1. As Roman Szporluk pointed out, the making of one nation entails the unmaking of another; nation building in Ukraine compels the remaking of the Russian nation. Roman Szporluk, “Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” Daedalus, Vol.126, No.3, 1997, pp. 85–119.Google Scholar

2. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1986), p. 148.Google Scholar

3. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (London: Fontana, 1993), p. 238.Google Scholar

4. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 240, 244.Google Scholar

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7. See Edward L. Keenan, “On Certain Beliefs and Russian Behaviours,” and Zenon E. Kohut, “History as a Battleground: Russian–Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine,” in. Frederick S. Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).Google Scholar

8. See the “Theses of the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the Reunion of Ukraine with Russia” in connection with the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654. The English-language translation of the excerpts was published in Ralph Lindheim and George S. N. Luckyi, eds, Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of Ukrainian Thought from 1710 to 1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 303–315.Google Scholar

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32. In this context, the term “indigenous” is applied to ethnic groups whose “ethnogenesis” took place on the territory of Ukraine. Apart from Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, Karaims and Krymchaky were included in this category. Other ethnic groups were merely minorities, since their ethnic homelands were in other states. On the case of Crimean Tatars as indigenous people, see Biuletyn Instytutu Demokratii Imeni Pylypa Orlyka, No. 4, 1996.Google Scholar

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37. Kuchma's speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of Ukrainian independence, Holos Ukrainy, 28 September 1995. This point was also made in the annual address of the president to parliament on 2 April 1996, the text of which was published in Holos Ukrainy, 4 April 1996.Google Scholar

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41. The symbols are: the trident (tryzub), the blue and yellow flag, and the anthem “Ukraine Has Not Perished Yet.”Google Scholar

42. The overlap between the two political forces increased during Kuchma's second presidency, when national democrats, such as Ivan Zaiets and Mykola Zhulynskyi, were appointed members of the Cabinet of Ministers under the premiership of Victor Yushchenko.Google Scholar

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49. Ibid. The Cossack period was defined as a high point not only in reconstituting statehood but also in legal and military achievements. Parallels were drawn with England in terms of constitutional traditions, exemplified by the constitution of Pylyp Orlyk of 1710, and the Cossack army, which matched European standards.Google Scholar

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54. Kuchma's speech at the celebrations to commemorate the eightieth anniversary of the ZUNR in L'viv was published in Uriadovyi Kurier, 3 November 1998.Google Scholar

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72. Kuchma's speech on the eighth anniversary of Ukraine's independence, Holos Ukrainy, 26 August 1999.Google Scholar

73. Mykola Khvylovyi was a prominent member of the literati circles in Ukraine in the 1920s, and believed in the cultural superiority of Western Europe vis-à-vis Russia. See excerpts from Khvylovyi's pamphlets in Lindheim and Luckyi, eds, Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine, pp. 267–277.Google Scholar

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77. Vasyl Kremen', “Na Terczakh Globalismu,” Polityka I Chas, No. 2, 1999, p. 56.Google Scholar

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79. See Dmytro Vydryn and Dmytro Tabachnyk, Ukraina na porozi XXI stolittia (Kiev: Lybid, 1996), and Volodymyr Hryniov, Nova Ukraina: Yakoiu II Bachu (Kiev: Abrys, 1995).Google Scholar

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82. As Wilson put it, “plugging in the gaps” is the major task of Ukrainian nationalist historians. See Andrew Wilson, “National History and National Identity in Ukraine and Belarus,” in Graham Smith et al., Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, p. 34.Google Scholar

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