Secretariat, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations’, 56^th Session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/545, 25 June 2004, p. 17. For a discussion on the attribution of responsibility of wrongful behaviour of peacekeepers, see Paolo Palchetti's article in this issue of the Review.

12 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, United Nations, International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001), General Assembly, Official Records, 56^th Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.

13 Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, United Nations, International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session (26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011), General Assembly, Official Records, 63^rd Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/66/10), available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_11_2011.pdf.

14 D. W. Bowett et al., ‘United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice’, Stevens & Sons, London, 1964, pp. 428–467; T. D. Gill and D. Fleck (eds), above note 1, p. 143.

15 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, XV UNCIO 335, Art. 1.

16 See Fleck, Dieter, ‘Securing Status and Protection of Peacekeepers’, in Arnold, Roberta and Knoops, Geert-Jan Alexander (eds), Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations Under International Law, Transnational Publishers, New York, 2006, p. 155Google Scholar.

17 ICJ, Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, Judgment, 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 213, available at: www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf.

18 ICJ, Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening, Judgment, 3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, para. 9978, available at: www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.

19 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Judgment, 29 October 1997, available at: www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acdec/en/71029JT3.html, para. 43.

20 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Jones v. United Kingdom (Applications Nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06), Judgment, 14 January 2014, para. 189, available at: http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Jones-v-United-Kingdom-ECtHR-2014.pdf.

21 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 22.

22 Italy, Court of Cassation, Lozano v. Italy, Appeal Judgment, Case No 31171/2008, ILDC 1085 (IT 2008), 24 July 2008, First Criminal Division.

23 Appeal Court in The Hague, Association of Citizens Mothers of Sebrenica v. (1) State of the Netherlands and (2) United Nations, Judgment, 30 March 2010, para. 4.2, available at: www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Dutch%20cases/Appeals_Judgment_Mothers_Srebrenica_EN.pdf.

24 Supreme Court of the Netherlands, The State of the Netherlands v. Hasan Nuhanović, Judgment, 6 September 2013, available at: www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/1005/The-Netherlands-v-Nuhanovi%C4%87/.

25 See Andrew Dickinson, Rae Lindsay, James P. Loonamand Clifford Chance LLP, State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

26 Van Alebeek, Rosanne, The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 102, 139 and 419Google Scholar; Fox, Hazel and Webb, Philippa, The Law of State Immunity, 3^rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 94Google Scholar and 611.

27 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 14 December 1946, 1946–1947 UNTS 15 (entered into force 17 September 1946).

28 In ICJ, Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 15 December 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 177, the ICJ has confirmed the expert on mission status of a special rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. No such confirmation has been given for peacekeepers so far. See Lepper, Steven J., ‘The Legal Status of Military Personnel in United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate's Analysis’, in Houston Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, 1996, p. 367Google Scholar.

29 Statement made by the Legal Counsel at the 59^th meeting of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly on 1 December 1981, United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1981, pp. 161–162, relating to field service officers under the Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization regarding the Headquarters of UNESCO and the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization on French Territory, 2 July 1954 (entered into force 23 November 1955), available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=48888&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. See also Michael Gerster and Dirk Rottenberg, Art. 105, MN 22, in Simma, Bruno et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 3^rd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012Google Scholar. See generally Miller, Anthony J., ‘Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Officials’, in International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 4, 2007, pp. 169–257Google Scholar.

30 Memorandum of the Legal Counsel to the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 23 June 1995, United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1995, p. 407, paras. 3–6.

31 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95 (entered into force 24 April 1964).

32 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167 (entered into force 20 February 1977).

33 S. J. Lepper, above note 28, p. 368.

34 See Second report on the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction by Concepción Escobar Hernández, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/CN.4/661, 4 April 2013, available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/4_2.htm.

35 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 9 December 1994, 2051 UNTS 363 (entered into force 15 January 1999); and the Optional Protocol thereto, 8 December 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/60/42, Annex, Registration No. A-35457 (entered into force 19 August 2010). Both documents are reprinted with a short commentary in Oswald, Bruce, Durham, Helen and Bates, Adrian, Documents on the Law of UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 185–194Google Scholar.

36 The legal character of ‘UN operation’ may also be confirmed by a special declaration by the Security Council or the General Assembly under Art. 1(c)(ii) ‘that there exists an exceptional risk to the safety of the personnel participating in the operation’.

37 ‘Safety issues’ comprise any hazards of deployment, including for example the handling of equipment or exposure to tropical diseases. ‘Security issues’ include external threats ranging from military assault to petty crime.

38 Art. 4: ‘Agreements on the status of the operation. The host State and the United Nations shall conclude as soon as possible an agreement on the status of the United Nations operation and all personnel engaged in the operation including, inter alia, provisions on privileges and immunities for military and police components of the operation.’ The latter formulation is open to misunderstanding, as immunities are derived from customary international law so that SOFA or SOMA provisions can be no more than declaratory in nature.

39 Preamble, para. 1.

40 On the applicability of IHL to non-state actors, see D. Fleck (ed.), above note 3, Section 1201, para. 5, pp. 585–586.

41 For a general consideration of the problem of compliance with international treaty obligations, see Ulfstein, Geir, Marauhn, Thilo and Zimmerman, Andreas (eds.), Making Treaties Work: Human Rights, Environment and Arms Control, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For some first steps taken, see GA Res. 67/85 (21 March 2013) and 68/101 (18 February 2014), Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and Protection of United Nations Personnel.

42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), Art. 26: ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith.’

43 Art. 8: ‘Duty to release or return United Nations and associated personnel captured or detained. Except as otherwise provided in an applicable status-of-forces agreement, if United Nations or associated personnel are captured or detained in the course of the performance of their duties and their identification has been established, they shall not be subjected to interrogation and they shall be promptly released and returned to United Nations or other appropriate authorities. Pending their release such personnel shall be treated in accordance with recognized standards of human rights and the principles and spirit of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.’

44 Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit/Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone, United Nations, September 2003, p. 3/83, available at: http://pbpu.unlb.org/PBPS/Pages/PUBLIC/ViewDocument.aspx?docid=275&cat=1&scat=111&menukey=_6_2_17; Benner, Thorsten, Mergenthaler, Stephan and Rotmann, Philipp, The New World of UN Peace Operations: Learning to Build Peace?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 174CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 For an example, see Arts. 113(1) and (2) of the German Criminal Code: ‘(1) Whosoever, by force or threat of force, offers resistance to or attacks a public official or soldier of the Armed Forces charged with the enforcement of laws, ordinances, judgments, judicial decisions or orders acting in the execution of such official duty shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or a fine. (2) In especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to five years. An especially serious case typically occurs if (a) the principal or another accomplice carries a weapon for the purpose of using it during the commission of the offence; or (b) the offender through violence places the person assaulted in danger of death or serious injury.’

46 See e.g. Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber I), 8 April 2009, para. 218, available at: www.refworld.org/pdfid/49e71f1b2.pdf.

47 The provisions in Art. 8 (2)(c)(iii) and 8(d)((iii) of the ICC Statute deal with attacks against persons protected under the law of (international or non-international) armed conflict, thus excluding most peace operations.

48 This provision also applies to the Optional Protocol, which shall be read and interpreted together with the Convention as a single instrument.

49 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Commentary on the UN Convention on the Safety of United and Associated Personnel, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, p. 4, available at: http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/csunap/csunap_e.pdf; see also Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, ‘Defending the Blue Helmets: Protection of United Nations Personnel’, in Luigi Condorelli, Anne-Marie La Rosa and Sylvie Scherrer (eds), Les Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire/The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law, Proceedings of the international symposium held on the occasion of the 50^th anniversary of the United Nations, Geneva, 19–21 October 1995, Pedone, Paris, 1996, pp. 115 and 132–145.

50 See the sub-section on ‘Applicability in other forms of robust peace operations’ below.

51 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 118(1).

52 Greenwood, Christopher, ‘Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime’, in Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 199–200Google Scholar.

53 Greenwood, Christopher, in Fleck, Dieter (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2^nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008Google Scholar, para. 4 to Section 208, p. 53.

54 C. Greenwood, above note 52, pp. 197–202 and 207.

55 Engdahl, Ola, ‘Prosecution of Attacks against Peacekeepers in International Courts and Tribunals’, in Military Law and the Law of War Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2012, pp. 279–280Google Scholar.

56 Ibid., p. 279: ‘There is a risk that such an approach adversely affects the respect for the protection of peacekeepers.’

57 SC Res. 82, 25 June 1950; SC Res. 83, 27 June 1950; GA Res. 377(V), 3 November 1950; GA Res. 498(V), 1 February 1951; GA Res. 500(V), 18 May 1951.

58 SC Res. 678, 29 November 1990.

59 SC Res. 1973, 26 February 2011.

60 Mona Khalil, ‘Humanitarian Law and Policy in 2014: Peacekeeping Missions as Parties to Conflicts’, 13 February 2014, available at: http://phap.org/thematic-notes/2014/february/humanitarian-law-policy-2014-peacekeeping-missions-parties-conflicts.

61 T. D. Gill and D. Fleck (eds), above note 1, Section 5.01, p. 81.

62 SC Res. 161, 21 February 1961; SC Res. 169, 24 November 1961; see Findlay, Trevor, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 71Google Scholar.

63 SC Res. 1088, 12 December 1996; SC Res. 1174, 15 June 1998.

64 SC Res. 1244, 10 June 1999.

65 SC Res. 2053, 27 June 2012; SC Res. 2076, 20 November 2012; and SC Res. 2098, 18 March 2013. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) found itself supporting government forces against the rebel group M23. The Security Council, ‘[e]xpressing its deep concern regarding the threat posed by the presence of M23 in the immediate vicinity of the city of Goma in violation of resolution 2076 (2012), as well as the continuation of serious violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights by the M23 and other armed groups’, readjusted MONUSCO's mandate to include protection of civilians, neutralising armed groups through the Intervention Brigade, monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo, and provision of support to national and international judicial processes (SC Res. 2098, Preamble para. 9; op. paras. 12–16), tasks that should not be misunderstood as deviations from the fundamental principles of consent of the host state, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate. For a first discussion on background and legal interpretation, see Oswald, Bruce, ‘The UN Security Council and the Force Intervention Brigade: Some Legal Issues’, in ASIL Insights, Vol. 17, No. 15Google Scholar, 6 June 2013, available at: www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight130606_0.pdf.

66 The list of States Parties to the Convention is available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-8&chapter=18&lang=en.

67 The list of States Parties to the Optional Protocol is available at: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-8-a&chapter=18&lang=en.

68 Information kindly provided to the author by Ms. Katarina Grenfell, Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations. See for example SC Res. 1502 (2003), 26 August 2003, op. para. 5(a); Protocole modifiant l'Accord entre l'Organisation des Nations Unies et la République démocratique du Congo concernant le statut de la Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO), Kinshasa, 6 June 2006, 2106 UNTS 357; and GA Res. 67/85 of 13 December 2012, op. paras. 16 and 17.

69 See, for example, SC Res. 1778, 25 September 2007, Preambular para. 9, op. para. 4.

70 See, for example, Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sudan concerning the status of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) (with exchange of letters), New York, 1 October 2012, I-50146; Status-of-Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (with supplemental arrangement) concerning the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Juba, I-48873 (entered into force 8 August 2011).

71 Agreement between the United Nations and the African Union and Sudan concerning the Status of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), Khartoum, 9 February 2008, 2503 UNTS 217, para. 6(a), available at: http://unamid.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMID/UNAMID%20SOFA.pdf.

72 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army, 31 December 2004, available at: http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf.

73 See communiqué of the 66^th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held in Abuja on 30 November 2006, available at: www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiquedarfureng-68th.pdf; and communiqué of the 79^th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 22 June 2007, available at: www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sudan%20AU%20PSC%20PR%20COMM%20LXXIX.pdf.

74 For a legal assessment of the conflict in Sudan, see the Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project (RULAC) website, available at: www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/state.php?id_state=205.

75 SC Res. 1769 (2007), 31 July 2007.

76 See Bellamy, Alex J. and Williams, Paul D., Providing Peacekeepers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

77 See ‘Status of Forces Agreements and UN Mandates: What Authorities and Protections Do They Provide to U.S. Personnel?’, Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 28 February 2008, Serial No. 110–153, available at: http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/congressional_comm/house_foreign_affairs/us_house_foreign_affairs_hearing_feb_28_2008.pdf; Worster, William Thomas, ‘Immunities of United Nations Peacekeepers in the Absence of a Status of Forces Agreement’, in Military Law and the Law of War Review, Vol. 47, No. 3–4, 2008, pp. 277–375Google Scholar.

78 UN Doc. A/45/594 (9 October 1990), reprinted with a short commentary in B. Oswald, H. Durham and A. Bates, above note 35, pp. 34–50.

79 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces (NATO SOFA), 19 June 1951, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm; Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of Their Forces (PfP SOFA), 19 June 1995, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24742.htm; Additional Protocol of 19 June 1995 to the Agreement among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace regarding the Status of Their Forces, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24743.htm?selectedLocale=en; Further Additional Protocol of 19 December 1997 relating to the application of the Paris Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, 28 August 1952, available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17300.htm.

80 Agreement between the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Art. 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this context (EU SOFA), 17 November 2003, available at: www.statewatch.org/news/2009/mar/eu-uk-military-staff-agreement.pdf.

81 Lady Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, above note 26, p. 595, observed that the NATO SOFA observes a principle of ‘equivalence, by which the host State is only obliged to extend to visiting forces the privileges and benefits that it extends to its own forces’. But this may be based on a misunderstanding. It should be noted that equivalence may exist for support standards for these forces which are more or less comparable within the Alliance, but definitely not with respect to their legal status, as armed forces of the receiving state do not enjoy immunity at home.

82 The EU, however, has adopted its own Draft Model Agreement on the Status of the European Union-Led Forces between the European Union and a Host State, Council of the European Union, 2007, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st11/st11894.en07.pdf; see also Draft Model Agreement on the Status of the European Union Civilian Crisis Management Mission in a Host State (SOMA), 17141/08, 15 December 2008, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17141.en08.pdf.

83 See Jan Wouters and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Good Governance: Lessons From International Organizations’, K.U. Leuven, Institute for International Law, Working Paper No. 54, May 2004, available at: www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP54e.pdf, with reference to the definition used by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific: ‘Good governance has eight major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law.’ See also Ghebali, Victor-Yves and Lambert, Alexander, The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security: Anatomy and Implementation, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2005Google Scholar.

84 Examples include SC Res. 1320 (2000), para. 6, in respect of the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and SC Res. 2043 (2012), para. 7, noting the agreement between the Syrian government and the UN in respect to the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, to be established under the command of a Chief Military Observer. Some of these decisions were taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: see SC Res. 1990 (2011), para. 4, to apply the SOFA for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) mutatis mutandis to UNISFA; and SC Res. 1996 (2011), para. 26, to apply the UN Model SOFA mutatis mutandis to UNMISS.

85 Fleck, Dieter and Saalfeld, Michael, ‘Combining Efforts to Improve the Legal Status of UN Peace-Keeping Forces and Their Effective Protection’, in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1994, pp. 82–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

86 See, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), Art. 2(1). See Jann K. Kleffner, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law: General Issues’, in T. D. Gill and D. Fleck (eds), above note 1, pp. 51–77.

87 See Ben F. Klappe in D. Fleck (ed.), above note 3, Section 1307, pp. 619–625.

88 See Rodney Batstone in D. Fleck (ed.), above note 4, pp. 61–69.

89 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95 (entered into force 24 April 1964), Art. 41(1); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261 (entered into force 24 June 1964), Art. 55(1): ‘Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.’

90 See UN Doc. A/45/594, above note 78, Sections 46–49.

91 Hampson, Françoise J. and Kihara-Hunt, Ai, ‘The Accountability of Personnel Associated with Peacekeeping Operations’, in Aoi, Chiyuki et al. (eds), Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2007, p. 198Google Scholar.

92 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, above note 12, Arts. 4–11.

93 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations, above note 13, Arts. 6–9.

94 Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for states related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict of 17 September 2008, UN Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636, 6 October 2008, available at: www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/intla/humlaw.Par.0057.File.tmp/Montreux%20Document%20(e).pdf.

95 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, 9 November 2010, available at: www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf.

96 UN Human Rights Council Resolution 15/26, 7 October 2010, para. 5, available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/167/42/PDF/G1016742.pdf?OpenElement.

97 See, for example, Jody M. Prescott, ‘Claims Operations in the Former Yugoslavia’, in D. Fleck (ed.), above note 4, pp. 170–182.

98 SC Res. 2086, 21 January 2013, para. 20.