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3 - Corporate Regulation and Elite Interests in Nigeria during the Twenty-First Century

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2026

Oliver McPherson-Smith
Affiliation:
Adam Smith Institute, London
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Summary

This chapter applies the rent-conditional reform theory to the case of Nigeria across the first two decades of the twenty-first century. It illustrates how, under the banner of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Goodluck Jonathan’s government coupled company creation liberalization for would-be entrepreneurs with generous awards and support for strategically placed business magnates and interest groups. Once the price of oil began to fall, and the disintegration of the PDP’s elite coalition gathered pace, Jonathan’s government quickly jettisoned the reform initiative within the Corporate Affairs Commission to placate rapidly defecting business magnates. Following the election of Muhammadu Buhari, the business creation reform agenda was similarly manipulated to develop an alliance between his nascent government and the elite business class. Once that relationship was in place, and oil rents were recovering, generous privileges were once again afforded to key magnates, and corporate regulatory liberalization went into overdrive in 2016, culminating in 2020 with the reform of the thirty-year-old Companies and Allied Matters Act.

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