Introduction

To clarify the aims underlying this book, we share a short anecdote with you. Of course, we do not know for sure if this story is entirely true, but it provides excellent food for thought about what this book is about.

The anecdote is about the rebuilding of St Paul’s Cathedral in London. The architect Sir Christopher Wren designed and supervised the construction of more than fifty churches in London following the Great Fire of 1666. The reconstruction of St Paul’s Cathedral was his masterpiece.

The story begins with Sir Christopher walking among the many workers building the cathedral. Apparently, he was not known to many of them. As he surveyed the progress of the building, he stopped and asked three different workers, all of whom were engaged in the same task, what they were each doing. He received three different answers. The first said, while acting a bit irritated, “You can see what I am doing, I am cutting this stone.”

The second answered, “I am earning three shillings, six pennies a day, to support my family.”

The third man straightened up, squared his shoulders, and, overlooking the building site, replied, “I am helping to build the most beautiful cathedral in London.”

This anecdote illustrates that people have different evaluations of the meaning of their work, ranging from work done as imposed labour and experienced as a burden to work as a means to acquire income and an existence to work seen as a means to contribute to something of personal and social value.

The anecdote shapes the aspiration underlying this book that all workers should be seen as builders of cathedrals – cathedrals of flourishing working lives. A second ambition is for workers to see themselves as cathedral builders. To clarify our third ambition, we expand the anecdote slightly.

It is tempting to attribute the three such different answers Sir Christopher obtained to a difference in personality or upbringing. However, we know on theoretical [Reference Bandura1, Reference Hackman and Oldham2, Reference Schein3] and empirical [Reference Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby and Herron4–Reference Lazarus and Folkman7] grounds and from practice that context is often more important than personal characteristics. For example, the three workers might have worked under contracts with three different supervisors.

The first worker’s boss might have said: “Here is a pile of rough stones, and here are your tools. When I come back, I expect a pile of smooth, stackable stones.” The boss of the second worker may have said: “I know that your wife is sick and you need extra money for your family. I have a job for you here; it is hard work, but because of that, it is well paid.” The boss of worker three may have said: “We are responsible with a group of five for that piece of wall of the cathedral that we are building. There are rough materials and tools. It should be carved, carried, stacked and bricked. You are professionals; see for yourself how you organise your work together within this magnificent project.”

Of course, this is a fantasy projected from the present to the past. However, it clarifies our third ambition, which involves how workers’ immediate social conditions should enable them to build great cathedrals of flourishing working lives. In this book, we argue that the CA can serve as a vehicle to achieve these goals. This value-driven approach focuses on normativity, diversity, and contextuality, aligning with the normative views of both the scientific and professional fields of work and health. The ambitions in these fields form an assignment, which means that science and scientific theories should improve the world and not just explain and analyse it. This view is fortunately becoming increasingly common and congruent with the field of occupational practice and the professionals working in that field, who want to create flourishing work environments rather than just understanding why work is often degrading or exclusionary for so many people.

The Capability Approach

To begin our elaboration of the CA, we take as a starting point the questions that have always been central to Amartya Sen, the founder of the approach. These questions concern what is truly important for people in their lives and how to recognise a society that facilitates this. The most general answer to these questions is that people should have a set of capabilities or a set of diverse freedoms. According to Sen, a capability exists when someone has the freedom to do or be what theyFootnote ¹ have good reason to value. As stated earlier, our view of this book is that if workers can be who they want to be in their work and do the things that add value for themselves and their working environment, this contributes to well-being and flourishing at work.

Functioning, another important concept in capability theory, is the actual realisation of freedom or capabilities. What people find important in their lives is subjective, and what they are free to do and be is contextual and objectifiable. It is a shared responsibility of the individual and the social context to build and maintain a set of capabilities necessary to realise a valuable life. The extent to which people have the freedom to realise their personal goals can be measured and objectified. This measurability and objectivity are important ambitions of Sen; thus, capabilities transcend the subjectivity of satisfaction or well-being.

By formulating the achievement of personal values and goals as a social goal and as entitlements or rights, the CA is able to realise deontological (virtue) ethics within the consequential (purpose ethics) reality of everyday life that people – and organisations – have and should have goals. However, in our society and economy, all activities and services, especially paid work, are at risk of being reduced to their strictly economic goals. It is a consequential pitfall to promote services aimed at participation and well-being, as if they will always contribute to the efficiency and productivity of employees. That is an economic, not a health and well-being, objective. In many cases, promoting health contributes to the organisation’s economic goals. However, the added ‘deontological’ value of our work as health professionals is precisely that workers have the right to a broader value perspective.

Sen does not find the debate between deontologists and consequentialists very interesting. That is understandable from his broader societal perspective. For us, from the perspective of the (by definition purpose-oriented) work context and work organisation, the debate is indeed interesting. Sen highlights the debate between ‘Niti’ and ‘Nyaya’ as much more relevant ([Reference Sen8]; see next section). In our view, the CA implicitly unites deontology and consequentialism and thus integrates and transcends them. It achieves this synthesis both by introducing deontological values within a purpose-oriented reality and by the vision that the purpose can also lie in a good process of virtuous behaviour.

Capability Approach Focused on Values within Work

Research shows that for present-day workers, contributing to something valuable at work is an important aspect of their quality of working life and sustainable employability [Reference Gheaus and Herzog16, Reference Jahoda17, Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma18]. Therefore, the challenge in all workplaces is to identify what the important values are and how people are able and enabled to achieve them. Importantly, in the work context, until recently, in the capability tradition, work as such was seen as a capability (i.e., the importance of work in itself for well-being in general). Capabilities (well-being) within work (i.e., of specific aspects of work) have not been investigated. This aspect is elaborated upon in this book. This reflects the focus we have imposed on ourselves in this book: we address the normative aspect of the values people should be able to achieve within their work. Naturally, we also consider the normative nature of the CA regarding the way society and the economy are organised and the extent to which this facilitates, restricts, enables, or prevents the achievement of capabilities at work (see, e.g., Chapters 5 and 12). We are also fully aware of the clear warning by Gloss et al. [Reference Gloss, Carr, Reichman, Abdul-Nasiru and Oestereich19] that important goals and values are often not realised for population groups already living in poverty, where poverty, as Sen also demonstrated, equates to the lack of freedom to achieve important goals and values. Gloss et al., like us, argue that the CA offers the best guarantee against this risk. We discuss Gloss et al.’s article in more detail later on.

Conversion Factors

In the CA, resources – ‘means to achieve’ such as income and wealth but also health or labour conditions – have value only because of what individuals can be and do through ‘converting’ such means into valuable outcomes. This reflects the importance of conversion factors in the model. For Sen, equity in capabilities – ‘equal freedoms to achieve important goals people have/equal opportunities’ – is important and not equal in terms of resources (equal means), as in most economic and political philosophical theories [Reference Sen20] (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1

Equity in resources versus equity in capabilities.

Note: Artist: Bert Cornelius, © by Jac van der Klink. The image might be inspired by a picture of the Interaction Institute for Social Change, Artist: Angus Maguire.

(a)

(b)

A Capability Model for Work and Health

In Figure 1.2, the essential elements of the capability model for work are visualised.

Figure 1.2

The capability model for work and health.

Figure 1.2 Long description

The means to achieve inputs or resources include work and personal inputs. These inputs are then processed through Work conversion factors and Personal conversion factors creating potentials to achieve capability set of tangible opportunities for sustainable employability. A Choice element acts as a mediator before reaching final outcomes which include well-being (Quality of Working Life) and specific achievements of valuable functionings like work ability, engagement, and performance. The macro level or the societal context includes the labour market, globalisation, and market conditions. The meso-level or the work context involves organisational culture and leadership. The micro-level or the personal context covers the family and personal social environment.

Source: Van der Klink et al. [18]

Figure 1.2 illustrates that workers possess resources or work inputs, including personal capacity, task structure, and work demands. These work inputs are not determinants of sustainable employability; instead, they are factors that can lead to a set of capabilities and achievable opportunities, provided that appropriate conversion factors are in place. Cutting stone, for example, is a burden in itself but is converted into a lesser burden if it is seen as contributing to building a cathedral.

The capability model, therefore, enables us to shape the ambition that employees see themselves as cathedral builders. Thinking in terms of values also realises the ambition that professionals see workers as cathedral builders. Finally, the contextual nature of the model, with contextual conversion factors translated as entitlements, shapes the third ambition.

Outline of the Book

Part I of the book (Chapters 2–6) outlines the capability model as a foundation for sustainable employability, linking valuable work, social justice, and contributive justice. It also highlights both the challenges of assessing capabilities and the openness of the approach, which makes it compatible with other theories in work, health, and behaviour.

Chapter 2 builds on two previous studies that first introduced and operationalised the concept of sustainable employability (SE) through the CA, resulting in the development of the Capability Set for Work Questionnaire (CSWQ). The chapter summarises these foundational studies. It provides an updated account of how the relationship between SE and the CA has been further refined and extended. The chapter reviews findings from a Delphi survey among experts and addresses critical reflections from the literature. It outlines conceptual and empirical advances since 2016, distinguishing between three strands of research: Reference Bandura1) methodological work on the conceptual and measurement properties of the capability instrument; Reference Hackman and Oldham2) studies targeting specific groups of workers; and Reference Schein3) research on particular contexts and situations. The chapter ends with ongoing debates and proposes directions for future research. Finally, the chapter provides the full text of the CSWQ and a conversation guide to support its application in practice, particularly in consultation settings.

Chapter 3 positions contributive justice as an essential complement to distributive justice in work settings. It argues that contributive justice aligns more closely with the CA, particularly with Sen’s concept of freedom, and adapts Kulkarni’s definition of social justice to “equal freedom of capabilities in contribution” [Reference Kulkarni21]. This chapter emphasises that people are generally inclined towards prosocial behaviour when conditions are supportive and shows how contributive justice, combined with the CA, can foster inclusive and diverse work environments while also addressing the challenges posed by malicious intent.

Chapter 4 examines the role of capability as the central informational focus in Sen’s theory of justice. It highlights the tension between the complexity of assessing capabilities – defined not only by achieved functionings but also by genuine opportunities – and the apparent simplicity in Sen’s writings. By exploring the relationship between capability and human rights, the chapter explains this paradox. Two case studies illustrate methods for capability assessment and provide criteria for evaluating their validity and relevance. The chapter frames the CA as a realist, non-ideal theory of justice, with implications for how assessments should be designed.

Chapter 5 explores the integrative aspects of the CA in two dimensions: across disciplines and in daily practice. It explains how the CA’s openness to diverse knowledge and values has enabled its wide application, including in work and well-being. Ethically, this openness serves both to prevent harm and deprivation and to secure legitimacy for policies and practices informed by the CA. This chapter identifies the core concepts of the CA as a foundation for integration and examines how these concepts can be applied in practice, with particular attention to conversion factors and commodities, encouraging flexibility beyond existing categories.

Chapter 6 examines how the CA relates to and complements existing theories that address human flourishing, such as the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health, the job demands–resources model, self-determination theory, and the integrative model of behavioural prediction. It argues that the CA broadens these perspectives by focusing on improving conditions, expanding freedoms, and fostering human agency, thereby offering a more comprehensive understanding of flourishing and the conditions needed to support it.

Part II of the book (Chapters 7–10) explores how the capability model can be applied at three organisational levels: corporate governance, human resource management, and individual work. It demonstrates the model’s integrative power in identifying challenges, improvements, and solutions.

Chapter 7 links corporate governance with contributive justice, drawing on Amartya Sen’s idea of justice to frame organisational justice. It argues that fair governance must reflect stakeholder contributions and develops this through generalised stewardship theory. This model emphasises participation, process accountability, equity, integrity, and collective benefit, moving beyond transparency and distribution towards a contributive understanding of just corporate decision-making.

Chapter 8 applies the CA to human resource management (HRM) through the lens of sustainable employability. It examines strategic HRM, showing how the approach can support both employee and organisational goals, and inclusive HRM, where it serves as a framework for promoting access to decent work for vulnerable groups. The chapter concludes with future research directions for applying the CA to HRM at the individual, organisational, and societal levels.

Chapter 9 examines the CA in relation to decent work and flourishing at work. It highlights how combining these frameworks deepens the understanding of employment quality by linking job security, fair conditions, and rights with well-being, growth, and fulfilment. The chapter shows how integrating capabilities, decent work, and flourishing can guide organisations and policymakers towards promoting dignity, agency, and broader human development beyond minimum labour standards.

Chapter 10 illustrates the practical application of the CA in organisations at the individual, team, and boardroom levels. It presents examples such as supervisor–employee dialogues, workshops, capability counselling, leadership training, and governance support. By showing how the approach can be tailored to diverse contexts, this chapter demonstrates its practical relevance and encourages reflection and collective action in addressing wider societal challenges.

Part III of the book (Chapters 11–15) highlights, among other things, the balance between universal values and contextual diversity, connecting to the central debate between Martha Nussbaum’s call for a universal list of capabilities and Amartya Sen’s value-openness. It links this discussion to cross-cultural perspectives, decolonial approaches, and applications of work capabilities across occupations and countries, as well as themes of leadership and future global challenges. Alongside these conceptual debates, the section stresses the importance of policy implementation in applying the CA.

Chapter 11 examines the universality of the CA, showing how it balances universal principles of well-being with cultural and contextual diversity. Drawing on Sen and Nussbaum, it explores work as a site of self-realisation and justice, highlights the role of grassroots engagement, and emphasises cultural values, relationships, and agency. The chapter argues for a nuanced, inclusive understanding of flourishing that integrates cross-cultural psychology with the CA.

Chapter 12 examines decent work from a Global South perspective, combining the CA with decolonial theory. Using South Africa’s history as a case, it criticises the colonial and structural inequalities that shape labour and dignity. The chapter reframes the CA as relational and emancipatory, advancing a pluriversal view of decent work. Through the ethic of courageous truth-telling, it presents decent work as a transformative path towards justice, inclusion, and dignity.

Chapter 13 applies the CA to examine work capabilities across occupations and countries. It explores how education, labour markets, workplace practices, and policies shape opportunities at work, highlighting differences across contexts. Through cross-national and occupational comparisons, the chapter identifies key capabilities for meaningful work and concludes with recommendations for inclusive, enabling environments. It shows how the CA can expand human capabilities and promote decent, empowering work globally.

Chapter 14 explores how the CA can guide leadership in fostering employee capabilities across changing work contexts. It argues that leaders must create supportive environments that enable employees to achieve valued functions, enhancing their satisfaction, engagement, agility, and well-being. The chapter examines leadership strategies, resource use, and opportunities for employees, concluding with recommendations for promoting capability development in dynamic organisational settings.

Chapter 15 applies the capability model to the challenges of digitalisation, globalisation, and climate change. It explores how organisations can foster resilience, flexibility, and sustainability by enabling employees to adapt and thrive in shifting contexts. The chapter outlines strategies for using digital tools, embracing cultural diversity, and adopting eco-friendly practices.

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the capability approach (CA) formulated by Amartya Sen is presented. This chapter focuses on the application of the CA, with a particular emphasis on sustainable employability (SE). In this context, the emphasis in discussing the CA is on its relevance to the well-being of individuals in their living and working environments and the broader social and societal context [Reference Sen1, Reference Sen2, Reference Sen, Nussbaum and Sen3]. The CA offers a promising and innovative framework for thinking about sustainability, encompassing well-being and flourishing at work, with a focus on the person and the work context.

The CA was originally a theory focused on social justice. A just society offers all people the opportunity to live a good life, that is, a life they value. This implies that they have the freedom or opportunity (capability) to do what they want to do (doings) and to be who they want to be (beings), which contributes to their well-being and quality of life: “beings and doings people have reason to value” [Reference Sen4, Reference Sen5)]. The CA was used to develop a model and operationalisation of SE [Reference Abma, Brouwer, De Vries, Arends, Robroek and Cuijpers6, Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7]. The idea behind this concept of SE is that people can work throughout their lifetime while safeguarding their health and well-being. Being able to do the things people value in life is important; also, in work settings, people want to add value (for some people’s financial value) to themselves and to society. This was considered a crucial element by the consortium of authors of this chapter when providing a definition and model of SE (see [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7]).

The original articles were the first to operationalise capabilities within work in the form of a set of work values/capabilities. Until then, work was seen as an important capability that contributed to well-being. Our article introduces the innovative perspective that distinct characteristics of the job could also be seen as representing values and capabilities. ‘Work’, as a general capability, is thus divided into a number of more specific (value) aspects that can be points of action to improve the quality of work.

If people can realise these more specific value aspects in their work, their contribution will be experienced as more valuable by the work environment and by themselves, resulting in a stronger bond between work and employees and hence more SE.

Referring back to the anecdote with which this book began, a ‘cathedral builder’ is more sustainable and happier in his work than a ‘stonecutter’. Our ambition is that all stonecutters will become cathedral builders (see Chapter 1). The objective of this chapter is to present the views and comments from the academic community on the relevance and feasibility of the model and the definition of SE provided by the consortium, which is presented later.

We report on a Delphi study conducted among international experts from various fields, including capability experts, occupational health psychology experts, and disability studies experts. We invited them shortly after the publication of our articles to evaluate the scientific and practical possibilities of the products described later (the definition, the model, and the work capability set) and to provide recommendations for further research.

After presenting this unpublished Delphi study, we discuss two recent articles that comment on our approach. In the following subsection, we indicate the extent to which theory formation and further research have actually taken place, providing an answer to the formulated recommendations and points of criticism. Finally, we discuss the current state of affairs and provide recommendations for future research.

In addition to the scientific developments described in this chapter, there is an impressive application of the work capability set in practice. It has been used by many professionals, such as occupational physicians, occupational psychologists, occupational nurses, labour experts, and human resource management (HRM) professionals. In Chapter 10, examples of practical applications are described.

A Capability-Based Definition, Model, and Questionnaire of Sustainable Employability

As indicated in Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, we formulate a definition of SE based on the capability model (Box 2.1), design a model based on capability models by Sen, Morris, Robeyns, and Welch Saleeby (Figure 2.1), and develop a questionnaire to operationalise values and capabilities at work (Box 2.2; see also Appendix 2.1).

Box 2.1Definition of Sustainable Employability by Van der Klink et al. [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7, p. 74]

“Sustainable employability (SE) means that throughout their working lives, workers can achieve tangible opportunities in the form of a set of capabilities. They also enjoy the necessary conditions that allow them to make a valuable contribution through their work, now and in the future while safeguarding their health and welfare. This requires, on the one hand, a work context that facilitates this for them and, on the other, the attitude and motivation to exploit these opportunities.”

Figure 2.1

Model of sustainable employability, well-being, and flourishing at work based on the CA.

Figure 2.1 Long description

The means to achieve inputs or resources include work and personal inputs. These inputs are then processed through Work conversion factors being enabled and Personal conversion factors being able to achieve capability set of tangible opportunities for sustainable employability. A Choice element acts as a mediator before reaching final outcomes which include well-being like flourishing at work and maintaining quality of working life and specific achievements of valuable functionings like work ability, engagement, and performance. The societal context includes the labour market, globalisation, and market conditions. The organisational context includes culture and corporate governance. The meso-level covers the work group culture, leadership, and H R M. The micro level includes the personal context, family, and social environment.

Source: Adapted from [7]

Box 2.2Seven Work Values

1. 1. Using knowledge and skills

2. 2. Developing knowledge and skills

3. 3. Participation in decision-making

4. 4. Developing and maintaining meaningful contacts at work

5. 5. Setting personal goals

6. 6. Having a fair income

7. 7. Contributing to a greater, valuable good

Sources: [Reference Abma, Brouwer, De Vries, Arends, Robroek and Cuijpers6, Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7]

In accordance with this definition and based on the previously mentioned models by Sen and others, we developed the following model for sustainable employment. This model is a slightly modified version of the model in Van der Klink et al. [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7].

Based on the definition and model, seven work values were identified [Reference Abma, Brouwer, De Vries, Arends, Robroek and Cuijpers6, Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7] [see Box 2.2]. To identify this work capability set (i.e., aspects that people value at work), a qualitative study was conducted, consisting of interviews with employees and expert meetings, in addition to a literature review. The interviewees represented as much as possible a cross-section of the Dutch working population in terms of professions and sectors. According to Sen’s assumption, it is important to ask the target group what is important to them and what they value. Such valued aspects can be considered to be a (work) capability for a person if (a) it is an important value for this person in their particular work situation; (b) theyFootnote ¹ are enabled by the work context (e.g., an adequate HRM policy; see Chapter 8); and (c) they are able to achieve it. These three elements (a, b, c) are rated on a five-point scale. If a person indicates that they regard a value important and feel enabled and able to realise it, that value is considered to be part of the work capability set. After all, a capability is a value that one deems important and can realise.

The focus on the specific work situation of an individual implies that the actual work capability set is context-dependent, even though most people value similar things. Therefore, in one-on-one situations, such as consultation contacts (with one of the professionals mentioned earlier), one should realise that the work capability set can differ per person and per job. In such practical situations, it is therefore advisable to ask whether there are other important values. Once what people value in their work (or a particular job) has been established, they should be asked to rate the various aspects of the work capability set.

In the next step, the list was validated in a representative sample of 1,100 Dutch employees. Correlation and regression analyses were performed to determine the statistical relationship between items of the potential value set and the indicators of SE. Based on these analyses, a group of experts established the final set of seven key work values (see Box 2.2).

The list of resulting capabilities (which we refer to as the ‘work capability set‘), identified in working people according to the Sen method, features characteristics of work that can also be found in major theories in work and organisational psychology and occupational health models, such as the manifest and psychological needs of Jahoda [Reference Jahoda8], the job characteristics models of Hackman and Oldham [Reference Hackman and Oldham9], and the ‘work vitamins’ of Warr [Reference Warr10]. These theories have been developed, using different perspectives, and have incorporated approximately the same features. This indicates the robustness of our list of work values.

In Appendix 2.1, you will find an English version of the work capability set. It has been translated from Dutch according to the standards of scientific translations (forward and backwards translations).

Consultation of Experts

To gain clarity on how experts assess the scientific and practical possibilities of the definition, model, and work capability set, Meerman conducted a two-round Delphi study on behalf of the consortium. A group of eighteen international experts, nine of whom responded to the second round and thus to both rounds, with backgrounds in occupational health and occupational psychology, disability studies, and the CA, were invited to take part. They were asked to reflect on the following topics: 1) the need for this research and its products; 2) comments on the products; and 3) follow-up research.

Most experts who have observed rapid changes, including new working patterns in developing countries, the ageing of societies, and the introduction of technologies, digitalisation, and globalisation, saw the necessity of a paradigm shift in terms of capabilities. The work capability set was generally well appreciated as operationalising the capability concept in the domain of work and health. Most experts agreed with the procedure for developing the ‘capability set for work’, which uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods.

Table 2.1 shows the experts’ recommendations for follow-up research, indicating which studies have been addressed since then. Most recommendations have been researched in several studies; in the third column, we provide some general remarks or comments from the experts.

Table 2.1Experts’ recommendations.

(a)

Table 2.1(a) Long description

The table has 3 columns. The first column lists the experts’ recommendations, followed by Articles addressing the recommendations and remarks in the second and third columns respectively.

The data included in the page are as follows.

Primary prevention. It is specifically addressed in the work of Dollevoet et al. (2022). According to the remarks, primary prevention is an element cited in studies by Meerman et al., Ragadu et al., Rolak et al., Schriemer et al., and Van Casteren et al.

Broader look than on return to work. It is specifically addressed in almost all studies in section “Overview of research using the Capability Approach”. The recommendation is encapsulated by a quote that reads, “Just returning to work isn’t enough!” Many experts agreed that work as a quality of life approach might be beneficial here and that the classical work and health paradigm should be integrated into a capability perspective.

Make research practical and applicable. It is specifically addressed in the next articles explicitly providing actionable recommendations based on the research findings, such as Barnard et al., (Murangi et al., Ragadu and Rothmann, Fleuren et al., De Wet et al., and Van Casteren et al. According to the remarks, practical applications are given in much of the research described in the section “Overview of research using the CA”, chapter 10 of this book.

Reflect on employer and supervisor values. It is specifically addressed in the work of Dollevoet et al, Lewis, Gürbüz et al., Van Casteren et al., and Meerman et al. According to the remarks, a few experts were critical about whether employers would support the notion that work should be valuable. They challenged capability scholars in the field to reflect on employer and supervisor values. See also Chapter 10 of this book for examples of practical interventions on organisational and supervisory values.

Specific assessments for low skilled workers. It is specifically addressed in the work of Muffels and Gielens. According to the remarks, it is developed in the context of the ‘Participation Income’ experiments’.

Application to different levels in the organisation. It is specifically addressed in the work of Meerman et al., Lewis, and Gürbüz et al. According to the remarks, the approach is applicable at the individual level but also relates to, such as management style or organisational culture. See also part 2 of this book (Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10).

(b)

Table 2.1(b) Long description

The data included in the page are as follows.

Valuable slash meaningful work for all. All studies have this focus, the C A for work focuses on well-being, value and meaning in work. According to the remarks, experts emphasised the benefits of including the aspect of ‘value’ with a quote that reads as follows. “If in the end the C A promotes the importance of valuable slash meaningful work for all, and especially for work accommodations, then it is worthwhile”.

Add two additional values. According to the remarks, this is contrary to the way the values were ‘retrieved’.

Values might change over time. It is specifically addressed in the work of Den Brinker.

Prognostic methods. It is specifically addressed in the work of Gürbüz et al.

Significant others. It is specifically addressed in the work of Meerman et al. According to the remarks, Significant others’, such as family and relatives, should be incorporated in the assessment.

Value of triptych in vulnerable groups. It is specifically addressed in the work of Van Gorp et al. According to the remarks, the triptych of the a, b and c questions was appreciated by the experts. Questions b and c might show whether minority groups/vulnerable groups are able to achieve important values.

Mental Health at work. It is specifically addressed in the work of Van der Klink et al. and Gürbüz et al. According to the remarks, the experts were interested in applying the C A to mental health disorders at work, both in research and practice.

Would the C A be able to predict prospectively which employees are sustainably employable and which are not? It is specifically addressed in the work of Gürbüz et al.

Relationship with other models from the Occupational Health domain. It is specifically addressed in the work of Barnard et al., De Wet and Rothmann, Fleuren et al., and De Beer et al. According to the remarks, the C A can easily be combined with other models in the Occupational Health domain. Research into how the approach can be combined with other models is reported below and in Chapter 6.

Work capability set should be validated in general populations, in various context in which employees work and in specific target groups. It is specifically addressed in the section ‘Overview of research using the CA’ is structured in that way.

The experts considered the work capability set promising but also noted that it needs further validation, both psychometrically and in different specific target groups and contexts.

Later, we first discuss the recommendations of the experts, followed by a discussion of some published critical remarks. In the section ‘Overview of Research Using the Capability Approach’, we summarise the research that has been conducted since the experts’ recommendation, following their suggestion for a classification in psychometrics, specific target groups, and specific contexts.

Discussion

The findings presented in this chapter underscore the importance of adopting CA in the context of SE. The integration of work capabilities as a conceptual framework allows for a comprehensive understanding of how individuals achieve valued work outcomes within specific organisational and socio-economic contexts. Empirical research has demonstrated that the CSWQ is a robust and valid instrument that captures the multifaceted nature of values within work across diverse populations and professional settings.

The expert consultation confirmed the necessity of a paradigm shift in how SE is conceptualised and assessed, acknowledging the interplay between individual, organisational, and contextual factors. The experts were generally very positive about how to conceptualise and operationalise. The research they recommended has largely been carried out. The studies reviewed highlight the importance of enabling work environments, inclusive leadership, and adaptive HR practices in facilitating employees’ ability to achieve work values that are meaningful to them. Furthermore, the application of the CSWQ in various cultural and occupational settings has demonstrated its broad applicability, reinforcing its potential as a global framework for assessing and improving SE.

Despite these promising findings, some conceptual and methodological challenges remain. Notably, the distinction between SE as an individual characteristic and as an outcome of interaction between personal and work-related factors warrants further examination. The research reviewed here suggests that SE is best understood as an interactive construct rather than a static attribute of an individual or workplace. This aligns with the argument that SE should be viewed through a dynamic lens, incorporating longitudinal perspectives to better understand changes over time.

Moreover, the critical perspectives on the CA interpretation of SE suggest that further theoretical refinement is desirable and that it is possible to clarify the relationships among work capabilities, well-being, and job performance. While the CA adopts an ideographic perspective, which allows for a flexible, context-sensitive approach, it is interesting to explore where a complementary nomothetic perspective is possible. It may be valuable to identify generalisable patterns that can influence policy and organisational practices.

A chosen limitation of this article is that we confined ourselves to studies that took our original articles from 2016 as a starting point. Of course, much has been published in parallel with value-giving work (see, e.g., Chapter 9). Notably, Gloss et al. discussed the CA in relation to work [Reference Gloss, Carr, Reichman, Abdul-Nasiru and Oestereich39]. This article is discussed extensively (and referred to) in Chapter 1.

Recommendations for Further Research

Given the complexities of SE in relation to the CA and the evolving nature of work environments, several avenues for future research emerge. First, further validation studies are needed to assess the applicability of the CSWQ across different cultural and economic contexts. While the instrument has demonstrated robustness in various settings, additional studies should explore its sensitivity to diverse work arrangements, including remote and gig economy employment. Second, additional longitudinal studies are needed to investigate how work capabilities evolve over time and their long-term impact on work engagement, health, and career progression. Third, more research should be conducted on the role of conversion factors – both at the individual and organisational levels – that enable or constrain the realisation of work values. This includes examining the influence of digitalisation, workplace automation, and shifting labour market dynamics on SE (see also the chapters in Part III of this book). Fourth, interdisciplinary research should explore the integration of the CA with other occupational health models to provide a more holistic understanding of SE (see Chapter 6). Finally, future research should focus on combining the ideographic and nomothetic perspectives to create a comprehensive framework that is both theoretically rigorous and practically applicable.

Addressing these research gaps contributes to the development of more inclusive and sustainable work environments that enhance well-being and long-term employability.

Introduction

In this chapter, I argue for using contributive justice as a necessary complement to distributive justice and as the preferred form of social justice in work situations in combination with the capability approach (CA).

In line with this, my argument for this chapter focuses on three elements: 1) in work situations, contributive justice is a necessary overarching framework for distributive justice; 2) contributive justice fits the CA better than distributive justice does; and 3) most people are inclined to make prosocial contributions under the right circumstances.

As in the first chapter, we use an anecdote to introduce and support the argument. This anecdote comes from Amartya Sen’s seminal book The Idea of Justice [Reference Sen1]. In the anecdote, three children – Anne, Bob, and Carla – are arguing over who should receive a flute. Anne makes a claim to the flute on the grounds that she is the only one of the three who knows how to play the flute (the others do not deny this). If that’s the only information we have, Anne has a strong case. However, Bob then takes the floor and says that he is the only one of the three who is so poor that he has no toys of his own. The flute would give him something to play with (the other two recognise that they are richer and well-stocked with toys). If we had only heard Bob, he would have a strong point. However, then Carla takes the floor and points out that she has toiled for many months to make the flute (the others confirm this), and therefore she has the right to keep it. If we only heard Carla’s argument, we might have given her the flute in recognition of her claim to something she made herself.

When we hear all three children and their arguments, it is not easy to make a decision. Distributive justice theorists of different persuasions, such as utilitarians, economic egalitarians, or no-nonsense libertarians, will each see one clear and just solution, but the respective solutions will each be completely different and point to a different child getting the flute.

In work situations, contributive justice is a necessary overarching framework for distributive justice.

Contributive Justice as a Necessary Overarching Framework

We can learn from this story that there is no unambiguous perspective on distributive justice, let alone one comprehensive theory that clearly solves all problems. In my view, this problem arises because we start from the idea of distributive justice.

The situation of the children is outlined from the perspective of a distribution problem (who gets the flute) and from the perspective of classical property right theory (who holds use and transfer rights on the flute), which is rooted in the theory of distributive justice. However, there are other theories and perspectives on social justice. One such perspective is that of Kulkarni [Reference Kulkarni2]. He draws on the CA and Amartya Sen’s concept of “justice as freedom (the equal freedom to realise capabilities)” as a normative basis for corporate strategy. Kulkarni focuses on the ability of stakeholders to “have a voice” and the managerial ability to “use the knowledge to give stakeholders a voice and freedom.” This view of social justice allows for a different view of the situation of the three children and thus a completely different framework, not determined by the question “who gets the flute” but by the capability-conform question: “Can the children derive equal freedoms from the situation to realise capabilities?” In the recent concept of contributive justice, the question is: “What equal freedoms, rights and obligations to realise capabilities and well-being do children derive from their participation in and contribution to the situation?” This entails an entitlement to the environment but also an obligation to enable equal freedom of capabilities through contribution. In this way, beyond Kulkarni’s conceptualisation, the question of distribution is placed in the context of a situation in which capabilities are realised through contribution. This context of contribution gives even more voice than does Kulkarni’s conceptualisation. In line with this, we adapt Kulkarni’s definition of social justice as ‘equal freedom of capabilities’ to ‘equal freedom of capabilities in contribution’.

I will now indicate, somewhat simplistically, that distributive justice concerns the question: “Who gets what and how much”, whereas contributive justice can be described as follows: “the right and obligation each of us has to contribute to civil society and to our collective wellbeing”. This is based on the idea that what we do in life has at least as much influence on who we become and the quality of our lives, as does what we get [Reference Sayer3]. These two concepts of justice are not mutually exclusive but can complement each other, certainly also at the meso level of the organisation.

Social Justice as a Combination of Contributive and Distributive Justice

Our introduction of contributive justice is not meant as an argument against distributive justice. However, as we have seen, within the framework of distributive justice, relevant questions remain unanswered, and problems persist that remain unsolved. The concept of distributive justice can undoubtedly have a place in the context of contributive justice; the question of ‘who gets what’ focuses then on what is needed for optimal participation and equal freedom to achieve capabilities. For this relationship between contributive justice and distributive justice, several authors on contributive justice, for example, Dempsey [Reference Dempsey8], Gomberg [Reference Gomberg9], and Timmermann [Reference Timmermann4], identify a hierarchy between the more comprehensive concept of ‘contributive justice’ and ‘distributive justice’ as a narrower form of justice. Contributive justice shapes ‘rightness’ – with its associated entitlements and responsibilities – in, for example, an organisational context, thereby serving as a framework for the application of distributive justice, often denoted as ‘fairness’. The contributive interpretation of the anecdote with the flute shows that the joint contribution to collective well-being using the flute provides the framework for a distribution on the basis of collective needs. Therefore, distribution finds a place within the context of contribution.

The relationship between the two theories of justice does not always have to be hierarchical. It can also be complementary. This depends on the role that justice plays in a specific situation and context.

Contributive Justice Fits the Capability Approach Better than Distributive Justice

In this section, we discuss why contributive justice fits well with the CA. We discuss four important arguments that CA scholars give, without explicitly mentioning contributive justice, in the context of work. We then discuss, in more detail, several points that follow from the conceptualisation of contributive justice and the CA, as we have already described.

The points from the literature are individual agency, diverse values, empowerment, and structural considerations.

Emphasis on Agency and Participation

The CA focuses on what individuals can do and be, emphasising the importance of agency [Reference Sen12]. Contributive justice, which focuses on individuals’ opportunities to contribute meaningfully to society, resonates with this focus. In contrast, distributive justice primarily concerns the allocation of resources or outcomes, overlooking individuals’ roles as active participants.

Recognition of Diverse Work Values

The CA acknowledges that individuals value different aspects of work beyond income, such as autonomy, creativity, and social interaction [Reference Nussbaum13]. Contributive justice accommodates this diversity by emphasising the value of individuals’ contributions, whereas distributive justice does not fully capture these qualitative dimensions.

Focus on Empowerment and Development

By prioritising capabilities, the approach supports the development of individuals’ skills and opportunities to contribute [Reference Robeyns, Gaus, D’Agostino and Muldoon14], aligning with the principles of contributive justice. Distributive justice, with its focus on outcomes, does not adequately address the processes that empower individuals to participate meaningfully in work.

Addressing Structural Inequalities

The CA considers the social and institutional structures that affect individuals’ ability to work and contribute [Reference Robeyns15]. Contributive justice aims to create conditions that enable all members of society to participate, whereas distributive justice takes less account of these structural factors.

The conceptual point is as follows:

• First, we saw in the discussion of the story of the three children that the question of what is just is posed differently in the CA – we adhere to Kulkarni’s perspective on the CA – than from the perspective of the distribution of resources (the flute in the anecdote). In the CA and in Kulkarni, it is about equality in freedoms (capabilities) and the entitlements the children have. In contributive justice, it is added that these freedoms and entitlements are in the context of the right (and obligation) to contribute. In the anecdote, the children can derive the right and obligation from their participation in the situation. The CA and contributive justice have in common that they ask different questions and thus arrive at different answers than just the question of who gets the flute.

• Second, in both approaches, the freedom of responsibility to realise important goals is central. Sen explicitly develops a concept of freedom in his writings. In the CA, freedom is an essential aspect of capability. In contributive justice, freedom is not explicitly but implicitly an important foundation of the theory.

In Sen’s notion, freedom is essential for realising important values and goals in the context of other people. It is thus not only the freedom to be free from constraints (referred to by Berlin as negative freedom [Reference Berlin and Hardy16]; often interpreted as being free from constraints to perform selfish behaviour) but, in contrast, the positive freedom to realise capabilities, which is bounded by the freedom of others to realise their capabilities.

The theory of contributive justice, which emphasises the rights of individuals to contribute to the community according to their abilities and receiving benefits in proportion to their contributions, does not explicitly address the concept of freedom. However, an implicit concept of freedom can be derived from this theory, which stresses that individuals should have the freedom to develop and exercise their ability to contribute meaningfully to society and/or institutions. This involves having access to education, resources, and opportunities that enable individuals to achieve their potential.

Therefore, for both approaches, freedom is positive freedom aimed at realising important goals or capabilities. Positive freedom is always bounded by the freedom of others to realise their capabilities; in general, the freedom of others is deeply respected. This understanding of freedom gives entitlements in both directions, not only rights to the context that should facilitate the achievement of capabilities but also the obligation and responsibility towards oneself and others to pursue capabilities.

In the CA, important concepts related to the realisation of freedom, such as autonomy and control, are linked to what people find important and valuable. One can score high on lists that measure control or autonomous behaviour, but if this concerns things that one does not find important, a high score contributes little to achieving capabilities and well-being. A pragmatic approach is used on the basis of what is important to people in realising valuable beings.

Third, pragmatism is a common factor between contributive justice and the CA. To illustrate this, we return to the anecdote with the flute with which this chapter began. The anecdote, as indicated, has been adapted to argue that contributive justice yields more inclusive responses, tailored to practical situations, than distributive justice does.

The anecdote and the myriad and deep issues involved are reflected in the title of Sen’s book, in which he is featured: The Idea of Justice. This title is a tip of the hat to John Rawls, who wrote the profound and now classic treatise called A Theory of Justice [Reference Rawls17]. Sen’s title reflects that there is no one comprehensive “ideal” theory of justice; in line with this, the title reflects Sen’s pragmatic view that it is better to start from a real-world or factual situation with an idea of what is just than to pursue a spot on the horizon, which may theoretically be perfect but to which there are no visible roads. Sen argues that it may perhaps even be better to have an idea of what is unjust (because collectively, we can more easily recognise injustice and are generally motivated to redress situations that are clearly unjust).

In line with this, the extent to which contribution-based distribution leads to a fair solution in a factual situation will vary depending on that situation. In the anecdote with the three children and the flute, there is a large difference whether Carla donates the flute to a music school or an organisation that aims to redistribute toys between rich and poor children or in a context where a company offers self-assembly kits for musical instruments on a commercial basis.

This pragmatic and situational approach – ‘Nyaya’, as we saw in Chapter 1 and a starting point for Sen – is thus also characteristic of the situation-dependent realisation in contributive justice.

Fourth, Timmermann’s argument about contributive justice focusing on new values and opportunities parallels the CA [Reference Timmermann4]. This parallel lies, on the one hand, in the aspect of ‘opportunities’; capabilities are, in fact, opportunities or freedoms. On the other hand, it lies in the dynamic and process-oriented character that both approaches share.

In the CA, something that has been realised (a functioning) can create new possibilities. This is called iteration, a term from dynamic systems theory: a repetition in which the previous step influences the next step [Reference van Geert18]. Realising a functioning at a certain moment influences the resources, conversion factors, and capabilities afterwards, whereby the result can lead to more capability (fruitful functioning), or not realising functionings can lead to less capability (corrosive disadvantages according to Wolff and de-Shalit [Reference Wolff and de-Shalit19]). This dynamic, in the case of a fruitful functioning, allows room for creation and not a static view of what is already present.

In line with this, creating conditions rather than making adjustments is a hallmark of real (contributive) justice. Real justice, the real freedom to achieve the ability to contribute, occurs when all stakeholders can participate without personal assistance through systemic measures.

The images in Figure 3.1, at least Figure 3.1(a) and Figure 3.1(b), have already been used in Chapter 1 to illustrate the difference between Equity in resources versus equity in capabilities. In Figure 3.1(a), it is assumed that everyone will benefit from the same support: equality. In Figure 3.1(b), stakeholders are given different support to acquire equal access to the game: equity. In Figure 3.1(c), all three can see the game through a transparenr glass fence without any personal adaptations or accommodations because, on a systemic level, the cause of the inequality and inequity was removed: Justice in which everyone can participate without personal adaptations.

Figure 3.1

Equality, equity, and justice.Note for (a) and (b): Artist: Bert Cornelius, © by Jac van der Klink. The image might be inspired by a picture of the Interaction Institute for Social Change, Artist: Angus Maguire.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Fifth, multiculturality is a hallmark of both approaches. The CA has, in the person of Amartya Sen, but also, theoretically, Western and non-Western roots and applications. Contributive justice has mainly Western roots, but its emphasis on community thinking rather than individualism has more resonance in non-Western contexts than in Western ones. One of the perspectives with which both CA and contributive justice resonate is the African perspective of Ubuntu. Ubuntu is an important realisation of how people in practice seek justice, in my opinion, contributive justice. The CA and contributive justice might form a basis for a philosophical underpinning of the impressive practice of Ubuntu thinking.

In conclusion, in the important areas of normativity, freedom, inclusivity, contextuality, pragmatism, and multiculturality, there are great similarities between the CA and contributive justice, and as a theory of social justice, contributive justice has greater added value for the CA than distributive justice does.

The Social and Organisational Challenge: Human Ambivalence

In our everyday experience, most people are inclined to make prosocial contributions under the right circumstances. This positive view assumes that, if given the opportunity, people will exhibit prosocial behaviour. To shape this, contributive justice, as well as the CA [Reference Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi20], places great value on democratic deliberation. As with Habermas, the quality of the process (i.e., the throughput, in addition to the input and output) is important [Reference Habermas21, Reference Habermas22, Reference Habermas23]. Here, too, a positive view (of humanity) underlies the belief that high-quality deliberation always leads to consensus.

This positive view of humanity, which underlies both the capabilities model and contributive justice, as well as stewardship models, has been criticised for being naive and unworldly. Critics argue that it is not self-evident that autonomous people subordinate their personal interests to the interests of others and to the interests of the community.

In philosophy, the positive view of humanity was challenged, as early as the 1950s and 1960s, by Arendt, who analysed the structures and ideologies that foster human evil and the “banality of evil” when people become thoughtless, obedient, and lack moral reflection [Reference Arendt24, Reference Arendt25]. Moreover, these days, we see all around us that, on the one hand, there are people who use (in fact, abuse) the democratic system to gain power and then secure it in an autocratic manner. On the other hand, there are people who, whether or not led by conspiracy theories, deliberately seek to undermine the system. In the theory of human ambivalence, this spectrum of human behaviour is highlighted (see later).

However, we can maintain a positive image of man because it appears on theoretical and practical grounds that, in a prosocial context, the vast majority of people behave prosocially. It is therefore important to create prosocial environments. In Chapter 7, it is argued that, in the company, corporate governance is an important means for this purpose.

The small percentage of people who want to abuse the circumstances and the institutional context for malicious purposes must be combatted. We argue that if the preventive policy of creating prosocial environments fails, contributive justice provides a structure in which actors with malicious intent can be identified, either before they join the organisation (by asking them whether they endorse the purpose) or at an early stage, when someone’s actions show that theyFootnote ¹ does not endorse the purpose. A stakeholder who has not yet joined can be prevented from entering the organisation; if someone is already in, what legal means are available to exclude the stakeholder from the organisation can be investigated.

Next, I first argue that prosocial behaviour does occur in organisations. Then, I will examine theories of ambivalence, and it will be argued that contributive justice might be well suited to handle malicious individuals.

A large amount of literature has developed in the domain of social psychology, which illustrates that human beings generally reciprocate other-regarding behaviour and sometimes even act against their own interest. Research on organisational behaviour indicates that perceived justice has a positive effect on the willingness to cooperate [Reference Cremer and Knippenberg26]. In addition, perceived justice is positively related to the acceptance of and degree of commitment to decisions [Reference Tyler27, Reference Gibson28, Reference Deutsch29], confidence in management [Reference Tyler and Caine30], and innovative capacity in teams [Reference Janssen31]. Employees who perceive high justice in their organisation show more voluntary help and a greater willingness to accomplish tasks [Reference Fields, Pang and Shiu32]. This extra-role behaviour is known as organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB). People who exhibit OCB support collective interests [Reference Moorman33], distinguish themselves by making positive contributions to the work environment, actively support the purpose of the organisation, and agree with the organisational rules [Reference Smith, Organ and Near34, Reference LePine, Erez and Johnson35]. OCB reflects an individual’s willingness to be involved in an organisation [Reference Shore, Barkdale and Shore36, Reference Chen, Lam, Buchtel and Bond37]. Because of this involvement in the organisation, employees will want to put in extra effort, which leads to positive outcomes for the organisation [Reference Ambrose38, Reference Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza39].

Hernandez contrasts OCB with stewardship behaviour [Reference Hernandez40]. According to Hernandez, OCBs are discretionary activities that target other individuals in the workplace with mainly short-term consequences – for example, helping co-workers or communicating changes that affect others – and the organisation itself – for example, actively participating in group meetings or representing the organisation positively to outsiders. In contrast, stewardship behaviours arise from a consideration of the long-term consequences for others and collective welfare [Reference Donaldson and Preston41, Reference Hosmer42].

In addition, research in the domain of sociology has demonstrated that agents disapprove of the favourable treatment of other agents or their own unfavourable treatment [Reference Bosse, Phillips and Harrison43, Reference Harrison, Bosse and Phillips44], which is perceived as unjust. Moreover, human beings find justice important not only for themselves but also for others [Reference Lind and Tyler45]. Thus, individual well-being is affected positively or negatively by the business’s treatment of agents, including other agents [Reference Lange, Bundy and Park46]. People are universally concerned about a lack of justice or a violation of justice in their organisation or community, even if these violations do not directly affect them. They use similar criteria, at least on an abstract level, to estimate what is just [Reference Morris and Leung47], with the indication, as we have seen above, that human beings usually have a better idea of what is unjust because they collectively recognise the unjust better and are more inclined to action to alleviate injustices [Reference Sen1, Reference Lange, Bundy and Park46]. When people experience justice, they are more tolerant of unpleasant decisions [Reference Lind and Tyler45], indicating that the assessment of justice in an organisation is related to the affirmation of one’s own identity within the community [Reference Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza39]. To conclude, the answer to the question of the extent to which autonomous individuals are inclined to act just voluntarily is that agents generally take the needs and interests of other actors into account, and perceived justice is generally reciprocated.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that many of the questions raised and problems that arise from the perspective of social justice, in which distributive justice is dominant, can be answered and resolved in a framework defined by contributive justice, within which distributive justice can play a role. It was further argued that there is a very good fit between the CA and contributive justice. Finally, contributive justice provides a framework for pro-social behaviour in the organisation.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on capability assessment. By assessment, I mean any mode of inquiry aimed at informing us about an individual’s (or a group of individuals’) capability, and especially if capability is found to be lacking, how this may be explained. Such an inquiry may be conducted for a variety of reasons, for instance, to learn about a programme’s impact, to see whether specific (groups of) individuals are structurally disadvantaged compared with their peers, and, if so, what sort of measures might be enacted to remediate this. Researchers conducting this type of inquiry face several challenges. Normatively, they need to make decisions regarding the content of the capability of their research subjects: what is it, exactly, that they should be able to do or be? Analytically, they need to make decisions regarding the factors that are likely to play a role in the development (or lack thereof) of capability in their research subjects. Finally, they need to make decisions regarding the methods that they are going to employ to collect the relevant empirical information (e.g., surveys, participatory observation, questionnaires, interviews, focus groups, or a combination thereof). The purpose of this chapter is to examine and discuss these challenges, specifically in relation to capability assessment in the workplace.

The chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section, the investigational requirements associated with adopting capability as the informational focus of a theory of justice are discussed. An apparent paradox will be foregrounded: whereas the CA has been dismissed as an unworkable idea by some, Sen himself has stated that capability deprivations can be readily observed by those who are willing to do so. Obviously, the issue is relevant to capability assessment: is it overwhelmingly complex, or fairly straightforward, as Sen himself seems to suggest? On the basis of what Sen has to say about capability deprivations and human rights violations and drawing on insights from policy sciences, I suggest that the apparent paradox can be resolved by distinguishing between two different stages in policymaking processes: listening and structuration. After pointing out that work can both help people develop their capabilities and act as a severe constraint in this regard, two case studies are presented. The first serves to illustrate in more detail the types of decisions that capability researchers need to make, both normatively and analytically as well as methodologically, and how such decisions can be taken into account during a structuration process. The case study is an example of how work can act as a strong promoter of capability. The second case study concerns forced labour and, as such, works as a potential constraint on capability development. It presents some data from globally conducted surveys and some of the critiques that these surveys have engendered. The following section presents an approach that can be used in the structuration process when findings from multiple sources are difficult to reconcile and appear to support different, incompatible actions. In the final section, it is argued that when making decisions in the context of capability assessment, we need to consider the realist and non-idealist nature of Sen’s CA.

Two disclaimers are in order. First, the work of Van der Klink et al. on the development of an instrument to assess workers’ capability (the capability set for work) will not be covered here since it is dealt with thoroughly in Chapter 2 of this volume. Second, this chapter does not intend to provide a systematic review of the literature of empirical studies of the relationship between capability and work, since this information was provided by Lessmann [Reference Lessmann1] and Julhe [Reference Julhe2]. Instead, it follows a case-study approach that is purposively meant to explore some of the challenges associated with applying the capability approach (CA) for empirical research in the area of work.

The Apparent Paradox Associated with Capability Assessment

Capability is the informational focus of the theory of justice developed by Amartya Sen [Reference Sen3]. This means that, according to this theory, people’s relative advantages and disadvantages should be assessed in terms of their capability. Capability refers to the real opportunities that people have to be and do things they have reason to value. The actual outcomes of the opportunities are called functionings. The focus on human capability has been developed by Sen as an alternative to other informational focal points of theories of justice, notably resources and utilities. Sen is critical of utility-based accounts of justice (utilitarianism) for various reasons, including the reduction of everything that can be of value to human beings into a single metric that is not possible or desirable. In his own account, the plurality of diverse values is preserved since the functionings (the doings and beings that people have reason to value) are left unspecified, and no attempt is made at commensuration.

Sen is critical of resource-based accounts of justice, primarily because these theories do not sufficiently acknowledge the substantial variation (“diversity”) across humans and over the life course in their ability to transform resources to achieve something that is of value to them. The focus on resources (usually commodities) without recognising human diversity leads to or further entrenches inequality in what people are supposed to enjoy from using these resources. In his own theory of justice, such human variation is explicitly taken into account by considering capability as a result of the dynamic interplay between the individual’s biopsychological characteristics (“endowments”), the external environment, including resources and conversion factors, and the ultimate functionings. Conversion factors here include how social environments address personal factors (e.g., age, gender, disability, proneness to illness), the physical environment (e.g., environmental conditions such as temperature ranges and flooding), the social climate (e.g., public health and healthcare, public educational arrangements, and the prevalence of crime and violence), and relational perspectives (e.g., the personal resources needed for taking part in the life of a community or to fulfil the elementary requirements of self-respect) [Reference Sen3].

The focus of the CA is not only on what people actually end up doing and being (achieving functionings) but also and primarily on what they are in fact able to do, irrespective of whether they choose to make use of such an opportunity [Reference Sen3]. To illustrate the conceptual and ethical differences, Sen offers the following example:

This “freedom to choose how to live” aspect of the CA has significant implications for empirical inquiry into people’s capability. Taking the earlier example, an assessment of this specific capability – the ability to retain parts of ancestral cultural traditions and lifestyles – among a group of non-Western migrants in some jurisdictions could plausibly include the following:

• An assessment of the arguments for which parts of ancestral culture (if any) would be reasonable for non-Western migrants to retain after they have settled in Europe or America (the ‘significant argument’). This initial part of the inquiry would serve as a justification for deciding which parts of ancestral culture do and which parts do not qualify as doings and beings that people have reason to value.

• Second, there would need to be some sort of empirical inquiry into the current level of achievement of such functionings: is there any evidence suggesting that non-Western migrants actually retain or would like to retain such parts of their ancestral cultural traditions and lifestyle after they have settled in Europe or America? Which practices, so to speak, would count as supporting evidence? Equally importantly, is achievement fairly straightforward as a matter of course, or at great pains for individuals, and constantly contested by the new surrounding environment?

• Third, it involves empirically exploring the levels and reasons for current non-achievement, specifically the extent to which non-achievement results from individual reasoned choices and the extent to which other factors are at play. In other words, is non-achievement evidence of capability deprivation?

• Finally, and particularly if the exercise also aims at remediating observed capability constraints, it would include an inquiry into potential causes of the capability constraints, focusing on resources, conversion factors, functionings, and their interplay to identify potentially effective and appropriate avenues for remediation.

The challenges and complexities associated with such an inquiry can hardly be overstated. For this reason, some authors have dismissed the CA as an “unworkable idea” [Reference Rawls4, p. 13]. However, this apparent complexity in assessing capability is in sharp contrast with what Sen has to say on this matter when discussing the obligations associated with having capabilities: “if someone has the power to make a difference that he or she can see will reduce injustice in the world, then there is a strong and reasoned argument for doing just that” [Reference Sen3, p. 271].

The phrasing suggests that injustices (in terms of capability deprivations) are out there for us to be seen, and if we can do something to make a difference, we should do just that. None of the complexities mentioned in the earlier example seems to be at play here. Rather, it is a matter of acknowledging that having the power to do something about which one can see will reduce injustice in the form of capability deprivation. To be sure, it might require considerable moral courage, stamina, and discernment. However, a complex inquiry along the lines suggested earlier is not needed. There appears to be a paradox here, with capability assessment being tremendously complex and demanding (even ‘unworkable’) on the one hand and surprisingly simple to address on the other hand. This paradox is obviously relevant to the investigational requirements associated with capability assessment: how complex, or simple, may we expect it to be? In the following, I explore this apparent paradox. To this end, I briefly discuss the congruences between capabilities on the one hand and human rights on the other. The reason for this link is that Sen makes several observations regarding the determination of the violation of human rights that, in my view, are quite relevant and transferable to capability assessment as well.

Capabilities, Human Rights, and Investigational Requirements

There are some conceptual congruences between capabilities on the one hand and human rights on the other. International human rights law identifies certain basic human freedoms (e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear) and the corresponding social obligations to promote or safeguard these freedoms [Reference Sen3]. The contents of such freedoms (what is it that humans should be free to be or do?) can arguably be conceived as functionings as defined by Sen (doings and beings that people have reason to value). Since capability is the freedom to achieve certain functionings, a clear parallel between capability and human rights emerges. There are, however, some differences. First, a distinction needs to be made between the opportunity aspect of freedom and the process aspect of freedom [Reference Sen3]. While the former refers to freedom to be or do X, the latter refers to how freedom is exercised. That is, a person forced to do X or doing X because there is no other choice would both be seen the same as someone wilfully doing X if the process aspect is also not recognised as important. Capability would be a good way of formalising the opportunity aspect of freedom and human rights, but as Sen says: “Issues related to the process aspect of freedom demand that we go beyond seeing freedoms only in terms of capabilities” [Reference Sen3, p. 371]. Second, in the CA, freedom is seen to result from the dynamic interplay between personal endowments, resources, conversion factors, and function in a way that is not usually seen in accounts of human rights [Reference Sen3]. Third, while human rights and capability are both linked to the obligations of others, the former can be viewed as levers of political articulation [Reference Critchley5], whereas the latter seems to focus on individual obligations. That is, there is Sen’s earlier quote about individual power and injustice. There is this further quote: “Freedom in general and agency freedom in particular are parts of an effective power that a person has, and it would be a mistake to see capability, linked with these ideas of freedom, only as a notion of human advantage: it is also a central concern in understanding our obligations” [Reference Sen3, p. 271]. In both, Sen seems to focus on individual obligations, whereas human rights are first and foremost obligations of governments towards their citizens.

Because of these parallels between capabilities and human rights and Sen’s own discussion on capabilities as the basis of some moral human rights, it is of interest to the present paper to understand what Sen has to say in the public discourse on human rights. Sen holds that different avenues exist for promoting human rights: “The ethical pronouncements, with distinct political content, that belong to a declaration of human rights may come from persons or institutions, and they may be presented as individual remarks or as social pronouncements” [Reference Sen3, p. 359]. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch, Médecins sans Frontières, and Amnesty International, as well as the media and social movements, can play an important role in exposing, advocating for, and informing public discussion. An important question is how moral claims with reference to specific human rights can be tested for their validity and acceptability. For Sen, this would require “an interactive process of critical scrutiny with open impartiality” [Reference Sen3, p. 385]. In the following, some insights from policy sciences are presented that could help shed more light on what such an interactive process might look like.

Listening and Structuration: Two Distinct Stages in the Policymaking Process

Sen distinguishes, then, between, on the one hand, a process where human rights, especially perceived violations of human rights, are brought to the attention of a wider public and, on the other hand, a process where such claims are adopted more formally and transformed into collectively binding policymaking or legislation. In the policy sciences literature, these two processes have been designated ‘listening’ and ‘structuration and decision-making’, respectively [Reference Bächtiger and Parkinson6]. According to these authors, claims and concerns that are voiced in the public sphere belonging to the listening stage of the policymaking process include: 1) narratives and experiences that are considered to have implications for the community at large; 2) statements calling attention to perceived breaches of specific norms; 3) ontological claims as to who and what is being recognised to exist in the world and how; and 4) proposals for collective action or inaction, all of which are bundled with evidence and experience. In a deliberative democracy (Sen mostly uses the term democracy by discussion), it is a relatively wild, open, inclusive, and uncontrolled type of public debate. For such claims to be accepted as the basis for formal and collectively binding policy, some type of channelling of the arguments is needed, testing and filtering them in a structuration process that is both a transmission and a transformation.

Based on the foregoing, I will now make two suggestions. First, because of the parallels between human rights and capability, I suggest that what Sen has to say in the process of articulating and formally adopting human rights also holds for capability. Specifically, all sorts of claims may be made regarding capability and especially capability deprivations as long as they are considered part of the listening stage of the policy process. For such claims to be taken seriously, in the sense of being considered the basis for formal and collectively binding decisions, some sort of structuration is needed. This leads to my second suggestion, to wit that the proposed distinction helps to understand the apparent paradox signalled at the beginning of this chapter. In a deliberative democracy, it is important that claims regarding capability and capability deprivations can be made in relatively uncontrolled, wild, open, and inclusive ways. No specific restrictions or demands should be made, acknowledging that the ability to articulate such claims may differ across citizens and that relatively weak voices in particular may have something to say that is of significant importance to the community at large. However, some mechanisms should be in place, allowing for a publicly observable and defensible way of selecting, with reason, which of the ‘sounds’ that are being heard are to be taken seriously, in the sense of serving as a basis for collectively binding decisions and legislation. Whereas the former may, in a way, be considered relatively simple (even though it requires significant courage and stamina), the latter involves more complex types of inquiry into the validity, consistency, relevance, and coherence of the expressed claims and concerns. In the following, I explore how such critical scrutiny may be conducted by discussing claims or concerns regarding capability and human rights in relation to work.

Capability and Work: Complex Relations

The relationships between capability and work are complex. First, work has been, and continues to be, a battleground of glaring violations of human rights. Forced labour and exploitation are likely to constitute sources of momentous deprivations of people’s capabilities. Indeed, present-day instances of forced labour, exploitation, and unsafe and unhealthy work environments have been designated instances of modern slavery [7]. However, in the absence of structural and overt violence and force, work may also act as a significant constraint on capability development. The late anthropologist David Graeber coined the term ‘bullshit jobs’ for meaningless and numbing work [Reference Graeber8]. More poetically, the Argentinian filmmaker Rodrigo Moreno draws our attention to this phenomenon in his film Los Delincuentes (2023). We meet Morán (Daniel Elias), a bank employee. His days pass by, drab and cheerless. At some point in time, he concludes that the bank is, in fact, robbing him of his time. To settle the bill, he decides to rob, in turn, the bank of its money. He does this in such a way that it is clear that it was he who did the robbing (cameras). After a few days spent in bliss, he turns himself in at a police station. However, the money is gone. Three years, he reckons, will be his sentence. An offering that he is willing to make to regain his freedom. In addition, it seems, to clear his conscience. Time in prison is challenging and not without violence. However, he finds his way, and after his release, we see him relating to the people around him, to the world, and to himself in an entirely different manner.

Tragic (and humorous) this may be, we need to acknowledge, of course, that work can also be a means for people to develop important capabilities [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma9]. Indeed, the very fact that work is considered a human right [10] may imply that work can be considered a valuable capability as defined by Sen. In the following, I turn to the question of what can be done to assess how work impacts individuals’ capability or human rights.

Two Case Studies: Microcredits and Capability Expansion and Forced Labour and Human Rights

To explore the challenges associated with the assessment of capability in the context of work, I present two case studies. First, the research objective was to determine whether there was any evidence suggesting that a specific intervention (microcredits) had resulted in an expansion of the capability of its beneficiaries. The second case study is more complex and involves two distinct approaches to explore the violation of human rights in the workplace context.

Structuration in the Case of Incongruent Evidence: Reconstructing Interpretive Frames

In line with the logic I have set out, if governments were to decide to formally adopt such recommendations, some sort of structuration would be needed. Given the diversity in types of research, findings, and recommendations, this could be a challenging task. On the one hand, there are global research efforts (such as the one producing the Global Slavery Index), revealing and drawing attention to the wide and increasing prevalence of modern slavery while recommending its complete eradication to be achieved, among others, by criminal justice and by making it socially unacceptable. On the other hand, small-scale research efforts suggest that phenomena such as child migration in West Africa should, at least to some extent, be accepted and that the key issue is not complete eradication but rather protection of migrating children from harm as much as possible. The question is what policymakers can do when confronted with such apparently diverging perspectives. One approach could be to appraise the validity of the available evidence critically and determine whether some studies should carry more weight than others do. In such cases, such an approach is unlikely to bring the question close in a satisfactory way. The reason for this is that there is a certain incongruence between the various studies; they do not fit well. The studies do not merely differ in terms of their methods; they also differ in terms of how the problem is conceptualised. On the one hand, forced labour is considered an exceptional problem in an otherwise well-functioning global economy, mainly owing to the greed and moral shortcomings of its perpetrators. Solutions are sought in the area of criminal justice and raising awareness. On the other hand, structural poverty is considered to be the driving force of forced labour, originating from global political‒economic inequity.

In policy sciences, the method of reconstructing interpretive frames has been developed as a means of structuration in the case of incongruent evidence [Reference Fischer22, Reference Dodge and Metze23, Reference Mendoça, Simões, Ercan, Asenbaum, Curato and Mendoça24]. It consists of making explicit the following elements in the available evidence (see Figure 4.1):

Figure 4.1

The four elements constituting an interpretive frame.

Figure 4.1 Long description

The four quadrants are labelled as follows. Problem Definition asks, What is it that is not as it should be. Judgement of Solutions asks, What sort of measures are most likely to help improve the situation. Background Theory asks, What are the major causes contributing to the onset and persistence of the problem. Background Values ask, What are the values that need to be fostered.

Jointly, these four elements constitute an interpretive frame. By making interpretive frames explicit, the mutual coherence between the various elements comes into view: a judgement of various solutions makes sense in view of how the problem is defined and vice versa; in turn, judgements of solutions and problem definitions are constituted by background theories and values. Stakeholders may reason and act from different interpretive frames; when they do, this will usually give rise to incongruent types of evidence. Importantly, a different approach is required for the process of structuration.

Although the global survey that gives rise to estimates of national rates of modern slavery and a study such as the one by Howard et al. [Reference Howard and LeBaron20] both testify, each in their own way, of a strong commitment to protect humans from the various types of forced labour, the underlying interpretive frames differ in a number of important ways. For example, in the study by Howard et al. [Reference Howard and LeBaron20], the problem is not so much that these children are on the move; the problem is that when they are on the move, they are subject to harm, including physical violence, robbery, and exploitation (problem definition). Potentially effective measures for resolution (judgement of solutions) include ensuring that, on their journey, children are accompanied by a relative and that if they run into trouble, they can continue to rely on their family for support. Additionally, when on the move, children should have easy access to safe and affordable places where they can sleep. Finally, as a journey into adulthood, the quality and relevance of apprenticeships should be enhanced, and there should be easy ways for children to keep their little money safe. In terms of background theory, poverty is considered among the main driving forces, resulting in failure of parents to sustain a family. Poverty itself is considered a result of global political and economic dynamics. Among the background values is a commitment to respect, at least to some extent, local culture: in Western African countries, it is not uncommon for children to leave their family home around the age of 15 as a ‘journey into adulthood’.

Importantly, interpretive frames define what is and what is not relevant evidence. For example, if the problem is not that these migrating children should be better protected but should not occur in the first place, the solutions of the sort proposed earlier are entirely misguided, and the associated background theory is largely irrelevant. Moreover, any research that aims to determine whether proposed solutions are effective is essentially a waste of money. The main lesson here is to resist the tendency to limit structuration to a critical scrutiny of the validity of the various evidentiary elements. Such scrutiny is important but may not be enough. The reason for this is that evidence is always produced in the context of some interpretive frame. As observed by Genevieve LeBaron: “The way that the problem of forced labour is framed and understood – who or what is demonstrated to bear responsibility, the way that data is collected and presented, and especially whether and how its causes are foregrounded or obscured – is shaped by researchers’ choices, whether they are aware of it or not” [Reference LeBaron and LeBaron18, p. 11].

Interpretive frames may, but need not, be widely shared. An important task of researchers in this respect is, then, to determine whether a specific issue (such as child migration and the associated risks of enforced labour and exploitation in Western Africa) is framed in multiple ways and, if so, what implications this might have for the interpretation of the available evidence. Importantly, this means that we should acknowledge that specific evidence is relevant only within a particular interpretive frame. Reconstructing interpretive frames as part of a structuration process is useful for several reasons:

• It broadens the scope from a focus on the assessment of the validity of evidence to include an assessment of the relevance of evidence.

• It offers the opportunity to assess and discuss the coherence of the interpretive frame in use.

• It offers the opportunity to assess and discuss the reasonableness of the way that general notions (background theory and background values) are brought to bear on concrete situations (e.g., practical reasoning).

• It offers an opportunity to assess and discuss the plausibility of background theory and support background values.

• Finally, it offers an opportunity to suggest how the parties involved might proceed while acknowledging differences in their interpretive frames.

Clearly, this renders the task of the researcher who is conducting and assisting the structuration process more complex and demanding but also more interesting and relevant to the policy process. In fact, it results in a shift away from the authoritative appraisal of evidence towards the promotion of mutual learning among various stakeholders [Reference Fischer25, Reference Grin and Graaf26]. In addition, relevant to the present discussion, the method could be particularly useful in the context of capability assessment. The problem definition would specify the nature of the capability deprivation: what is it that (a group of) individuals are not well able to do or be? Solutions that are considered potentially effective in expanding or restoring capability typically refer to (lack of) resources, (deficits in) conversion factors, or both. Background theory would specify how, in a more general way, capability deprivation or capability expansion work, and background values would include the freedom to aspire and achieve and the associated responsibilities towards others.

Discussion and Conclusion

Starting from the observation that capability is the primary informational focus of the theory of justice developed by Amartya Sen, I have explored some of the investigational requirements that are associated with such choice. I have argued that there seems to be a paradox here, with capability assessment being prohibitively complex (if not unworkable) on the one hand and surprisingly simple on the other. The paradox can be understood, or so I have tried to argue, if we take into account the context in which capability claims or concerns are expressed. Specifically, when capability claims or concerns are intended as a basis for some sort of collective action (that is, politically), they should be able to withstand some test of criticism. I have presented two case studies to illustrate the strategies researchers may adopt to operationalise the capability concept or the related concept of human rights. Such strategies cover a wide range, varying from calculating national indices to questionnaires and focus groups, resulting in a wide diversity of data. I have offered some suggestions as to what may be done in terms of the structuration of such a variegated body of evidence, emphasising the importance of assessing both the validity and relevance of evidence, and I have argued that we may need to go beyond evidence to examine frameworks.

Introduction

It is now close to forty-five years since Amartya Sen first proposed reconceptualising human welfare/well-being in terms of what he called ‘human capabilities’ and outlined a related theory called the capability approach (CA), which was initially applied in ethics, welfare economics, and social and political philosophy [Reference Sen1]. Although he initially presented it as a simple conceptual idea and as a modest shift in the focus of the target of equality, it has been developed into a robust approach, with wide applications and what some would call a minimal theory of social justice [Reference Robeyns, Fibieger, Zalta and Nodelman2, Reference Wells3]. The CA has had tremendous influence in various academic disciplines and professional practices that are concerned with human well-being and equity/ethics, such as economics, philosophy, development studies, education, law, health sciences, and well-being in work. The CA has also been used to inform trenchant critiques of or, conversely, helped shape diverse (global) public policies, especially poverty and government welfare programmes, economic evaluation frameworks, United Nations agendas and agreements, and others [Reference Robeyns4]. In many of these efforts, there has been an explicit effort to work across disciplines, bridge academic theory with practice, expand narrow informational frameworks, fill gaps, and break down knowledge silos. All of this was motivated to realise the CA’s promise of doing more justice for our fellow human beings with regard to their well-being. To complement the diverse chapters in this volume exploring and applying the CA, this chapter focuses largely on the ‘integrative’ nature or powers of the CA in two dimensions.

The first aspect is that the CA as a conceptual framework has both enough core ideas and openness for integrating with a diverse range of academic and professional disciplinary knowledge (e.g., economics, philosophy, epidemiology, education, law, work and health, etc.) (‘informational openness’). It is also open to integrating different kinds of social values and ethics rather than being narrow or dogmatic (‘value openness’). There are advocates and academic scholars of the CA that would like the CA to be more fixed with more or particular content everywhere and all the time [Reference Nussbaum5]. However, the relative balance of openness and fixity of core content has allowed many individuals from diverse disciplines and professions and, importantly, across the world from diverse social contexts to find the CA accessible and useful when integrated into their paradigms, or vice versa.

In addition to the possibility of integration into extant paradigms and practices, the CA’s clarity and openness can also help individuals in diverse professional or practical fields seek to clarify and elevate their activities through grounding them in the CA’s rich conceptual and ethical resources. That is, as new kinds of labour develop (e.g., gig workers, digital nomads) or as new group identities form (e.g., same-sex parents) or professionalisation of certain human activities develops (e.g., domestic servants), the CA can provide a framework to assess the well-being of the doers, articulate moral claims regarding their well-being, and identify their contributions to the well-being of others. The CA can help ground new or hitherto undervalued human activities (and human beings) into a robust theory of well-being and related ideas about social equity and justice.

The second integrative aspect is that the CA perspective can be profoundly productive when integrated into daily practice in a variety of spaces. For example, the focus on human agency in the CA demands that various kinds of individual and community development programmes, or the practice of healthcare at worksites, must seek people’s views and engender agency rather than just treat people as recipients, objects to be moved, or outcome producers. Similarly, the CA’s assertion that well-being is multidimensional and not just one narrow thing (e.g., happiness, wealth) provides professionals with ethical justification and conceptual support to expand pathways and outcome measures such as those periodically used for evaluating students, employee well-being, child development, personal empowerment, and so forth.

Considering these two integrative aspects, it is worth noting that the novel CA framework, which offers the possibility of day-to-day implementation of a fundamental moral idea (i.e., human well-being as capabilities), has by now been scrutinised in robust discussions for decades across various disciplines through the most complex quantitative analyses to the most abstract meta-ethical philosophical debates and has been applied at the micro to the macro levels. The breadth, depth, and scale of applications and scrutiny or stress testing of this fairly new ethical and practical idea has very few modern comparisons. If this statement sounds doubtful, try to identify a new ethical concept that is less than forty years old and has had similar scrutiny and global impact.

The non-dogmatic and open approach to diverse forms of knowledge from the natural and social sciences and humanities as well as professional practices and the relative ease with which the CA can be integrated into daily practice addressing human well-being make the integrative aspects of the CA extremely interesting, productive, and appealing. However, there are also weaknesses in both the empirical and value openness and the ease of practical application.

There is the familiar problem of any new conceptual or social theory losing its accuracy and validity, as it is transmitted over time and space far from original sources. It is similar to a new design product or fashion item that is reverse engineered and mass produced to the point where the original creator and context are unknown and where the products look only superficially like the original thing. Moreover, as history shows, over time, even the most radical or bold theory or ideas often become diluted and used to make superficial dressing up of the status quo.

Putting aside these familiar problems of transmission over time and space, two immediate weaknesses of the openness of the CA are that it is easily misinterpreted and misused. For example, as the CA focuses on the supporting conditions for freedom and agency, it has sometimes been misunderstood as a libertarian philosophy – that it is a theory about absolute freedoms to do and be whatever anyone wants. Second, in trying to take advantage of the insights, intellectual depth, and momentum behind the CA, some of the concepts are cannibalised and inserted into other prevailing frameworks, often contradicting the CA’s basic motivations and aims. For example, efforts have been made to integrate the capability concept into existing economic utilitarian paradigms. The resulting calculations are presented as maximising capabilities, or a new metric, such as the capability-adjusted life years, is proposed [Reference Mansdotter, Ekman, Feldman, Hagberg, Hurtig and Lindholm6]. If we are in support of human capabilities, then surely, we must be for maximising or indexing capabilities, right? No, not always.

While some of the early and new followers of the CA might steadfastly keep teaching its original tenets, there is another reason to protect and keep reasserting its original conceptual foundations. Regular people, academics, policymakers, and implementers around the world are becoming increasingly vocal about and resisting the long-standing epistemic domination of Anglo-Euro-American knowledge systems, values, theories, and practices in various fields and institutions. Whether through decolonisation (see Chapter 12) or other language and efforts, there is growing resistance to both the imposition of certain epistemological perspectives and the unquestioned or facile universalisation of certain perspectives. The CA having global informational origins from the start rather than originating in the West/G8 and exported, its plausible relevance to every human being on the planet, and its intrinsic informational and ethical openness will likely be even more valuable, necessary, and useful in the coming years.

To that end, the discussion to follow is aimed at readers interested in the CA’s applications generally or in integrating it into their own respective discipline or professional practice, such as the aim of this book on work and health. It is not an introduction to or survey of the CA, as there are many good texts on that by now. Rather, the discussion focuses on integrating it into different disciplines and into daily practice. The use of the term integration rather than application is purposeful. While some may find it easier or best to think of the CA as a robust template to apply to a problem or project, the more substantial and far-reaching impacts come from integrating core ideas into disciplines, practices, and ways of thinking. There is no single definitive methodology for applying or integrating the CA with an academic discipline or professional practice. As the discussion that follows proceeds, it will become clear how there are numerous aspects or entry points to the CA that can be appealing to different scholars and practitioners depending on what limitations, gaps, silos, or problems they seek to address in their current work or primary discipline (Chapter 10 is an example of this type of application). The chapter is organised as follows. The next section sketches the CA and discusses why and how the CA is open to both empirical information and ethical values. The following section focuses on conceptual issues in practical applications, with a focused discussion of conversion factors and commodities. Finally, a conclusion closes the chapter.

Integrative Properties: Openness

The intrinsic and purposeful informational openness in the CA, which has been present from the beginning, is due to important ethical reasons. The primary concern of the CA is human beings and their well-being, welfare, or quality of life. While many of the analyses by Sen and other advocates of the CA may be conceptually abstract or even quantitatively complex, it should never be forgotten that all of it is driven by ethical concerns to improve human well-being through social action, with a consistent focus on identifying and addressing inequity or injustice. Much of the inequity and injustice comes from poor reasoning and arbitrary constraints on information, such as disciplinary silos. The ease with which the CA can be integrated into different paradigms and into daily practice is undoubtedly a result of Sen being a polymath. He draws on and synthesises across his research in different fields as well as insights from different disciplines and thinkers, both modern and historical, from around the world [Reference Paxman7]. Equally important, the CA has been developed in such a way that it is accessible and, through illustrations, it has been shown how the CA is useful to help realise real-world justice at many levels, from the micro-individual and household up to macro-global agendas [Reference Basu, Kanbur and Sen8].

Before discussing how the CA has conceptual openness for integration into diverse paradigms and practices, it may be helpful to further explore why the CA was purposefully developed in this particular way. We can find at least two significant ethical motivations: first, to avoid the violence (destruction or deprivation of human well-being) resulting from the informationally narrow or dogmatic nature of other approaches; second, to enable proper justification and legitimacy of important socio-ethical values when they are applied in CA-informed policies and practice.

Practical Integration

Let us now turn to the CA’s productivity and ease of integration in daily professional practice. The CA can be valuable for professionals who are concerned with human well-being daily (e.g., health and social care, education, and vulnerable group services). It can help professionals expand the scope of well-being frameworks and metrics being used as well as help professionals think more openly about the capabilities and internal and external constraints on the capabilities of concern. The CA can also be very helpful for individuals who are seeking to assess their own personal quality of life and how to improve it. It is also helpful for the delivery of community-level programmes or indeed for social organisers and activists. As already discussed, many academic disciplines and professional practices are focused on certain cause-and-effect pathways. The CA helps, in some cases, expand the scope of the effect or outcome, expand the understanding of the causes and constraints, understand the distribution patterns, and much more.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the integrative nature or powers of the CA in two dimensions and its practical application. The argument is that the CA has had tremendous reach and influence in a relatively short period of time because of its ability to be integrated into a wide range of academic disciplines and professional practices. This integration is largely possible due to its informational openness to diverse forms of knowledge, both facts about the world and the diverse values of people. This informational openness of the CA, it was argued, is due to at least two ethical reasons: to avoid violence, in the form of causing or tolerating deprivations of well-being and inequity, and to engender the legitimacy of any policies and programmes informed by the CA. The CA’s militant anti-violence stance and concern for legitimacy are underrecognised. In terms of how integration is performed, the discussion focused on identifying the core components and concepts of the CA and looking for overlap as the starting point. Another avenue is to look for the cause-and-effect story operating in a particular discipline or practice, such as well-being at work and healthcare, and explore how the CA might help to reorient, clarify, or expand the understanding ends and means.

The second part of the chapter discussed the productive nature of the integration of the CA in daily practice, where individuals deal directly with the well-being of individuals. It helps to reorient daily practice to focus on human beings and their well-being and helps bring in profound ethical values such as freedom, equality, and agency. There has been some discussion on the underexamined topic of conversion factors. Chapters 1 and 2 discuss this in more detail, and Chapter 10 presents examples of practical applications. It was argued that conversion factors in relation to commodities are an insightful part of the CA. The identification of particular categories of conversion factors in the current CA literature should not limit our analysis of many other possible conversion factors that affect the individuals of concern. (In the CSWQ, categories b and c offer opportunities for such a broad, open approach.) At the same time, it was argued that, in the practical integration and theoretical use of the CA, it would be a mistake to look for commodities linked to capabilities where there are none. The important thing to ascertain through the practical integration of the CA is an understanding of the most influential constraints and enablers of capabilities to identify and deliver an appropriately just response, policy, or care.

Introduction

Work is an important part of human life and significantly influences well-being (or flourishing) [Reference Blustein1, Reference Clifton and Harter2]. The capability approach (CA), pioneered by Amartya Sen and further refined by philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum, provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how work contributes to human flourishing. Rather than focusing solely on resources or utilities, the CA emphasises individuals’ substantive freedoms, meaning what people can actually do and be. It also highlights capabilities, which are the real opportunities individuals have to lead lives they value, reflecting their freedom to achieve desired functionings [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Sen4]. This chapter explores the integration of the CA with four well-established theoretical models: the International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (ICF), the job demands-resources (JD-R) model, self-determination theory (SDT), and the integrative model of behavioural prediction (IMBP).

These frameworks were selected for their strong empirical foundations, widespread use in work and health (psychology) research, and complementary coverage of critical elements related to flourishing at work. Specifically, they each address key components of the CA’s conversion chain: contextual conditions (ICF), job demands and resources (JD-R), motivational processes (SDT), and behavioural determinants (IMBP). Together, they provide mature, evidence-based models that enable a deeper analysis of the factors that shape individual opportunities and outcomes across diverse settings. In this chapter, we demonstrate how integrating these theories with the CA can create a more comprehensive framework: the CA broadens their normative scope by emphasising individual capabilities and the real freedoms necessary for human flourishing, whereas these theories complement the CA by providing explanatory mechanisms that link contextual factors, motivation, and behaviour. Taken together, these perspectives offer a richer understanding of how to foster environments that support individuals – whether they are in work, seeking employment, or striving to return to work – by expanding freedoms and promoting sustainable well-being.

Overview of the CA

The CA initiated a paradigm shift in understanding human development and social justice [Reference Robeyns3]. This conceptual framework (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed description of it) differs from traditional utilitarian and resource-based approaches by emphasising individuals’ substantive freedoms to lead lives they value. According to this framework, the assessment of well-being should focus on people’s actual opportunities to undertake actions and activities they wish to engage in and be who they want to be [Reference Sen4, Reference Sen5].

Central to the CA is the concept of value-neutral functionings and capabilities. Indeed, the notion of ‘value-neutral’ is nuanced: while the framework itself is analytically value-neutral (meaning it does not prescribe which specific capabilities or functionings are inherently valuable), it allows individuals or societies to determine what they have reason to value within their contexts. A functioning is defined as any state of being or doing that a person can attain [Reference Sen5], such as being well nourished, employed, or engaging in community activities [Reference Robeyns3]. Capabilities, on the other hand, represent those valuable functionings that a person has the freedom to access effectively – that is, “what people have the opportunity to be and do” [Reference Sen5, p. 38]. This distinction highlights (opportunity for) freedom and choice within the CA framework and is central to understanding and comparing interpersonal advantages [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Robeyns6, Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7]. For instance, in the work context, securing meaningful employment encompasses being employed and choosing among job opportunities that align with one’s skills, values, and aspirations.

The CA’s emphasis on human diversity and factors affecting well-being makes it particularly useful when dealing with complex work-related issues. Individuals differ in their ability to convert resources into functioning due to personal, social, and environmental influences [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Robeyns6, Reference Sen8], which means that employees or job seekers may require different types and levels of support to attain similar outcomes [Reference Alkire9]. For example, a worker with a disability may require specific accommodations (e.g., an ergonomic workspace), whereas another worker may need flexible working hours to balance both work and family responsibilities to perform their job effectively (see Chapter 3).

The CA is distinguished from purely descriptive or explanatory theories by its normative and practice-oriented (‘Nyaya’) [Reference Sen5] and ideographic (see Chapters 1 and 2) foundation, which emphasises the intrinsic values that each individual holds. According to this stance, social arrangements should be evaluated according to how free people are in pursuing and attaining functions they consider valuable, reflecting the importance of valuing each person as an end in themselves [Reference Nussbaum10]. This normative perspective has significant ramifications for organisational policies and practices: it suggests that workplaces not only offer fair compensation and safe working conditions for their employees but also cultivate environments that expand employees’ capabilities to pursue diverse goals (as ultimate ends) [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Robeyns11]. By cultivating environments that allow for a plurality of values [Reference Sen12], organisations enable individuals to pursue their unique aspirations. Thus, the CA encourages workplaces to create environments where employees not only have the resources they need but also the freedom to achieve meaningful outcomes in their lives (see Chapter 3 for an argument that contributive justice can serve this goal in connection with the CA), emphasising the evaluative properties of capabilities and functionings [Reference Robeyns3].

The CA’s focus on human diversity, individual capabilities, and the contextual factors influencing well-being provides a foundation for comparing the CA with other theoretical models. By exploring similarities and differences, we are able to understand how the CA’s multifaceted perspective aligns with existing approaches to work-related well-being. As Robeyns noted, the CA is particularly well suited to encompass other theoretical concepts, provided that they meet certain criteria (e.g., compatibility with the CA’s emphasis on individual agency, diversity, and valued functionings) [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Robeyns6]. Building on this, we offer insights into how the CA and these other approaches can connect and enrich each other.

Comparative Analysis of the CA with Other Theoretical Models

The following sections present the comparative analyses in the following order: 1) ICF; 2) the JD-R model; 3) SDT; and 4) the IMBP.

International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health

Summary of the ICF

The International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (commonly referred to as the ICF) is a comprehensive framework and classification developed by the World Health Organization for describing the complex consequences of health conditions. The ICF is recognised worldwide for offering a multifaceted system to describe the full range of functioning, which is defined as the dynamic interaction between an individual’s health condition and contextual factors [13].

Principal components in the ICF include body functions, body structures, activities, and participation along with contextual factors (see Figure 6.1). Body functions refer to the physiological functions of body systems (e.g., the ability to see). Body structures refer to anatomical parts of the body (e.g., the structure of the eye). Activities are the execution of a task or action (e.g., performing tasks required of an apprenticeship), whereas participation is considered involvement in a life situation, such as maintaining a specific job. Contextual factors include personal factors, such as age, which may affect an individual’s ability to work (e.g., the minimum age required to work), and environmental factors, including the availability of jobs in a geographical location and appropriate conditions in the workplace.

There are several important points to note about the ICF system. First, activities and participation are grouped together in domains covering a full range of life areas. Qualifiers are used to differentiate them, namely, the capacity to describe an individual’s ability to complete the task or action and performance to describe what an individual does in their current environment. Second, capacity and performance can be measured with and without assistive technology or personal assistance (environmental factors).

Figure 6.1

ICF framework.

Source: World Health Organization [13]

Comparing the ICF and the CA

The ICF framework has often been compared with the CA framework to better understand disability and functioning. For details, see the works of scholars, including Bickenbach [Reference Bickenbach14], Mitra [Reference Mitra15], Mitra and Shakespeare [Reference Mitra and Shakespeare16], and Welch Saleeby [Reference Welch Saleeby17, Reference Welch Saleeby18]. This section summarises the salient points of these published comparisons.

Theoretical basis. Both frameworks are multidimensional and useful for understanding well-being. The CA is normative in nature, emphasising individual freedoms and potential opportunities as a mechanism for evaluating individual well-being. As Sen indicated, what an individual values in terms of their capability to achieve functionings provides the general approach to determining social arrangements [Reference Sen8]. In contrast, the ICF is not an evaluative instrument, although assessment tools based on the ICF are available. Instead, the ICF is a robust descriptive framework with an in-depth corresponding classification focused only on the individual’s actual lived experience, summarised by relevant ICF components.

Terminology. Differences in terminology can be confusing. In the CA, functionings are broadly defined as realised doings and beings, whereas in the ICF, functioning is a broader, all-encompassing umbrella term for its key components. A lack of consensus among ICF scholars on how to remedy such differences in terminology is evident. However, if we consider that capabilities represent potential and their actual materialisation is defined as functionings, the focus shifts to examining the significance of what individuals are actually doing in their everyday lives, including aspects related to work.

Conversion and contextual factors. In the CA, conversion factors – personal, social, and environmental – shape how resources translate into real opportunities and outcomes [Reference Robeyns6, Reference Ribeiro, Huisman and Tight19]. These factors are conceptually similar to the contextual factors in the ICF that can influence an individual’s activities and participation. Indeed, the value of both frameworks lies in describing interpersonal variations that enable a greater understanding of individual circumstances independently. In essence, the conversion factors in the CA account for human diversity and contextual specificity [Reference Ribeiro, Huisman and Tight19], and the contextual factors in the ICF are the same [Reference Welch Saleeby18]. Personal conversion factors, for example, include intelligence or gender; social conversion factors may be workplace norms or employment policies; and environmental conversion factors may be related to the physical or built climate, such as the accessibility of a work site.

Using the CA with the ICF

Some scholars [Reference Nussbaum10] have critiqued Sen’s CA for lacking a defined list of capabilities (for a comprehensive discussion of the debate between Sen and Nussbaum, see Robeyns [Reference Robeyns6]), arguing that this approach leaves no clear standard for evaluating well-being or social justice. While this openness was intentional, others – most notably Nussbaum – have proposed lists to fill the gap. With respect to work capabilities, Nussbaum briefly mentions “control over one’s environment” as one of the basic capabilities and includes “having the right to seek employment” and “in work, being able to work as a human being” [Reference Nussbaum10]. Although Nussbaum’s list is intended to bridge the gap in the CA, the practicality of using it to fully capture the complexity of work is not feasible. More recently, Van der Klink et al. [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7] proposed a set of seven work-related capabilities aimed specifically at operationalising sustainable employability. This adaptation offers a more targeted approach, although practical challenges remain (see almost all other chapters of this book for elaboration and specification of this remark).

In contrast, the ICF classification provides a systematic way to operationalise the CA by its ability to organise a wide range of information around what individuals are actually doing and the context in which they are doing it. The ICF has already been used to support the CA in social care [Reference Welch Saleeby18] and healthcare [Reference Van der Veen, Evans, Huisman, Welch Saleeby and Widdershoven20] settings. Bringing the CA and the ICF together to examine work capability enhances both frameworks. For example, the ICF can help identify barriers to performing a specific job (e.g., lack of accessible tools), guiding interventions such as assistive technology. This improves actual functioning in a role and expands a person’s capability set – their options for valued work outcomes – by increasing both the number and quality of achievable job functionings.

Self-Determination Theory

A Brief Summary of SDT

SDT is a comprehensive theory of human motivation that asserts that individuals possess inherent tendencies for psychological growth, integration, and well-being [Reference Ryan and Deci29, Reference Vansteenkiste, Ryan and Soenens30]. At its core, SDT theorises about three essential psychological needs – autonomy, competence, and relatedness – and their role in fuelling these tendencies. These basic psychological needs are considered innate and universal across individuals. Autonomy refers to the need for individuals to experience volition and choose freely among various actions they undertake. Competence refers to feeling effective and capable of dealing with challenges. Relatedness involves feeling connected to and cared for by others [Reference Vansteenkiste, Ryan and Soenens30]. SDT employs a broad and multifaceted approach, encompassing several mini-theories. Each targets different aspects of motivation and psychological functioning [Reference Ryan and Deci29]. This chapter will focus on one of the widely implemented theories of SDT: basic psychological needs theory. SDT examines the psychological processes that foster or hinder motivation and well-being by analysing how social-contextual factors (e.g., leadership, job design, and organisational culture) affect motivation through these basic psychological needs [Reference Gagné and Deci31, Reference Deci, Olafsen and Ryan32]. In other words, when these needs are supported, individuals are more likely to internalise motivation, experience well-being, and engage meaningfully in their work. Conversely, when these needs are thwarted, motivation tends to become controlled or even absent (amotivation), often resulting in disengagement or strain [Reference Gagné and Deci31, Reference Ryan, DeHaan and Ryan33].

Understanding Human Flourishing: A Comparison of SDT and CA

The CA and SDT offer solid frameworks for understanding human flourishing, but each emphasises different aspects of the process. SDT posits that these three basic psychological needs are the keys to personal growth and optimal functioning. These needs are shaped by immediate social environments (e.g., leadership or collegial interactions), directly affecting motivation and/or well-being [Reference Gagné and Deci31, Reference Deci, Olafsen and Ryan32]. In contrast, the CA offers a broader, normative framework, focusing on what should be done to improve well-being and social justice. The CA emphasises capabilities and shifts the focus from internal motivational processes to external societal, political, economic, and institutional elements that determine whether individuals have opportunities to convert resources (e.g., organisational support) into meaningful functionings, such as being healthy or employed [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Sen4].

Similarities

Despite emphasising different aspects, SDT and the CA share several core principles. Both theories emphasise the importance of autonomy (or agency) in shaping individual well-being. In SDT, autonomy refers to the need to make self-determined choices, a fundamental element of motivation [Reference Ryan and Deci29, Reference Vansteenkiste, Ryan and Soenens30]. Similarly, the CA’s concept of agency highlights the importance of individuals being active agents in shaping their lives. The CA goes a step further by considering the broader societal structures that enable or hinder an individual’s ability to exercise autonomy [Reference Robeyns3], including in the workplace. Furthermore, the need for competence, as outlined in SDT, refers to the feeling of being effective and capable of mastering one’s environment [Reference Ryan and Deci29, Reference Vansteenkiste, Ryan and Soenens30]. This need aligns with the CA’s emphasis on social structures, such as educational systems and workplace training programmes, that support the development and application of individuals’ capabilities [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Ryan, DeHaan and Ryan33]. Both theories recognise that feeling competent is essential for individual well-being. Finally, both SDT and the CA underscore the importance of social connections. SDT’s focus on relatedness [Reference Ryan and Deci29, Reference Vansteenkiste, Ryan and Soenens30] resembles the CA’s focus on the social structures [Reference Robeyns3] that facilitate or hinder these connections. Both frameworks highlight the role of socio-contextual support in fostering relationships, which are vital for well-being.

Differences

While both SDT and the CA are concerned with human well-being, they differ significantly in their scope and approach. These differences in scope and approach are highlighted in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2Differences between SDT and the CA.

Table 6.2 Long description

The table includes three columns labeled Dimension, S D T, and C A.

Scope. S D T is primarily a descriptive framework explaining how the satisfaction of psychological needs influences motivation and well-being. It focuses mainly on individual-level processes and the immediate social environments, such as work settings, that directly affect need fulfilment, whereas, C A is a normative framework that goes beyond individual processes to address the broader social, political, and economic structures that shape an individual’s opportunities. It looks at how these structures create or restrict capabilities, enabling people to achieve valuable functioning in their lives.

Opportunities versus psychological needs. S D T focuses on the satisfaction of psychological needs within specific contexts, examining how environmental factors like leadership or colleague communication influence an individual’s motivation and functioning, whereas, C A emphasizes capabilities, the real freedoms and opportunities people have to pursue the functioning they value. It addresses how societal institutions and policies either support or limit individuals’ ability to achieve meaningful goals, such as being healthy or successful.

Normative versus descriptive (Idiographic versus nomothetic, refer to Chapters 1 or 2). S D T is more descriptive and explanatory, providing insights into the psychological conditions that foster or hinder motivation and growth, whereas C A is explicitly normative, focusing on what should be done to ensure that individuals have the freedoms and opportunities to achieve well-being. It concerns the structural conditions that enable or inhibit an individual’s ability to convert resources into meaningful functioning.

Integration of SDT and the CA: A Holistic View of Human Flourishing

Integrating the CA with SDT provides a more holistic understanding of human motivation and well-being by addressing internal psychological needs and external structural opportunities. SDT provides a detailed understanding of how need satisfaction leads to motivation and well-being. Moreover, the CA adds a broader framework for understanding the external conditions necessary for individuals to exercise autonomy, develop competence, and foster relatedness. This integration is visually depicted in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2

Integrated framework of the SDT and the CA for enhancing well-being and performance.

Sources: Adapted from DeHaan et al. [35], Meerman et al. [34], Robeyns [3], Ryan and Deci [29], and Van der Klink et al. [7].

The figure shows how macro-level (e.g., national labour policies and organisational culture), meso-level (e.g., team dynamics, leadership styles), and micro-level (e.g., individual skills and experiences) factors [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7, Reference Ryan, DeHaan and Ryan33, Reference Meerman, Van Casteren, Brouwers, Van Dam, Van der Klink and Wiśniewska34] influence the availability of resources, which shapes the capabilities – or real freedoms – individuals can use to achieve valuable functionings. Furthermore, conversion factors (social, environmental, and personal) determine how effectively resources are transformed into capabilities [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7, Reference DeHaan, Hirai and Ryan35]. From this capability set, individuals make choices that affect their need-based experiences, particularly in relation to autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The satisfaction of these needs influences functionings [Reference DeHaan, Hirai and Ryan35], such as well-being and job performance.

For example, labour market policies that promote flexible working arrangements or offer training programmes enable individuals to exercise their autonomy and competence in a work context. These policies expand employees’ capabilities, allowing them to pursue meaningful goals and engage with work in ways that enhance their well-being. Social norms that support work‒life balance or inclusive workplace cultures also ensure that individuals can meet their psychological need for relatedness, enabling them to connect with others and build meaningful relationships at work.

Despite the clear synergies, several challenges exist in integrating the CA and SDT. One key difficulty is their differing levels of analysis. SDT centres on psychological processes and immediate social contexts influencing need-based experiences and motivation. In contrast, the CA operates at a broader level, addressing socio-economic structures and institutional factors that affect capabilities. Bridging these factors requires considering how macro-level factors (e.g., national policies or social norms) translate into micro-level experiences of need satisfaction and well-being. Therefore, one promising avenue is to focus more on how specific labour policies or organisational structures and practices influence employees’ capability to make autonomous choices, develop competence, and foster meaningful relationships. Another challenge is measuring capabilities (see Chapter 4). SDT benefits from well-established measures for psychological need satisfaction and motivation, whereas the CA’s multidimensional and context-specific capabilities are harder to measure consistently across different contexts. The complexity of assessing capabilities, particularly in ever-changing work environments, poses methodological challenges for empirical research. Nevertheless, Van der Klink et al.’s capability set for work, which outlines seven core work-related capabilities, offers promising ways to make the CA more empirically accessible [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7].

In conclusion, the integration of the CA and SDT allows for a more comprehensive framework for enhancing well-being at work and beyond. SDT sheds light on the psychological needs that drive motivation and growth, whereas the CA emphasises the societal structures that shape individuals’ real opportunities. Together, they inform practices and policies that support both the need for satisfaction and the freedom to pursue valued lives. This integration urges organisations and policymakers to address both psychological and structural barriers, promoting strategies that are both normatively grounded and psychologically sound to foster human flourishing across contexts.

The Integrative Model of Behavioural Prediction as Illustrated through the Guidance of Unemployed Individuals

A Brief Overview of the IMBP and Its Development

In addition to the other theories discussed in this chapter (e.g., ICF, JD-R, and SDT), the IMBP is a key framework for understanding and influencing human behaviour in contexts such as health, sustainable employability, and long-term unemployment. The IMBP and its predecessors have guided interventions across domains, from preventive health behaviour to job seeking [Reference Van Hooft, Born, Taris and Van der Flier36, Reference Van Hooft, Born, Taris, Flier and Blonk37, Reference Boermans, Van de Logt and Blonk38]. In our research, we use this model to support unemployed and sicklisted individuals in returning to work. While our examples are drawn from these areas, the IMBP applies to any behaviour.

The IMBP is the latest development in what is known as the reasoned action approach (RAA) [Reference Fishbein and Ajzen39]. The RAA, which started more than half a century ago, encompasses several theories that have developed over time, such as expectancy-value theories (EVT), the theory of reasoned action (TRA), the theory of planned behaviour (TPB), and, more recently, the IMBP. Our goal is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the five to six decades of research that led to the development of the IMBP. For those interested in deeper exploration, we recommend Ajzen’s essay on the legacy of Martin Fishbein’s work and other supporting literature [Reference Fishbein and Ajzen39, Reference Ajzen, Van Lange, Kruglanski, Tory Higgins and Ajzen40].

Among the precursors of the IMBP, both the TRA and the EVT emphasise the importance of attitudinal beliefs (values). The theories differ in the outcomes of these beliefs. In EVT, beliefs are related to the importance of a specific goal for an individual (e.g., the value of having a job) and personal beliefs about the likelihood of successfully pursuing that goal. In TRA, the beliefs (e.g., functional, useful, pleasant, fun) focus on performing a specific behaviour (e.g., job search) rather than the goal that the behaviour aims to achieve. While this difference seems minor, it helps us better understand the varying effectiveness of interventions and what drives unemployment: is it a matter of belief (motivational), behavioural issues, goal setting, or a mix of these and perhaps other factors not yet included in the model? As such, extending the TRA to include beliefs about perceived control is a small but significant step.

This extension draws on the social cognitive theory [Reference Bandura41]. To some extent, self-efficacy resembles the expectancy concept in the EVT, ultimately transforming the TRA into the TPB, which Ajzen describes as the premier reasoned action approach [Reference Ajzen, Van Lange, Kruglanski, Tory Higgins and Ajzen40]. Beliefs about perceived control refer to resources and obstacles that may foster or hinder a specific behaviour. Perceived behavioural control, or self-efficacy, encompasses beliefs about effectively conducting a required behaviour. This includes knowing what to do, having and managing resources, and dealing with obstacles. Applied to the job search process, these beliefs involve being confident in one’s ability to engage in effective job search behaviours, such as asking for help when needed and dealing with inevitable setbacks.

Until now, these models have focused primarily on factors that facilitate or hinder the intention or motivation to perform a specific behaviour. However, intentions are not enough; one also needs the skills and knowledge to perform the necessary behaviours (e.g., job search) to attain the goal (e.g., acquiring a job) and the opportunity to do so (e.g., job vacancies, inclusive labour employer behaviour). Fishbein and Ajzen extended the TPB into the IMBP by adding actual skills and environmental constraints as predictors to the model. By integrating these additional components, the RAA moved from centralising the intention and motivation in the TRA and TPB to centralising both motivation and behaviour in the IMBP. As such, the resulting IMBP framework provides a comprehensive approach to understand and predict behaviour and to develop effective interventions (see Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3

A dynamic model combining the IMBP with the CA.

From: Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned action approach by M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, figure 1.1, page 22. Copyright (2010) by Psychology Press. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.

Figure 6.3 Long description

Distal variables like Personal characteristics, Demographics and culture, and other individual differences feed into three respective core cognitive pillars, Attitude slash value, Social norm, and Self-efficacy driving a reciprocal relationship between Intention slash Motivation and behaviour. The reciprocal relationship is supported by two external factors like Skill acquisition and Dealing with constraints leading to a step-wise goal attainment. The step-wise goal attainment features two major feedback loops, Person-centered guidance and Capability set.

Source: Adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen [39]

This integrated framework coincides with the results of a meta-analysis on the effects of job search interventions conducted by Liu et al. [Reference Liu, Huang and Wang42]. Based on forty-seven studies that met the quality criteria of at least a quasi-experimental design, Liu and colleagues showed that job search interventions increased the likelihood of finding a job by a factor of 2.67 compared with no-treatment control groups. Liu et al. then conducted an in-depth analysis of the content of these job search interventions, revealing two main components: interventions aimed at enhancing motivation (e.g., improving job search self-efficacy) and those focused on developing specific skills needed to apply for a job (e.g., self-presentation). Their subsequent analysis revealed that interventions were only effective when they addressed both skill development and motivation enhancement [Reference Liu, Huang and Wang42]. This finding supports the notion that interventions based on models such as the IMBP should centralise motivation and behaviour in predicting outcomes.

The IMBP has proven flexible in incorporating additional insights. For example, the IMBP connects seamlessly with the SDT, and many of the factors in the ICF are reflected within the subconcepts of the IMBP. As the IMBP becomes more detailed and expands, researchers may debate its subconcepts’ specific content, relationships, and relative order. However, in our experience, complexity is reduced when this technique is applied as a diagnostic tool and as a foundation for designing interventions.

Combining the IMBP with the CA

Given its history and development, it is not surprising that the IMBP is open to the CA. The connection between these two approaches can be understood or established on four levels. First, the CA focuses on values – specifically, the aspects (beings and doings) that people have reason to value. This is also the case in the IMBP, which, with its roots in EVT, highlights the importance of the values people assign to their goals as key aspects of motivation and perseverance.

Second, the concept of agency is important in Sen’s work, which resonates with the notion of self-efficacy (akin to SDT’s notion of competence). Even though Sen has a much broader and deeper notion of agency, the development of an individual’s sense of self-efficacy can be understood as a process of the social construction of meaning in which relationships with case managers, as well as collective systems such as social services or team dynamics, play an important role in shaping an individual’s sense of self-efficacy. For example, the most influential source of self-efficacy beliefs is an individual’s interpretation of one’s performance or mastery experience. As such, recognising and affirming experiences or providing support when confronted with setbacks may work to encourage and empower individuals in their job search, while downplaying can work to defeat and weaken self-efficacy beliefs.

Third, the IMBP describes the role of environmental and individual constraints or hindrances that may impede behaviour and goal attainment. These constraints can include not only physical or mental disabilities but also factors such as stigma, discrimination, and reduced access to resources. When applied to guiding the unemployed (back) to work, the IMBP does not differ from the CA in these aspects. However, unlike the CA, the IMBP is not a normative model. It merely describes the factors related to the model’s central aspects, thus contributing to its predictive quality.

In line with the ICF, JD-R, and SDT, this normative nature also extends the IMBP on a different level that encompasses all aspects of the model. This extension arises from the CA’s focus on the quality of the goals being pursued and the personal agency to pursue them. For example, in the context of guiding unemployed individuals, the CA emphasises that work should be something people have reason to value. In some cases, especially when social benefits are at stake, the focus of employment guidance may shift from helping the job seeker find meaningful work to minimising costs for society. While this shift does not always lead to lower-quality outcomes, it increases the risk of steering individuals into jobs that might negatively impact their health or other long-term outcomes.

Therefore, the fourth point is that combining the CA with the IMBP would advocate for person-centred employment guidance, with a focus on sustainable outcomes (see Chapter 2, Appendix 2.1 for a start on this). Where the IMBP explains a person’s behaviour in pursuing a job, CA can help translate insights into effective strategies for behaviour change based on the IMBP into normative principles for employment guidance or the development of labour market policies. For example, strategies that encourage the pursuit of personal career ambitions (attitude/value), boost self-efficacy to achieve these ambitions, and reduce environmental constraints (see Figure 6.4). Such an approach would use the IMBP but view and apply its aspects through the lens of CA, ensuring that the guidance process is aligned with meaningful, long-term benefits for the individual.

Figure 6.4

Foci of combining the IMBP and the CA.

Figure 6.4 Long description

Behavioural beliefs influencing an individual's attitude or value, Normative beliefs influencing the social norm, and Control beliefs determining an individual's level of Self-efficacy converge to form an individual's Intention or Motivation moderated by Actual skills and Environmental Constraints thereby leading to behavioural action and Goal attainment.

Source: Adapted from Yzer [43, p. 23]

Discussion

This chapter explored how integrating the CA with other prominent models enhances our understanding of flourishing and sustainable employment. By examining these synergies, we sought to demonstrate how each model complements the CA, and vice versa, to offer a more holistic view of well-being in work and social contexts.

A key takeaway of these integrations creates a more comprehensive foundation for promoting well-being. The ICF [13] helps operationalise the CA by illustrating how contextual factors shape functioning. The JD-R model adds insight into job demands and resources [Reference Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner and Schaufeli23, Reference Bakker, Demerouti and Sanz-Vergel24], which, when integrated with the CA, extends the focus to capability expansion and workplace agency. SDT, with its focus on innate psychological needs, provides a detailed understanding of the connection between need-supportive environments and well-being [Reference Ryan and Deci29], which the CA enhances by considering broader or more distal external opportunities and conditions for need support. Finally, the IMBP complements the CA by providing insights into how behavioural intentions and determinants translate into realised functionings, addressing a gap in the CA’s explanation of how opportunities are converted into actions. Together, these integrations enrich the CA’s practical and explanatory relevance. While the CA is normative rather than explanatory [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Sen5], integrating it with empirical theories strengthens the link between determinants and outcomes such as behaviour and well-being [Reference O’Brien and Cooper44].

Another important lesson is the CA’s distinctive normative orientation. Unlike fixed models, the CA avoids assigning universal meanings to concepts such as ‘health’ or ‘employment’. Instead, their significance is defined by individuals’ values and circumstances, enabling more tailored assessments of well-being and personalised interventions, as shown in Chapters 2 and 10.

These insights point to promising directions for future research. Studies could evaluate health-promoting interventions that blend CA and JD-R model elements and examine how CA–SDT integration facilitates both behavioural internalisation and the high-level external conditions necessary for this beyond organisational settings. Further work could also investigate how macro-level policies and micro-level practices interact to shape individual capabilities, need-based experiences, and motivation, bridging the gap between broader societal structures and individual well-being. Advancing measurement tools, such as those developed by Van der Klink et al. [Reference Van der Klink, Bültmann, Burdorf, Schaufeli, Zijlstra and Abma7] and Abma et al. [Reference Abma, Brouwer, De Vries, Arends, Robroek and Cuijpers45], can also enhance the operationalisation of capabilities in dynamic work contexts. Additionally, aligning (re)employment strategies with individuals’ values and capabilities could ensure that work meaningfully contributes to long-term flourishing.

Finally, we call on theorists and practitioners to embrace the CA’s empowerment-focused perspective. While many traditional models provide descriptive insights into human behaviour, the CA offers a unique perspective by emphasising what individuals should be able to achieve based on what they have reason to value. This normative focus encourages a shift from merely addressing current states to actively expanding opportunities for valued functionings [Reference Robeyns3, Reference Sen4]. By integrating normative evaluation with explanatory mechanisms, theorists and practitioners can move beyond understanding behaviour and well-being to foster environments that prioritise human flourishing across diverse settings.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter highlights the value of integrating the CA with four other established theoretical models to provide a more holistic understanding of well-being. The combined frameworks offer valuable insights for improving individual and organisational outcomes by emphasising both internal psychological processes and external enabling factors. Future research should continue to explore these integrations, focusing on practical applications that align with the normative, improvement-focused nature of the CA, ultimately contributing to more inclusive and supportive workplaces for all.