1.1 Prologue
Ebenezer Scrooge stands out as one of the most beloved characters created by Charles Dickens’s pen and genius. Originally published in 1843, A Christmas Carol has woven itself into the fabric of holiday customs worldwide. There are many reasons behind this success, but one is the presence of another much loved character in the novella: Bob Cratchit, Scrooge’s counting house clerk. Dickens depicts him as a faithful employee, a loving father and husband,1 and a person who profoundly loves the good sentiments aroused during Christmastime in particular2 – unforgettable is the scene in which “the clerk in the tank involuntarily applauded,”3 the Christmas laudation made by Scrooge’s nephew, later to be reproached by Scrooge himself (“Let me hear another sound from you and you’ll keep your Christmas by losing your situation”4). In the novella, Scrooge undergoes a transformative journey that significantly alters, among many other things, his relationship with Cratchit.
Scrooge paid his employee a mere fifteen shillings a week, which he admitted was insufficient, barely enabling the clerk to support his large family. In addition, Dickens vividly illustrates Scrooge as a rather stern and unsympathetic employer. He would deny Cratchit the warmth of a cozy fire to save on coal costs and even scold him for taking a much-deserved paid day off on December 25th: “If I was to stop half-a-crown for it, you’d think yourself ill-used … and yet, you don’t think me ill used, when I pay a day’s wage for no work.”5 Things change after the Ghost of Christmas Present and the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come show him the poor conditions in which Cratchit’s family celebrates Christmas and the sad ending of Tiny Tim, who dies of an illness that his father is unable to cure with his insufficient salary. One of the more tangible signs of Scrooge’s transformation from a greedy and insensible man into a heartful and kind person is the dialogue with his clerk on December 26th:
“Now, I’ll tell you what, my friend,” said Scrooge, “I am not going to stand this sort of thing any longer. And therefore,” he continued, leaping from his stool, and giving Bob such a dig in the waistcoat that he staggered back into the Tank again: “and therefore I am about to raise your salary!” … “A merry Christmas, Bob!” said Scrooge, with an earnestness that could not be mistaken, as he clapped him on the back. “A merrier Christmas, Bob, my good fellow, than I have given you, for many a year! I’ll raise your salary, and endeavour to assist your struggling family, and we will discuss your affairs this very afternoon, over a Christmas bowl of smoking bishop, Bob! Make up the fires, and buy another coal-scuttle before you dot another i, Bob Cratchit!”6
The happy ending of A Christmas Carol is favored by the supernatural intervention of three ghosts who reawaken Scrooge’s dormant conscience and sense of generosity. But in our nonfictional lives, this is not something we can count on. If we envision an alternate version of Dickens’s tale, stripped of its magical elements, it’s reasonable to suggest that Cratchit ought to have directly confronted Scrooge to negotiate a salary increase. After all, he would have good reasons to do so. He was a faithful employee, facing difficult circumstances due to Tiny Tim’s health conditions, and the first contract signed with Scrooge had to be reviewed to account for the changing circumstances. I am not claiming that Cratchit would have been inherently entitled to a raise or that he would have undeniable reasons for requesting one. However, I believe everyone would concur that addressing the matter with his employer, as unsympathetic and cold as Scrooge’s attitude might have been, would be the right thing to do.
If we agree with this last statement, we can take a step further and wonder about the content of the meeting between Scrooge and Cratchit. Although renegotiating a contract is an economic matter, it inherently encompasses moral considerations. Both Scrooge and Cratchit might be interested in making what, from their perspective, is the fair choice. The problem is that morality is not that simple, and what counts as “fair” or “just” cannot be univocally or definitively determined. Before the meeting, Scrooge and Cratchit might wonder what course of action they should follow, which moral principles should guide them, and what moral reasons they should put forward to support their choices. If, for any given situation, there was just one all-inclusive moral package (principles, reasons, courses of action), then the task of people interested in doing the right thing would be simply to discover it. The history of ethics shows us that this is not the case. There is no unique moral system nor conclusive agreement on the primacy of one of the many available. In their renegotiation, Scrooge and Cratchit are reading a menu of moral principles. Each principle suggests a course of action and good moral reasons to go that way. Ultimately, it is their choice.
This book aims to enrich Scrooge and Cratchit’s moral options by providing three moral principles that can be applied to cases similar to theirs. If you find these economic and moral issues intriguing, I encourage you to keep reading. Otherwise, there is still the hope that the three ghosts might do the work for us.
1.2 Business Ethics and Normative Ethical Theories
Normative ethical theories are pillars of research and teaching in business ethics (BE, henceforth). Western approaches to BE revolve around the triad of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, as can be seen in hundreds of BE textbooks7 and course materials.8 The starting point is common to every approach, and it consists of the refusal of the market as a “morally free zone,”9 which means that the debate on what is right and wrong, good and bad, cannot be separated from analyses of the business world. Normative ethical theories attract students and researchers not by detailing common patterns of actions or business habits but by encouraging everyone to explore what “should” happen independently of what “usually” happens. Consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics provide three distinct perspectives to tackle normative business queries. While these normative ethical theories were developed during various eras of Western history, they still offer insights valuable in addressing modern challenges.
Many BE courses begin with an introductory lecture on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. In one of my courses at Tilburg University (the Netherlands), titled “Morality of Commercial Life,” for third-year international business administration students, the first lecture focuses on these normative ethical theories. This should not come as a surprise. As shown in the chapter devoted to the Netherlands in the Global Survey of Business Ethics 2022–2024: Teaching, Research and Training,10 the three theories are commonly studied in Dutch universities:
Table 4 shows results derived from respondents in academia and training. In both areas, most respondents can be seen to use variations of consequentialism/utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics as the standard theoretical foundation for their approach to business ethics. Note that the use of these three normative ethical theories is not specific to Dutch business ethics; proponents of U.S. approaches to business ethics typically use a similar “traditional trifecta” of normative ethical theories, and it may well be that the theoretical foundation of Dutch business ethics is partly derived from its North American counterpart.11
The triad is then further elaborated in each of its three components. Consequentialism is frequently illustrated through utilitarianism, which assesses the morality of an action or policy based on its outcomes. This necessitates consideration of which consequences are significant. The utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is anchored in the principle of utility, focusing on maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain for everyone affected by an action or policy.12 Though this serves as a common foundation, explanations of consequentialism may vary. Some educators delve into historical expansions of Bentham’s perspective, including John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) differentiation of higher and lower pleasures13 or Henry Sidgwick’s (1838–1900) distinctions between egoistic and universal hedonism.14 Others explore modern applications of utilitarianism, like Peter Singer’s argument for animal ethics in critiquing the meat industry.15 There are other routes to discuss consequentialism without necessarily referring to utilitarianism. A very recurrent one is the distinction between act-consequentialism, focused on case-by-case calculus of the consequences of an action, and rule-consequentialism, which claims “that an act is morally wrong if and only if it is forbidden by rules justified by their consequences.”16 Alternatively, the reflection can refer to the impartiality of consequentialist theories, which entails, for example, assessing if consequences should refer to present or future generations.
Deontology operates similarly. Deontological normative ethical theories typically emphasize rights and duties when evaluating the morality of actions, prioritizing intentions over outcomes. A key figure is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). With his concepts of duty and the categorical imperative, educators help students grasp the significance of universal moral principles in ethical reasoning and highlight the need to avoid treating others merely as means to an end and recognizing that acting rightly may not always lead to favorable results for oneself or others.17 Nonetheless, lectures vary widely. Some explore the argument that Kant’s philosophy is not entirely deontological, as it involves making judgments based not only on universal principles but also on contextual factors.18 Some distinguish between duty ethics and rights and justice ethics. Within the rights and justice ethics category, references include human rights theory19 and the contractualist perspective20 of John Rawls (1921–2002). In this latter view, morality is seen as a mutual agreement among individuals on the principles of justice that should underpin societal institutions such as the state or market.
Virtue ethics is frequently viewed as a counterpoint to both consequentialism and deontology. While the latter normative ethical theories focus on the moral evaluation of individual actions, virtue ethics emphasizes the character traits that contribute to human flourishing. A foundational aspect of this tradition is the perspective of Aristotle (384–322 BCE) on virtues, which he sees as habits that represent human excellence in the pursuit of eudaimonia (the good life).21 Justice, in this framework, is not merely about actions; rather, it is a virtue that must be cultivated through deliberate practice, enhancing our ability to flourish. Contemporary discussions on virtue ethics sometimes arise in BE lectures. Among them is Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of virtues as connected to practices. According to MacIntyre, a practice is “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity.”22 Can the market be considered a practice with its annexed virtues? While MacIntyre seems to exclude this possibility, others admit it and list market virtues.23 These can be topics that connect virtue ethics to BE and, as such, might be the object of BE lectures.24
While some scholars and educators explore alternative paths within the triad, others seek to transcend it by examining substitutes. For instance, care ethics has gained substantial recognition in BE research and can be seen as the “fourth” pillar of this framework. Care ethics emphasizes significant personal relationships over abstract rules or universal principles, prioritizes dependence and mutual support instead of independence and autonomy, values partiality as attentiveness to individuals’ needs rather than impartiality, and underscores the importance of emotions and passions over rationality and calculation. The objective is not just to act rightly but to foster meaningful and authentic relationships founded on cooperation and mutual assistance. The workplace and marketplace are two areas where reciprocal care can be practiced. Care ethics emerged as a feminist critique of the masculine character of normative ethical theories,25 and today, the discussion of the possibility of theorizing and applying a “feminist business ethics” is vivid and ongoing.26
A different way to overcome the triad involves decolonizing normative ethical theories by examining non-Western ethical accounts. Confucian ethics is among those explored in the literature.27 Aside from similarities to Aristotelian virtue ethics, Confucian ethics emphasizes family relations, hierarchy, and social traditions, as well as rituals as meaningful organizational practices. Another interesting project in the decolonization (or de-Westernization) of BE is represented (not exclusively) by the publication of the volume Tribal Wisdom for Business Ethics.28 In it, contributors highlight several elements from Indigenous knowledge and practices that could enhance both the theory and practice of BE. One significant aspect is the role of stories and storytelling as tools for sharing knowledge and wisdom. Unlike conventional Western narratives, tribal stories often do not adhere to a linear format (beginning, middle, and end); rather, they are considered “living” tales that reflect the connections among all natural elements, with humans being just one of them. These stories are specific to particular territories and communities and convey knowledge that extends beyond science and rationality. Scholars argue that because businesses function within distinct communities and locales, BE should embrace indigenous knowledge. They advocate for re-evaluating the concept of “global business ethics,” which often hinges on the dominance of Western normative ethical theories, including the triad.29
My book can be considered another attempt to look for alternatives to the triad of normative ethical theories. However, my aim is not to find substitutes for but rather integrations of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. In other words, I will not provide any arguments for abandoning the triad. Instead, I aim to add a new section to the chapters devoted to normative ethical theories in BE textbooks. To explain how I intend to do so, I will now turn to the aims and scope of this book.
1.3 Aims and Scope
The triad signifies a productive intersection between BE and the Western history of ideas. Aristotle developed his concepts in ancient Greece, whereas Kant and Bentham formed their own within a European landscape influenced by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Still, we find their ideas relevant in addressing contemporary moral issues, including those that emerge in the economic sphere.
My book seeks to contribute to the existing triad of normative ethical theories – consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics – by introducing another triad. I plan to achieve this by recreating the productive intersection of the Western history of ideas and BE. The triad of normative ethical theories I propose comprises political economy, civil economy, and moral economy. Under these labels, I include the moral principles for economic agents30 elaborated by Adam Smith (1723–1790), Antonio Genovesi (1713–1769), and Kant. In the eighteenth century, these Enlightenment philosophers provided, more or less explicitly, different answers to the same two questions: What is the moral principle to adopt when engaging in a market transaction? What are the moral reasons to follow it?
Smith combined self-interest with the concept of the invisible hand. From this standpoint, I will outline the moral “principle of self-interest and non-tuism.” In contrast, Genovesi argued that reciprocity, which he viewed as a natural tendency toward mutual assistance, provides ethical guidance for market participants. This is why I refer to his ideas as the moral “principle of mutual assistance.” Unlike those of Smith and Genovesi, Kant’s writings and lectures from 1784 and 1785 framed a market within the kingdom of ends, where mutual assistance shifts from the empirical to the a priori realm. For Kant, morality is centered on duties grounded in universal principles. Concerning the market sphere, I assert that he was discussing the moral principle of “honoring the spirit of mutually beneficial contracts.” Readers need not be concerned if these principles seem unclear; nearly all the chapters in this book will define and explore them. At this point, it is necessary to determine the boundaries of this book by offering some clarifications.
First, it’s important to distinguish between the moral principles underlying the two triads of normative ethical theories. While consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics address various aspects of social life, the principles of political economy, civil economy, and moral economy focus on market transactions – particularly voluntary exchanges between individuals in a free market. My triad does not extend to issues in law, education, ecology, politics, family, bioethics, gender, or other domains. For example, while we might explore the implications of consequentialist thought on terrorism, applying the principle of mutual assistance in that context wouldn’t make sense. Similarly, though virtue ethics can inform the virtues that a specific institution, like a school, should promote, the concepts of self-interest and non-tuism have little relevance there. The list of excluded domains could continue. Even within the economic sphere, my new triad has a narrower focus than traditional frameworks. Economic inequalities can indeed be assessed from utilitarian or deontological perspectives. However, the three principles I will outline assume a certain equality among the parties involved in the exchange, or at least that any inequality is not so extreme as to compel someone to engage in market transactions out of necessity. While this may seem like a limitation, it actually sets a pragmatic scope for my analysis. If I can demonstrate the utility of this new triad within its defined limits, that will already mark a significant achievement.
The second clarification concerns the terminology I have chosen. Political economy and civil economy are two schools of economic thought that emerged in the eighteenth century, namely in the UK and Italy.31 When historians refer to schools, they do not imply a physical place or a tight-knit group of instructors and pupils. Instead, the term encompasses theorists who share a fundamental understanding of a specific research topic. Thus, it can be asserted that both Smith and Genovesi were pivotal figures for their respective schools. However, in this book, I will use political economy and civil economy in a more general sense. My goal is not to demonstrate that their respective moral principles apply universally to all authors typically categorized under these labels. At the same time, it is also false to claim that these moral principles are entirely separate from their associated schools of economic thought. My modest objective is to suggest that these moral principles derive from the theories of Smith and Genovesi and can, therefore, be classified as political economy and civil economy, respectively. To clarify this usage, I categorize the moral principle connected to Kant as “moral economy.” Everyone knows there has never been an established school of economic thought named thus. This serves to caution readers to establish precise associations between my labels and historical schools of thought. I adopt this terminology to reflect what occurs within the classic triad of normative ethical theories. While I illustrate the diversity within each part of the triad, it is commonplace to link consequentialism with Bentham, deontology with Kant, and virtue ethics with Aristotle. I aim to provide compelling arguments that connect Smith’s moral principle to political economy, Kant’s moral principle to moral economy, and Genovesi’s moral principle to civil economy. This is with the hope that researchers will further explore this new triad as it applies to BE.
Next, I would like to clarify the title of my book. Smith, Kant, and Genovesi were prominent figures of the eighteenth century, all key protagonists of the Enlightenment era. As philosophers, they championed the advancement of reason and science, viewing these as foundational elements of modern societies. The market sphere was no different. In contrast to the hierarchies and privileges of feudal societies, where many individuals lacked the freedom to choose their trading partners, commercial societies founded on voluntary exchanges marked a significant advancement in human history. Freedom, equality, and fraternity were principles that these philosophers acknowledged and supported in their theories. Nonetheless, viewing the Enlightenment as a single entity would be erroneous, even in the context of Western history. Instead, we should think of it in the plural, as “Enlightenments.” For instance, Smith belonged to the Scottish Enlightenment, Genovesi was part of the Italian (specifically Neapolitan) Enlightenment, and Kant represented one development in the German Enlightenment. This book does not aim to detail the distinctions among the three Enlightenments. Instead, its goal is to highlight the pluralism found in Western thought by discussing the different moral principles relevant to market transactions elaborated within the three Enlightenments. It is evident that a multitude of authors and moral principles associated with various Enlightenment movements (e.g., French Enlightenment or British Enlightenment) could also be examined. My analysis represents just one of many contributions aiming to prevent reductionism in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of Western philosophical and economic thought.32
A final, brief clarification concerns the connection between the three moral principles and the theories of Smith, Genovesi, and Kant. Notably, these authors do not directly mention these principles or apply them to voluntary market exchanges between individuals. However, I assert that they can be inferred from their theories. This is what I do in this book. I outline the moral principles through an analysis and interpretation of the theories of the three philosophers. My intention is for readers to apply their timeless ideas to contemporary debates in BE revolving around moral issues. I believe these moral principles align with the essence of the theories of Smith, Genovesi, and Kant. However, for readers who may not be well versed in the history of Western philosophical and economic thought, it’s important to clearly distinguish between their theories and my interpretation of them.
These considerations lead me to the focus of the next section. I have outlined my intentions and aspirations for this book. However, I have not clearly articulated why it is worthwhile. For scholars of BE, the overarching goal may be apparent. Research in BE, including studies on the history of ideas, seeks practical application. We study ancient authors to uncover answers or rediscover neglected questions, applying their insights to current business challenges. While this is certainly the aim of the book, it’s essential to elaborate on what “application” entails regarding the moral principles of normative ethical theories.
1.4 Application
Applying normative ethical theories to specific cases is not straightforward or self-evident. Challenges frequently emerge when moving from general principles to real-world scenarios, and BE is no exception. Scholars, for instance, have debated the application of Kant’s moral philosophy. Some critics33 designate particular authors as “moral purists” for contending that Kant’s duty-based perspective on morality should be regarded as a critique of all market scenarios. Moral purists interpret Kant as suggesting that when self-interest is involved, duty ceases to exist, thus leaving no room for morality in free markets. However, these authors often overlook Kant’s important distinction between morality and ethics, the latter of which mixes general rational principles with empirical aspects of human inclinations and desires. While Kant emphasizes that moral law, framed as duty, should dominate our motivations, this does not inherently conflict with the self-interested aims of individuals. I delve into the shortcomings of moral purism in Chapter 2, but I mention them here to illustrate the challenges that can arise when trying to apply moral principles to specific situations.
The challenges are heightened when examining the normative ethical theories of ancient authors. For instance, consider Aristotle’s virtue ethics. His concept of virtues as character traits guiding individuals toward eudaimonia was relevant in a society with minimal disagreement about what happiness entails. Thus, we can interpret Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as a father (Aristotle) instructing his son (Nicomachus) on the virtues essential for a fulfilling life. However, scholars aiming to apply Aristotle’s virtues to modern market issues might overlook that in today’s Western societies, we experience “reasonable pluralism.”34 Rawls used this term to indicate that citizens in liberal democracies hold diverse beliefs about what constitutes a good life and prefer that social institutions, including the market, not be governed by a singular perspective. In essence, we have varying opinions on which virtues matter. As such, any attempt to adapt Aristotle’s virtue ethics to contemporary contexts must recognize this divergence – and many others.35
My book analyzes three Enlightenment authors from the eighteenth century by elaborating on three moral principles derived from their theories. As a result, I encounter the same challenges and risks regarding application. How should I address them? The solution is to articulate the same rules of engagement I usually discuss in the lecture on normative ethical theories in my BE course. The first rule concerns the temptation to tick boxes. When presented with moral principles, we might be tempted to think of them as self-explanatory guidelines to be uncritically applied to people’s conduct. For example, if an action aligns with the utilitarian principle of maximizing pleasure and minimizing suffering, it can be considered moral. This approach is not advisable. Moral principles may, and indeed should, be subject to scrutiny. In the context of utilitarianism, one might consider what constitutes pleasure and for whom it is applicable. In essence, I encourage students to view normative ethical theories not as definitive conclusions but as foundational starting points for contemplating moral problems or dilemmas in particular cases.
The second rule is to value pluralism and freedom of choice. When considering three normative ethical theories – whether the classical versions or the ones I discuss in this book – the aim isn’t to choose a single preferred theory. Each theory presents its own set of moral principles, each with distinct values and limitations. The objective of my lecture (and this book) is to provide an ethical toolkit made up of various normative ethical theories that students (and readers) can use to make their own moral judgments in specific situations. I believe that having multiple alternatives enhances our freedom of choice. By selecting one moral principle and comparing it to others, our decision becomes more informed (and freer) because it encompasses all the reasons we consider other moral principles to be inadequate. This section presents the overarching aim of this book, that is, the rationale behind writing (and reading) a book focusing on the three economic enlightenments. I intend to diversify the wellspring of ethical theories available to students and scholars by introducing an alternative set of normative ethical theories. My approach involves exploring the history of Western thought to accomplish this objective. To enhance readers’ freedom of choice, I refrain from showing any preference for the three authors or the moral principles I examine. Political economy, civil economy, and moral economy offer three perspectives from which to frame contemporary business issues. The final choice for one over the other can emerge only from the reader’s own reflections based on their basic moral understanding.
The third and final rule emphasizes the connection between moral principles and their application. In Chapter 4, I delve into how these principles outline broad guidelines for conduct while providing the moral reasons for adhering to them. However, moral principles do not necessarily automatically become motivations for action. Motivations are the ultimate reasons why we act in a certain way. However, they can consist of various factors. I can find motivation in the traditions and customs of my surroundings, the guidance of others, my instincts, or my passions, among other influences. Moral reasons, as expressed by moral principles, can be one motivation among others. I propose that motivation transforms into a moral motivation when it is linked to at least one moral reason reflected by a moral principle. Moreover, human actions cannot be explained just by relying on their motivations. Sometimes, we want to act in a certain way but find ourselves doing something different because of the circumstances. Not everything is in our control or unfolds as expected. And yet, it is still valuable to reflect on what we can control. I believe most people want to understand whether their motivations for acting are right or wrong and, thus, seek various perspectives to assess those motivations. Understanding the distinction between courses of action, moral reasons, and motivations is necessary to accurately apply the moral principles outlined in political economy, civil economy, and moral economy discussed in this book. I am not offering ready-made recipes to act morally but rather three alternatives to ground and structure our reflections on the morality of our own or others’ behavior. By establishing clear boundaries for what readers can expect from the application part of this book, I aim to mitigate the risks and challenges associated with using normative ethical theories in BE.
Up to this point, I’ve discussed how the three moral principles should be applied. Another aspect of applying normative ethical theories involves the specific contexts in which they are applied. I’ve indicated a focus on market transactions and voluntary exchanges. However, these terms are broad and can encompass a variety of situations. In order to further delimit the scope of the application, I will address the issue of incomplete contracts. In the field of economics, contracts represent the terms of a mutually beneficial agreement between two or more parties. Contracts are considered incomplete due to their inability to anticipate all present and future contingencies that may alter the mutually beneficial nature of a market transaction. I have selected three fictional examples inspired by real-life stories of incomplete contracts to illustrate how the moral dilemmas they present can be analyzed using the moral principles from the three economic enlightenments. In Chapter 4, I provide a detailed explanation of this. For now, I will guide the reader through the book’s structure by presenting a roadmap.
1.5 Roadmap
I have structured this book with the intended audience in mind. Readers may be divided into two groups: those interested in historical and philosophical analysis and those more focused on applying moral principles to practical situations. I hope that both groups will move beyond their specific interests and engage with the entire book. Acknowledging that this is not guaranteed, I will now outline the book’s structure by offering a reader’s guide.
The book consists of two parts. Part I, titled “Political Economy, Civil Economy, Moral Economy,” is followed by Part II, titled “Application.” Each part includes an introductory text that outlines what to expect in the subsequent chapters. I will now summarize the content of each chapter.
Part I consists of two chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the evolution of economic and philosophical ideas, exploring the perspectives of Smith, Genovesi, and Kant regarding the morality of commercial society. To enhance understanding of these authors’ ideas, relevant historical and contextual information is included. However, the chapter mainly emphasizes part of the existing secondary literature, addressing both Smith and Kant – two prominent figures in Western philosophy – and Genovesi. The latter’s works, despite being untranslated into English, are increasingly sparking international discussions, particularly among scholars of economic thought.36 I aim to illustrate the diverse interpretations of each philosopher’s thoughts. Even within the specific area of markets and morality, multiple perspectives exist regarding the core message of their reflections. I believe it’s unfeasible to arrive at conclusive answers regarding the “correct” interpretations. Nevertheless, without the pretense of covering everything, it is essential to acknowledge the plurality and diversity of secondary literature prior to presenting one’s own interpretation.
Chapter 2 sets the stage for Chapter 3, where I unveil the moral principles behind the three economic enlightenments. I will describe Smith’s perspective using the ideas of self-interest, the invisible hand, and non-tuism (the latter concept originated from his later interpreters). In contrast to Smith, Genovesi posits that within the civil economy framework, self-interest is a key motivation driving economic agents, alongside the inclination to assist one another. The moral foundation for economic agents is rooted in the principle of mutual assistance, understood as intended mutual benefit. Kant’s stance appears to align more with Genovesi than with Smith. However, for Kant, mutual assistance is not an innate inclination of economic agents but a mandate of pure practical reason. Thus, Kant’s position will be elaborated through the notion of the imperfect duty to uphold the spirit of mutually beneficial contracts.
Chapter 3 is the central one in the book. Readers who focus solely on “application” – those who aren’t interested in the origins of ideas and the debates surrounding them – might be able to skip Chapter 2, but Chapter 3 is essential to grasp what happens in Part II. This does not imply that Chapter 2 is optional. As a philosopher trained in the history of Western thought, I assert that effective application relies on sound theorization, which in turn requires a historical analysis of past authors’ ideas, including secondary literature. Still, I acknowledge the diverse interests of potential readers. Consequently, I have structured each chapter of Part I as a self-contained learning unit. Readers who wish to grasp the big picture must refer to both chapters, but it is possible to consider Chapter 3 the starting point for the subsequent application.
Part II is divided into three chapters. In them, the moral principles of the three economic enlightenments will be applied to three fictional case studies37 of incomplete contracts. Chapter 4 introduces the first fictional case study. A contractor is engaged to renovate the façade of the house. The contract stipulates that work must halt during rain. The contractor utilizes uncertain weather forecasts to delay the project for a week. In response, the clients convene a meeting to challenge the decision. The three economic enlightenments offer distinct answers to the questions both the contractor and the clients ponder before the meeting: How should I engage in the discussion? What moral principle should become my motivation for action?
Chapter 5 explores the case of a researcher tasked with conducting a survey. The agreement specifies that participants receive payment in the form of a gift card for completing a survey with open-ended questions. During the analysis of responses, the researcher discovered that 20 percent of participants provided unsatisfactory responses. Frustrated, she raised concerns and organized a meeting with a random selection of those participants to address their responses. The three economic enlightenments offer distinct angles from which the researcher can argue that the participants should have engaged with the survey more carefully despite the lack of more explicit instructions in the contract. Interestingly, participants can also reference these perspectives to explain and justify their own actions.
Chapter 6 focuses on the third fictional case involving an incomplete contract. It tells the story of an individual grappling with an ethical dilemma regarding his bank deposits. Years after depositing his funds, he realizes that the bank invests in the arms and gambling industries. He seeks to move his savings to a different bank without incurring the costs outlined in the contract with the “armed” bank. I will demonstrate how he can leverage the moral principles from the three economic enlightenments to articulate his moral reasons and motivations for altering the contract terms, while also showing how the bank managers can implement a similar approach.
Readers may perceive the inclusion of three fictional case studies to illustrate the same three moral principles as redundant. While this might have some validity, I contend that the distinct contexts of these stories can effectively demonstrate the application of the moral principles I delineate in Part I. Exploring whether the three economic enlightenments can extend to other cases or issues beyond incomplete contracts is not within the scope or objectives of this book.
Chapter 7 will examine the framework of my analysis. I will discuss areas needing further development, such as the impact of the institutional contexts affecting exchanges, and different frameworks, like feminist perspectives, which can be suitably compared and contrasted with the three economic enlightenments. My goal is to diversify the normative ethical theories accessible to scholars and students of BE. One may question whether it is appropriate to reference the theories of three European Enlightenment philosophers as the most effective method to accomplish this objective. This book may be subjected to critiques rooted in feminist or decolonial perspectives on BE. While I cannot offer definitive counterarguments to these objections, there is much to be said about the value of revisiting the history of Western ideas to uncover diversity and plurality. A fundamental aspect of decolonizing knowledge and curricula is to question the prevailing narratives surrounding the Western philosophical “canon.”38 I view this book as contributing to that objective, fitting into a larger effort that encompasses various perspectives extending beyond the canon.
