Changes in warfare and the military

The Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1910) manufactured a large number of early handgun-type personal gunpowder weapons at the beginning of its establishment and maintained a tactical system with them and a large cavalry. The infantry was armed with spears, polearms, and bows, and one-fifth of the total was required to be armed with gunpowder weapons (Chinbŏp Reference Yu, Sŏng and Im1983, 351). The cavalry, which was to make up half of the combat force, was armed with spears and bows.

Militia organizations modeled after the fubing (府兵) system, a militia system of the Tang dynasty of China, were matched with certain weapons to constitute the army. In Korea, the fubing system served as a blueprint for military organization (Im Reference Im2011, 87). In China, soldiers under the fubing system served in the capital on a regular rotational service. When there were no rotational duties or long-distance expeditions, they made a living through farming. They provided their own supplies and equipment using the income generated by agriculture, organized along the lines of the equal-field system, and some exemptions from corvée. The soldiers attended regular collective drills every winter under the supervision of a regimental commander (Graff Reference Graff2002, 189–192).

Korea’s medieval military was built using a similar system. Although the specific operational methods remain unclear, the Koryŏ dynasty placed eight guard commands in the capital, with soldiers serving on a rotational basis. In the fourteenth century, the ikkun (翼軍), a nationwide militia system, was established in response to continuous military threats from Japanese pirates and the Red Turbans. The Chosŏn dynasty inherited the military system. After undergoing various changes, the new military system was codified with the publication of the Law Code (Kyŏngguk taejŏn 經國大典) in the fifteenth century.

There were many types of soldiers, but the most important were armored soldiers (kapsa 甲士) and regular soldiers (chŏngbyŏng 正兵), who had a rotating military duty. They were regularly obligated to serve at the five guard commands in the capital and at each regional key point. There were five shifts for armored soldiers, and their term of service was six months at a time. Regular soldiers in the central army had eight shifts with two months of service at a time (Min Reference Min1968, 90-94). Soldiers had four shifts of one month each in the local garrisons. In this system, the number of soldiers on-duty in peacetime was fewer than 20,000. The total number of armored soldiers in 1475 was 14,800, while the number of regular soldiers was 72,109 (Sŏngjong Sillok, 1475/9/8). Instead of receiving land through the equal-field system, as in the Tang dynasty, Korean militias were supported financially by support taxpayers (poin 保人), who were individually allocated to each soldier. With this financial aid, soldiers managed the expenses of their military service, covering their equipment and travel costs to their posts (Oh Reference Oh1996, 125). When they were not on duty, soldiers relied on farming for their own livelihood, attending regular military training by local commanders. In times of emergency, such as warfare, the state mobilized both active-duty personnel and those who were off duty.

As the possibility of a large-scale war gradually decreased, and small-scale conflict with the northern nomadic tribes became the focus of military attention, the tactical system gradually changed into one centered on archers and cavalry. Gunpowder weapons were still treated as important, but their proportion decreased. Also, the absence of a need for a large-scale military gradually transformed the militia’s military obligations into labor or poll tax payments (Yi Reference Yi1968, 240–253). Just before the Imjin War, Chosŏn maintained its military power with thousands of cavalry (No Reference No2015, 66).

The impact of the Japanese invasion was felt on both Chosŏn’s existing military service system and tactics. The Chosŏn army, with a small number of cavalry, attempted to perform field battles in the early stages of the war but were destroyed by the Japanese harquebusiers, leading them to require new weapons and military organizations. The new weaponry and tactics Korea tried to introduce at this time originated from Japan and Ming China. The harquebus was pointed out by the Chosŏn government as the most crucial factor in the series of defeats (Chingbirok, 346). With captured Japanese harquebuses and prisoners, Chosŏn actively tried to introduce a new weapon system (Andrade et al Reference Andrade, Kang and Cooper2014, 65, 82). The new weapon also required new tactics and organization. The model for the system was the Zhejiang army of Ming China, which was built by the famous Ming general Qi Jiguang (1528–1588). Qi Jiguang became a military commander in southern regions of China in 1557 and created a new organization and tactics to fight against Japanese pirates, Wokou (倭寇). His new army was trained to use many Western-style harquebuses and cannons (Lorge Reference Lorge2008, 81; Noordam Reference Noordam2018, 252). He recruited farmers and created professional soldiers who made a living on government-paid silver, and trained them with collective drills and strict discipline (Paek Reference Paek1998, 223–224). Impressed by the activities of the Zhejiang army during the war, Korea introduced a military manual called New Book of Effective Techniques (Jixiao xinshu 紀效新書), written by Qi Jiguang (Sŏnjo Sujŏng sillok, 1594/2/1). Through its interactions with Japan and China, Chosŏn successfully adopted both the harquebus and the volley fire tactics associated with it (Kang Reference Kang2013, 142).

New military organizations were established matching the new weaponry and tactics. The government’s efforts consisted in founding the Military Training Agency (Hullyŏn togam 訓鍊都監) and the sogo army (sogogun 束伍軍; regimental troops). In 1593, as soon as Korea regained its capital with the help of the Chinese army, the Military Training Agency was installed by royal order (Kim Reference Kim2015, 34). The Agency began with 500 soldiers, which increased to 2,000 by the end of the Imjin War. The unit gradually expanded and reached 7,000 in 1662 but was reduced soon after and maintained about 5,000 troops during the late Chosŏn dynasty. According to early nineteenth century data, twenty companies, with 2,440 soldiers, out of thirty-three companies in the total combat force of the Agency were harquebusiers. All of these harquebusiers were given a harquebus, a sword, armor, ammunition, and gunpowder (Man’gi yoram, 220, 261).

The service type of soldiers belonging to the Military Training Agency was described as “long-duty (changbŏn 長番)” or “long-march (changjŏng 長征).” They were forced to stay no more than 15 km from the capital where their unit was located and remained on-duty without rotational shifts until they reached their retirement age of 60 (Man’gi yoram, 260). They also earned a living by receiving salaries from the government.

The new standing army alone could not supply all the harquebusiers needed by Chosŏn. In order to meet the demand, militias armed with harquebuses appeared. The sogo army was the result of the reform of existing provincial armies that were already drafted. The reform began in earnest in 1594, and the focus was placed on the training of harquebusiers and the adoption of the tactics of Qi Jiguang. The sogo army maintained around 100,000 members during the first half of the seventeenth century (Kim Reference Kim2001, 127). They belonged to thirty-two regiments, which were stipulated to consist of 2,500 men each (Sŏ Reference Sŏ1999). In the late seventeenth century, the number had doubled, and it remained unchanged until the end of the nineteenth century. In rural villages, the soldiers of the sogo army usually belonged to companies near their residences, and low-ranking officers selected from the region took responsibility for the soldiers’ training and command. Periodically, state-appointed regiment commanders would circulate through the districts to supervise group training (Injo Sillok, 1627/4/20).

The proportion of harquebusiers within the sogo army gradually increased. In the early days of its establishment, harquebusiers constituted about one-third of the sogo army in the northern region (Kim Reference Kim2001). In the early eighteenth century, it was recorded in a list of the Ch’ungch’ŏng province army that three-quarters of the Troops were armed with harquebuses (Kang Reference Kang2013, 141). The rest of the troops were armed with bows and melee weapons. The government was also active in supplying the harquebuses to the sogo army. In the mid-seventeenth century, the government secured 50,000 harquebuses and decided to provide them to 110,000 sogo army soldiers (Pibyŏnsa Tŭngnok, 1641/6/3). The guidelines for the sogo army in the mid-eighteenth century also stipulated the provision of the harquebuses to soldiers of the sogo army (Pibyŏnsa Tŭngnok, 1730/9/25). If a soldier prepared a gun on his own, he was rewarded.

Contrary to the standing army of the Military Training Agency, the form of military service of the sogo army was as a typical militia. Basically, these soldiers did not have a regular service obligation at local garrisons or in the capital. In times of peace, they just engaged in their own jobs and attended regular military training near their hometowns (Kim Reference Kim2001, 112). Almost all of the soldiers registered in the sogo army were also farmers. To ensure their livelihoods, the government guidelines for the sogo army emphasized that the military training should not hinder their farm work (Sŏnjo Sillok, 1595/7/29).

After the Imjin War, the new type of harquebusier units was established within the central army. The Royal Division (ǒyŏnggun 御營軍) was initially set up with the recruitment of harquebusiers in preparation for the invasion of Manchuria in 1624 and was gradually expanded. The number of soldiers in the Division had reached 21,000 by 1652. In 1706, it was reduced to about 16,000 men in 125 companies (Man’gi yoram, 327–331). Another unit, the Guard Division (Kumwiyŏng 禁衛營), was established in 1682 by gathering various militia units, with 136 companies (Man’gi yoram, 283). The Guard Division was reduced to about 16,000 men in 125 companies in the early eighteenth century. The majority of the soldiers in these divisions were mainly harquebusiers.

Although these soldiers had new weapons in their hands, their form of service was similar to the soldiers of the pre-war period. Most combat troops in the divisions had rotational duty in the capital. The rotation schedule was different depending on the period. Initially, when the Royal Division was at its largest, there were ten companies in service at a time with fourteen shifts for two months each (Hyŏnjong Kaesu sillok, 1663/11/14). In the early eighteenth century, the number of troops on duty at a time decreased to five companies, which were then changed to rotate in twenty-five shifts (Man’gi yoram, 285). The Guard Division operated in a similar way, for it was founded on the model of the Royal Division. To cover the costs of the military service, support taxpayers were allocated to each soldier. When they were not in a period of service that returned once every four years, the soldiers lived in their own homes in the rural areas and engaged in their regular livelihoods as farmers.

The soldiers belonging to the Royal Division and Guard Division also can be defined as militia. The military obligations in their lives were a secondary aspect of their existence as farmers. Although the soldiers of the two divisions did regular military service, it was only for a very short period of time that recurred every four years. Economic compensation for military service was only an aid to subsidize their military service, not an important factor in their livelihoods. Moreover, they were not a professional elite class specialized in the use of military force.

Soldiers who went to the battlefield

From the seventeenth to eighteenth century, who were the direct users of the new type of warfare with harquebuses on the battlefield? The harquebus was effective not only because of its firepower, but also because individuals could easily learn to use it. Unlike traditional weapons that required years of physical conditioning and intensive martial training, the harquebus could be mastered relatively quickly. This accessibility enabled individuals outside the traditional military elite to serve as capable combatants. Nevertheless, the adoption of the harquebus did not make training obsolete. While the need for individual martial prowess declined, the weapon demanded a higher degree of collective coordination. Because the rate of fire was still too low, the harquebus alone could not guarantee tactical superiority. In order to compensate for the weaknesses of the weapon, collective tactics and strict mass drill were required. The need for continuous collective training is considered one of the key factors driving the military transition toward standing armies (Roberts Reference Roberts1956, 17).

The standing army was able to meet these conditions. The soldiers of the Military Training Agency received mass drill three times a month, which was the same number suggested in Qi Jiguang’s manual. However, the soldiers of the militia units had to direct their strength toward making their own living, which made it difficult to get enough training. Their mass drill, conducted only during the agricultural off-season, did not meet the number of drills originally required by Qi Jiguang. The training of the militias had to be focused on individual combat skills training rather than collective drill. As a result of their lack of training, militia units showed a lack of collective movement on the actual battlefield (Yŏllyŏsil kisul, 186).

There is no doubt that the Military Training Agency had strongly trained and disciplined harquebusiers. However, not only were their numbers too small, but they were assigned to particular tasks solely meant for them as royal guards, which made it hard for them to be active on the battlefield. From the beginning, the Military Training Agency carried out the task of guarding the palace.

The mission continued after the war. They usually escorted the king, defended the royal palaces and the capital where the king was located, and maintained security. When the king left the capital, the Agency accompanied the king to prevent possible threats. At least 10 to 22 companies (approximately ∼2,300 troops) from the Agency accompanied the king (No Reference No2019, 119). In contrast, when committed to battle, the number of troops deployed did not exceed five companies. Also, the king disliked dispatching the Military Training Agency to military affairs far from the capital, and the commanders of the unit also refused to authorize long-distance missions, under the pretext of escorting the king (Kwanghaegun Ilgi, 1610/9/28).

The proportion and role of the standing army on the actual battlefield were small. In the seventeenth century, Chosŏn was threatened by the Manchus, who were trying to drive out the Ming and seize supremacy. The Military Training Agency sent troops to the northern strategic points because of requests from the border area, but the number of troops was usually below 200 (Kwanghaegun Ilgi, 1622/4/27). This is in contrast to the 7,000 armored soldiers in charge of northern defense in the early Chosŏn dynasty (Oh Reference Oh2003, 144). In 1624, when deputy field commander Yi Kwal rebelled against the court, chief State Councilor Yi Wŏnik argued that the Agency should be sent to battle. However, the commander of the Agency ignored it, stating the Agency should guard the king, not go to the battlefield (Injo Sillok, 1624/2/7-8). Also, during the First Manchu Invasion in 1627, the Agency was dedicated to the task of escorting the king instead of going out to the front (Injo Sillok, 1627/1/18).

Although these new soldiers were indeed well-trained troops, they were soldiers who did not actively enter the battlefield. The king of Chosŏn did not directly lead the army and perform the role of a field commander like Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden or Napoleon of France. When war broke out, the king of Chosŏn stayed in the capital or moved to a fortress or an island. In a country where the king did not attend the battlefield himself, it was difficult for the royal guards to play a major role on the battlefield. Instead of the new soldiers, the old soldiers were assigned to fight the enemy in a series of external crises. In particular, Chosŏn’s militias did not merely serve a supplementary or subordinate function to the standing army; rather, they played a leading role and often stood at the forefront of military engagements, including cross-border offensives. A notable example occurred in 1619, when Chosŏn joined Ming forces in an offensive against the rising Later Jin – which would later establish the Qing dynasty. The majority of the troops dispatched by Chosŏn for this campaign were militia forces (Chang Reference Chang2021, 78).

During the Second Manchu Invasion in 1636, the situation was a little different. As the Manchurian vanguard, which bypassed all the fortresses in the northern regions, arrived near the capital after only seven days and cut an escape route to the island, King Injo (r. 1623–1649) of Korea had to take refuge with his standing army in Namhan Fortress (南漢山城) near the capital, while the Qing army besieged the fortress for forty-seven days. As the king’s location became the battlefield, new soldiers of the Military Training Agency were also committed to the battle. But still, it was the militia’s mission to fight against the 40,000 cavalrymen in the open field. To save the king who was surrounded by the enemy, the commanders of each province gathered all their troops, marched to the capital, and fought against the Qing army. However, the provincial armies, composed of militias armed with harquebuses, were unable to achieve their objective.

Without a large-scale external war, small-scale troop dispatches and civil wars became the main military issues after the Second Manchu Invasion. Still, the military activity of the standing army was not prominent. As a result of the defeat, Chosŏn formed a new tributary relationship with the Qing dynasty and fought with the enemy of the Qing. The Qing now demanded the dispatch of harquebusiers to fight against the Ming. The subjects of conscription came from the Royal Division and militia units that later became the basis for the establishment of the Guard Division. These soldiers with rotational duty were drafted from all over the provinces, gathered in the capital, and dispatched (Pibyŏnsa Tŭngnok, 1641/5/15). In 1654 and 1658, the Qing once again demanded the dispatch of harquebusiers, at this time, to fight against Russian expeditions. At their request, Chosŏn assembled and dispatched harquebusiers from the border area, not the central army (Pukchŏng Ilgi, 56). Although their affiliation was not specifically described, it is presumed that they belonged to the sogo army or other local militia units, because Chosŏn did not operate standing army units in this area.

A similar pattern appeared during times of civil war. Against the massive rebellion of 1728, the government quickly organized and dispatched a suppression force of approximately 2,000 men. At this time, the Military Training Agency mobilized three companies, and the Royal Division and Guard Division mobilized five companies each that were on-duty. Two cavalry companies from the city near the capital participated (Cho Reference Cho and yŏn’guso1998, 108–109). Still, it was the militias who constituted the majority of the government forces. In addition, the soldiers from the Military Training Agency were all cavalry and were armed with bows, swords, and flails (Man’gi yoram, 264). The standing infantry of the Agency armed with personal firearms and trained with collective tactics did not participate in the first suppression force. After the decisive victory, some troops were mobilized to defeat the remaining rebels in the southern provinces, but the number was about two companies (Hun’guk Tŭngnok, 467–470). Also, it was the local militias who suppressed the remaining rebel forces in the southern provinces (Yŏngjo Sillok, 1728/4/2).

It was not until the Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion in 1811 that the harquebusiers from the standing army were able to take noticeable action on the battlefield. The Military Training Agency dispatched two cavalry companies and three infantry companies (375 soldiers) composed of harquebusiers. The Guard Division and Royal Division also mobilized two infantry companies that had been converted to standing forces during this period, along with a small number of cavalry forces (Ko Reference Ko2019, 285). These central troops played an important role in suppressing the rebellion. However, militias from P’yŏngan Province – where the rebellion took place – secured a decisive victory over the rebels at the Battle of Songnim prior to the arrival of the central forces (Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi, 1812/1/2). Moreover, the majority of the 9,000 troops who besieged Chŏngju Castle, where the rebels made their final stand, also consisted of local militias.

How about the overall military buildup? What is noteworthy is that it is difficult to see any movement to replace the militia with a standing army until the middle of the eighteenth century, when potential military demand, assuming an all-out war against the Qing, was dissipated. The expansion of the standing army always entailed a broader expansion of the militia units. Even after the Manchu Invasion in 1636, the seventeenth century was not a time of peace for Korea. Even though the Qing dynasty asserted dominance over mainland China, it was unclear whether the Qing would be able to stabilize their domination in the long term or whether they would collapse soon. In 1673, the surrendered Ming generals revolted against the Qing Dynasty. In this unstable international situation, Chosŏn continued to strengthen its military power. This involved a process of restoring the military system that had collapsed during the Manchu invasions and, at the same time, preparing for the “Northern Expedition (pukpŏl 北伐),” the political movement planning a military assault against the Qing for revenge. There are disagreements on the actual intent of the policy, but it is clear that a major overhaul of the military had been made. In the process of preparing for the Northern Expedition, the increase in the size of the army was most notable for its increase in the number of militias. The Military Training Agency was augmented by 75 percent to 7,000 men. However, it was the Royal Division that was selected as the main unit, and as a result, this division increased in strength by 200 percent from 7,000 in the 1640s to 21,000 in 1652 (No Reference No2015, 73-74). The size of the sogo army also doubled. In addition, military units composed of militias serving on a rotational basis – numbering approximately twenty thousand men – were established as part of the central army (Hyŏnjong Kaesu sillok, 1663/11/14). During the reign of next king Hyŏnjong (r. 1659–1674), the size of the Agency returned to 5000, but the size of the militia units was maintained. The military buildup in the seventeenth century aimed to expand a type of army similar to the one that existed before the war rather than to enhance the units with the new type of soldiers.

At the end of the seventeenth century, the Qing’s dominance stabilized, but Chosŏn’s security concerns were not completely resolved. As the Zunghar military threat became prominent, the possibility of the collapse of the Qing dominance and consequent security crisis continued to be raised, despite its unlikelihood. Also, the threat of pirates gradually came more into focus (No Reference No2016, 135). By 1704, the number of soldiers in the Royal Division and Guard Division was reduced by 17 percent, while the number of the Military Training Agency was preserved. However, the proportion of the standing army had not yet increased. The size of the sogo army was maintained, and various types of new militia units like clerks and slave units (inodae 吏奴隊) were established in the provinces. The government maintained the organization and manpower of the militias while continuing to produce and supply harquebuses. Despite various issues – such as problems with storage, maintenance, and the leakage of arms – the state persisted in its efforts to arm the militias, accepting the accompanying burdens (Namgung Reference Namgung2025, 143–153).

The cause of continuity

As examined above, the traditional militia system in Chosŏn persisted over an extended period and continued to play a significant military role, regardless of the introduction of the harquebus and the subsequent changes in warfare. In Chosŏn, militias were the primary users of the harquebus. Why, then, did the transformation of military organization – of the kind described in classical Military Revolution theory or observed in China from an early period – not take prominent form in Chosŏn? Several reasons can be deduced for this. Existing studies have suggested that a fiscal problem was the reason (Kang Reference Kang2013, 173–178). Certainly, in the 17th and 18th centuries, government departments continued to raise complaints about the pressure that the Military Training Agency put on central finances (Pang Reference Pang2016, 253–255). It was also recorded that the salaries of these soldiers consumed about two-thirds of the Ministry of Taxation’s annual budget (Ko Reference Ko2019, 263). The tax burden on the people was used as an important argument for those who advocated the reduction of the Military Training Agency.

The question here, however, is whether there was ever truly a strong intention to expand the standing army at the cost of financial expansion. Even after the national fiscal situation stabilized, there was no movement to expand the military budget or the standing army. During King Sukchong’s reign (1674–1720), the overall financial situation improved considerably despite several fatal famines. During this period, Korea gained huge profits from silver and copper through intermediary trade between the China and Japan. These financial gains served as the basis for the Korean government to implement a large-scale coin circulation policy that had failed before. There were even concerns that the stored grains would decay (Kim Reference Kim2018, 195–199). However, the military changes during this period focused on the establishment of new militia units and the construction of additional fortresses near the capital.

In the eighteenth century, there were also movements to control and reduce the expansion of military finances. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Office of Equal Service (Kyunyŏkch’ŏng 均役廳) was established to integrate and manage the taxes that had been independently collected by each of the military divisions. This process involved fiscal centralization but not a fiscal expansion of the military. Essentially, this reform was planned to restrain the military budget. Although the overall financial situation was not insufficient, each divisions’ attempts to request additional financial payment from the Office of Equal Service or to acquire means of replenishment on their own were strictly blocked (Sŏ Reference Sŏ2020, 64-65).

Indeed, the demand for a standing army in Chosŏn Korea was not large enough to prompt the expansion of the tax system and changes in the national structure. The movement to overcome financial limitations appeared only limited; on the contrary, Korea tried to operate a military system while keeping overall finances fixed. The expansion of military power usually appeared in the form of the creation of new militia units, which posed a limited burden on the national finances.

Throughout the Chosŏn dynasty, Korea strongly avoided pursuing a standing army, preferring the militia system. This path was selected based on the ideological orientation and perception of historical precedents, which had formed negative views of the effectiveness of the standing army. After the outbreak of the Imjin War, the necessity of separating soldiers and farmers, which meant the creation of professional soldiers, was raised several times. The Chosŏn government blamed untrained soldiers for the defeat in the early years of the war – a result of the collapse of the existing military training system (Kim Reference Kim2015, 40). The separation of soldiers and farmers emerged as a solution to untrained farmers’ filling the military roster.

It is noteworthy that even under such circumstances, the perception that the militia system was ideal was maintained. Kim Uong (1540–1603), the Inspector-General, who advocated the separation of soldiers and farmers in 1594, said at the same time that “it has been a matter of concern since ancient times (Sŏnjo Sillok, 1594/5/30).” In 1595, King Sŏnjo (r. 1567–1608) also said that the separation of soldiers and farmers was necessary in the immediate term, but at the same time, he recognized that the combination of soldiers and farmers was a “beautiful system (Sŏnjo Sillok, 1595/9/6).” The problem of the militia system was regarded as an operational problem rather than an essential weakness. On the other hand, the problem of the standing army was regarded as an essential element. Therefore, as time went by, the demand for the return to the militia system and the abolition of the standing army gradually became stronger.

The strong orientation toward the militia system and the negative perception of the standing army had long-standing roots. Ouyang Xiu (歐陽脩; 1007–1072) of the Northern Song dynasty of China, who later inspired many Confucian scholars in Korea, offered a critical assessment of the military systems of earlier periods. According to his argument, the militia system of the Tang dynasty followed the principle of the ancient Zhou dynasty’s militia system; it also made numerous military accomplishments of Tang possible, and with the system’s weakening, the dynasty also declined (Tang Song ba da jia wen chao, 311–313). Similar perceptions can be found in Essential Excerpts of the Comprehensive Mirror (Tongjian jieyao 通鑑節要). Here, the militia system of the Tang dynasty was repeatedly portrayed as the most ideal and commendable model. The system was “the best of the military systems since the three ancient dynasties of antiquity,” but the descendants failed to maintain it properly (Tongjian jieyao, 47). Conversely, Zhang Yue (張說 663–730), the Tang official who established a standing army with professional soldiers in the early eighth century, was received negatively. He was understood as the initiator of the distinction between soldiers and farmers, an act that permanently abolished the idealistic ancient system (Tongjian jieyao, 279).

In Chosŏn, where Neo-Confucianism was used as a national ideology, the state system of ancient China was regarded as an ideal model. Similar to Ouyang Xiu’s views, the militia system of the ancient Zhou dynasty was also regarded as the ideal military system, and the Tang dynasty’s system was its most legitimate successor. On the contrary, the standing army system, expressed in the word changjŏng, was pointed out as the cause of the national crisis in the late Tang dynasty. Chŏng Tojŏn, who organized the early national system, observed that the Han dynasty weakened with Emperor Wu’s (156–29BC) establishment of the changjŏng army and that the Tang dynasty failed to maintain the fubing militia system, which also led to the collapse of the country. In his eyes, the same fate befell to the previous dynasty.

This perception was not limited to the personal views of Chŏng Tojŏn. King Sejong (r. 1418–1450), who also played a central role in shaping Chosŏn’s state system, expressed similar views and regarded the militia system as the ideal form of military organization (Sejong Sillok, 1435/4/17). This ideological stance of the state’s architects shaped the structure of the military system (Namgung Reference Namgung2025, 84–90). The situation was the same in the late Chosŏn Dynasty, as the same logic was raised in 1725 during the royal Confucian lecture (Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi, 1725/1/6). The phrase, “There is nothing better than pubyŏng system and nothing worse than the changjŏng system” was a strong belief that lasted from the beginning until the end of the Chosŏn dynasty (Hanp’ojae chip, 153; Ch’ŏngjanggwan chŏnsŏ, 129–132; Hyŏnjong Sillok, 1661/1/15). Those who opposed the reduction or abolition of the Military Training Agency also showed a positive perception of the militia system and a negative view of the changjŏng system (Hyŏnjong Sillok, 1669/11/1; Sukchong Sillok, 1682/4/27). The ultimate solution to the military problem was the proper restoration of the proper militia system. This perception had strong continuity in that it appeared the same even after contact with Western military power in the nineteenth century (Kojong Sillok, 1867/1/16; Unyang chip, 160).

The perspective of the military system of ancient and medieval China was also connected to the view of the Chosŏn army. The pre-war military system was regarded as adhering to the principle of the Tang dynasty’s militia system, and the sogo army was understood as an imitation of the system of the Zhou dynasty. Also, both the Royal Division and Guard Division were understood to be imitating the Tang dynasty’s system (Chŏngjo Sillok, 1796/3/22). On the other hand, the Military Training Agency was considered to take the form of the changjŏng system (Sukchong Sillok, 1704/12/28). Naturally, the negative thoughts associated with the changjŏng system were linked with the perceptions of the Military Training Agency. In the eyes of those who were negative about the changjŏng system, the soldiers of the Agency were arrogant, lazy, incompetent, and unable to properly march because they were city dwellers, not farmers (Sukchong Sillok, 1682/4/27; 1697/8/25; 1719/9/2).

Military theorists with practical experience in military affairs also expressed similar perspectives. Song Kyubin (1696–1778) stands as a representative example. He was a professional military bureaucrat and theorist who advocated an aggressive strategy toward the Qing (Siegmund Reference Siegmund and Eugene2025, 98). He criticized the central military units, including the Military Training Agency, and argued that the militia system of the pre-war Chosŏn dynasty was the most suitable military system in terms of both peacetime management and wartime tactical operations (Paek Reference Paek2004, 121–128). He also acknowledged the usefulness of the sogo army. Belief in the militia system and distrust in the standing army made Korea continue to prefer a militia-based military organization.

Of course, this tendency did not result in the complete abolition of the standing army. Although calls for its dissolution emerged on several occasions, the standing army – as noted above – remained a core institution for the protection of the monarch. For this reason, the king consistently rejected such demands (Pang Reference Pang2025, 21–35). The standing army also served as the police force within the capital. The practical need to guard the throne and secure the capital prevented the standing army from being deployed to the battlefield, while simultaneously shielding it from various ideological criticisms.

Korea’s ideological orientation toward the militia system was also in line with the actual military demand that Korea was facing. The defining characteristic of Korea’s military environment was that the external military threats were typically potential rather than ongoing – especially in contrast to contemporary European countries – and that war itself appeared very rarely, but at the same time, the scale tended to be very large when the potential threats became real. During the Imjin War, the Japanese troops dispatched about 150,000 expeditionary forces. Subsequently, the Manchus sent 20,000 horsemen during the first invasion and 40,000 for the second invasion (Ku Reference Ku2015). With the potential threat of a continuously-maintained, large-scale enemy, Korea had no choice but to acquire a large-scale army of their own. In 1626, the required military demand was tallied at 120,000 and government calculated that 40,000 troops should be put at the front (Ch’oe Reference Ch’oe1995, 229). If the potential external crisis became a reality, Chosŏn could not supply the minimum necessary manpower with only a small number of an elite standing army. In contrast, if such a potential crisis was not realized, the actual military demand was low. Chosŏn was able to sufficiently cope with the internal military crises by using a small number of the standing army and militia units deployed in the capital.

Including both the standing army and the militias, Chosŏn’s total military force – estimated at approximately 300,000 – was not exceptionally large compared to several European states of the same period. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Europe experienced a marked expansion in military forces, with armies frequently numbering in the hundreds of thousands (Parker Reference Parker1988). In contrast, Chosŏn was characterized by a relative absence of immediate military conflict. During the late Chosŏn period, relations with neighboring states stabilized, and no major wars occurred for an extended time (Hŏ Reference Hŏ2020, 39–85). Nevertheless, the perceived necessity of maintaining a sizable military force in preparation for emergencies persisted and proposals to reduce the size of the militias were repeatedly rejected (Namgung Reference Namgung2025, 25–33). As actual threats remained minimal, a significant gap emerged between Chosŏn’s immediate military needs and its anticipated wartime requirements. To simultaneously supply the very small number of troops required in normal times and the extremely large number of troops needed in wartime, Chosŏn focused on the militia system.

Another realistic condition, which supported the ideological orientation, was the national strategic posture that Chosŏn was taking. After the attempt to attack the Liaodong region at the end of the previous dynasty was abandoned by Yi Sŏngkye (1335–1408) himself, the founder of the new dynasty, Chosŏn accepted the hegemony of Ming China. After expelling the Jurchen tribes from the northern part of the Korean Peninsula in the fifteenth century, Chosŏn had no intention of expanding its territory anymore.

Not only was field warfare in the enemy’s territory not considered, but also in the defense strategy, Chosŏn pursued battles using fortresses rather than field battles. Traditionally, Korea implemented a strategy to build and defend multilayered fortresses. This strategic orientation remained consistent even after personal firearms became widely adopted. Experiences during the Imjin War confirmed that fortress defense remained an effective strategy in warfare. This wartime lesson influenced subsequent efforts to reorganize the military (Hŏ Reference Hŏ2012, 82–84). Even when the Northern Expedition movement was underway, efforts to strengthen the defensive posture were strongly maintained. King Hyojong (r. 1649–1659) emphasized checking the defense system by overhauling the militia units in the southern regions and repairing many fortresses. The production of new cannons during this period also focused on producing defensive weapons (No Reference No2016, 134).

The adoption of the national defensive strategy and the defense war strategy using fortresses could have offset the weaknesses of the harquebus. The problem with the lack of collective training of the militia could be solved if defensive battles were carried out on rough terrain or with fortresses. The militia with harquebuses was not always incompetent on the battlefield. During the Battle of Kwanggyo Mountain and the Battle of Kimhwa in 1636, the Korean militia harquebusiers showed considerable ability, killing the commanders of the Qing army (Kang Reference Kang2013, 154). The battles in which the Korean militia armed with harquebuses showed their abilities were commonly fought at fortresses or on rough terrain comparable to a fortress. A Chosŏn official also said that the specialty of the Korean army was to rely on the rough terrain and block the enemy using harquebuses (Pibyŏnsa Tŭngnok, 1689/10/6).

The fortress was an important element in warfare using harquebuses in Chosŏn. The militia cavalry units, which were basically trained with traditional weapons and tactics, honed their harquebus skills on the assumption they would be in a situation where they had to protect the fortress (Kang Reference Kang1999, 611). This could also be confirmed with the introduction of a new harquebus. In 1725, a new harquebus, the “thousand-paces gun” (ch’ŏnboch’ong 千步銃), with a much longer range than the existing harquebus, was developed. When the developer reported the test firing of the weapon, the first purpose he mentioned was “useful for defending castles (Pibyŏnsa Tŭngnok, 1725/12/27).”

Then, although it was not common, what kind of tactics did the Chosŏn army pursue when it had to go in the field? Chosŏn intended to use battle wagons to install obstacles and create fortresses on the field (Sukchong Sillok, 1710/11/27). This tactic, too, was adopted from Chinese military practice. The deployment of wagons and other obstacles to counter cavalry had been implemented earlier in China (Noordam Reference Noordam2023, 343–355). Following his campaigns against the Wokou, Qi Jiguang assumed command in military operations against northern nomadic groups and reorganized his forces to incorporate large numbers of war wagons. The Veritable Record of Troop Drilling (Lian bing shi ji 練兵實紀), a tactical manual based on Qi Jiguang’s campaigns in the northern frontier, once again provided inspiration to Korea. Therefore, it is not surprising that those who considered offensive strategies against the Qing commonly considered combat using war wagons. Yun Hyu (1617–1680), who advocated an attack through an alliance with former Ming general Wu Sangui (1612–1678), claimed that Korea could occupy Shenyang in 10 days with 100,000 troops (Paek Reference Paek2004, 172). As a weapon for the attack, he suggested war wagons pushed and pulled by soldiers (No Reference No2016, 145). Song Kyubin also suggested an “ever-victorious formation” (sangsŭng jin 常勝陳), which used a large number of battle wagons to obstruct enemy cavalry (Paek Reference Paek2004, 166). Controversy continued over what type of battle wagon to use in the mountainous terrain of Korea, but the production of the wagon itself continued. Military training was also conducted to prevent cavalry charges by organizing formations with battle wagons equipped with fifty harquebuses (No Reference No2016, 144–147). Battle wagons were used to suppress the rebellion in the early nineteenth century, and 283 wagons were recorded in the central army’s weapons inventory at the time (No Reference No2016, 153).

Defense strategies using fortresses and field tactics using battle wagons made it unnecessary for Chosŏn to pursue a standing army in new warfare with a large number of harquebuses. Rather than trying to increase the effectiveness of collective tactics through collective training, Chosŏn tried to solve the problem in a different way. It was consistent with the ideological orientation of the military system that Chosŏn had maintained for a long time, as well as the military situation.

In the nineteenth century, the proportion of the standing army in Chosŏn’s total military power gradually increased. Since the Military Training Agency served as both the king’s guard and a defense force for the capital, the demand for a reduction in military power due to the prolonged absence of the external warfare was strongly reflected in the militia units. Following the end of the eighteenth century, the Military Training Agency gradually became a larger portion of Korea’s entire military strength. In addition, the Guard Division and Royal Division were gradually converted into a standing army. The cessation of duty (chŏngbŏn 停番) was a notable phenomenon that appeared in these units at the end of the eighteenth century. This was a measure to suspend the rotating shift of militiamen. This measure was gradually institutionalized, along with the creation of standing combat troops in each of the two divisions. At a government meeting in 1808, a decision was made to create a standing company with people from the capital instead of reinstating the soldiers who had been suspended from duty (Man’gi yoram, 375–378). By the mid-nineteenth century, the number of standing troops had increased, and the system of rotational service was completely abolished (Ko Reference Ko2019, 268). As a result, the standing army became the primary user of the harquebus in battlefield. When the French fleet attacked Kanghwa Island near the capital in 1866, followed by the American fleet in 1871, harquebusiers from the central standing army were dispatched in response and engaged the enemy.

The transition of the central militia divisions into a standing army was implemented as a cost-saving measure. Initially, the cessation of duty was introduced in response to national crises, such as famines or epidemics. When the duty was suspended, soldiers of the militia divisions were required to pay taxes in lieu of performing active service. From the late eighteenth century onward, the government gradually expanded this practice to reduce fiscal spending and expand tax revenues (Ko Reference Ko2019, 268). As a result, the transition toward a standing army entailed dismantling the military functions of large-scale militias and converting their members into taxpayers. This transformation led to a significant reduction in the number of combatants. The two militia divisions, each formerly comprising over 10,000 men, were restructured into standing army units consisting of approximately 500 soldiers each. Thus, the shift to a standing army resulted in a substantial downsizing of the overall military force.

Provincial militia units also gradually lost their military functions. Overall, the training of the militias declined, and their rosters were not properly maintained. Many units were transformed into tax-collection bodies, similar to the central divisions. Although the sogo army retained some degree of practical function, its relative importance within the broader military structure clearly diminished due to the general deterioration of training and weapons supply (Namgung Reference Namgung2025, 153–162). With the abolition of the traditional military system in 1895, the provincial militia system came to a definitive end.

The expansion of the role of the Military Training Agency, the conversion of the Royal Division and Guard Division into standing forces, and the diminished practical functions of provincial militia units increased the proportion of the standing army within the entire military power. This change, however, did not result from the demands of continuous warfare, as in Europe, but rather from the weakening of other types of military organizations due to the prolonged absence of actual external conflict. Therefore, the increase in the proportion of the standing army did not lead to the strengthening of military power. From the 18th to the 19th centuries, regular collective drills within the central army were gradually discontinued for various reasons (Ko Reference Ko2019, 274). The transition to a standing army in the late Chosŏn period was prompted by a reduction in military size and accompanied by a general decline in military strength and combat capabilities.