The outbreak of the full-scale Russia–Ukraine war in February 2022 has brought the spotlight into the post-Soviet space (Kluczewska and Silvan Reference Kluczewska and Silvan2024) at a time when scholars of international security have been preoccupied with more trendy issues such as the Indo-Pacific. Among the post-Soviet states, Moldova presents a compelling case, as its foreign policy trajectory – from initial membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to signing an association agreement with the European Union (EU) in 2014, followed by EU candidate status in 2022 – reflects a decisive process of reorientation from Russia towards the West, primarily the EU, under the conditions of a tense and volatile regional geopolitical landscape.
What makes Moldova especially noteworthy, however, is the paradoxical coexistence of two seemingly ambivalent political dynamics since its independence. On the one hand, it has grappled with the as-yet unresolved problem of Transnistria, in which Russia has played a decisive role. On the other hand, since Moldova’s first post-independence parliamentary election in 1994, pro-Russian forces advocating for closer ties with Moscow and even the reunification of Moldova and Russia have remained an influential and persistent political faction, leading to a deepening cleavage between the country’s pro-European and pro-Russian camps. This unique political configuration, combined with Moldova’s frontline position in the geopolitical confrontation between the EU and Russia, make it a critical case study.
Despite receiving insufficient scholarly attention, the political polarization caused by the two-party divide within the country has been evident since the early 2010s. This polarization intensified further as one of the consequences of the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea (Quinlan Reference Quinlan2020) and was allegedly exploited by the Russian disinformation campaign (McGlynn et al. Reference McGlynn, Cenusa, Kravets, Beseler, Toepfl and Ryzhova2024). At the same time, following deteriorating EU–Russia relations and deepening disagreements in terms of foreign-policy orientation between the pro-European and pro-Russian camps, Moldovan voters participating in elections increasingly align their votes with the geopolitical stance of the party they endorse (Torres-Adán Reference Torres-Adán2021). It is certain that, as the external geopolitical environment surrounding Moldova has evolved, Moldovans have generally become more pro-European, reflecting and mirroring the country’s current geopolitical preference at the national level (Cenusa Reference Cenusa2023; Simionov Reference Simionov2023). Not only has this trend undoubtedly intensified the degree of political uncertainty in terms of relations between pro-European and pro-Russian political forces in Moldova, it has also revealed the necessity of understanding the geopolitical preferences of Moldovan political parties – particularly parliamentary ones – in an era of geopolitical transition.
To what extent is the framing of Moldovan political parties as either ‘pro-EU’ or ‘pro-Russia’ an accurate reflection of their motivations and platforms? Or is this just a simplification imposed by the country’s geopolitical context? Furthermore, does prioritizing geopolitical factors as the primary driver of Moldovan domestic politics obscure other significant influences on party ideologies and behaviour? This article delves into Moldovan domestic politics to examine how the geopolitical preferences of the major political parties in this post-Soviet country have evolved and to analyse what impact, if any, this geopolitical contestation of political parties has on Moldovan politics and foreign strategy. In this regard, the article also pays special attention to such issues as Moldovan parties’ perceptions of Russia and the nature of pro-Russian parties in Moldova.
Focusing on the Moldovan case and considering both the country’s location and evolving external geopolitical environment over the last two decades, this research argues that the geopolitical codes of Moldovan parties from 2001 to 2024 have not been fixed all of the time, as they have undoubtedly been affected by the transitioning geopolitical environment facing the country. It finds a persistent fluidity in party alignments vis-à-vis Russia, nuanced ideological distinctions within pro-Russian factions, and adaptive geopolitical codes that reflect both national strategic priorities and transnational pressures. It mainly contends that while geopolitics plays a significant role in shaping interactions among Moldova’s major political parties, it is neither the sole nor dominant factor influencing their dynamics. Other critical elements, such as electoral competition, anti-corruption and anti-oligarchy initiatives, as well as ideological differences, also play substantial roles in determining inter-party relations. These multifaceted factors collectively influence the internal politics of Moldova’s multi-party system, ultimately shaping the government’s geopolitical preferences and foreign policy decisions.
To operationalize parties’ geopolitical preferences, the research employs the concept of geopolitical code. This is defined as a framework of geopolitical orientations constructed by a country to help it position itself within the global environment and to design and develop related strategies in order to maintain or deepen its geopolitical position (Flint and Taylor Reference Flint and Taylor2018). In this research, the concept of geopolitical code, which can be particularly useful as an analytical tool to observe, analyse and summarize the rationale behind key foreign policies and their propositions, is further modified to be applicable not only to states but also to other political actors such as political parties. Methodologically, our research narrows down to study the geopolitical codes of the main parliamentary parties in Moldova. After separating these parties according to their publicly announced geopolitical stances, we analyse 31 accessible party electoral programmes for all the parliamentary and direct presidential elections in Moldova from 2001 to 2024. By employing content analysis, the article discovers patterns of change and continuity in how these Moldovan parties frame their geopolitical stances over time. The topics of each party group’s perceptions of Russia – derived from the correspondingly coded content in their respective electoral programmes – are also analysed.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the research background, providing some historical context, drawing on the existing literature in relation to Moldova’s electoral and party politics and pro-Russian parties in the country, and elucidating the research gaps. After this, we introduce the theoretical lens, operationalizing the concept of geopolitical code in the Moldovan context. The section which follows advances the research design and analytical framework by delineating the methodological architecture and specifying our case selection, data sources and analytical approaches to interrogate the research questions. We next synthesize the empirical findings through a systematic analysis to interpret patterns of geopolitical alignment and party behaviour before moving on to discuss the impact of competing geopolitical orientations on real Moldovan politics. The last section summarizes the key insights derived from our findings and concludes the research with an emphasis on the potential value and contribution of this research.
The party political landscape in post-soviet Moldova
To develop an analysis about the domestic politics of geopolitical preferences in Moldova, it is essential to understand how the country’s party politics and elections function at the national level. Established as a parliamentary republic in 2000, Moldova holds regular parliamentary elections in which eligible citizens vote for parties, electoral blocs or independent candidates, determining the composition of the national legislature. It employs proportional representation, with one of the highest electoral thresholds: historically set at 6% (Brett and Knott Reference Brett and Knott2015), the current thresholds are 5% for individual parties, 7% for electoral blocs, and 2% for independent candidates, according to the existing electoral legislation. Such a high threshold has effectively limited parliamentary fragmentation by reducing the number of political groups. In addition, since 2016, Moldova has also held direct nationwide presidential elections. Although the president largely plays a ceremonial role, recent officeholders have actively participated in many multilateral events and diplomatic occasions at the international level.
Considering Moldova’s political history since its independence in 1992 following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the country’s party political set-up has undergone significant structural change over less than four decades, indicating a cyclical pattern.Footnote 1 Following Moldova’s successful transition to a parliamentary republic, the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), widely identified as a pro-Russian party, held an absolute parliamentary majority from the 2001 election until April 2009. However, a series of protests which questioned and challenged the PCRM’s third consecutive absolute majority, and the subsequent political instability, led to the party losing its majority in the July 2009 snap election, the collapse of the communist government and the formation of a new pro-European coalition government. No other party won an absolute majority in parliament for more than a decade, until 2021, when this was achieved by the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS). These developments were also driven by internal power changes and shifts within both the pro-Russian and pro-European camps. The divisions and polarization have also affected Moldovans living outside Moldova in the EU and Russia, despite suggestions that Moldovans are becoming less interested in their country’s electoral process (Macuhin Reference Macuhin2021).
Following the PCRM’s loss of its absolute parliamentary majority in 2009, two additional pro-Russian parties, the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM; Quinlan Reference Quinlan2020) and the ȘOR Party (now banned and largely succeeded by the electoral bloc ‘Victory’), have also won votes at elections and gained parliamentary representation. The persistent and wide-scale existence of pro-Russian parties throughout Moldova’s post-independence history, primarily represented by the PCRM, demonstrates the continuous and stable support they have gained from the public. While political diversity and pluralism are to be expected in countries with an effective parliamentary democratic system like Moldova, having such wide-scale pro-Russian representation and such a degree of political division and polarization is exceptional, revealing a notable gap between Moldova’s predominantly pro-European trajectory, under the current PAS-led government, and the persistent geopolitical preferences of parties with a pro-Russian orientation.
Existing scholarship has analysed the pro-Russian parties in Moldova. For example, Vincent Henry and Julien Danero Iglesias (Reference Henry, Iglesias, Escalona, Keith and March2023) attribute the existence of these parties to a loss of confidence in Moldova’s rapprochement with the EU and nostalgia for the Soviet era after people witnessed the country’s failed liberal democratization, which has particularly been true for the radical-left PCRM and PSRM in recent times. Lisa Gohlke (Reference Gohlke and Ilovan2021) also mentioned that Moldovenism – an ideological framework that emphasizes the ethnic and linguistic identity of Moldova as distinct from that of Romania – has been promoted by at least some pro-Russian parties. Arūnas Molis and Irina Jardan (Reference Molis and Jardan2023) focus their analysis on the close religious, cultural and even political ties between these pro-Russian parties and the Moldovan Orthodox Church (MOC), as most Moldovans follow the Christian Orthodox religion. Indeed, Gohlke (Reference Gohlke2022) points out that the MOC has played a core role in promoting the Moldovenist doctrine.
In terms of relations between pro-Russian parties in Moldova and Russia itself, it appears that they receive mixed support from Russia. The fact is that Russia still holds the two regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia, which gives it a strategic advantage over Moldova (Goltsov Reference Goltsov2020), and the security situation facing Moldova has also become much more serious under the administration of its pro-European government following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in 2022 (Solik and Graf Reference Solik and Graf2023). Among the three pro-Russian parliamentary parties, the PSRM and the ȘOR Party have had close ties with Russia, with the PSRM receiving diverse forms of aid and even consultants from Russia (Molis and Jardan Reference Molis and Jardan2023).
On the other hand, at least some of these parties have seemingly tried to reach a certain level of strategic autonomy. For example, the PCRM ‘signalled a shift away from Russia’ and moved closer towards the EU at one point during its governing era, causing doubt about its pro-Russia ‘purity’. Already in 2004, Paul D. Quinlan (Reference Quinlan2004) pointed out that the PCRM’s attitude towards Russia had not been fixed. Instead, it had employed a very pragmatic style. Its interactions with Russia and the EU had just been a strategy in order to get the best political benefits and interests for the country, the party and its leader. Such a pragmatic stance at the time has also been confirmed by William Crowther (Reference Crowther2007) and Jussi Lassila and Ryhor Nizhnikau (Reference Lassila and Nizhnikau2023), mostly driven by the party’s desire to win elections. Tensions between the PCRM and the EU first arose due to the political conflict which followed the April 2009 election, emphasizing the assessment of the party’s stance as being essentially pragmatic and interest-oriented (Gabanyi Reference Gabanyi2009).
Therefore, the three parliamentary pro-Russian parties in Moldova cannot simply be viewed as ‘puppets’ or ‘satellites’ of Russia. Instead, they maintain their own cognitive frameworks through which they perceive Russia, the EU and other related geopolitical stakeholders from a Moldovan perspective. They also employ diverse economic and cultural strategies to implement their related policies and pursue their political objectives in accordance with their own geopolitical perspectives. In other words, in the Moldovan context, even parties generally and widely labelled as ‘pro-Russian’ also have their own geopolitical discretions, which mirror the cognitions and calculations of key geopolitical stakeholders interacting with Moldova, such as Russia and the EU. Such geopolitical preferences are not uniform, and there is significant incoherence and discrepancy even between parties categorized into the same group, as manifestations of their geopolitical preferences may evolve over time.
The existing research provides valuable reference points for establishing the research context, yet also reveals significant research gaps concerning Moldovan party politics. First, there is an urgent need for updated analyses of Moldovan parties that correspond to the rapidly evolving geopolitical environment surrounding the country. Second, current research related to the geopolitical preferences of Moldovan parties is still far from sufficient. Despite having been profoundly affected by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Moldova is not directly involved in the war and has only a small territory and population, thus marginalizing the country in terms of both scholarly and policy-oriented attention (Ceban Reference Ceban2022). To address these gaps, this research studies parliamentary politics in Moldova, with reference to the political parties’ geopolitical codes.
Domestic party politics through the lens of geopolitical code
Geopolitical code has been conceptualized as an analytical lens through which to operationalize a geopolitical agent’s strategic mindset and orientation (Flint and Noorali Reference Flint and Noorali2024; Flint and Taylor Reference Flint and Taylor2018). Indeed, there is already a great deal of work in the geopolitical literature which adopts this concept to study the foreign policy of various states, including Greece (Huliaras and Tsardanidis Reference Huliaras and Tsardanidis2006), the United States (US) from 1988 to 2008 (Flint et al. Reference Flint, Adduci, Chen and Chi2009), Kazakhstan (Ambrosio and William Reference Ambrosio and Lange2014), Poland between 1991 and 2011 (Macała Reference Macała2017), Italy (Varricchio Reference Varricchio2018), Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia (Just and Morgado Reference Just and Morgado2023), and China (Vidal Pérez Reference Vidal Pérez2024). Given their state-centric tendency, most of these studies focus on each country’s geopolitical code as expressed by state-level actors. For example, Colin Flint et al. (Reference Flint, Adduci, Chen and Chi2009) and Thomas Ambrosio and William A. Lange (Reference Ambrosio and Lange2014) examine the evolution of the geopolitical codes of the US and Kazakhstan by analysing the public speeches of the two countries’ presidents, respectively. Meanwhile, Jarosław Macała (Reference Macała2017) studied Poland’s geopolitical code by analysing the electoral programmes of major Polish political parties in the corresponding historical period, aiming to understand the country’s geopolitical code at the national level. Last but not least, the work by Giovanbattista Varricchio (Reference Varricchio2018) and Esteban Vidal Pérez (Reference Vidal Pérez2024) addresses their research puzzles by generating multiple types of data source, including those relating to sub-national actors.
For studies related to foreign policy and geopolitics, utilizing a geopolitical code approach has two advantages. One is that since the key term of this concept is ‘code’ instead of a more grandiose one like ‘strategy’, it makes the concept applicable not only to major powers and key geopolitical stakeholders but also to those seemingly less significant or largely domestic actors. The other is that, although the concept developed and evolved with states as its primary subjects, the prospect of taking non-state actors as subjects still exists (Flint and Noorali Reference Flint and Noorali2024), which makes it possible and indeed necessary to take political parties as the subjects and thus expand the approach’s analytical scope.
This research therefore contends that the concept of geopolitical code can be applied to domestic party politics – especially in liberal democracies, due to the more autonomous political agency of political parties in these countries. Parties’ geopolitical codes can mainly be captured and then interpreted by each party’s expressions and statements, which indicate their particular interpretations and ways of defining the key external and regional geopolitical stakeholders of concern to them. These codes manifest in parties’ official documents in various forms, such as policy propositions and official declarations that collectively articulate a party’s means of addressing currently existing and potential allies, partners and enemies from an economic, political, territorial or cultural perspective. It should be noted that content indicating a party’s geopolitical codes in practice can be captured throughout a document, not just in the part related to geopolitics or foreign policy issues.
Scholarly attention must also be paid to context-specific issues, such as the prevailing political system. In the above-mentioned studies on the US and Kazakhstan, for example, the State of the Union speeches given by the two presidents were determined as the sole source of data in each case, because they were both presidential republics. Drawing on the data from the presidents – who were each simultaneously head of state and head of government – would therefore be sufficiently persuasive, especially once the authors focused on each country’s geopolitical code and foreign policy-making. Indeed, such an approach would be even more relevant in the Kazakh case, because Kazakhstan has been widely recognized as an authoritarian state and the president would be responsible for almost all policies at the national level, including foreign policy. This could therefore indicate a continuous, consistent and stable national geopolitical preference.
Currently, most countries covered in the relevant scholarly literature are either ‘great powers’ or ‘middle-power states’ when compared to Moldova in terms of national power status. This narrow empirical focus has constrained the theoretical applicability of geopolitical codes because it neglects typical cases like Moldova – a small but special country due to its location and surrounding geopolitical environment – and the value that studying its internal politics may bring. The current study addresses this identified gap.
Research design
Data selection
To study political parties’ geopolitical codes, this research mainly focuses on analysing the text and language used in these parties’ published documents. Specifically, it employs content analysis as the research method. The data source for this report comprises two streams. The first is a collection of electoral programmes of Moldovan parties participating in parliamentary elections from 2001 to 2021.Footnote 2 The second stream consists of the electoral programmes from the two popularly elected Moldovan presidents spanning three presidential terms in total, and their corresponding failed electoral rivals in every second round of the three presidential elections from 2016 to 2024. Taking advantage of both streams makes the research design as comprehensive as it can be.
All the documents have been collated from two online sources. One is ADEPT (www.e-democracy.md), which recorded the results of every parliamentary election in Moldova from 2001 to 2014 and almost all the parties’ electoral programmes from these elections. The fact that it is not the first time for this website to be used in an academic work increases its academic credibility (Popșoi Reference Popșoi2016). The second online source is ‘alegeri.md’, another informative and popular platform responsible for data collection work about presidential and parliamentary elections from 2016 to 2024, including parties’ electoral programmes.
Regarding the criteria for data selection, the research includes all Moldovan parties which gained parliamentary representation through the elections from 2001 to 2021 based on the following considerations. First, Moldova’s small population and area lead to a limitation both of the national parliament’s total number of seats and the number of elected parties, automatically reducing the number of selectable parties and therefore removing the need for advanced screening and selection procedures. Second, every party which has ever gained parliamentary representation will have had significant support from the Moldovan voters thanks to the high parliamentary electoral thresholds. Nevertheless, since the ȘOR Party’s only available programme in 2021 made no reference to geopolitical codes, this party is excluded from the analysis. In addition, the programmes of the three eligible presidential candidates were, respectively, included into the data collection for the PSRM and PAS once their political experiences had been examined.
We find different trajectories for each party group. Parties in the pro-Russia group demonstrate stable party composition mainly because of the parties’ stable electoral performance, while parties in the other group show a cyclical pattern, resulting in a big challenge for the work on periodization. To overcome this problem, there is no work on periodization for the pro-Russian parties; the findings for this group from 2001 to 2024 are all displayed in one table. For analysis purposes, the pro-European party group has been organized into three distinct periods based on the political trajectories of its major parties. Thereby, three subgroups are created: BeAB, BMD and PPCD from 2001 to 2005; the AMN, PDM, PL and PLDM from April 2009 to 2019; and ACUM and PAS from 2016 to 2024.Footnote 3 Such a design achieves the best balance between guaranteeing the consistency of the findings while at the same time maintaining their orderliness.
Coding scheme
The coding scheme of this research comprises three clusters – ‘Foreign Policy’, ‘Other Emphases’ and ‘Perceptions of Russia’. ‘Perceptions of Russia’ is the earliest determined cluster. It consists of three geopolitical codes – ‘Ally’, ‘Partner’ and ‘Threat and/or enemy’, representing three possible emotional cognitions of Russia and covering all forms of interaction with a country (a more detailed outline and sample content is provided in Appendix A in the Supplementary Material). Beyond their literal meanings, ‘Ally’ also includes content indicating propositions or actions to promote the status of the Russian language in Moldova. Conversely, ‘Threat and/or enemy’ is similarly applied to content supporting demotion of the Russian language or multitudinous forms of de-Russification. ‘Partner’ defines a party’s sentiments towards Russia as being neither favourable nor hostile, but normally willing to cooperate with Russia in many areas closely related to Moldova’s foreign affairs, or to directly establish ‘partnership relations’ with Russia; while acknowledging Moldova’s goal of interacting normally with Russia, such interaction does not reach the level of ‘Ally’.
In the ‘Foreign policy’ cluster (following some adjustments made during the provisional scanning process), the codes are ‘Pro-Europe’, ‘Euro-Atlanticism/pro-NATO’, ‘Neutrality’ and ‘Pro-US’ on the one side, and ‘Pro-Russia and/or Eurasia’ on the other. Among the codes in this cluster, ‘Pro-Europe’ not only comprises content that literally reflects a party’s positive stance towards the EU, but also includes content indicating a party’s policy propositions regarding active participation in pan-European projects or initiatives, the introduction of European standards into the country, and other forms of linkage or interaction with pan-European organizations. ‘Neutrality’ is constituted both by content related to the defence of Moldova’s constitutionally regulated permanent neutrality and content expressing a party’s willingness to establish friendly partnership relations with all key geopolitical powers and stakeholders. Additionally, content is coded as ‘Pro-US’ only if it positively mentions the US itself rather than other countries, regions or organizations in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Finally, the ‘Other emphases’ cluster is added in order to capture Moldova’s unique characteristics, and comprises four codes. The first is ‘Moldovenism’, which is determined in accordance with the literature review section. It only starts to work when matching content which emphasizes the defence of Moldova’s own national, cultural or linguistic identity as being distinct from that of Romania, or promotes the status of Orthodoxy in the country and enhancing relations with the MOC. Correspondingly, the code ‘Connection with Romania’ is added and includes content which perceives the nominal official language of Moldova as Romanian rather than ‘Moldovan’. To satisfy the need to code all the geopolitics-oriented content that cannot be coded using the aforementioned codes, another two – ‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Territorial integrity’ – are also added.
It needs to be emphasized that the codes in the three clusters are not mutually exclusive, as one form of content may satisfy the coding criteria of multiple codes, and one electoral programme may contain content involving mutually contradictory codes. Normally, content coded as ‘Pro-Russia and/or Eurasia’ would also be coded as ‘Ally’, except that such content merely indicates a party’s positive attitude towards other members of Eurasian integration organizations or similar mechanisms. Sample coded content for each code is provided in the Supplementary Material online to demonstrate the application of the coding scheme.
Analytical stepsFootnote 4
The analytical process is conducted in three stages. First, after separating the parties into the two groups and periodizing the pro-European ones, the percentage of each party’s coverage of the codes in each document are calculated and counted. This calculation is expected to show a positive correlation with political parties’ geopolitical preferences, as content satisfying the coding criteria and being coded already indicates a party’s subjective attitude and emotions instead of presenting an objective narrative concerning the issues. Therefore, these coverage percentages mirror the parties’ degree of emotion. Any significant change in the percentages would represent a valuable finding, and major changes in terms of new percentages appearing or old ones disappearing should be treated even more seriously. Once the results of the calculations are obtained, it is possible to analyse the relationship between noteworthy changes and any special performance derived from them, and thus the real development of Moldova’s political history can be discerned. Last but not least, each party’s programme content concerning their perceptions of Russia is further analysed.
Major findings
This section presents the major findings and corresponding analyses. The first two parts concentrate on the calculated coverage percentages of geopolitical codes for the parties in each group, alongside the dynamics of real-world politics. The third part presents the analysis concerning different parties’ perceptions of Russia in their electoral programmes.
Coverage percentages of geopolitical codes: pro-Russian parties
Prior to presenting the findings, it is necessary to construct the political context of the two primary pro-Russian parties, the PCRM and the PSRM, along with the electoral bloc they created known as ‘BECS’. Despite them both being founded and registered during the 1990s and both being classified as radical left, these parties had very different political trajectories before coming together to form BECS in 2021. The PCRM has a special status in the country’s political history, as it is the only party to date to have governed independently for eight years. The PSRM, in contrast, has only demonstrated any significant influence during the last 11 years, yet its power and popularity have increased very rapidly. The number of seats it gained surpassed that of the PCRM in 2014, which was also the year when it gained parliamentary representation through elections for the first time. It then became the leading power of the pro-Russian camp, which is manifested by the better electoral results it gained in the 2019 parliamentary election and the three direct presidential elections. Initially, these two parties were electoral rivals. The PSRM openly criticized the PCRM’s governance of Moldova in its 2014 electoral programme, claiming that the country’s power over the past 20 years (which included the period when the PCRM was in charge) ‘has been controlled by a group of oligarchs’. The PSRM consolidated its leading role in the pro-Russian camp through the 2019 election, in which the PCRM lost all its seats. The two parties formed an electoral bloc and jointly contested the election in 2021, but did not gain a satisfactory result. The future prospect of relations between the two parties still remains unclear.
After the manual scanning, the coverage percentages of these three political forces’ geopolitical codes from 2001 to 2024 are calculated and presented in Table 1. It should be clarified that only the socioeconomic part of the BECS 2021 electoral programme is publicly available, potentially limiting the calculation result. However, the PSRM’s 2020 programme, temporally proximate to the 2021 election, offers supplementary data for this period.
Coverage Percentages of Geopolitical Codes of Parties in the pro-Russian Group (2001–2024)
Notes: C = PCRM; S = PSRM; B = BECS; – = 0.
As core pro-Russian parties, the PCRM and the PSRM demonstrate consistent geopolitical and foreign policy orientations across their electoral programmes between 2001 and 2024. Neither of them have or had in the past any content elements which satisfy the coding criteria for the codes ‘Euro-Atlanticism/pro-NATO’, ‘Pro-US’ or ‘Connection with Romania’. Nor do they perceive or have ever perceived Russia as a threat or enemy, regardless of the evolution of EU-Russia relations or the geopolitical environment surrounding Moldova. Such consistency suggests the fundamental Russia-leaning foreign policy orientation of both parties.
The distinct historical trajectories of the two parties provide an ideal comparative context. As for the PCRM, the evolution of its geopolitical codes closely mirrors the country’s political development. Initially demonstrating a classic pro-Russian characteristic without having any pro-European or pro-Western elements prior to 2001, the party’s electoral programmes subsequently underwent a remarkable shift following deteriorating Moldova–Russia relations since 2003. The coverage percentage of its content elements coded as ‘Pro-Europe’ grew from nothing to reach a record high of 12.10% in its 2005 programme, and continued to play a leading role in its April 2009 programme. The party defined European integration as one of its four strategic priorities between 2005 and 2009, and expressed its willingness to integrate Moldova more firmly into pan-European economic, social and cultural projects in 2005.
Although the coverage percentage of its content elements coded as ‘Pro-Europe’ decreased after April 2009, the party demonstrated the motto ‘European Moldova’, using ambitious language and pragmatically expanding Moldova’s European integration agenda to include agriculture and industry as well. Meanwhile, its content perceiving Russia as an ally disappeared from the same 2005 and April 2009 programmes, and the content perceiving Russia as a ‘Partner’ also experienced a trajectory of decline over the four-year period. All these changes happened during the historical era in which Moldova was governed by the PCRM and had disputes with Russia with regards to Transnistria and trade. The situation started to fundamentally change in 2010, however, when the PCRM lost its status as governing party and tensions rose between it and the EU, which also corresponds with the findings of Anneli Ute Gabanyi (Reference Gabanyi2009) mentioned earlier.
The PSRM, on the other hand, has clearly had higher coverage percentages than the PCRM in terms of content elements coded as ‘Pro-Russia and/or Eurasia’, ‘Moldovenism’ and ‘Ally’ since 2014, when it first gained parliamentary representation through elections as an individual party, suggesting a deeper degree of Russia-leaning foreign policy orientation compared to the PCRM. Based on the fact that the PSRM has been the leading pro-Russian parliamentary party since 2014, it is plausible that general feelings of favourability, support and trust towards Russia among pro-Russian voters in Moldova have been significantly enhanced, which has contributed to – and can partially explain – the current situation of deep division and extreme polarization among the Moldovan electorate.
Nevertheless, the situation changed following the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war. Although research has shown that the PSRM received aid from Russia for several years (Molis and Jardan Reference Molis and Jardan2023), and suggests high levels of loyalty towards Russia following the party’s poor parliamentary and presidential performance caused by the nationwide shift to a pro-Europe geopolitical preference among the voting public (Simionov Reference Simionov2023), no content coded as ‘Pro-Russia and/or Eurasia’, ‘Moldovenism’, or perceiving Russia as an ally exists in its 2024 presidential electoral programme. Considering the party’s pragmatism and the fierce competition it experienced in the 2024 presidential election, these recent changes may be understood as a manifestation of its pragmatism and strategic adjustments driven by its most natural pursuit of winning elections. In a nutshell, the evolution of the PSRM’s geopolitical codes during the last 10 years demonstrates a higher level of consistency compared to that of the PCRM. It has never shifted its foreign policy orientation to being anti-Russia, but it has also acknowledged the objective possibility of Moldova joining the EU as a future prospect for the country.
Coverage percentages of geopolitical codes: BeAB and pro-European parties
Although this study separates the non-pro-Russian parties into three subgroups, the primary consideration for this move is to make the display of our findings as organized and orderly as possible. To guarantee a comprehensive analysis of the collective characteristics demonstrated by this party group, Tables 2–4 consolidate the analytical content together, detailing the coverage percentages of different parties’ geopolitical codes in the respective subgroups. This enables us to display of the findings systematically at the group level.
Coverage Percentages of Geopolitical Codes for BeAB, BMD and PPCD (2001–2005)
Note: – = 0.
Coverage Percentages of Geopolitical Codes for AMN, PDM, PL and PLDM (April 2009–2019)
Note: – = 0.
Coverage Percentages of Geopolitical Codes for PAS and ACUM (2016–2024)
Note: – = 0.
As can be seen from the findings presented in Tables 2–4, BeAB (the ‘Braghis Alliance’ Electoral Bloc) is the only political force that presents geopolitical neutrality and whose programmatic content satisfies the coding criteria for both the pro-Europe- and pro-Russia-oriented geopolitical codes. This party will therefore be analysed first.
BeAB’s 2001 programme articulated two geopolitical and foreign policy orientations. On the one hand, it advocated Moldova’s participation in European integration and enhancing the country’s relations with the US; on the other, it expressed the party’s intention to develop friendly cooperative relations with Russia and other CIS member states, particularly in terms of the economy, education and regional cooperation. Viewing Russia as a partner, it insisted that Moldova needed to cooperate with Russia to address the Transnistrian problem. Such geopolitical neutrality has been exceptional for parties since the 2005 election, the only other example being the PDM, which manifested a similar programme in 2010. Nevertheless, the PDM is still categorized as a pro-European party, based on the content of its subsequent electoral programmes.
Regarding the more typical pro-European parties, their codes suggest mirror image characteristics to their pro-Russian counterparts. Specifically speaking, none of them contain content coded as ‘Pro-Russia and/or Eurasia’ except in the aforementioned case of the PDM. As concerns the PDM, its content coded as ‘Pro-Russia and/or Eurasia’ in the 2010 programme emphasized the importance of Russia for developing Moldova’s rural economy and international trade in terms of agricultural products. Considering the preface to its party political programme, which blamed Moldova’s previous governing parties for Moldova’s ills and criticized their actions in choosing sides as being harmful for the country, along with the fact that it has gradually turned into a purely pro-European party, it is difficult to know whether this rhetoric revealed a genuine geopolitical neutrality or simply electoral pragmatism. A similar rhetorical strategy also appears in the ACUM’s 2019 programme, which likewise denounced previous governments formed of pro-Russian and/or pro-European parties. Furthermore, parties in this group uniformly lack any content coded as ‘Moldovenism’ or perceiving Russia as an ally.
Compared to the political forces in the pro-Russian group, parties in this group have more stable coverage percentages of their geopolitical codes, although subtle changes also emerge. Responding to the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, the currently governing PAS eliminated all content perceiving Russia as a partner, while reaching its highest coverage percentage for the code ‘Threat and/or enemy’, demonstrating both caution and hostility towards Russia in its 2024 programme. In addition, notable inter-party differences exist regarding parties’ attitudes towards NATO. Despite the pro-European parties’ uniformity in terms of their pro-Western foreign policy orientation, the degree to which they are willing to enhance Moldova’s relations with NATO varies, with some of them preferring to support defence of the country’s permanent neutrality, as guaranteed and regulated by the constitution.
Parties’ perceptions of Russia
Last but not least, it is essential to analyse both the pro-Russian and pro-European political forces’ perceptions of Russia. As indicated in the introduction, we are intrigued by a paradoxical issue in Moldovan politics: why does Moldova simultaneously grapple with concerns of territorial integrity connected to Russia and yet maintain a significant pro-Russian faction? This puzzle necessitates an examination of what defines these parties as ‘pro-Russia’ and the factors which contribute to this designation. Furthermore, given their alignment with Russia, it is illuminating to analyse how these parties’ perceptions of Russia have evolved over the past 24 years, highlighting any distinctive features in their cognitive framework. Concurrently, a parallel analysis of the pro-European factions is necessary to provide comparative insights, thereby offering a comprehensive understanding of these contrasting political orientations within Moldovan society.
Regarding the evolution of programmatic content, almost all the parties have changed their identifiable programme topics over the past 24 years, a characteristic similar to the coverage percentages of their geopolitical codes. Frequently changing before each election, these topics do not always appear just once. Some previously important fields of policy focus and goals may become essential again in later years. Examples include the pro-Russian group’s first-level topic ‘Language’, appearing in 2001 and 2020, or the pro-European group’s topic ‘Energy’, appearing in April 2009 and 2024. In addition, some of the topics identified may appear vague in meaning or inconsistent with a party’s ideological positioning; these are recorded and further examined to clarify their meanings in relation to the party’s geopolitical stance. For instance, the topic ‘Transnistrian conflict’ is recorded by the pro-Russian PSRM, but it actually means that the party considers settlement of the Transnistrian conflict to be an indispensable part of its policy goal of restoring a strategic partnership with Russia. This finding does not invalidate the parties’ previous categorization or the coverage percentages of their geopolitical codes; rather, it develops and intensifies them.
The analysis of the pro-European Moldovan parties’ ‘Partner’-coded content from 2009 to 2021 reveals consistent thematic priorities, emphasizing pragmatic, mutually beneficial relations with Russia rooted in shared interests. Key objectives include advocating for a peaceful resolution to the Transnistrian conflict with Russia’s constructive involvement and fostering economic cooperation – a theme which is also prominent in the pro-Russian parties’ ‘Ally’-coded content, though the latter envisions a deeper, multi-sectoral collaboration, reflecting their alignment with Russia as a strategic priority. In contrast, the pro-European parties’ ‘Threat/enemy’-coded content focuses on reorienting foreign policy towards Europe, demanding unconditional Russian military withdrawal from Transnistria, reducing energy dependence on Russia, and contesting the status of the Russian language in order to prioritize a Moldovan linguistic identity – a divisive issue which underscores the ideological rift between pro-European and pro-Russian factions. These distinctions highlight the divergent visions for Moldova’s geopolitical trajectory, balancing pragmatic engagement with aspirations for European integration.
The analysis of our findings demonstrates that Moldovan parties’ geopolitical preferences regarding Russia are not static, but rather adaptive to the specific context of Moldova. Importantly, prior to the 2022 Russia–Ukraine conflict, even pro-European parties did not hold uniformly negative perceptions of Russia, challenging the notion of automatic anti-Russian sentiment. This suggests that the full-scale conflict has had a profound impact on Moldovan domestic politics and the geopolitical orientations of its political parties. Furthermore, the existence of some degree of potential accommodation between the pro-European and pro-Russian factions prior to the conflict indicates that other factors beyond geopolitics – such as electoral interests – also contribute to the competitive dynamic observed between these groups.
Discussion: geopolitical dynamics in Moldovan party politics
Following an overview of the major parties’ evolving geopolitical preferences, this article analysed the geopolitical dynamics within Moldovan party politics. While Moldovan politics is often framed as primarily determined by alignment with either the EU or Russia, the diverse and sometimes fluid geopolitical orientations of the major parties suggest a more complex reality. This raises questions about how consensus-building can emerge when no single party holds an absolute majority, a particularly relevant concern given the fluctuating political alliances and occasional collaborations between parties with differing geopolitical orientations during the period under study. Therefore, this research asks: to what extent does geopolitics shape interactions between Moldova’s major political parties, and what other factors contribute to these dynamics? We will explore these questions through an analysis of two key episodes in Moldovan party politics.
The first one refers to the parliamentary elections of April 2009, which failed to produce a constitutional majority, with the then ruling PCRM party securing only 60 of 101 seats. These results were further complicated by allegations of electoral fraud and subsequent civil unrest, which included documented instances of widespread police brutality and significantly damaged the ruling party’s reputation (New York Times 2009a).
The subsequent parliamentary elections in July 2009 yielded a markedly different outcome. A key figure in the PCRM, along with several members, defected from the party and joined the PDM, which gained 13 seats compared to none in the previous election (New York Times 2009b). Speculation arose that PDM leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, previously associated with the grandson of the PCRM leader (who was also then president), orchestrated this shift. The PDM subsequently engaged in negotiations with both the PCRM and the parties forming the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) – a pattern which was repeated after the 2010 elections in an effort to consolidate power. While the AMN, PL, and PDLM included members strongly committed to European integration, these parties also contained individuals primarily motivated by political ambition, as evidenced by later defections to the PDM. The PDM itself appealed to a diverse electorate, including both Eurosceptics and those with nostalgic ties to the Soviet era who opposed the PCRM, positioning the party on the centre-left. Within the AIE, some members prioritized geopolitical interests, while others opportunistically aligned with the prevailing political momentum to gain power and advance their personal interests through the removal of the existing leadership.Footnote 5
In this example of cross-party consensus-building, the extent to which geopolitical considerations – specifically, a shared pro-European orientation – influenced the coalition-building process, beyond purely electoral interests, warrants further discussion. The formation of the AIE was not a spontaneous event, but rather developed in a context where the PCRM had maintained full control of the parliament, government and presidency (at that time elected by the parliament) for two consecutive terms, a period characterized by sustained public protests. Despite its origins as a strongly pro-Russian party, the PCRM ironically initiated steps to strengthen ties with the EU, notably by facilitating the Association Agreement.
Another notable example of party coalition-building dynamics involves the pro-European PAS, which formed a governing alliance with the pro-Russian PSRM in 2019 rather than the PDM, despite both being major pro-EU parties. Following the 2019 parliamentary elections, the PAS did not enter parliament as an independent entity, but rather as part of the ACUM electoral bloc, formed in alliance with the Party for Truth and Justice (DA). This bloc subsequently formed a governing coalition with the PSRM, with the stated aim of dismantling the perceived oligarchic regime of the PDM under the leadership of Vladimir Plahotniuc. Amid this political shift, there was an abundance of campaign rhetoric such as ‘de-oligarchization’, ‘anti-oligarchy’, ‘bringing the Republic of Moldova back on the path to normality’, and ‘restoring citizens’ trust’ (Ziarul Naţional Reference Ziarul Naţional2019).
However, shortly after the formation of the government with Maia Sandu as prime minister, the PSRM initiated a vote of no confidence, garnering support from other political parties. This move was widely perceived as a betrayal of the ACUM alliance and a return to corrupt practices, particularly due to collaboration with members of the ȘOR Party, who had previously been associated with Plahotniuc. The policies implemented by this temporary governing coalition proved unpopular with the electorate, ultimately leading to a decisive victory for the PAS in the subsequent election in July 2021 (Euractiv 2021). The PAS secured 52.8% of the vote and a parliamentary majority of 63 seats, establishing a situation comparable to that of the PCRM in 2001, where a single party controlled the parliament, government and presidency. The dramatic changes that occurred in this short period demonstrate how corruption can be a significant issue influencing the dynamics of party politics in this small, post-Soviet country.
This study thus reorients the analytical focus from a predominantly geopolitically driven understanding of Moldovan politics, and centres it instead on the dynamic interactions between major political parties as revealed through the detailed analysis. While existing analyses frequently categorize these parties along a pro-EU/pro-Russia axis – a dimension largely informed by Moldova’s geopolitical context – this framework risks oversimplification,Footnote 6 particularly given the current regional climate. Moldova, often overlooked as a small state, is frequently a priori assumed to have its domestic politics overwhelmingly determined by external geopolitical forces. This simplified understanding completely overlooks major domestic issues, such as the country’s various economic and social problems which are debated within Moldovan party politics (Ceban Reference Ceban2022).
Our research thus challenges the prevailing assumption that geopolitics is the primary driver of Moldovan party politics. While acknowledging the likely influence of geopolitical factors, we argue that their role has been overstated. A comprehensive understanding of Moldovan party politics requires consideration of domestic issues, economic factors, historical legacies and individual party agendas, in addition to EU/Russia alignment.
Conclusion
This study enhances our understanding of how Moldova’s internal party dynamics are influenced by its geopolitical environment. As a small state situated between the EU and Russia, Moldova is particularly vulnerable to external pressures, which play a crucial role in shaping its political landscape.
Through a systematic content analysis of electoral programmes from 2001 to 2024, we identified the specific policy positions and geopolitical narratives of major political parties in the country. Our findings demonstrate that Moldovan political parties have adapted their geopolitical codes in response to the evolving context, rather than adhering to fixed stances over the past two decades. While external actors such as Russia and the EU exert significant influence on Moldova’s domestic politics, it is essential to recognize that geopolitics is not the sole determinant of inter-party dynamics. Other critical factors include electoral competition, economic and social challenges, anti-corruption initiatives and ideological differences. These multifaceted elements collectively shape Moldova’s internal political environment, ultimately influencing the government’s geopolitical preferences and foreign policy decisions.
This research underscores the adaptability of political parties in peripheral post-Soviet states like Moldova and highlights the complex interplay of factors that define their political trajectories. By contextualizing these findings within broader geopolitical trends, the research contributes valuable insights into the dynamics of small-state politics in contested regions.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.10026
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback and Ziqing Yang for her helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
Data availability
The data are available upon request.
Financial support
This work was supported by the University of Macau under Grant MYRG-GRG2023-00017-FSS.
Disclosure statement
The authors report that there are no competing interests to declare. They acknowledge the use of <Gemma-3-27B> to proofread and improve the English language at the manuscript completion stage.
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