In June 2024, The Economist called China a “scientific superpower.”Footnote 1 Some of China’s top-tier universities are among the world’s best,Footnote 2 and the country ranks first in terms of scientific publications.Footnote 3 The inevitable conclusion one must draw is that innovation and excellence have been possible in China, even in the absence of genuine academic freedom and institutional autonomy. The origins of this success story can be traced back to the 1980s, when the central government introduced reforms to enhance the decentralization and marketization of universities.Footnote 4 David Zweig outlines the impact of these early reforms and demonstrates the persistent ambivalence and balancing act between the aims of decentralization and commercialization on the one hand, and political control on the other.Footnote 5 At that time, the need for international links partially overcame the concerns regarding political loyalty. The party-state was also forced to make some concessions and deregulate some of its administrative controls due to the problem of “brain drain,” as well as domestic and international pressures; however, it never lost full control.Footnote 6 The global academic data above indicate the fruits of these efforts. Observers believe that what was once hailed as a “positive trend towards greater university autonomy” has now been reversed under Xi Jinping 习近平 by the re-emphasized leadership role of the Party and more articulated emphasis on ideological obedience.Footnote 7 However, this development does not seem to have affected the status of Chinese universities.
This article relates to the literature on university autonomy and authoritarian resilience more broadly. This scholarship has focused on how many freedoms institutions have, as well as the incentive structures and control mechanisms within Chinese universities.Footnote 8 There has been scant research on the Party structures within universities, or how the party-state has managed to overcome the tensions between the authoritarian political system and scientific excellence. I show that university governance in China is paradigmatic of the principal-agency problem. Following the brutal suppression of the Tiananmen protests in 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the Party hereafter) introduced the so-called “presidential responsibility system under the leadership of the grassroots Party committee” (presidential responsibility system hereafter) in all state-funded higher education institutions in mainland China, meaning that Party organizations permeate their entire governance structure.Footnote 9 This has created a basic organizational structure that is highly hierarchical and bureaucratic, with a complexity of individual relations and long chains of command. A complex social organization of Party officials, administrators and academics are all embedded within this system.
I argue that the presidential responsibility system has not only resolved a fundamental agency problem in Chinese universities, but it also contributes to regime stability. It is sufficiently flexible to easily adapt to political needs, allowing the Party to loosen or tighten control over universities as required. The design of the system explains why and how innovation and excellence have been possible in the absence of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. The system is supported by a combination of outcome-related and behavioural regulators. In other words, the party-state uses a carrot-and-stick approach, combining monitoring with incentives, such as promotion and prestige, and sanctions to address agency problems, such as information asymmetry and conflicting interests. Such behavioural regulators have gained a new momentum in the Xi Jinping era; however, because they can exacerbate animosities between the Party and academics, the party-state has installed institutional mechanisms to accommodate this political shift. My study is based on legal and political documents, interviews and survey findings. Between August 2021 and September 2023, I interviewed 25 scholars in different localities in Europe and Asia who have either worked in or on China.Footnote 10 In August 2023, a survey was conducted among scholars who have been affiliated with Chinese universities to gain a better understanding of university governance in China.Footnote 11
I begin the article by explaining the principal-agency theory in the context of Chinese universities. I then outline the presidential responsibility system and shed light on how it has deployed various mechanisms to address agency problems in universities.
The Principal-Agency Theory in the Context of University Management in China
The principal-agency theory first emerged in the field of economics to understand how information asymmetries and conflicting interests in principal-agent relationships could be addressed through contractual relationships between individuals. Traditionally, the principal-agency theory concentrates on questions of information asymmetry, moral hazard, incentives and responsibilities in corporate settings because it presumes agency problems will inevitably occur. Gary Miller assumes that the agent, as the expert, holds an informational advantage over the principal. As the principal cannot fully observe the agent’s actions, information asymmetry is inevitable, endowing the agent with hidden knowledge that may encourage opportunistic behaviour. Aware of this risk, the principal introduces incentives to align interests and reduce agency costs.Footnote 12 As the theory has evolved, it has been applied to other contexts, including social organizations. Political scientists and sociologists have added more layers of complexity to the simplistic notion of a single agent and a single principal, questioning some of the orthodox assumptions about the principal-agent relationship. As sociologists would put it, principal-agency theory is essentially about social relations within complex systems.Footnote 13
Chinese universities are complex and hierarchical social organizations. Since the late 1970s, the sector has expanded enormously, and there are currently around 2,738 higher education institutions, the majority of which are state-funded.Footnote 14 Despite the large number of universities in China, it is possible to draw some generalizations about their governance. This is due to two factors: the responsibility system is obligatory in all state-funded universities, and Chinese law regulates the set-up of various Party, administrative and academic organs found within such institutions. All universities operate under a long chain of command that includes different actors, creating a complex web of principal-agency relationships. Indeed, there is not one principal and one agent but multiple principals and agents, and different interests exist at different levels of the bureaucracy. Yet the quiet that surrounds Chinese universities appears to support the impression that the party-state has managed to install a smoothly functioning machine that serves its agenda, even though a “perfect” principal-agent relationship is arguably unattainable.Footnote 15
Party and government authorities at the top delegate tasks to university-based Party organs and instruct administrative leaders on the party-state’s education policies. Those in the middle may be an agent to superiors and simultaneously act as a principal to subordinates. The existence of multiple principals and multiple agents adds to the complexity of the system. The different groups of principals and agents within Chinese universities can be divided into six groups: (1) Party cadres; (2) Party cadres with academic positions; (3) cadres in the administrative apparatus; (4) academics who concurrently work as cadres in the administrative apparatus; (5) pure academics with Party membership; and (6) pure academics without Party membership or without a concurrent position in the Party or administrative apparatus. In reality, there may not always be an ideal cadre to strictly adhere to or implement Party or government instructions,Footnote 16 or an ideal academic to demonstrate unquestioned loyalty to the Party while silently striving for excellence.Footnote 17 Instead, individuals may act opportunistically and pursue their own interests, and individual goals may conflict with the party-state’s agenda. The party-state has, however, taken precautions.
While common interests may exist between the Party, administration and academics, such as research excellence, reputation or funding, disagreements and frictions can arise regarding the extent of political and ideological influence on an institution and the freedoms afforded to academics (for example, regarding curriculum or research topics). The last resort is sanctioning academics.Footnote 18 A conflict of interest is more likely to occur when interests do not align, increasing the risk of power struggles within the universities. In the reform era, efforts to professionalize and expand academic interests, such as the establishment of academic bodies, have heightened the risk of information asymmetries and conflicting interests between principal(s) and agent(s). Thus, the party-state applies different systems of incentives, monitoring and accountability to the different groups to address agency problems through role assimilation and dual roles, ultimately aiming to balance political control with innovation and excellence.
The Presidential Responsibility System
The introduction of the presidential responsibility system after 1989 resolved a fundamental agency problem within universities. The system entails the co-existence of a university-based Party committee and an administration led by a university president.Footnote 19 Consequently, universities have two leaders, a Party secretary and a president, who occupy the top two leadership positions in the institution. These key figures are appointed – not elected – and managed by local governments or, in a minority of cases, directly by the central government.Footnote 20 In 31 cases, including top-tier universities like Tsinghua 清华大学, Renmin 人民大学 and Fudan 复旦大学, the CCP Central Committee has the final approval on appointments to these two positions.Footnote 21 The system operates under a hierarchical chain of command. The university Party committee, whose daily work is usually managed by its standing committee and is made operational by the support of various Party organs within the institution,Footnote 22 consolidates political power within an institution.Footnote 23 The university Party secretary is the “No. 1” responsible for the ideological and political orientation of the institution, while the other members of the Party committee are expected to combine professional work with ideological and political duties.Footnote 24 Indeed, the university Party committee’s responsibilities also include day-to-day management tasks, including institutional and personnel decisions, as well as academic affairs relating to research and teaching.Footnote 25 The committee is, therefore, more than simply the political and ideological watchdog for an institution, and there is a clear overlap between presidential and Party management tasks.
The university Party committee is understood to assume a “unified leadership” over the work of the institution and to support the president in exercising power. This means that the president is the legal representative of the institution and, as such, takes overall responsibility for teaching, scientific research and administrative work, while the university Party committee is vested with the formal decision-making powers. This constellation suggests that the Party secretary is the most powerful figure within a university, while the president is understood to be a deliberator, mostly responsible for the implementation and coordination of Party committee decisions.Footnote 26 In this way, the president is regarded as the “enforcer” of the decisions made by the Party committee.Footnote 27 However, as shown below, the notion of the president as merely an “enforcer” is problematic, especially considering that the president may serve as the deputy Party secretary – and often does – and that members of the administration’s leadership often sit on the university Party committee. In these instances, presidents are not just “enforcers”; they actively engage in decision-making and implement these decisions through the administration.
To avoid power struggles between the Party secretary and the president, the party-state encourages leaders to reach a consensus before adding items to the agenda, emphasizing collective decision-making.Footnote 28 At the top leadership level, this collective approach is reflected in the fact that the university Party committee and the president work together in a joint office.Footnote 29 Some institutions, such as Jinan University, have explicitly instituted a joint meeting, the Party–administrative joint meeting (dangzheng lian xi huiyi 党政联席会议), as the highest decision-making body of the university.Footnote 30 Officially, there is no separation between the Party and the administration at the top leadership level. Below the leadership level, collective leadership is further emphasized through various joint decision-making bodies.Footnote 31 This merger of Party and academic organs can be found throughout the hierarchy as the organizational structure is replicated at lower levels. Daniel Bell describes how such consensus-building took place among the leaders at Shandong University, where he served as dean between 2017 and 2022. Decisions were not made by a single individual, and Bell’s own influence was limited and heavily reliant on the support of other leaders. In other words, the power of one person was inherently limited.Footnote 32 While this curbs opportunistic behaviour by individual agents or principals, it also concentrates decision-making within a narrow circle.
The middle-management level serves as the backbone of a university. It comprises the heads of administrative departments, the deans and vice-deans (department chairs and directors) of colleges (departments and institutes), as well as the Party secretaries and deputy secretaries of branch Party committees (general Party branches).Footnote 33 The university Party committee and its organization department (zuzhibu 组织部) hold the authority to appoint individuals to middle-level management positions within institutions, allowing them to maintain control over this level.Footnote 34
Depending on the number of Party members within an institution, various Party branches can be established at the college and department levels,Footnote 35 often mirroring the responsibilities of the university Party committee.Footnote 36 Members of the administration can also hold positions in the Party committee of their school or department, and the Party secretary of a college or department may sit on the university Party committee.Footnote 37 At lower levels, Party branches are integrated into the existing institutional structure and do not run in parallel to it, with Party secretaries typically serving as department heads.Footnote 38 This effectively merges the Party with the administrative apparatus. While strategic decisions are made at the university level, the lower levels handle the day-to-day operations of an institution, which is seen as granting them some discretion in how to implement leadership decisions relating to research and teaching, while personnel decisions remain at the university level.Footnote 39 However, Terry Bodenhorn notes that university leaders often outsource targets to the middle level in order to avoid responsibility.Footnote 40
The entire apparatus of administrative and academic bodies operates under the leadership of the Party. However, a strict separation between the Party and the administrative apparatus, which could create conflicting interests, would not serve the objectives of the party-state. Such a scenario could arguably increase the risk of agency problems. Consequently, the duality between the Party and the administration is essentially non-existent in practice.Footnote 41 In reality, the party-state has installed a vertical-horizontal system of control through organizational and personnel overlap. However, the balancing act of political control on the one hand, and scientific excellence on the other, adds another layer of complexity to the system. Yet thinking in binary terms – academia versus Party – is not helpful when considering complex social organizations, such as universities, where Party cadres are more than ideological and political watchdogs. Similar to administrative leaders, members of the Party apparatus also assume various management tasks, which creates space for common interests. This alignment of interests helps to assimilate the roles of leaders at both the top and lower levels, which can reduce the risk of agency problems. However, interest alignment between Party, administration and academia alone cannot eliminate the possibility of conflicting interests, especially in the absence of a clear framework for balancing political and academic interests. Thus, the party-state needs leaders who can navigate both the delegated tasks and the fundamental constraints.
Delegated Tasks and Fundamental Constraints
Universities in China have to follow the directives of the party-state. Thought control imposes an obvious constraint on them as they, and by extension academics, are primarily seen as instruments of the Party, tasked first and foremost with ideological and political indoctrination.Footnote 42 Research and teaching are constrained through an array of control mechanisms, including classroom surveillance and curriculum setting.Footnote 43 Thought control has intensified under Xi and the task of ideological and political work must be taken seriously.Footnote 44 Since 2017, universities have been required to set up a teacher work department (jiaoshi gongzuobu 教师工作部), which is a Party organ, to oversee academics.Footnote 45 This Party body has effectively merged with the human resources office (renshichu 人事处), sharing not only an office but also personnel.Footnote 46 Its main responsibility is to strengthen the ethical standards of academics (shide 師德), as outlined in the codes of conduct issued by the Ministry of Education (MOE). These standards emphasize patriotism and adherence to the law, which entails supporting the CCP leadership and the socialist system.Footnote 47 Recent regulations have made these ethics the top criterion in annual performance assessments,Footnote 48 with failure to meet these standards potentially blocking an academic’s chances of promotion, among other things.Footnote 49 This development has been accompanied by tightened supervision over Party and government cadres,Footnote 50 arguably increasing the pressure on all actors within universities to demonstrate good political quality. How this stricter rhetoric plays out in practice is less clear, as those assessing academics’ ethics have discretion and may be influenced by competing interests or delegated tasks.
Undoubtedly, the marketization of universities sets the broader agenda for university administrators, as decision-making is guided by “managerialism.”Footnote 51 University rankings measure quantity and focus on performative indicators such as citations and Science Citation Index (SCI) and Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)-ranked publications, internationalization and student enrolment numbers.Footnote 52 Bodenhorn has illustrated how ranking indicators have been translated into targets for administrators and delegated to the college level, in his experience, requiring deans to sign documents that obligate their colleges to achieve specific targets that reflect these indicators, particularly regarding research funding and publications.Footnote 53 This focus highlights the presence and erosive effects of managerialism on academic freedom, an issue that extends beyond China. Since the 1990s, China’s promotion and tenure evaluation system has placed significant emphasis on publications in top journals as a key indicator.Footnote 54 While this system has contributed to China’s growth in outputs and reinforced its status as a superpower, it has also encouraged scientific misconduct and can stifle innovation when researchers prioritize metrics over genuine academic exploration.Footnote 55 Since 2020, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) and the MOE have issued new guidelines stating that the number of SCI papers and related metrics can no longer serve as the primary criterion for awarding degrees or determining promotions. Instead, emphasis is placed on representative works.Footnote 56 Yet, China’s share of international publications continues to rise, which is unsurprising given that the imposed reforms conflict with an overarching system still driven by metrics.
Another fundamental constraint faced by universities is economic. They are expected to contribute to social and economic development, and innovation relies on funding for infrastructure and capacity building. Since the 1990s, the party-state has implemented three education projects, the 211 Project (1995), the 985 Project (1998) and the Double First-Class University Plan (2015), which replaced the first two. Key institutions included in these education projects receive a significant project-based budget from the state.Footnote 57 The concentration of resources among a small group of selected universities has led to a stratification of the higher education sector. However, in the case of top-tier universities like Tsinghua, only a portion of their annual revenue comes from the state, while a significant part is derived from other sources; however, many universities are completely reliant on funding from the state.Footnote 58
Universities compete for rewards and funding, with education plans and policies serving as indicators of where the money is. The central planning of the party-state predefines the overall agenda for the higher education sector and the strategic direction of an institution.Footnote 59 In terms of “science and technology” (keji 科技, S&T hereafter), the 2023 Modernization Plan emphasizes the key areas of quantum information, network communications, artificial intelligence (AI), biomedicine and modern energy systems, among other things.Footnote 60 Xi Jinping himself has underlined the need for “scientific and technological self-reliance and self-improvement,” leading to the prioritization of research in the fields of AI and semiconductors.Footnote 61 Additionally, the party-state has further centralized S&T planning. In 2023, the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC) was established under the Central Committee’s leadership, taking over strategic planning responsibilities from the MST.Footnote 62
The National Natural Science Foundation of China (Guojia ziran kexue jijin weiyuanhui 国家自然科学基金委员会, NSFC), the principal funder of basic research, also reformed its funding structure to better support the growing number of young scientists, although the success rate of applications dropped to 13 per cent in 2023 amid a surge in the number of submissions.Footnote 63 Despite a funding increase of 10 per cent in S&T in 2024,Footnote 64 the system remains biased towards low-risk, application-driven research.Footnote 65 Meanwhile, the “Made in China 2025” policy aimed for 70 per cent self-sufficiency in key industries.Footnote 66 However, concerns remain. Ding Kuiling 丁奎岭, current president and deputy Party secretary of Shanghai Jiao Tong University 上海交通大学, has highlighted the problem of poor research commercialization, particularly within universities.Footnote 67 For example, the commercialization rate of university patents remains low, at about 5 per cent.Footnote 68
University leaders, especially those who are close to the Party centre, understand what is expected of them. President of Sun Yat-sen University 中山大学, Gao Song 高松, who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress, has been unequivocal in asserting that university administrators must align with national strategies to support local development. For example, in response to the 2018 “Outline of the plan for the development of the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macau Greater Bay Area,” the institution invested in marine disciplines, and following Xi Jinping’s call for dissertations “about the motherland,” it prioritized theses about the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macau metropolitan area.Footnote 69
The responsiveness of universities is also evident in the restructuring of academic disciplines and majors. In 2023, the MOE set a target to modify around 20 per cent of existing programmes by 2025, scrapping those deemed irrelevant to economic and social development. Lower-tier universities have been especially quick to act on this directive, likely due to the greater competitive pressure they face compared to elite institutions.Footnote 70 This is plausible as they are more dependent on government funding.
However, the party-state is not only interested in knowledge that can be measured economically. It also pours large sums of money into the dissemination of its ideological and political agenda and actively engages academia in sustaining the authoritarian system. This is part of its carrot-and-stick approach: repression can lead to contestation, and by providing incentives for compliance and participation, the party-state can better channel potential dissatisfaction. Universities can benefit from demonstrating excellence in the areas of Party building and ideological and political work. The 2023 Modernization Plan encourages the development of philosophy and social sciences “with Chinese characteristics.”Footnote 71 The party-state provides funding for research projects related to socialism “with Chinese characteristics” as well as for ideological and political work, which was officially recognized as a research topic eligible for funding by the MOE in 2021.Footnote 72
Universities are also rewarded for their Party building efforts. In his 2024 report, deputy Party secretary and president of Xihua University 西华大学, Li Qiushi 李秋实, highlighted the school’s achievements in this area. Notably, four teachers were honoured as “Person of the year” for their ideological and political work within the province, and projects on digital, ideological and political topics received the MOE’s excellence award.Footnote 73 Yet, the Shanghai ranking shows that Chinese universities perform more poorly in the arts, humanities and social sciences, indicating that the party-state is prepared to sacrifice quality to retain ideological and political control. This devaluation of critical academia is part of the system. The trends in higher education have more directly affected the freedom of research and teaching in the humanities and social sciences, while S&T receive increased support; both, however, serve the party-state’s strategic agenda.
The university leadership’s management tasks, which are delegated down the chain of command, include enrolment targets, graduate employment rates, research funding and research outputs, among other things. For both government and Party leaders, key performance indicators include political and ideological work (ranked as the first criterion), as well as leadership abilities and work performance, all of which must be executed with the correct political attitude; leaders are held accountable for bad performances.Footnote 74 As an effective control mechanism, performance evaluation thus serves a dual purpose: incentivization and accountability. A highly skilled president may excel at satisfying political commands while promoting academic interests. The overarching goal is arguably to maximize the intersection of these common interests. But how has the Party addressed potentially conflicting interests?
Interest Alignment through Role Assimilation
The Party has implemented measures to mitigate the risks of conflicting interests and information asymmetries. While leadership positions are intentionally designed to be interchangeable, it is easier to navigate conflicting interests and power struggles through role assimilation. The prevailing wisdom is that increased prestige will confer greater authority and influence upon institutions, thereby elevating the president’s status as the highest authority.Footnote 75 However, if leaders become too resistant to politics or blatantly undermine the authority of the Party secretary, this can lead to power struggles, thus creating a problem for the party-state. Academics may have more expertise than a pure cadre within the Party or administrative apparatus. For the party-state, it is thus sensible to ensure that leaders are well-grounded in all aspects to make them “red and expert” (you hong you zhuan又红又专). My interlocutors pointed out the academic qualifications of Party secretaries, particularly those at top-tier universities, emphasizing that these leaders are highly skilled individuals. They also noted that the powers of the president and the Party secretary are comparable and that both positions are interchangeable.Footnote 76
Although the reform era’s emphasis on professionalization meant that “expertise” was prioritized over “redness,” political loyalty was still regarded as a desirable quality in academics.Footnote 77 Under Xi, while the political qualities of leaders have gained greater significance,Footnote 78 academic excellence continues to remain a key requirement for university leaders.Footnote 79 Moreover, for university Party secretaries, having experience within the Party or government apparatus is an important factor in being appointed to a leadership role. On the administrative side, relevant government decision makers will opt not to appoint a separate Party secretary if they believe that the president can effectively fulfil both roles.Footnote 80 For example, in August 2024, the Party committee of Shanghai appointed Zhu Xinyuan 朱新远 as the new deputy Party secretary and president of the University of Shanghai for Science and Technology 上海理工大学. Zhu’s profile reveals that he is an engineer by training and an award-winning researcher who has previously served as dean and deputy Party secretary of the School of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, among other positions.Footnote 81
Members of the university leadership, such as presidents and vice-presidents, often serve simultaneously as deputy Party secretaries or hold seats on the university Party committee or its standing committee. This interchangeability of leadership positions is replicated at lower levels. According to interviewees, skilled leaders understand how to balance academic interests while accommodating political demands.Footnote 82 Research by scholars in China has shown that it is not uncommon for a Party secretary to also hold an academic position,Footnote 83 effectively assuming a dual role as researcher and political representative.Footnote 84 Yet the percentage of university leaders who are concurrently members of the Party committee may be higher. Furthermore, presidents who do not concurrently hold positions as deputy Party secretaries or Party secretaries often have done so in the past or will do so in the future. This suggests a chronological interchangeability of roles within the leaderships of universities. One interviewee illustrated this interchangeability of the two roles by pointing to the chronology of appointment of leaders first as (deputy) Party secretary and then as (vice) president, or vice versa.Footnote 85 For example, Xu Zheng 许征 of Fudan University was a vice-president from 2006 to 2017; she was then moved to the position of deputy Party secretary, without any office in the university leadership, in May 2017. Later, in November 2021, she returned to the university leadership as executive vice-president. In short, she moved from the university leadership to the Party committee and then later returned to the university leadership.Footnote 86 A similar constellation can be observed at Tsinghua University. In February 2022, Qiu Yong 邱勇, a high-ranking Party official and academician (yuanshi 院士), assumed the role of Party secretary after serving as president for seven years.Footnote 87 Tsinghua is, however, a rare case of “dual leadership of academicians.”Footnote 88 While Party secretaries are not necessarily poorly educated, they generally hold lower academic qualifications than university presidents, even those within the elite Project 985 or 211 institutions.Footnote 89 This gap is likely to be even wider at lower-tier universities, potentially exacerbating tensions between political and academic priorities.
The assimilation of leadership roles is no coincidence, despite criticism from observers about the unclear delineation of responsibilities between the two key figures.Footnote 90 Role assimilation is facilitated by functional similarities and overlapping yet ambiguous responsibilities. In 2017, Mao Jianqing conducted a survey of university presidents, Party secretaries, middle-management cadres and professors from 211 institutions.Footnote 91 In terms of role expectations, the majority of respondents saw both the president and the Party secretary primarily as “educators.” The second most important role for the president was that of “reform leader,” while for the Party secretary it was “politician.” With regard to specific work tasks, in their own perceptions of the duties and actual day-to-day work, Party secretaries and presidents identified highly similar tasks. They both regarded “strategic planning” as their most important task and put most energy into it; this was followed by tasks such as talent cultivation and institutional reforms.Footnote 92
The appointment and removal of university presidents are tightly controlled by government decision makers. While the assimilation of roles and dual roles can, to some extent, serve to counterbalance mere politicians or administrators, the central Party authorities deliberately maintain control over the 31 elite institutions to prevent lower authorities from stepping out of line. Although the university leadership is appointed for a five-year term,Footnote 93 research has shown that the average tenure of Chinese university presidents is around four years.Footnote 94 Scholars have criticized these frequent changes of personnel as detrimental to the academic environment and long-term goals. In response, in 2015, the party-state called for “de-administration,” a term which signifies a reduction in Party/government influence, stressing that university leaders should be academics.Footnote 95 However, the removal of a president before the fourth year of tenure appears to be rare, especially for top-tier institutions within the 985 Project. However, a presidential reshuffle did occur at South China University of Technology 华南理工法学, one of the “four great engineering colleges” (sida gongxueyuan 四大工学院). In 2022, the MOE appointed Zhang Liqun 张立群,Footnote 96 who was then moved to Xi’an Jiaotong University 西安交通大学 in 2024, a promotion to a university at the vice-ministerial level.Footnote 97 Reports of similar incidents suggest that these occurrences reflect strategic efforts to enhance institutional status.
Power struggles can occur at the middle leadership level, where roles are less assimilated and pure Party leaders compete with pure academic leaders. Personnel changes at this level are decided directly by the university Party committee and its organization department, meaning that decisions are made by the Party rather than by the relevant government authority. In March 2024, Professor Zhao Dingxin 赵鼎新, who had headed the sociology department at Zhejiang University 浙江大学 since 2021, resigned from all his positions. On 11 March, the university Party committee formally removed him from his position as director, although he remained in charge of many departmental tasks. Shortly afterwards, a meeting was held without Zhao, during which Chen Sushan 陈素珊, secretary of the Party branch and deputy director of the department, announced the formation of a new sociology department working group that excluded him. Feeling sidelined, Zhao chose to step back. Zhao had been focusing on quality rather than quantity, which meant reducing outputs and project applications. Consequently, the institute had only received a B+ rating from the MOE, which had led to dissatisfaction among senior administrators.Footnote 98 The renewed emphasis on ideological and political work may have opened a window of opportunity for Party cadres like Chen to seize power from academics and expand their influence institutionally, although it is still difficult to draw firm conclusions about such internal processes. Zhao is now listed as an emeritus professor of the sociology department, but he remains a member of the department’s academic committee and continues to serve as head of the Zhejiang University Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences.Footnote 99
Creating a Nexus between Party–Administration–Academia
In the drive for scientific excellence, the establishment of academic bodies in universities, such as the academic committee (xueshu weiyuanhui 学术委员会) and the faculty representative assembly (jiaozhigong daibiao dahui 教职工代表大会), can be understood as a bargaining chip for academics, as it creates room for negotiation.Footnote 100 Available information indicates that there is a relatively high representation of academic committees at the different levels of top-tier universities like Tsinghua and Fudan.Footnote 101 It is more difficult to assess whether this is the case for second- and third-tier universities, as their websites often lack the relevant information. Moreover, interlocutors and survey participants have reported improvements in research and teaching conditions, which have been attributed to the establishment of such bodies.Footnote 102 However, the party-state faces a potential challenge if too much power shifts to academics. To prevent academics from becoming too independent from the Party branch, they are placed under the leadership of university-based Party organs,Footnote 103 their decision-making powers are limited, and members of the Party and administrative apparatus, including the university leadership, are positioned within or over these bodies.Footnote 104 This arrangement is crucial for maintaining control and overcoming information asymmetries, as formal subordination alone cannot prevent conflicting interests.
Indeed, academic bodies composed entirely of pure academics are neither intended nor feasible in practice. A considerable percentage of university academic committee members are also Party members, ranging from 26 to 52 per cent.Footnote 105 However, CCP membership alone should not be overinterpreted, as there are various reasons why academics would want to join the Party. There is, however, another critical group: academics who may decide to enter the administration and become “double-shouldered” (shuang jian tiao 双肩挑) cadres.Footnote 106 In such cases, they assume a dual role. Based on a survey of 88 universities, Liu Yarong and colleagues found that while the number of pure administrators or university leaders in academic committees has decreased, the proportion of double-shouldered cadres, who constitute 50 per cent of such committees, has remained largely unchanged, and the number of pure academics has not increased.Footnote 107 Double-shouldered cadres serve as a critical nexus between the triangle of academics, administration and Party. The Party can control this group through incentives and monitoring. Moreover, the embeddedness of double-shouldered cadres helps to mitigate the risk of information asymmetries, as they may lean towards satisfying political demands. For academics, the prestige and security attached to this dual role can be appealing, especially as these cadres hold more power than pure academics. If an academic also serves in the Party or government apparatus, career considerations are likely to impact their behaviour, as political loyalty is traditionally more important for those within the Party apparatus.Footnote 108 For the party-state, individuals with dual roles represent a critical group: they are more reliable agents for realizing the Party’s goals and their connection to academia allows them to exert influence within that sphere. Given the dual roles of individuals who concurrently hold positions within the Party or administrative apparatus, it would be difficult to form an academic committee or any other academic body composed solely of pure academics. Installing double-shouldered cadres in academic committees helps to address information asymmetries, while their career considerations provide the necessary incentives for them to observe delegated tasks and adhere to constraints.
Since the responsibility system grants the university Party committee the authority to oversee all processes in an institution, including final decision-making power in academic affairs,Footnote 109 academics cannot be given formal decision-making powers, as this would contradict the system. Instead, they can only “deliberate” in most instances, and their recommendations usually require the approval of the Party or administration.Footnote 110 The apparently weak position of academic bodies within university governance is well-known, but this is not the crucial point.Footnote 111 A significant number of survey respondents felt that academic interests were adequately represented by the academic committee, which they also acknowledged was controlled by the university-based Party committee. However, this is not necessarily a contradiction. Even though the university Party committee may control or have an influence over the academic committee, the interests of academics may still be represented, unless conflicts occur; those vested with the authority of the Party would presumably prevail in cases of conflict.Footnote 112 While the Party’s omnipresence in academic bodies is undeniable, drawing general conclusions about decision-making processes remains difficult. It is unlikely that the academic committee would submit a proposal that the university Party committee might later reject. It is, therefore, plausible that academic affairs are negotiated among various stakeholders before being submitted for final decision-making.
The question is, when does the university Party committee align with academic proposals? Gaining insight into these internal decision-making processes is challenging; however, financial resources and prestige may serve as key indicators of where interests align. In Bell’s case, for example, higher approval authorities rarely intervened in the academic committee’s deliberations on hiring or promotion decisions.Footnote 113 Again, all sides have an intrinsic interest in promoting their institution’s reputation. As another example, in 2019, the Tsinghua Party committee approved the establishment of a new research centre, the School for Vehicles and Mobility, to replace the former department of automotive engineering. The State Council identified energy-efficient and new energy vehicles as one of the ten key areas for “Made in China 2025,” an initiative partly designed by members of that department.Footnote 114 The research centre maintains extensive national and international cooperation arrangements and produces a large number of publications.Footnote 115 Considering the prestige and financial benefits associated with such undertakings, and which are measurable economically, neither the Party secretary nor other members of the university Party committee had reason to sabotage this arguably prestigious undertaking. The key takeaway is, even if the party-state views academics as needing to be controlled and managed, academic interests will be promoted if they align with state interests. Here, there are no agency problems: the principal’s goals fully align with those of the agent. This partly explains why innovation and excellence have been possible in China, even in the absence of true academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
Conclusion
A “democratic atmosphere” is viewed as a crucial prerequisite for fostering academic freedom and, arguably, innovation.Footnote 116 However, China’s rise as a “scientific superpower” presents a paradox that challenges conventional assumptions about innovation under authoritarianism. In this paper, I contend that the introduction of the presidential responsibility system after 1989 resolved a fundamental agency problem within Chinese universities. The party-state has installed an effective system of university governance that can easily adapt to political shifts while advancing innovation and excellence under authoritarian control. Applying a tight corset of delegated tasks and constraints, the party-state predefines the settings for the multiple agents and principals within universities, combining behavioural regulators with incentives. As I have demonstrated, the party-state has addressed agency problems, conflicting interests and information asymmetries by assimilating roles and establishing dual roles for leaders. Academic bodies serve as an important nexus between the Party, administration and academia: placing individuals with dual roles within these bodies helps to overcome information asymmetries. Where interests align, academic interests can be promoted, even in the absence of genuine academic freedom and institutional autonomy. This demonstrates how the party-state has managed to navigate the tensions between its authoritarian control and scientific excellence.
Innovation and excellence are not measured by the existence of academic freedom but largely by quantitative and economically measurable outputs. Academia remains in the shadow of the Party’s declared leadership. The system systematically and intentionally devalues critical academia for obvious reasons, resulting in the marginalization of the social sciences and humanities. However, this is also somewhat true for other, apparently less politicized disciplines, including the natural sciences, as academics are expected to demonstrate obedience and fulfil the party-state’s agenda. Academics are actively engaged and incentivized to sustain the authoritarian system. As the party-state continues to promote S&T while tightening ideological control, a growing divide between the marginalized humanities and social sciences and the strengthened STEM sector will become more evident.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Bun Koon for his great research assistance. Thanks also go to Tsai Wen-Hsuan, Katrin Kinzelbach, Daniel Sprick and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to thank Anna Ahlers for bringing the case of Zhao Dingxin to my attention. Research for this article was funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) under grant number 01DO21005A (“Academic Freedom in the People’s Republic of China”). The responsibility for the content of this publication lies with the author.
Competing interests
None.
Alexandra KAISER is an assistant professor (Akademische Rätin a.Z.) at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg (FAU), where she is affiliated with the Chair for Human Rights Law.
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