In the field of human rights law, the concept of personal scope plays a pivotal role in defining which subjects are recognised as rights holders. Within this framework, rights holders are not passive beneficiaries but active legal subjects capable of holding duty bearers accountable for human rights violations. This capacity underscores their essential role in ensuring the effective implementation of human rights. From a procedural standpoint, it is equally important to determine who may invoke the right to science before judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. Clarifying this point supports the realisation of the right and demonstrates the need for a nuanced understanding of personal scope in human rights law.
The treaty language of the right to science, as articulated in Art. 15(1) ICESCR, grants this right to ‘everyone’. Building on this inclusive formulation, this chapter identifies three principal categories of rights holders. The first includes private persons – both individual and collective rights holders. The second examines legal persons, such as organisations or institutions, as potential rights holders. The third category addresses future generations. Although future generations may technically fall under the broader category of private persons, they are discussed separately to underscore their emerging relevance and distinctive connection to the right to science.
To illustrate the breadth and diversity of those entitled to the right, this chapter provides concrete examples for each category. In doing so, it acknowledges that science operates as a complex ecosystem involving a range of shareholders and stakeholders, each with a specific role in its advancement and regulation. It also recognises that holders of the right to science may simultaneously assume the role of duty bearers, thereby reflecting the interdependent nature of modern human rights relationships.
6.1 Private Persons
The point of departure for the present analysis is the language of the treaty provision on the right to science. Art. 15(1) ICESCR extends this right to ‘everyone’. In its General Comment No. 21 on the right to participate in cultural life, the CESCR explained that the term ‘everyone’ in Art. 15(1) ICESCR refers to both individuals and collectives. More specifically, the Committee stated that ‘cultural rights may be exercised by a person (a) individually, (b) in association with others, or (c) within a community or group, as such’.Footnote 1 While the Committee did not delve into the specifics of rights holders in General Comment No. 25 on science and ESC rights, the interpretation of rights holders in General Comment No. 21 is equally relevant to the right to science. This relevance is grounded in the application of the term ‘everyone’ in Art. 15(1) ICESCR across all three of the rights that it enumerates: (a) to participate in cultural life, (b) to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications and (c) to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production that one authors. The individual and collective character of the right to science is further mentioned in the Venice Statement,Footnote 2 as well as in the UNESCO Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers.Footnote 3
Although human rights are constituted as individual rights in international human rights law, they can also be exercised in a collective context and thus have a collective dimension. For instance, the right to participate in cultural life in Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR, the right to freedom of assembly and association in Art. 21 and 22 ICCPR, and the right to education in Art. 13 and 14 ICESCR all exemplify individual rights with collective dimensions.Footnote 4 To date, the concept of collective rights and rights holders has been understood in different ways. Despite the recognition of collective rights in international human rights law, there are still unresolved doctrinal issues related to the object and subject of collective rights. The main questions in this debate are whether collective rights can or should be recognised as human rights, how collective and individual rights interact and how to define the holders of collective rights.Footnote 5 Furthermore, the notion of collective rights – and thus the question of who collective rights holders are – and related terminology have been inconsistently used in scholarship and practice. Given the breadth of this discourse and its treatment in other contexts, a detailed engagement with these debates exceeds the scope of the present study.Footnote 6 Accordingly, this book adopts the conceptual approach advanced by Donders, which offers a coherent and pragmatic framework suited to the present analysis.Footnote 7
Following the Committee’s interpretation of the term ‘everyone’, the analysis begins with an examination of individual rights holders under the right to science. These are broadly categorised into three overlapping groups: professionals, non-professionals and the general public. The analysis also considers individuals who may realise the right to science in association with others. In this context, a distinction is drawn between groups of individuals who share certain social characteristics or lifestyles and communal rights holders, where membership in a collective entity is explicitly referred to. The focus then moves from individual rights holders to community rights holders, who enjoy rights within a community rather than on an individual basis.
6.1.1 Individual Rights Holders
The recognition of individuals as rights holders is a common thread running through all United Nations human rights treaties, including the UDHR and the ICESCR. Art. 2 OP-ICESCR aligns with this perspective and states that communications may be submitted by or on behalf of individuals. When applied to the right to science, this raises important questions about who, specifically, qualifies as an individual rights holder. Is this right limited to scientists, narrowly defined as those working within the natural sciences? Does it extend to other researchers – such as those in the social sciences, humanities or interdisciplinary fields – whose work may not traditionally fall under the term ‘science’ in its strictest sense? And, crucially, can individuals outside the scientific community – that is, ‘everyone’ – also be recognised as rights holders under this right?
As highlighted in Chapter 3, the understanding of science within the framework of the right to science is broadly construed. The unifying feature across various definitions is that science, in the context of human rights, refers to any serious and deliberate effort to uncover truth, offering the most reliable statements currently possible within recognised knowledge systems. Accordingly, the scientific process is not confined to academic disciplines; it encompasses a wide array of knowledge systems, including citizen science, Indigenous knowledge and traditional knowledge. The emphasis, therefore, lies on the process rather than on disciplinary boundaries (see Section 3.2.2.3a).
In identifying rights holders under the right to science, it is essential to recognise that science operates within a distinct ecosystem. While the right is conferred upon ‘everyone’, an individual’s level of professionalism may affect their degree of access to scientific knowledge – though it does not determine their status as a rights holder. In principle, science should be universally accessible. Nonetheless, certain information – such as the formulation of biological weapons – must be legitimately restricted for public safety reasons. This nuanced conception of access is well articulated in a report on the right to science by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which frames access as ‘a fluid and bi-directional continuum of access, defined on one end as “access for public” and on the other as “access for scientists”’.Footnote 8 This continuum, paired with the broad conceptualisation of science, provides a useful analytical tool for identifying individual rights holders. As the AAAS report notes, an individual’s position along this continuum may shift depending on their social context, interests, capabilities and level of training.Footnote 9
6.1.1.1 Professionals
Professionals occupy a primary position among individual rights holders under the right to science. This reflects the provision’s inherent link to scientific pursuits. However, the scope of rights holders extends far beyond the archetypal image of scientists working in laboratories. It includes researchers and academics across all academic disciplines, embraces a comprehensive and inclusive understanding of the breadth of science and recognises the diverse nature of scientific inquiry and the wide array of individuals involved in its pursuit (see Section 3.2.2.3). This interpretation differs from the narrower interpretation found in the UNESCO Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers. The latter uses the term ‘scientific researchers’, which is defined as ‘those persons responsible for and engaged in research and development’.Footnote 10 Furthermore, the scope of science within the UNESCO Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers is limited to the natural and social sciences (see Section 3.2.2.1a).Footnote 11
Within the framework of the right to science, professionals are recognised as scientists, researchers and academics. Their designation depends on the nature of their work and their affiliation with particular institutions. The level of human rights protection afforded to professionals varies accordingly, with status and institutional context playing a decisive role. For example, an academic affiliated with a university, such as a tenured professor who is involved in ‘teaching, studying, researching, and working at an institution of higher education’,Footnote 12 typically enjoys the highest level of human rights protection through both scientific and academic freedom. According to UNESCO’s understanding, academics are ‘higher-education teaching personnel’, which ‘means all those persons in institutions or programmes of higher education who are engaged to teach and/or to undertake scholarship and/or to undertake research and/or to provide educational services to students or to the community at large’.Footnote 13 The Special Rapporteur on the promotion of freedom of opinion and expression defined academics as ‘members of academic communities (e.g., faculty, students, staff, scholars, administrators and community participants)’.Footnote 14
By contrast, researchers working at non-university research institutions are not entitled to academic freedom, which remains reserved for academics. Nonetheless, they still enjoy the right to scientific freedom. These institutions – whether public or private, for-profit or not – are often shaped by economic or industrial mandates, which may influence research agendas or limit independence in ways distinct from university contexts.
Further distinctions arise with primary and secondary school teachers. While essential to scientific literacy and education, these teachers do not typically engage in research and, in a strict sense, would not qualify as academics. Consequently, they would not fall within the scope of academic freedom.Footnote 15 However, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) outlined in General Comment No. 13 that ‘staff and students throughout the education sector are entitled to academic freedom’.Footnote 16 The Committee’s broad understanding of the personal scope is commendable, as it recognises that teachers can be threatened and persecuted simply for teaching and imparting scientific knowledge (e.g. a teacher who instructs girls in Afghanistan, where girls are not allowed to attend school).
Lastly, the term ‘academic’ warrants clarification due to its divergent meanings across languages. In English-speaking contexts, it typically refers to someone who teaches and conducts research at a university. However, in languages such as Danish (akademiker), Dutch (academicus) or German (Akademiker or Akademikerin), the term refers more generally to a person who holds a university or college degree – similar to the English term ‘graduate’. As such, in the context of the right to science, academic freedom should be understood as applying specifically to those engaged in teaching and research at institutions of higher education, consistent with the English understanding of ‘academic’ and not to all degree holders, as might be inferred in the other linguistic contexts.Footnote 17
6.1.1.2 Non-Professionals
The right to science encompasses not only professionals but also non-professionals. As noted by the CESCR, ‘doing science does not only concern scientific professionals but also includes ‘citizen science’ (ordinary people doing science)’.Footnote 18 The Committee’s understanding of non-professionals who participate in scientific inquiry also extends to, for example, indigenous persons or citizen scientists.Footnote 19 Indeed, the active participation and unique contributions of non-professionals are integral to the broader community of knowledge, which aligns with a comprehensive and holistic view of science (see Sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3). Given that their contributions substantially enhance communities of knowledge, which are safeguarded by the right to science, these contributors should be acknowledged as rights holders within the scope of this right. It should also be mentioned that indigenous persons enjoy the right to science as community rights holders (see Section 6.1.2).
6.1.1.3 The Public
As suggested by the term ‘everyone’, any individual should be considered a rights holder, regardless of their capacity to contribute to scientific inquiry. This includes members of the public, who may not fall into professional or non-professional categories. Against this backdrop, the Committee emphasised the universal nature of the right to science and cautioned against a binary approach to participation in science that exclusively reserves active contribution for scientists and relegates laypersons to passive beneficiaries of scientific progress. This perspective is underlined by a systematic and teleological interpretation of the right to science.Footnote 20 The initial discussions, as revealed in the travaux préparatoires, explored the terms ‘participate’ and ‘share’ before the phrase ‘enjoy the benefits’ was selected. This word choice reflects a consensus that participation implies a more active and elitist role of rights holders; thus, the decision was made to use ‘enjoy the benefits’ to underscore that active professional or non-professional engagement is not a prerequisite for being a rights holder under the right to science.Footnote 21 Consequently, it can be inferred that the term ‘everyone’ in the context of the right to science truly means that every individual has the right to participate in and benefit from science, which affirms the inclusivity and universality of this right.
6.1.1.4 Groups of Individuals
While rights are experienced on an individual basis, the fact that individuals are part of specific groups – such as women, children, persons with disabilities, LGBTQIA+ individuals or members of particular social classes – warrants specialised consideration. In this context, the term ‘groups’ denotes individuals who might encounter disadvantages that stem from shared social characteristics or lifestyles. It is essential to differentiate these groups of individuals from communal rights holders, as discussed in Section 6.1.1.5.Footnote 22
By virtue of their group association, groups of individuals may be particularly susceptible to human rights infringements and may thus require targeted measures to ensure protection against discrimination. The Committee acknowledged this in General Comment No. 25 on science and ESC rights, which lists women; persons with disabilities; indigenous persons; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals; and those living in poverty (among others) as groups that warrant special protection.Footnote 23 For example, children require a distinct form of protection under the right to science. This protection can take various forms, one of which is the provision of quality education that explicitly respects and promotes the child’s right to science. A key component of this could be the integration of compulsory digital literacy education, including instruction on artificial intelligence, within the school curriculum to bolster digital literacy (see Section 5.4.1.1e).Footnote 24
6.1.1.5 Communal Rights Holders
Human rights can also be enjoyed within the context of a collective entity, which positions individuals as communal rights holders. This dual aspect highlights the nuanced nature of rights; it allows for their individual exercise while also recognising their communal dimension.Footnote 25 Individuals who are communal rights holders experience human rights as part of a collective, often with an explicit acknowledgement of their membership within this collective. An example of communal rights is the rights of minorities, which are to be enjoyed ‘in community with the other members of their group’ (Art. 27 ICCPR), or the right of a child to enjoy their culture individually or in community with other members of their group (Art. 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)).Footnote 26
In summary, the right to science can be enjoyed by ‘everyone’, which in the Committee’s understanding also means that it can be enjoyed in association with others.Footnote 27 However, communal rights holders of the right to science are not defined in General Comment No. 25 on science and ESC rights. Therefore, the question arises of whether scientific circles themselves could be considered communal rights holders under the right to science. The determination is nuanced, given that the provision on the right to science does not explicitly articulate its communal dimension in the same way as other rights, such as those guaranteed to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities under Art. 27 ICCPR or Art. 30 CRC.
Despite the lack of explicit acknowledgement of a communal dimension within Art. 15 ICESCR, the call for states to foster international contacts and cooperation in the scientific field, as outlined in Art. 15(4) ICESCR, suggests an implicit recognition of the communal nature of scientific endeavour. Science and its applications inherently depend on collaborative interactions between individuals within a collective framework. Therefore, it can be argued that communal rights holders indeed exist under the right to science. Specifically, while scientific communities are comprised of individuals who independently work to advance science and technology, they are engaged in collective interactions that are essential for the full realisation of the right to science and the overall advancement of scientific knowledge.
6.1.2 Community Rights Holders
As the discourse on human rights increasingly incorporates its collective dimension, community rights holders assume a distinct and significant role. They exercise their rights not merely as individuals within a group, but as collective entities – such as peoples or communities – whose identity is central to the rights in question. This is clearly reflected in Art. 1 of both the ICESCR and the ICCPR, which enshrine the right of peoples to self-determination.Footnote 28 Unlike communal rights holders, who may experience rights both individually and in association with others, community rights holders are the communities themselves, acting as legal subjects in their own right, rather than the individuals or sub-groups within them.Footnote 29
To date, a precise legal definition of community rights holders remains elusive.Footnote 30 Communities are often characterised by what may be termed a timeless existence, marked by a substantive connection that extends beyond the pursuit of shared objectives – setting them apart from legally constituted entities. For a group to qualify as a community rights holder, it must possess a collective identity grounded in more than common interests; it must embody a persistent and cohesive social or cultural connection. This connection is typically rooted in shared values, beliefs, practices and historical continuity. It is this depth of collective identity that distinguishes such communities from broader social groupings – such as women or persons with disabilities – who, while sharing aspects of lived experience or social status, do not necessarily share a unified cultural narrative or common historical lineage.Footnote 31
Potential subjects of collective rights include peoples, indigenous peoples, minorities or other communities unified by race, ethnicity, religion, culture, language or history.Footnote 32 For example, indigenous peoples may be community rights holders under the right to science and enjoy various community rights, especially under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).Footnote 33 One right in the UNDRIP that is particularly relevant in the context of the right to science is the right to maintain, control, protect and develop traditional knowledge and manifestations of sciences and technologies, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines and the properties of fauna and flora (see Section 3.2.2.3c). Indigenous peoples also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such traditional knowledge (Art. 31 of the UNDRIP).Footnote 34
Given the emphasis in international law on the preservation of collective identity through a sustained social or cultural bond based on shared values, beliefs and history, the scientific community may not typically qualify as a community rights holder in the conventional sense. Its structure and identity differ markedly from those communities traditionally recognised in human rights frameworks.
Nonetheless, the notion of the scientific community as a potential community rights holder under the right to science warrants further examination. While it may not be grounded in shared ethnicity, language or historical continuity, the scientific community possesses a distinct epistemic identity. It is characterised by shared norms and values such as a commitment to scientific integrity, methodological rigour and the peer review process, alongside a collective orientation toward the pursuit of truth. These features establish a form of solidarity that may be said to constitute a collective identity.
That said, the primary unifying element within the scientific community remains a shared objective – the advancement of scientific knowledge – rather than the deeper cultural, social or historical ties that typically underpin the legal recognition of community rights. Moreover, the internal diversity of the scientific community, comprising varied disciplines and knowledge traditions, may appear to challenge the existence of a sufficiently ‘substantive connection’. This diversity, however, could potentially enrich collective identity by promoting a comprehensive perspective on scientific inquiry and collaboration. Thus, it could be argued that the scientific community is unified not only by a common goal – the pursuit of truth – but also by its social and cultural connections, which are anchored in the scientific process and integrity.
Still, the question remains whether it is necessary – legally or conceptually – to categorise the scientific community as a community rights holder under the right to science. Rights under the right to science do not specifically require a community framework for their enjoyment. Moreover, from a procedural standpoint, community rights holders do not possess legal standing in individual complaint procedures before the CESCR (Art. 2 OP-ICESCR) and HRC (Art. 1 OP‑ICCPR)Footnote 35 despite their recognition in international human rights law. In such cases, claims must instead be brought by individuals acting on behalf of the community.Footnote 36
This procedural limitation does not negate the existence of community rights, nor does it preclude their recognition. Rather, it reflects the structural emphasis of current treaty mechanisms on individual rights holders.Footnote 37 The inability of communities to have standing before individual communications procedures underscores this orientation. Nevertheless, individuals – such as tribal leaders or designated representatives – may still bring claims that reflect or advocate for community interests.Footnote 38 Thus, while the scientific community may not presently fit within the established category of community rights holders for procedural purposes, its unique characteristics and collective dimension merit continued conceptual exploration.
6.2 Legal Persons
Legal persons, distinct from natural persons, may also enjoy human rights – either as individual rights holders or, in certain cases, as community rights holders. Examples include civil society organisations such as NGOsFootnote 39 or trade unions. The distinction between legal persons and communities is rooted in the organisational structure and purpose of legal persons, which are collective entities that pursue a common purpose and have a membership based on voluntary commitment. By contrast, communities are defined by a timeless existence and a substantive collective identity, as discussed in Section 6.1.2. This identity is characterised by a sustained social or cultural bond and underpinned by shared values, beliefs and history (see Section 6.1.2). Legal persons, on the other hand, only acquire legal status through intentional establishment and are guided by specific criteria that clarify and define their existence and operation within the legal framework.
An example of legal persons in human rights law is the right of trade unions to operate freely, as specified in Art. 8(1)(c) ICESCR, in which the rights holder is considered a legal person rather than merely an aggregation of individuals. It should also be highlighted that legal persons do not enjoy human rights per se; they are only entitled to the rights of their members, who are natural persons. Therefore, legal persons cannot directly enjoy human rights; rather, their members enjoy human rights within the legal person. Of course, a legal person can, under different legal regimes such as trade or investment law, hold certain rights, but they are not holders of human rights under the ICESCR and the ICCPR, which are the focus of this analysis.Footnote 40
Although legal persons are not holders of human rights per se, they may bring individual communications before the Committee, acting through their members, which enjoy standing. Therefore, legal persons can act in the interests of their individual members, the natural persons who are the human rights holders. In other words, legal persons can lodge a complaint over a possible violation of the individuals who constitute their members, according to Art. 2 OP-ICESCR.
Within the context of the right to science, various stakeholders in the science ecosystem are defined as legal persons; they encompass both state and non-state actors. State actors include universities, research institutions and funding agencies, whereas non-state actors encompass business entities, publishers or private funding agencies. Notably, these legal entities may also be duty bearers under the right to science (see Chapter 7). For example, universities – often described as the ‘conscience and critic[s] of society’ – play a pivotal role in fostering free and impartial scientific inquiry. To preserve this role, it is essential that their members enjoy academic freedom. The continuous process of inquiry and exploration hinges on the institutional autonomy of universities, which must remain insulated from external pressures, including commercial interests or state-driven industrial policies. Allowing such influences to interfere risks compromising their integrity and undermining their core commitment to the pursuit of unbiased knowledge.Footnote 41
From the perspective of rights holders, it is essential to identify the specific legal entity with which an individual is affiliated, as this affiliation significantly influences both the scope of rights to which the individual is entitled and the degree of protection afforded. For instance, academics – such as tenured professors – typically benefit from enhanced safeguards through the right to academic freedom. By contrast, scientists and researchers working within non-university institutions are generally protected under the broader framework of scientific freedom, which, while overlapping with academic freedom in certain respects, may not offer the same level of institutional protection or autonomy (see Section 5.4.3.1).
6.3 Future Generations
The recognition of future generations as rights holders has gained increasing prominence in international law, particularly in relation to the climate change. This development reflects a growing awareness that present-day actions – or inaction – have consequences that extend far beyond the current generation.Footnote 42 The challenges posed by climate change, in particular, illustrate the dual nature of many global issues: they are both intragenerational, affecting people today, and intergenerational, shaping the lives and well-being of those yet to be born. As such, the interests and rights of future generations have become a compelling normative and legal concern, warranting their inclusion in discussions on the scope of the right to science.Footnote 43
The human rights of future generations may be threatened both directly and indirectly. Direct risks involve the violation of fundamental human rights, including the right to life, health and an adequate standard of living. At the same time, protecting future generations from direct risks could infringe on the autonomy and reproductive rights of individuals today, which requires a careful balancing of interests. Indirect risks stem from the repercussions of today’s policy decisions, such as those that target climate change mitigation and adaptation, the ethics and regulation of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity or genetic engineering.Footnote 44
However, addressing future generations as rights holders within the framework of international human rights law, particularly the right to science, is both complex and crucial. Although it is evident that future generations have much to lose, their position as rights holders in international human rights law remains a subject of debate. Academic discourse on this issue is diverse and spans various theoretical and philosophical frameworks, indigenous knowledge systems and ethical principles. Such perspectives have persuasively argued for a broadening of states’ obligations under human rights law to encompass considerations that affect future generations. The current overview is far from comprehensive, as the nuanced exploration of future generations as rights holders is a complex subject that exceeds the scope of this book.Footnote 45 However, since future generations will inevitably inherit the positive or negative outcomes of current scientific and technological advancements, it is relevant to briefly explore their status as potential rights holders under the right to science.
Although future generations have not yet been formally recognised as rights holders in human rights law, the responsibilities owed by present generations to their successors have been acknowledged in various international documents.Footnote 46 In the latter, future generations are broadly regarded as beneficiaries of human rights. One document that specifically mentions the implications of science and technology for future generations is the 1997 UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations. The Declaration states that present generations ‘have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human activity … and that scientific and technological progress in all fields does not harm life on Earth’.Footnote 47 Furthermore, in the context of the human genome and biodiversity, the Declaration outlines that ‘[s]cientific and technological progress should not in any way impair or compromise the preservation of the human and other species’.Footnote 48
In a significant milestone, legal experts initiated a comprehensive review of existing human rights laws by examining the extent to which people today are responsible for the well-being of future generations. This review culminated in the creation of the Maastricht Principles on the Human Rights of Future Generations, a legal framework supported by nearly sixty experts in human rights (law).Footnote 49 Introduced for consideration within the UN Human Rights Council, these principles were officially unveiled at the UNGA in 2023. They serve to elucidate and solidify current international law and illustrate its relevance to future generations. Most importantly, the Maastricht Principles are built on the legal architecture that has evolved since the adoption of UDHR.Footnote 50
The Maastricht Principles further elaborate on the ways in which legal systems are responsible for safeguarding all human rights for future generations across diverse contexts. Initially, they asserted that human rights do not impose any temporal limitations on the enjoyment of human rights. The global set of human rights norms recognises the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all human family members, present and future, regardless of when they are born. Given that equality and non-discrimination are cornerstone tenets of human rights law, it follows that the rights of future generations should be recognised and preserved.Footnote 51
The Maastricht Principles define future generations as ‘those generations that do not yet exist but will exist and who will inherit the Earth. Future generations include persons, groups, and peoples’.Footnote 52 This wording explicitly states that children who are alive today are not counted among future generations. Moreover, the Maastricht Principles stipulate that future generations are entitled to human rights at both the individual and collective levels. Thus, intergenerational justice has both individual and collective dimensions.Footnote 53 Consequently, those who are charged with upholding human rights are mandated to employ preventive and precautionary strategies to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of yet-to-be-born generations.Footnote 54 While the Maastricht Principles do not provide a definitive answer about the legal status of future generations as rights holders, they unambiguously establish the responsibility of current generations to act responsibly towards those who will inherit the Earth.Footnote 55
In summary, the Maastricht Principles make clear that future generations are beneficiaries of human rights in a broad sense, as they possess both individual and collective human rights, which present generations have a responsibility to protect. Existing international documents, such as the 1997 UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations, also recognise the responsibilities of present generations, particularly in relation to the impact of science and technology on those yet to be born. Interestingly, while the UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations solely focuses on the prevention of risks posed by science,Footnote 56 the Maastricht Principles adopt a more positive view of science and technology. The guidelines consider the need to provide and disseminate the benefits of science, such as technological developments and scientific research, which could have a significant impact on the well-being of future generations.Footnote 57 The discussion on future generations highlights the essential balance required by the right to science: not only mitigating the potential risks of scientific progress and its applications but also actively anticipating and leveraging the benefits.Footnote 58 Such a dual approach is important, given the significant potential of these benefits to enhance the well-being of future generations. This underscores the importance of including future generations in deliberations on rights holders under the right to science.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter clarified the personal scope of rights holders under the right to science, categorising them into three primary groups: private persons, legal persons and future generations. For each category, specific rights holders were identified and examined, with due consideration given to the distinctive ecosystem in which science operates.
The first section on private persons explored Art. 15(1) ICESCR, which affirms the right to science for ‘everyone’. It detailed individual rights holders – professionals, non-professionals and the general public – and highlighted diverse professional levels and contexts in rights application. The section also underscored the dual aim of the right to science: safeguarding scientists’ creative freedoms and promoting equitable access to scientific achievements. The analysis extended to individual rights holders in collective entities, such as women, children or persons with disabilities, and communal rights holders, such as scientific communities that collectively enjoy the right to science. The analysis extended to groups of individuals – such as women, children or persons with disabilities – and to communal rights holders, such as scientific communities. While communal enjoyment of the right was acknowledged, the proposition that scientific communities might qualify as community rights holders was ultimately found to offer limited practical utility and remained primarily theoretical.
The examination of legal persons considered institutions such as universities, independent research centres and private enterprises. While legal persons do not hold human rights per se, they are instrumental in advancing the right to science and may exercise certain procedural rights on behalf of their members, particularly through mechanisms such as individual communications before the Committee. The affiliation of individuals with specific legal entities also significantly shapes the level and type of protection they enjoy under the right to science.
Lastly, the analysis turned to future generations, whose interests are increasingly acknowledged in the context of long-term scientific and technological developments. Although the legal status of future generations as rights holders remains contested, there is growing recognition that current generations bear obligations to consider and protect their future interests, positioning them as emerging beneficiaries of the right to science in a broader sense.
This chapter has demonstrated that delineating the personal scope of the right to science is far from a purely academic task. It is central to ensuring the right’s full and effective implementation. As scientific inquiry and technological innovation increasingly shape our societies, a nuanced and inclusive approach to rights holders becomes increasingly important, including for those yet to come.
Open access