Money is neither a thing nor a concept. Rather, as many writers have rightly suggested, money is a relation. But what kind of relation? This articles refuses the now seemingly common-sense notion that money is an ‘institution’ or a ‘public good’. Instead, it insists on specifying money as a concrete relation between creditor and debtor. To grasp money in both its practical and conceptual complexity, we must see it as an array. The money array is comprised of four elements: (1) a token that symbolizes the money relation; (2) a creditor who holds the token; (3) a debtor on whom the token makes a claim; (4) a denomination, i.e., the named quantity of credit/debt. The money array makes clear that no form of the money stuff - as money, i.e., as part of the money relation - ever possesses any positive, intrinsic value. The raison d’être of the money stuff - of any coin, note, bill, check, or digital token - is not to contain, have, or incarnate value. Money has no value. The value element of the money relation never lies in the money stuff, but rather can only be located across the entire money array.

The quest for social status is usually considered one of the main drivers of the demand for consumer credit. This article provides a nuanced take on consumer credit by exploring the interaction between consumption, borrowing, and class identity. To do so I pursue a cultural class analysis inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Drawing from 26 semi-structured interviews, the article has two main findings. First, it shows that people engage in borrowing not only to gain prestige, but also to assert their belongingness to symbolic groups, which embody the values of imagined communities. Second, against the idea that borrowing is undertaken mainly for conspicuous consumption, the article's findings show that middle-income families in Chile borrow to consume ‘ordinary’ goods. Through the consumption of these goods, the Chilean middle classes seek to stabilize their class identities through their life trajectories, thereby achieving a sense of place in a changing environment. These findings lead me to focus on the normalization of credit and the process through which borrowing practices turn consumer goods from wants into needs, ratcheting up the demand for credit. The article argues that this is an overlooked way in which competitive dynamics drive the demand for credit, which is a missing link in the explanation for the rise of household debt.

European financial regulation consistently gives governments privileged access to private investors, reflecting the anchor role assigned to sovereign securities as safe and liquid assets for the financial system. Legislative reforms after the financial crisis of 2008 further expanded the preferential treatment of sovereign securities as zero-risk claims, introduced portfolio requirements in favour of public debt, and constrained market speculation against governments. These sovereign privileges appear counterproductive for fiscal discipline and financial stability: they encourage excessive public debt issuance and make financial institutions holding government bonds - in particular from euro area countries with a variable risk profile - vulnerable to fiscal turbulence. Governments seem to have a conflict of interest. On the one hand, they are prudential regulators of financial risk-taking, on the other hand, they tend to overlook the financial sector's exposure to sovereign risk. This article considers four theories of the state-finance nexus and their solutions to this conflict of interest. The money view, the franchise view, and the modern financial repression view draw on the state's monetary and regulatory powers over finance to confirm sovereign safety. Their positions fundamentally contrast with the neoliberal view, which relies on free markets to enforce sustainable public finances. The article concludes that sovereign privileges present a fundamental dilemma for European financial governance with a neoliberal orientation: they oblige private investors to hold public debt, while weakening the role of markets in promoting fiscal discipline as the very foundation of sovereign safety.