Introduction
On 13 March 1946, a group of North Korean police officers were walking down a neighbourhood street at night in Pyongyang on foot patrol. So far, the night had been quiet and peaceful, but the policemen knew all too well that the seeming tranquillity was deceptive. Not a single night had been quiet since the administration proclaimed its land reform about two weeks earlier, and this one, they thought, would not be an exception. They were right, as soon two explosions followed by shots resounded through the night-shrouded city. The policemen rushed to the scene where they saw a group of people spraying a house with bullets in an attempt to kill the people inside. The police officers' sense of duty overcame their fear as they charged towards the attackers without having any weapons to defend themselves. Back in 1945, the Soviets had confiscated most of the weapons the police had, while the few guns that they did leave were kept locked in the armoury which could be opened only with the written permission of the Soviet military commandant. Naturally, the outgunned policemen had to break off the pursuit. The criminals got away, leaving three people dead including a 17-year-old girl, two wounded and a group of policemen infuriated by at the Soviet military's strict policies.Footnote 1 Little did they know, however, that everything was about to change.
The year 1946 marked a crucial turning point in the history of North Korea and, eventually, the entire East Asian region. During this year, the North Korean elites under the supervision and control of the Soviets established the first formally independent Provisional People's Committee of North Korea (Pukchosŏn imsi inmin wiwŏnhoe). Kim Il Sung ascended to power, initiating the land reform and nationalising industry. More significantly, 1946 witnessed the initial steps towards establishing an armed force, which would later evolve into the Korean People's Army (KPA; Chosŏn inmingun).
In terms of military development, 1946 witnessed the creation of Railroad Police units (ch'ŏlto kyŏngbidae), which soon transformed into what North Korean documents call the Railroad Guard Headquarters (ch'ŏlto kyŏngbidae saryŏngbu). Additionally, Maritime Police (susang poandae), which is often considered as the foundation for a future navy,Footnote 2 and other organisations were established. These entities would, in various ways, influence the formation of the North Korean military force.
Finally, the second half of 1946 was marked by the arrival of a group of Soviet military advisors tasked with training what Soviet documents referred to as the “Korean formations” (koreyskiye formirovaniya) – the future North Korean army. There was also an issue of the restrictive policy mandated by Stalin's directive of September 1945. In this directive, Stalin ordered the Soviet forces in North Korea to assist in establishing a “bourgeois-democratic” government and prohibited the installation of the Soviet system. Stalin's motivation for this directive was likely pragmatic; he aimed to safeguard Soviet post-war acquisitions in the Far East through diplomacy and was hesitant to engage in conflict with former allies over Korea. However, by the latter half of 1946, relations between the powers and Soviet and US military administrations had significantly deteriorated. Consequently, this directive, which initially hindered the political and military development of North Korea, effectively shifted to a policy of support and even direct control over military build-up in North Korea.
The prevailing narrative in the field of early North Korean military history asserts that “Soviet advisors worked with the North Korean security forces from the beginning of the occupation and supplied arms to the Koreans and trained them in their use.”Footnote 3 However, this narrative requires scrutiny through available archival materials. Unfortunately, the limited subsequent research on this topic has resulted in a stagnation in the field. In a book on the history of the North Korean army published in 2023, the police and the Railroad Police are only briefly mentioned,Footnote 4 while the section on the North Korean police relies on the narrative presented in a good for its time but now completely outdated South Korean book published in 1991.Footnote 5 Kim Youngjun in his book also touches on the theme of the North Korean police. However, due to the lack of evidence, the uncritical acceptance of various facts that are groundlessly stated in some older South Korean research and the almost complete disregard for Soviet archival evidence, his argument that “the Soviet authorities wanted to give the integrated police and security power to Kim Il Sung's group” does not seem to hold ground.Footnote 6 The documentary evidence concerning the formation of the North Korean police is now richer than it was some decades ago, and it needs to be taken into account.
This article argues that the militarisation of the North Korean police force did not commence with the beginning of the occupation. Instead, drawing from unpublished Soviet archival documents and published documents of North Korean origin, this article posits that this process stems from a set of measures in response to the challenges North Korea faced immediately after liberation. To present these arguments, it is essential to discuss changes in the public security situation in North Korea, providing the historical backdrop for this process and exploring its impact on the structure of the North Korean police. Subsequently, we will delve into the history of the formation of specific branches of the North Korean police, namely the Railroad Police, Maritime Police as well as the historical origins of the Korean-Manchurian border guard units.
As the North Korean police force was established by Soviet military authorities, we will mostly use the terminology as it appears in Soviet documents. The North Korean side, however, vehemently objected to the Soviet naming of North Korean police to the extent of openly resisting and sabotaging their directives. The Korean nomenclature will be written in parentheses next to the first appearance of the Soviet one in the text.
Eruption of violence in 1946 and the rearmament of the North Korean police
The establishment of an effective peacekeeping system was the cornerstone for all Soviet military administration operations in North Korea from the very beginning of the occupation. The collapse of the colonial administration created a power vacuum that was quickly filled by various political groups, each having its own paramilitary organisation, which, among other responsibilities, had to perform the role of the police in its region. When the Red Army arrived, however, the Soviets encountered widespread political violence and economic disintegration, partly resulting from the Koreans' inability to immediately restore order. The Soviet military authorities took steps to centralise control over the North Korean police by establishing the Police Department of North Korea (Poanguk, PDNK) in early November 1945. To present a semblance of legitimacy, they appointed Korean anti-Japanese partisan leader Ch'oe Yong-gŏn as the formal head of the PDNK. Despite this, the actual decision-making power rested with the Soviet military representative Nikolai Zagruzin, who reported directly to the command of the 25th Army, which was responsible for the Soviet operations in North Korea.Footnote 7
To quell the internal political violence that erupted in North Korea immediately after liberation, taking the forms of “white terror” against communists and violence directed at both Japanese and certain Koreans labelled as “pro-Japanese elements” due to their collaboration with the former colonial authorities, the Soviet military counterintelligence agency SMERSH advised the military administration to prohibit the Korean police from making arrests on political charges. Instead, their responsibilities were confined exclusively to handling common crimes (ugolovniye prestupleniya) such as murder and robbery. To ensure compliance with these new directives, the Soviets initiated a series of what they termed “purges,” resulting in the dismissal of more than 40 percent of all North Korean policemen.Footnote 8 These policies were implemented through a network of commandant offices established in all provinces, cities, and many counties throughout North Korea. For instance, the military commandant of Kusŏng county stated in his report that on 24 January 1946, a commission tasked with reviewing police activities ordered the discharge of nine individuals. One of the primary reasons cited was noncompliance with leadership orders, along with charges of looting, torturing people, and having served in the Japanese army.Footnote 9
The Soviets also implemented a stringent policy regarding the use of weapons by the police. Following the decision to establish a unified police force in October 1945, the Soviet military command mandated the confiscation of weapons held by existing police organisations.Footnote 10 During the reorganisation and “purges,” the Soviets permitted the police to retain some weapons, but they could only use them after obtaining permission from the local military commandant. For instance, in Kangsŏ county, the Soviet military commandant allowed the 136 policemen to keep only two pistols and 20 swords, confiscating all other firearms.Footnote 11 In some areas, county police were permitted to retain some Japanese rifles, but the military commandant authorised to carry only pistols, limiting this permission to the head and deputy head of the county's police department.Footnote 12 The only exception in some places was made for guarding economically important objects such as warehouses, banks, etc. Two main reasons account for such restrictive measures towards the police. First was the Soviet military authorities' distrust of the Korean police. From the Soviet perspective in 1945, granting the Korean police the right to freely carry weapons and ammunition could lead to factional struggles and create problems for the entire occupation enterprise. The Soviets were also likely concerned that it could allow some “hidden reactionaries” among the policemen to turn their weapons against the Soviets. Indeed, the first months of the occupation were plagued with an extremely high crime rate among Red Army soldiers and officers, a problem that became one of the reasons for the eruption of the white terror by right-wing nationalists.
Soviet efforts to normalise the functioning of the police force began to yield results. In December, the Soviets established an interparty commission which included Koreans from the Democratic Party, Communist Party, and the Union of Democratic Youth and assigned it to examine and evaluate the operations of the People's Committee of South P'yŏngan province located in Pyongyang. In the final report of this commission, the police department of this committee was among the few departments that did not receive significant criticism. While certain staff members of the finance department were accused of “sabotage,” the leadership of the healthcare department was deemed incompetent, and the People's Committee itself faced criticism for continuous factional struggles, the only mentioned issue concerning the Police department was the unsatisfactory performance of one small police station.Footnote 13 Thus, the process of police formation was largely completed by the beginning of 1946. What was once a disjointed system of paramilitary organisations had now transformed into a unified police force controlled from Pyongyang. The commandant offices provided necessary oversight, curtailing the capacity of local political forces to exert influence through violent means.
At the end of December, the situation underwent a significant and sudden shift. On 27 December 1945, the South Korean newspaper Tonga Ilbo published its notorious report on the Moscow Conference, incorrectly asserting that it was the USSR that proposed the trusteeship, while the USA advocated for the “immediate independence of Korea.”Footnote 14 The very idea of a trusteeship period before full independence went against the expectations of the Korean population. Korean nationalists, both left and right alike, feared that it could lead to another period of colonial rule. The translation of the word “trusteeship” as 신탁통치 only heightened these fears, as in Korean eyes, this could be understood as a form of mandate rule. This news quickly spread across Korea, sparking widespread public reaction. Much to the surprise of Soviet authorities, protests erupted all over North Korea as well, including in Pyongyang.
On the 2 of January 1946, the Political Department of the 25th Army reported a large number of leaflets containing “radical propaganda” discovered in Pyongyang, including calls for the assassination of communists and even armed revolt against the Red Army.Footnote 15 In some areas, protests involved, according to Soviet estimates, as many as 60 people. Protesters directly approached local commandant offices, demanding explanations.Footnote 16
The initial steps taken by the Soviet military administration to address the situation were focused on garnering support from the masses rather than resorting to direct political repression. Upon realising the extent of the issue, the Soviet command initiated an extensive campaign of public outreach among the North Korean population, employing various methods such as radio broadcasts, meetings, and newspapers. Mass rallies were also organised by the Soviets, promoting slogans like “The Decision of the Moscow Conference guarantees freedom, independence, and the creation of a democratic Korea,” tactfully avoiding the term “trusteeship.” The Korean translation of this term became a central concern for both right- and left-wing nationalists. This led the Soviets to engage in lively semantic debates about the distinctions between the Russian word “opeka” and “trusteeship.”Footnote 17
Failing to entirely quell the protests, the Soviets resorted to repressive measures against the demonstrators. Over a short span of 14 days, Soviet counterintelligence officers arrested over 70 individuals in Pyongyang and around 20 people in Hwanghae province, all charged with incitement.Footnote 18 Despite these actions, the protests persisted throughout the month, leading to a significant development on 16 February 1946 when Soviets carried out a series of high-profile arrests, including the leader of a Democratic Party's Committee in one of the counties of Hwanghae province. They were transferred to SMERSH counterintelligence organs for further investigation.Footnote 19
The response of the American forces to what initially appeared to be a clear misunderstanding only heightened the concerns of the Soviet command. Instead of supporting Soviet counterpropaganda efforts, representatives of the US military administration in South Korea chose to jump on the bandwagon of anti-Soviet criticism. The situation became so dire that the Soviet command directly complained to Stalin. On 23 January, Stalin met with the US ambassador to the USSR, Harriman, and presented him with the telegram from the Soviet command in North Korea, warning of impending Soviet counteractions.Footnote 20 On 25 January, the Soviet central information agency TASS published an article titled “On the Korean question,” elucidating their position.Footnote 21
The Soviets also mobilised the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the North Korean bureau of the Korean Communist Party. In February 1946, the Chinnamp'o (modern day Namp'o) city committee published the “New Year Propaganda Outline (Sangch'un sŏnjŏn yogang),” entirely dedicated to the Moscow Conference issue, criticising the “reactionary nature” of the anti-trusteeship movement.Footnote 22 The staunch resistance against the Moscow decision even led to the downfall of the North Korean nationalist leader Cho Man-sik and the ascent of Kim Il Sung as the new leader of North Korea.Footnote 23
Amidst widespread protests against trusteeship and political tensions with their American counterparts in South Korea, the Soviets initiated a series of reforms in North Korea, including the much-anticipated land reform in early March 1946. The Soviets intended to use the land reform to enhance the regime's popularity by addressing “one of the major, most crucial problems for Korea, an agrarian country where the main bulk of the population consists of peasants.”Footnote 24 Additionally, Soviets aimed to resolve the persistent issue of procuring food supplies for the Soviet Army by eliminating the landlord class, since the reluctance of landlords to sell grain to the Soviets at a fixed low price had often been the main obstacle preventing Soviet military representatives from meeting procurement goals. A notable example is the case of Soviet representative A. Soloviev in Kangwon province, who encountered resistance from everyone including local communists and even interpreters while attempting to sign a contract with the People's Committee of Chŏrwon county. They explicitly expressed their unwillingness to strain relations with landlords solely for the sake of Soviet procurement efforts.Footnote 25 The shock Soloviev received was so profound that after the incident, he asked the military command to relieve him from the duties of a military representative.Footnote 26
To lend legitimacy to these reforms, the Soviets permitted the establishment of the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea (Puk Chosŏn Imsi Inmin Wiwŏnhoe, PPCNK), which formally acted as the Korean organ of political power and served as the central government, thereby officially concluding the period of formal rule by the Soviet Military Administration. However, in reality, the Soviet military administration still maintained absolute control over these organisations, and although Koreans were afforded more freedom, they were still required to align with the political directives of the Soviet military command. All 10 departments of the Soviet Civil Administration (SCA) were incorporated into the PPCNK, including the PDNK.Footnote 27
It was during this period that the Soviets realised that the initial protests against trusteeship were only the tip of the iceberg. On 1 March, the Soviet military command and the North Korean authorities jointly organised a demonstration to commemorate the anniversary of the 1st March Movement. After all congratulatory speeches by representatives of the Soviet Command and North Korean political leaders had been delivered and the procession began, someone from the crowd threw a grenade in an attempt to assassinate Kim Il Sung and other Korean political figures. Soviet Lieutenant Iakov Novichenko intercepted the grenade but sustained severe injuries while covering it with his body to shield the surrounding people from the blast. Two out of the five attackers were captured by SMERSH operatives on the spot, while the others escaped in the chaos that ensued after the explosion. Soviet military counterintelligence swiftly mobilised the North Korean police, resulting in the arrest of about 100 people.Footnote 28
The attempt to assassinate the North Korean leadership during the 1st March demonstration marked the beginning of a series of attacks against North Korean leadership and Soviet military authorities. On 8 March, at 1:45 am, three grenades were thrown at the window of Ch'oe Yong-gŏn's house in an attempt to assassinate the head of the PDNK.Footnote 29 The following day, a group of Koreans cut telephone wires that went to the local commandant office, while another group threw a grenade at the Pyongyang city police department. Although the attackers were spotted by a commandant office's patrol, they managed to escape.Footnote 30
By mid-March, the situation had extended into the provinces as well. The military commandant of Hwanghae province reported receiving information about armed groups of terrorists crossing the 38th Parallel. In a report, the deputy commandant of South P'yŏngan province quoted the head of the local police department, who allegedly said that “Some Koreans say that soon a rebellion would rise in Pyongyang, and when it does, people all over Korea will support it.”Footnote 31
Attacks on North Korean politicians of different levels, Soviet soldiers, and officers occurred almost daily throughout March. One of the attacks that shocked the Soviets the most was the assassination attempt on Kang Ryang-uk, the secretary of the PPCNK. On the night of 14 March, terrorists threw two grenades and fired gunshots at Kang Ryang-uk's house in Pyongyang. Kang himself sustained light injuries, but the explosion and gunshots killed his 22-year-old son, 17-year-old daughter, and his friend, a local priest. The police arrived at the crime scene almost immediately after the incident and began chasing the suspects, but the police unit was unarmed and could not apprehend the armed group. A group of SMERSH operatives engaged in hot pursuit and soon cornered the perpetrators inside a local hospital. A gunfight ensued, resulting in one person being killed, one heavily wounded, and several captured.Footnote 32
A search carried out after the gunfight provided the Soviets with conclusive evidence that they were not fighting against small independent groups of local “reactionaries” who were simply opposed to the land reform. Instead, they were up against an organisation of nationalists based in Seoul, known as the Paeguisa (White Shirts or White Clothes), supported by South Korean right-wing elites. Among the seized documents the Soviets found a pass issued to Ch'oe Gi-sŏng, a member of Paeguisa, signed by the “Head of the Internal Affairs Department of the Provisional Government” Sin Ik-hŭi on 15 February 1946.Footnote 33 Documentary evidence suggests that SMERSH organs might have been aware of the existence of this organisation as early as late November 1945. Then following a series of student riots, Soviets investigated the work of local police organs and, during a search of local police chief's apartment, along with some anti-Soviet leaflets found a magazine called “White Clothes,” leading to the arrest of 30 men.Footnote 34 The final report from the SCA states that in 1946 out of 8,926 people arrested on political charges, almost two thousand “had tasks directly received from South Korea.”Footnote 35
Of course, protests against the Red Army or local communists were not entirely unprecedented for the Soviets. One of the significant incidents in 1945 was the student uprising in Sinŭiju. In a confidential report, the military commandant of Sinŭiju provided the following account of the events:
In the city of Sinŭiju on 23 November 1945, a [group of] student youth, around 700 men armed with sticks, stones, and partially with guns, attacked the provincial committee of the Communist Party, crushed the doors, broke in, and beat up 9 Communist Party workers. The city police took measures, and suppressed the riot. The attackers suffered 9 fatalities and 80 injuries.Footnote 36
There were other incidents, such as an assault on the local police office in Ryongamp'o when a group of armed men attempted to rob the local police office. However, unlike the attacks in Pyongyang, these pre-March 1946 incidents were viewed as isolated events that did not specifically target the Soviet Administration or the governance system over North Korea as a whole.
The findings of the investigation were promptly relayed to Colonel Zagruzin, who swiftly took measures to prevent further escalation. On 18 March 1946, Zagruzin submitted a request to I.M. Chistyakov, the Commander of the 25th Army, seeking permission to provide more than 250 Japanese rifles and several thousand units of ammunition to the Pyongyang police. The request was directly forwarded to the Head of the Primorsky Military District and was executed on 22 March 1946.Footnote 37 Zagruzin underscored the urgency of the request designating his title not as “Representative of Soviet Military Command at the Department of Police of North Korea” but as the “Head of the Department of Police of the SCA in North Korea.”
There was another factor that influenced such evolution of North Korean police organs. Despite the Soviets' efforts to reduce new attacks by arming the PDNK and assigning them new responsibilities, the impact on stability in North Korea remained significant. This was particularly pronounced in the regions bordering South Korea, where attacks on Soviet soldiers and officers adversely affected the morale of stationed troops. The pervasive fear and anxiety were so profound that Soviet servicemen frequently ignored military censorship, a breach that everyone knew could result in serious negative consequences. In numerous letters sent home, they described the situation as extremely dire.
One of the most illustrative examples is a letter dated 17 August 1946 from a soldier, I.K. Lukanov, to his brother, in which he wrote:
“Hello, brother Vova. I'm stationed at the 38th Parallel. There are many cases here of people being killed, strangled, and [murdered] by various means. Numerous gangs exist, consisting of Korean landowners and capitalists, and some include peasants and workers. Of course, Vova, we catch them, and the Korean police assist us. A week ago, we buried two comrades-in-arms who went on patrol. Two Koreans approached, greeted them with ‘Hi, Russian!’ and then shot them. One was shot in the ear, the bullet passing through one ear and exiting the other, so he died instantly. The other got wounded. He resisted, and they took the murdered Red Army man's rifle, stabbing him twice with the bayonet, so he died too. The Koreans then took their weapons, documents, and fled to the American side. That's the situation here, and such incidents are quite frequent…”Footnote 38
Another soldier wrote:
“Hello, Grigoriy Yakovlevich. Yesterday one of our lieutenants ‘got treated’. He received eleven stab wounds and was sent to a hospital. The Korean (who did it) ran away. Well, there is a great number of such facts, and we are starting to ‘getting used’ to it. Though I am not sure whether we will eventually get used to it or not.”Footnote 39
The incidents described in these letters were undoubtedly well-known to the Soviet Military Command in North Korea, and they certainly influenced decision-making at the local level. The unusually high frequency of such incidents prompted the Soviet Command to issue orders to put not only the police and military commandants but also all other military personnel on high alert. For instance, on 11 March 1946, the Headquarters of the 25th Army issued an order to its units, instructing them to increase vigilance in the border regions with South Korea and Manchuria. They prohibited the deployment of solitary units for night patrols, enforced a curfew, and even mandated providing armed guards for every vehicle leaving the garrison premises.Footnote 40
The reform of the PDNK and creation of the specialised police units
The new reality in which the Soviets found themselves after the events of late December 1945 – mid-March 1946 necessitated a profound reform of the PDNK as well. By 1 April 1946 North Koreans under their supervision introduced a new structure for the Police Department. The number of divisions was reduced to four: the General Affairs division (ch'ongmubu), Guard division (kyŏngbibu), Inspection division (kamch'albu), and Public Order division (hoanbu). Each division was further divided into three offices.
The General Affairs division included a Personnel (insakwa) office, Economic Management, and Secretariat. The Personnel office was still mainly responsible for the recruitment of cadres; however, some aspects of the recruitment process underwent changes. The series of purges organised in 1945 by the Soviets to prevent the North Korean police from becoming a tool in the political struggle of local elites led to North Koreans complaining about the lack of stability due to the high staff turnover, with people being “promptly fired for the slightest mistakes.” To fix the problem, the PDNK implemented several cadre policies, one of which was to scrutinise the background of new cadres, especially their “revolutionary history” (hyŏngmyŏng ryŏksa). The role of the Accounting office (kyŏngnikwa), on the other hand, remained unchanged and continued to cover the economic aspects of the North Korean police. The Secretariat (sŏmukwa) was responsible for paperwork and compiling statistical data.Footnote 41
The Guard division included offices of Police (kyŏngbikwa), Railroad Police (ch'ŏltokwa, established 10 January 1946), and Maritime Police (susangkwa, created with the establishment of the Maritime Police). This division was essentially responsible for overseeing the entire practical work of the North Korean police.Footnote 42 The processes that led to the creation of Railroad Police and Maritime Police will be discussed below.
The Inspection division represented an important part of the new structure of the PDNK. It consisted of three complementary offices, among which the Inspection office (kamch'alkwa) was initially established to support policing in Pyongyang as an “investigation unit” (sach'aldae). This unit was tasked with assessing the situation and creating a police network to pre-empt potential threats. In response to the events of March 1946, the investigation units were reorganised to include only those who “had a high level of ideological awareness (sasang chakp'ung).”Footnote 43 The Intelligence office (chŏngbokwa) was created with the mission of collecting information about the situation in both North and South Korea, as well as intelligence from other countries. Although later reports indicate that the Intelligence office did not yield the expected results, the creation of the Inspection and Intelligence offices itself symbolises a fundamental stage in the development of North Korean intelligence and counterintelligence organs as political police. The Inspection division was in charge of managing prisons.Footnote 44
Finally, the Public Order division included the Public Order office (hoankwa), Investigation office (chosakwa), and Firefighting office (sobangkwa). The Firefighting office oversaw the firefighting squads and equipment, while the Public Order office remained in charge of economic activities and preserving “social tranquillity.” The Investigation office was primarily responsible for criminal investigations.Footnote 45
The situation in which political terrorists began targeting the Soviets most likely became the key factor in Soviets' eventual decision to allow repression on political charges. By July 1946, the political crimes reported by the North Korean police mostly involved “shadow activities of terrorist elements” from various South Korean groups, including former members of Korean Liberation Army (Hanguk Kwangbokkun), anti-Soviet and anti-Communist propaganda, “White terror elements,” and so on.Footnote 46 It is a fact, however, that the Soviets, much to the deep dissatisfaction of the North Korean leadership, still maintained a tight grip on political repression in North Korea. In March 1947, Kim Il Sung directly demanded the Soviet Command to allow him to create the “political (secret) police in order to fight political crimes and crimes [against] the state.”Footnote 47 The Military Commandant of the Kusŏng county, in his report dated January 1946 mentioned the existence of the “Political office” in the structure of the county's police department but did not specify its functions.Footnote 48
The abovementioned Railroad and Maritime Police were two specialised components of the North Korean police, the introduction of which has long been viewed in historical literature only as groundwork for the future North Korean army and navy.Footnote 49 Available Soviet documents help illuminate some details that led to the formation of these structures.
Railroad Police
The railways were crucial for the Soviets as the primary means of cargo transportation. This was particularly evident during the initial stages of the occupation when the Soviets were occupied with transporting trophies and valuable cargo from the occupied territories to aid in the restoration of their war-damaged economy. While trains were also used for other purposes, such as grain redistribution between provinces, in the first months of occupation, the North Korean railroad system was “almost exclusively used by the Red Army… for transporting cargo in only one direction.”Footnote 50 The state of the North Korean railroad network was unsatisfactory, lacking even lamp oil or electric lamps, making night movement extremely dangerous.Footnote 51 This situation understandably provoked the anger of the local population, especially the railroad workers who received low salaries and were initially not provided with food and clothing.Footnote 52
This eventually led to acts of resistance and even sabotage. One of the most significant incidents of railroad sabotage occurred at the end of November 1945. On 20 November, a Soviet train loaded with Japanese weapons and ammunition stopped at the Rajin train station. An unidentified group set the train on fire, and as the flames reached the cargo, it caused a powerful explosion. This explosion destroyed several dozen buildings, inflicting serious damage on both the small town and the railroad.Footnote 53 In December 1945, a Soviet commission tasked with evaluating the Railways Department's work reported on the dismal state of work discipline among locomotive operators. They highlighted cases where operators were found to have used trains for personal gain and even abandoned them. The Soviet commission cited an incident that occurred on 11 December 1945, when a group of individuals unlawfully commandeered a train from Pyongyang station to Sunan station and then assaulted the station workers.Footnote 54 In its final report the Soviet Military Administration will call November-December 1945 “the most difficult period for the [railway] transport” of North Korea.Footnote 55
To address the problem and prevent the destruction of valuable equipment, Senior Lieutenant Egorov, the military representative at the Department of Transportation, submitted a report titled “On the Requirements of the Railways of North Korea.” In this report, he made several demands for measures to protect North Korea's railroad system. One of his requests was to dispatch two NKVD railroad regiments to guard the railroad and accompany the cargo.Footnote 56 As the NKVD guard regiments never arrived, the Soviet command in North Korea had no choice but to rely on its own resources. They decided to utilise the newly formed Police department, and the command of the 25th Army ordered Zagruzin to “help the [Police] department to create a police force for guarding the railroads.”Footnote 57 This order was promptly executed, and the Railroad Police was established on 10 January 1946.Footnote 58
In early July 1946, two months after the reorganisation of the PDNK, the Soviets made the decision to separate the Railroad Police from the Department, establishing an entity known as the “Headquarters of the Railroad Guards (ch'ŏlto kyŏngbi saryŏngbu).”Footnote 59 The timing suggests a connection to Soviet plans for the reorganisation of the Railroad Police. Documents from the 384th Division make a reference to an order from the Primorsky Military District dated 15 June 1946, according to which the 25th Army Headquarters (HQ), on 19 June, directed the establishment of a separate “Korean Railroad Police brigade.” This brigade was assigned the duty of safeguarding railroad facilities and maintaining order at North Korean railroad stations, excluding crucial areas such as the border with Manchuria, which remained under the control of the Soviet army.Footnote 60
Unlike the Railroad Police, which was a part of the PDNK, the new “Railroad Police brigade” was to be under the control of the Head of the Transportation Department. The brigade's headquarters were to be located in Pyongyang and it was to consist of three battalions. The first battalion was to guard Pyongyang's railway facilities and was operationally controlled by the head of the Pyongyang railway, with its headquarters, naturally, located in Pyongyang. The second battalion had the same functions but focused on the Hamhŭng railroad, with its headquarters situated in the city of Hamhŭng. Lastly, the third battalion was tasked with a range of duties, from guarding cargo and railroad warehouses to policing the stations. Its headquarters were also in Pyongyang, and two companies (rota), the 12th and 13th, were operationally subordinated to the Heads of Pyongyang and Hamhŭng railroads accordingly. According to the document, the third battalion was to be formed using existing Railroad Police units that were to be removed from the subordination of the PDNK.Footnote 61
The newly formed brigade also received weaponry. The commander of the 25th Army issued an order to supply the new unit with 1106 rifles, 105 pistols, 1677 swords, 16,590 rifle bullets, and 840 pistol bullets seized from the Japanese forces. Each unit assigned to patrol bridges, factories, and tunnels was supposed to be equipped with three rifles. Those tasked with guarding railroad depots were to have two rifles, and those watching over water pumps were to carry just one rifle. However, these weapon regulations applied only to the first two battalions; the third, which included the training company, was allocated one rifle for every three men. Those without firearms were allowed to arm themselves with swords. To ensure that the brigade units met operational standards, the commanders of locally stationed Soviet army units were instructed to conduct monthly inspections along with the brigade commander. The Soviet military command mandated the establishment of the brigade before 28 June 1946, and ordered it to replace the existing guard units on most parts of the railroad before 1 July.Footnote 62
Even after Soviet military instructors arrived in North Korea and began training the units which would later become the KPA, the Railroad Police continued to be exclusively used for guarding the railroads. This fact prompted Kim Il Sung, in March 1947, to request the Railroad Police to be relieved from railroad guarding duty and allowed to receive military training like other units.Footnote 63 If the previously mentioned “Headquarters of the Railroad Guards” and the “Railroad Police brigade” are the same entity, then its origins are unlikely to be viewed as a disguise for establishing a regular army.
Maritime Police
While a comprehensive understanding of the origins of the Railroad Police requires further archival research, the origins of the Maritime Police are well documented. The need to establish a police unit to address activities along the coastline became especially evident to the Soviets immediately after the events of March 1946.
This necessity was linked to the lack of control over the coastline, allowing local ports to potentially serve as sites for illegal imports of various goods, including drugs.Footnote 64 As early as December 1945, the Soviets had complained that the counties adjacent to the Yellow Sea were centres for illicit activities, having documented numerous incidents of contraband. An attempt by the local military commandant to mobilise local police and stop a contraband vessel resulted in the vessel responding with machinegun fire and escaping.Footnote 65 Additionally, it could serve as one of the routes for “reactionary elements” to enter and exit North Korea. While the Soviets had their own units stationed across the coastlines, they were apparently ineffective in the establishing strict control over the coastline.
The Commander of the Primorsky Military District issued the order to establish the Maritime Police on 26 June 1946. Upon receiving the order, Chistyakov instructed his Deputy A.A. Romanenko to create the Maritime Police by 10 July 1946. Soviet command instructed to select the personnel for the Maritime Police from “the best and proven Koreans with the necessary recommendations from the People's Committee of North Korea.” The Maritime Police was planned to have eleven cutters, with eight of them stationed on the West coast, the most challenging area for the Soviets to guard. The Maritime Police headquarters was designated to be in Chinnamp'o, the largest North Korean port on the West Coast. It was to be well-equipped, as the 25th Army commander instructed to supply the Maritime Police with 11 light machine guns, 54 rifles, 15 pistols, 12 binoculars, 2200 rifle bullets, and 150 pistol ammunition from the trophy weaponry, taken from the Japanese. Initially, the Maritime Police was to be directly subordinate to the PDNK, while the commanders of the Soviet military units in their operational region were to “periodically control the work of the Korean (Maritime) police on observing and guarding the coastline” through specially assigned officers from the Division and Regiment HG Soviet military command instructed them to submit daily reports on the results of observation and the apprehension of ships with contraband. While the order specified the towns where the cutters were to be stationed, the concrete selection of locations for placing cutters and observation points was left to the Head of the PDNK. Soviet command directed him to submit his suggestions through the Operational division of the 25th Army no later than 15 July 1946.Footnote 66
Around that time, the Soviets formulated the “Regulations on the [work of] North Korean Maritime Police” and sent it to the headquarters of the divisions stationed along the coastlines of North Korea. The divisions' HQ thoroughly examined the document, and promptly returned its revised version to the Army HQ.Footnote 67 On 27 July 1946 the Soviet command dispatched to the Division HQ the final version to serve as a guideline.Footnote 68
The final version of the Regulations clearly outlined the establishment of the Maritime Police with the purpose of thwarting illicit transportation of goods and passengers by sea between North and South Korea. It seems that the opinions of the commanders of the Soviet military units were considered, as there were alterations regarding the subordination of the Maritime Police. Instead of a single subordination to the PDNK, it now stated that while the Maritime Police still reported directly to the Department of Police of North Korea, operationally it was subordinated to the commanders of the units of the Red Army stationed in the locations where the cutters were deployed. This effectively meant that the actual control over the North Korean Maritime Police remained in the hands of the Soviets. Nevertheless, the PDNK retained the authority to appoint the head of the Maritime Police, though such appointments required approval from the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea. The appointed head was responsible for overseeing the personnel, actions, and assets of the Maritime Police.Footnote 69
Again, the Soviets intended the Maritime Police to fulfil purely police functions. It consisted of three divisions, namely Operative Division, Criminal Division, and Economic Division. The Operative Division was personally headed by the head of the Maritime Police, as it was the division performing sea patrols. The division was primary tasked to control coastline shipping in the area of the West Coast of North Korea up to the 38th parallel. Each cutter had a Petty Officer (starshina), who was responsible for the crew of the cutter both during patrols and when on shore. Every time the cutter sailed out, the head of the cutter issued the order to set sail, recorded in the ship's log along with every detail of the sailing. After returning to the harbour, the cutter's head reported first to the Red Army commander to whom he was operationally subordinated. The cutters were not to cross the 38th parallel, and the maximum distance of sailing from shore was limited to 25–30 km. The other two divisions had the same functions as the corresponding divisions in the PDNK.Footnote 70
The Regulations explicitly stated that the newly created Maritime Police had authority to conduct checks of the vessels belonging to countries other than Soviet Union. The Soviets naturally excluded their own ships from the inspection by the North Korean police. If during the inspection of other vessels the officers found that the necessary documents were absent or did not match the cargo, they were instructed to seize the vessel and direct it to the nearest base of the Maritime Police to conduct a thorough investigation. If the perpetrator vessel refused to follow the instructions, the police were permitted to open fire. Any confiscated cargo was to be transferred to the People's Committee.Footnote 71
Section 15 of the Regulations vividly illustrates the Soviet perception of the North Korean police and their awareness of that the North Koreans might trigger a significant international incident. This section explicitly prohibited cutters from crossing the 38th parallel, regardless of whether they had any “provocative intent” (most probably meaning an attempt to engage in direct military confrontation with their South Korean counterparts), or if it constitutes an act of “betrayal of the People's Committee of North Korea” (i.e. defection to the South with their expensive equipment). It specified that if a cutter was discovered crossing the 38th parallel, all personal belongings of its crew were to be confiscated. To add to the severity, “family members of the cutter's crew: father, mother, wife, brothers, sisters, adult children, and caretakers are to be relocated to remote rural areas of the country.” The Head of the Maritime Police was to be dismissed.Footnote 72
The fact that the Soviets had complete control over the Maritime Police clearly clashed with the desires of Kim Il Sung and other North Korean leaders who undoubtedly regarded this institution as the nucleus of a future navy. A notable instance of Soviet non-cooperation in this matter was how they handled North Koreans' attempts to address the issue of the lack of their own vessels for sailing and training the members of the Maritime Police. When the Red Army units entered Korea in August 1945, the fleeing Japanese sank about 70 ships near the coast of North Korea.Footnote 73 Observing that the Soviets had no intention of giving their vessels to North Koreans for their own needs, the local administration took matters into their own hands and established a joint-stock venture to acquire equipment for retrieving small ships and cargo from the seabed. Unfortunately for the North Koreans, the Soviet counterintelligence service discovered their plans, and on 3 June 1946 a SMERSH unit raided the organisation, confiscated money, equipment, and demanded an immediate halt to its activities. Naturally, the Koreans attempted to protest against such actions. In October 1946, they urged Kim Il Sung to write a letter to Romanenko and seek assistance.Footnote 74 The Soviets evidently ignored the request, as in April 1947, Kim Il Sung sent another letter to the Soviet commander stating that the Maritime Police lacked skills of seamanship and was thus still unable to fulfil its duties.Footnote 75
Korean-Manchurian border guard
Another example of a paramilitary organisation that also had its roots in a security crisis was the Korean-Manchurian border guard (Cho-Man kukkyŏng kyŏngbidae). The dominant narrative in South Korean scholarship on the historical origins of the Korean-Manchurian border guard states that it was created under the personal directive of Kim Il Sung.Footnote 76 This narrative stems from a single piece of evidence, namely a text published by the North Koreans in 1992 in the second volume of the “Complete Works of Kim Il Sung” under the title “On the creation of the State Border Guard (Kukkyŏng kyŏngbidaerŭl chojikhalde taehayŏ).”Footnote 77 Whether the future paramount leader of North Korea did, in fact, give such a directive and, if this directive really existed, whether it had any influence on the process of the creation of the Border Guard units, may be confirmed only on the basis of North Korean archival evidence. The available Soviet documents, however, paint a slightly different picture.
The situation at the border between Korea and China has consistently held paramount importance for the stability of the region, long before its formal delineation by the Qing and Chosŏn authorities in the early eighteenth century. Its significance was further enchanced after the “opening” of Manchuria, a long-forbidden region considered sacred by the Qing dynasty, in 1860. The resulting problems, such as uncontrollable migration flows, epidemics and banditry, among others, remained largely unresolved even during the period of Japanese rule. The partially successful (though sometimes brutal) Japanese attempts to address some of these problems came to naught after the Soviet blitzkrieg of August 1945, which dismantled the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo and brought an end to the Japanese rule in North Korea. Unbeknownst to themselves, the Soviets, having occupied Manchuria and North Korea, essentially inherited the problems that had plagued the border region.
The liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule opened a new chapter for the Korean population in Manchuria. Many families, most of whom had been compelled to leave Korea due to famine or political persecution, now aspired to return to their homeland. The influx of Korean returnees from Manchuria was so substantial that, for the first year of the occupation, the Soviets did not even attempt to gather statistical data. The Soviet Military Administration's final report, compiled at the end of 1948, cites over 350,000 people crossing the Manchurian border, and this figure excludes the numbers for the initial year of the occupation, not to mention the likely thousands of people whose entry into North Korea either went unnoticed or was simply ignored and not reported by some careless Soviet border guard units.Footnote 78
From the perspective of the Soviet military authorities in North Korea, the mass voluntary repatriation of Koreans at this time was not necessarily a positive development. Firstly, not all returnees supported the ongoing processes in North Korea. Both the Soviets and North Koreans, having legitimate concerns, understood that, particularly after the events of March 1946, there might be “reactionary elements” among the returnees, potentially sent by the South Korean side. For example, one North Korean document expressed concerns about the possibility of numerous Kuomintang spies crossing the border.Footnote 79 Another concern was that such migration would place an even greater strain on North Korea's agriculture, especially when the acreage for sowing had not yet been restored to pre-war levels, making it challenging for the Soviets to secure provisions for themselves.Footnote 80
There was also the threat of epidemics. The liberation of Manchuria from Japanese rule unleashed an outbreak of plague, as the system put in place by the Japanese to control and combat the plague collapsed.Footnote 81 In March 1946 rinderpest started spreading from Manchuria, posing a further threat to already existing agriculture.Footnote 82 Additionally, there was a cholera epidemic brought to South Korea by a ship carrying Korean returnees from Guangdong in Spring 1946, which quickly spread to North Korea. This situation made the Soviets acutely aware of the impending crisis.Footnote 83
To address the spread of plague into Korea, the 25th Army HQ on 17 March 1946 ordered the commanders of units stationed along the Manchurian border to establish sanitary control points staffed with Soviet military personnel, including a medic, sanitary instructor, and a disinfection specialist. Their task was to check arriving people for symptoms of the disease and to disinfect them. Those who came from regions known to have an epidemic were subjected to a 9-day quarantine.Footnote 84
The border with Manchuria also presented a more direct threat to the people living and stationed nearby, namely, banditry. The situation in Manchuria after its “opening” in 1860, led to the emergence of a specific social stratum of outlaws, often bordering on criminal and social banditry. They were sometimes referred to as honghuzi (Red Beards), tufei (rural or local bandits), or mazei (or bazoku in Japanese, meaning horse bandits). Some gangs frequently crossed the border into Korea to attack police or Kempeitai posts for weapons or to plunder local villages for food and supplies. These gangs were particularly active during periods of political crisis. Bandit groups often exploited the ongoing political struggle to forge temporary alliances with one of the warring parties to gain profits from the cooperation. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Japanese, through a series of stringent economic and harsh military measures, managed to somewhat quell the bandit activities in the region. However, after the collapse of the Manchukuo government, banditry experienced a revival. The resurgence of military confrontation between Chinese Communists and Kuomintang gave a banditry new impetus.Footnote 85
The Soviets were well aware of the threat posed by the bandits in Manchuria. For instance, on 11–12 January 1946, an armed group of 60 individuals crossed the Amnok (Yalu) river from the direction of the town of Andong (modern-day Dandong), raiding a small border township in North P'yŏngan province. The group apprehended the head of the local People's Committee and the police chief, confiscated the police's weapons, and then departed, leaving one Korean individual dead. Although the Soviet report refers to the armed group as the “Chinese People's Army,”Footnote 86 likely a mistranslation of either the Kuomintang's “National Revolutionary Army” (NRA) or the Chinese Communist units known in Red Army documents as “8th NRA,” the group's actions suggest they were most likely bandits dressed in Chinese military uniform or using the name as a disguise. Coincidentally or not, on 12 January 1946, the commander of the 384th division ordered the closure of the Korean border with Manchuria.Footnote 87
Naturally, the repeated demand from the Soviet command to completely close the border with Manchuria throughout 1946 did not prove effective. Soviet army units stationed in the area were already stretched thin with other concerns during that year. They had to contend with the frequent presence of Chinese Communist units at the border, who requested entry.Footnote 88 Conflicts with the Kuomintang units responsible for guarding the Chinese side of the border added to their challenges. These units occasionally trespassed into the Soviet zone, insisted that the Soviets cede control of a bridge and at one point even blatantly suggested a joint guarding arrangement for a dam over the Amnok river.Footnote 89 Thus, it came as no surprise when the Soviet HQ's check-up of the state of the Korean-Manchurian border in June 1946 revealed that the Soviet “personnel understands their duty, but does not perform it,” allowing “Koreans to systematically breach the border by taking advantage of the unguarded but monitored gaps between the observation posts.”Footnote 90
To ease the burden on some of the Soviet military units responsible for border guard duty, the Soviets opted to delegate some of these responsibilities to Koreans. In June 1946, the Soviet military commandant of Wiwŏn county reported the establishment of a “People's unit” (narodniy otryad). It had 44 members, led by a Korean named Chae Wŏn-gyu.Footnote 91 The commandant mentioned that the unit had supplies and housing but lacked weapons and ammunition, which were expected to arrive from the provincial capital to the mountainous border county. The unit members were undergoing military training, likely with the assistance of the military commandant, and actively participated in border security duties.Footnote 92 By July 1946, the commandant had not only instructed the People's unit but also the local police to provide assistance in border protection. During this period, the Soviet military commandant office conducted not only military but also political training for the unit.Footnote 93 By September, the promised weapons had finally reached the county, and 70% of the People's unit, now renamed the “Guard unit,” were armed, while the police remained unarmed. They were deployed to seven locations along the county's border.Footnote 94
Documents of the division also confirm that the Soviets began transferring control over certain border regions to Koreans around July–August 1946. On 1 August 1946, the commander of the 384th Division received an order to withdraw Soviet guard posts from four locations, including P'osan in Kanggye county. After obtaining confirmation from local military commandants, the duty was to be transferred to Korean units.Footnote 95 The final report of the SCA indicates that the Soviets organised two border units, each assigned to three border commandant offices and 64 border guard posts.Footnote 96
The documentary evidence clearly illustrates that the Korean-Manchurian border guard was neither a part of the Korean police, nor a structure subordinated to the People's Committee of North Korea. Instead, it was created as units staffed by Koreans under the control of the Soviet military commandants. Therefore, its formation most probably had nothing to do with Kim Il Sung's directives, even if the previously mentioned directive did actually exist.
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined the process of the militarisation of the North Korean police and the establishment of its specialised units such as the Railroad and Maritime Police, as well as the Korean-Manchurian border guard, primarily through the lens of Soviet archival material. The available Soviet documents indicate that one of the main drivers for reinforcing the North Korean police under Soviet military administration was not the desire to create an independent North Korean regime or give more power to Kim Il Sung, but rather the necessity to address immediate challenges in the realm of public security.
The first significant challenge arose with the outbreak of anti-trusteeship protests. The primary trigger for these protests was an erroneous report published in the South Korean newspaper Tonga Ilbo, which, while blaming the USSR for including trusteeship in the plan for the re-establishment of an independent Korean state, falsely claimed that the USA proposed immediate independence for Korea. In the midst of this crisis, the Soviets launched a land reform campaign, which was intended, among other things, to resolve the difficulties the Soviets faced in procuring provisions for stationed troops. The land reform was interrelated with a series of terrorist attacks against North Korean politicians, Soviet military commandant offices, and Soviet servicemen stationed at the 38th Parallel. This prompted the Soviet command to start arming the North Korean police, albeit more reservedly in some places than in others.
The next step towards empowering the police was the reform of the PDNK, which not only put an end to the Soviet purges of the police but also initiated the process of its ideologisation. This allowed the leadership of the PDNK later in 1947 to openly call for a “firm unity under the ideology of General Kim Il Sung.”Footnote 97 Naturally, it is difficult to assert that by that time Kim Il Sung had developed his own distinctive ideology, and it should be viewed as a means of achieving political centralisation. This was also the stage when the Soviets even permitted Koreans to take measures of political repression.
During these processes, the Soviets began expanding the North Korean police by introducing new branches. The first one was the Railroad Police. The Railroad Police has long been considered a disguise for establishing a regular army. Although some parts of the Railroad Police did eventually receive military training and were partially incorporated into the military, the available Soviet documentary evidence suggests that the branch itself was initially created purely as a police force to assist the overstretched Soviet units in guarding the North Korean railroad. On 1 July 1946, the Soviets ordered the creation of an independent unit from the PDNK called the Railroad Police brigade. Available evidence also suggests that these units were initially formed mostly for the purposes of guarding the railroad and cargo. The process and reasons for their transformation into the military are not found in the available foundational documents.
The same holds true for the Maritime Police, whose creation was ordered by the HQ of the Primorsky military district on 26 June 1946. Indeed, like the Railroad Police, it was also a unit with access to weapons and small vessels, specifically cutters. However, nowhere in the foundational documents can traces be found of Soviet plans to lay the groundwork for a future navy by creating the Maritime Police force.
The number and location of cutters and bases for the Maritime Police clearly suggest that the Soviets intended to use them as a police force to prevent further intrusion of “reactionary” agents from South Korea by water crossing from the West Coast of Korea, a coast that the Soviets could not easily control. Some towns on the East Coast of the Northern part of the Korean peninsula, such as Wonsan, even had military commandant offices not only of the 25th Army responsible for the military occupation of North Korea but also of the Pacific Fleet.Footnote 98 The severe penalties for crossing the 38th parallel, as stipulated in the Regulations of the Maritime, may seem like a punishment equivalent to that of state treason for defection to the enemy. However, firstly, it was directed not only at those intending to defect but also at those with “provocative intent.” This can be explained by the Soviets' (and the North Korean leadership's) desire to protect valuable equipment and to prevent certain individuals from provoking military incidents, for which the Americans were likely to blame the Soviets.
The creation of the Korean-Manchurian border guard was also aimed at addressing numerous issues that the unprepared Soviet military units were not equipped to handle. Contrary to the narrative presented by some South Korean historians, who asserted that Kim Il Sung played a significant role in the creation of the Korean-Manchurian border guard, Soviet archival evidence suggests that the process of its establishment was not only gradual but also initiated and controlled by the Soviets. It was designed to tackle the complexities of issues on the Northern border of Korea instead of providing the North Korean leadership with new tools for exercising power.
The most crucial distinction of these new units from the Railroad Police and the Maritime Police was that they received both military and political training from the Soviets from the very day of their creation. Subsequently, with auxiliary support from the local police, they took over guard duty from the Soviet military in locations that the Soviets deemed less crucial. This allowed the Soviets to concentrate their efforts on those sections of the border which were of a greater economic and political significance.
A comprehensive exploration of the history of the North Korean police and military organs is yet to be undertaken. The establishment and development of the police force played a significant role in shaping the early North Korean state. Analysing its evolution through Soviet and Korean documentary evidence will offer greater insight into the specific reasons and motives of the Soviets, as well as the extent of influence exerted by North Korean political elites in this process. The social dimension of the North Korean police is equally intriguing. Research into the daily lives of North Korean police officers and how they changed alongside the growth of the North Korean state will illuminate shifts in North Korean social structures.
Another intriguing avenue for research is the process of the Soviets transferring control over police, intelligence, and other security agencies to their North Korean counterparts. Investigating the timing and reasons behind these transitions could yield empirical information about the Soviet Union's plans for North Korea and their execution. Furthermore, it could aid in understanding the extent to which the Soviets maintained influence over these crucial state agencies after the departure of the Soviet military from North Korea.
As for the origins of the North Korean specialised police units and border guard, Russian archives contain more Soviet documents on various aspects of the North Korean police that can provide further insights into the details of the process of its militarisation, as well as changes in Soviet control over these organisations and the rationale for their creation. The evidence available today suggests that while the structure and tasks of these units changed in the first half of 1946, the units themselves, at least in the eyes of the Soviet military command in North Korea, remained essentially police units.
Competing interests
The author declares no competing interests.
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