According to conative subjectivists, agents’ normative reasons are all grounded in their desires; according to cognitive subjectivists, normative reasons all derive from (or are relativized to) actual beliefs about what reasons they have. Hobbes was neither a conative nor cognitive subjectivist about normative reasons. He was committed to the irreducible normativity of at least two objective sets of precepts: (a) precepts of instrumental transmission that prescribe desiring and taking the relevant means to one’s normative ends; and (b) prudential precepts that prescribe caring for one’s ongoing good or felicity. The normativity of the prudential precepts implies that rational agents have reasons of the good; these precepts are the normative foundation of natural law. Affective and practical normative reasons, moreover, are relativized not to what agents think, nor to what actually turns out to be the case, but to the evidence epistemically accessible to them, i.e., to what they have a sufficient epistemic reason to believe. Thus when natural laws prescribe the means to self-preservation, they prescribe to agents the means they each can reasonably know or foresee will favour their self-preservation—where self-preservation denotes not bare survival, but the preservation of a life worth living.