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The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on Electoral Competition in United States House of Representatives Races

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Jamie L. Carson
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
Michael H. Crespin
Affiliation:
Michigan State University

Abstract

Legislative redistricting in the states is highly contentious due, at least in part, to its partisan implications. But does the method by which states draw legislative districts affect partisan competition in the elections that are held in these districts? We examine the effects of three methods used by states to draw district boundaries on competition in congressional elections. Specifically, we evaluate the effects on competition of legislative, judicial, and commission redistricting plans enacted prior to the 1992 and 2002 congressional elections. We find that more competitive elections occur when courts and commissions are directly involved in the redistricting process, as opposed to when redistricting is handled only in the state legislative process.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

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