The history of the recording industry has primarily been written from a Euro-American perspective. Considering the process by which sound reproduction technology developed, together with the formation of the industry around it, such an approach might seem reasonable and even natural. At the turn of the twentieth century, the world witnessed the birth of the international recording industry when the major record companies in Europe and the United States began expanding into other European countries and Canada, taking advantage of new wax disc recording methods.Footnote 1 The companies quickly began searching for markets in the rest of the world, including Asia, Africa, and South America (Liebersohn Reference Liebersohn2019, 178). Their most significant task in the initial stages of this process was to make recordings of artists in each country, as they considered records with familiar sounds to be important for marketing gramophones to local people (Gronow and Saunio Reference Gronow and Saunio1998, 11–12). In addition, the gramophone companies established subsidiaries in locations they considered key for expanding their markets. By setting up regional recording and pressing facilities in such strategic locations, the multinational major labels reinforced their global presence by ensuring efficient production and distribution (Gronow Reference Gronow1981, 252–53). Whether in India, China, Brazil, or Argentina, they established these facilities with the aid of foreign settlers and local intermediaries (G. Jones Reference Jones1985, 87). Thus, it is not an overstatement to say that the Euro-American multinational record companies fundamentally shaped the global emergence of the recording industry as the twentieth century began.
Japan was one destination for the major multinational labels’ international recording expeditions. The recording pioneer Frederick William Gaisberg (1873–1951) traveled to Japan as part of the industry’s first Asian recording tour in January 1903 on behalf of the UK-based Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd (G&T hereafter).Footnote 2 Azami Toshio describes the impact of his arrival with the phrase “the black ship from Britain” (Azami Reference Azami2007a). This metaphor invokes the historical memory in Japan of Commodore Matthew Perry’s steam-powered vessels from the United States, commonly known as “Black Ships” (kurofune 黒船), with a symbolic critique of foreign intrusion, technological dominance, and pressure to modernize and conform. After making the recordings, Gaisberg sent the master discs to Hanover for pressing, and the finished records were then exported back to Japan. Other major companies, such as Columbia and Victor, quickly followed suit (Azami Reference Azami2007a, 835–36). As Hosokawa Shuhei aptly notes, these records were “both national (in terms of content) and foreign (in terms of manufacture),” a duality captured in advertising language like “New Arrival of German- and American-made Japanese titles” (Hosokawa Reference Hosokawa, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 54–55).
Japan responded with remarkable speed and initiative, establishing its own recording and pressing infrastructure within a decade. The swift domestic expansion of Japan’s recording industry through the 1910s and the first half of the 1920s redefined the market landscape in Japan and its colonies. During the same period, the multinational major record companies established pressing factories in other strategic locations. The Gramophone Company’s Calcutta (contemporary Kolkata) plant had been pressing discs since 1908, producing Indian-language titles under various labels, including the iconic HMV (His Master’s Voice) as well as Chinese-language recordings for Victor. In 1910, Compagnie Pathé-Orient began manufacturing discs through its pressing factory in Shanghai (Lubinski and Steen Reference Lubinski and Steen2017, 285–287; Steen Reference Steen, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 111). In 1913, Germany’s Lindström also opened a record factory in Buenos Aires intended to outpace its US competitors by cutting costs and accelerating production in South America (Gronow and Saunio Reference Gronow and Saunio1998, 30). The global majors continued to profit substantially from the Japanese market, as Japan remained one of world’s leading importers of high-quality gramophones and records produced in the United States and Europe, particularly classical music records. However, they did not establish pressing plants in Japan until the late 1920s (Mason Reference Mason1992, 37). Japan’s recording industry in its formative years was thus marked by a division in the market: premium classical music records were largely supplied by multinational majors while most Japanese titles came from domestic companies.
From the late 1920s, the Japanese recording industry became increasingly integrated with the multinational record companies through affiliations and mergers. Serving as gateways for new technologies, capital, managerial methods, and diverse catalogs, the multinationals spearheaded Japan’s transition from acoustic to electrical recording. This institutional shift was deeply influenced by the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 and its aftermath. The Japanese government’s subsequent tariffs on luxury goods, coupled with its promotion of domestic consumption, significantly curtailed foreign exports to Japan, leading to increased direct investment by the global majors (Gronow Reference Gronow1981, 282–283). Beginning in the late 1920s, three companies, Columbia, Victor, and Deutsche Grammophon, set up regional corporations in Japan in collaboration with domestic partners to manufacture and distribute their gramophones and records locally. The era of electrical recording was led by the transnational labels, namely Nippon Columbia, Nippon Victor, and Nippon Polydor, followed by two domestic ones, King Record Co. (Kingu Rekōdo) and Imperial Phonograph Co. (Teikoku Chikuonki) (Hosokawa Reference Hosokawa, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 60–69).Footnote 3 While the recording industry in the rest of the world suffered during the Great Depression of the 1930s, record production flourished not only in Japan but also in its colonies (Choi Reference Choi2018, 54–55; Wang Reference Wang, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 182; Yamauchi Reference Yamauchi, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 94).
Through the lens of “minor transnational engagements,” this article examines how Japanese record companies, especially the Nipponophone Company (Nihon Chikuonki Shōkai 日本蓄音器商會, abbr. Nitchiku, hereafter “Nipponophone”),Footnote 4 led the construction of a domestic recording industry in the 1910s. It highlights how the Japan-headquartered, but largely American-funded and managed Nipponophone strategically mobilized foreign expertise to compete with rival firms. Compared to the multinational major record companies, Nipponophone remained small (“minor”) in global terms but operated with legal and managerial autonomy by embedding its identity in Japan’s domestic market. By approaching Nipponophone as a form of domestic entrepreneurship, different from a subsidiary of the international labels, this article argues that Japan’s early recording industry was shaped as much by Japanese and settler investors, foreign recording experts, and consumers as it was by the global majors. The expression “minor transnational engagements” thus captures the domestic companies’ entrepreneurial drive and agency, which helped make Japan’s early recording industry vibrant and autonomous.
While some Anglophone scholars have published monographs on the modern transformation of music and its practitioners in Japan in relation to sound technology and the early twentieth century recording industry, studies focused on the industry in Japan have largely remained the domain of Japanese scholars. Their studies often highlight Japan’s responses to the expansion of the global majors, focusing on domestic initiatives and contributions. This article builds on such literature by drawing attention to the often-overlooked roles of settler entrepreneurs and foreign recording engineers who were instrumental in shaping the industry in its formative period. I have relied especially on Kurata Yoshihiro’s Nihon rekōdo bunkashi (A history of Japanese record culture, 2006) and Azami Toshio’s numerous articles, which have been compiled in his book Nijusseiki Nihon rekōdo sangyōshi: gurōbaru kigyō no shinkō to shijō no hatten (A history of the Japanese record industry in the twentieth century: the advancement of global companies and market development, 2016). These works offer focused analyses of the development of Japan’s recording industry. In revising this article, I was fortunate to be able to incorporate insights from the recently published volume Phonographic Modernity: The Gramophone Industry and Music Genres in East and Southeast Asia (eds. Yamauchi Fumitaka and Ying-fen Wang, Reference Yamauchi, Yamauchi and Wang2024). Structured by country-specific case studies, the book significantly broadened my comparative lens across Asian contexts.
By juxtaposing scholarly works with company-produced and foreign-produced primary sources, this article presents a globally informed yet locally specific understanding of the formation of the Japanese recording industry. Although they are integral to understanding Nipponophone’s minor transnational engagements, two sources have been overlooked in most existing scholarship on Japan’s record production. First, The Talking Machine World, the top US trade magazine for the recording industry between 1905 and 1928, contains numerous news items contributed by foreign recording engineers and managers at Nipponophone.Footnote 5 Second, the encyclopedic website Recording Pioneers contains comprehensive documentation regarding sound recording innovators, including a collection of period documents and photos. The site thus provides invaluable information and evidence about the employees and associates of Nipponophone. By examining locally driven minor transnational engagements based on these and other primary and secondary sources, this article demonstrates that careful attention to local diversities can enrich our understanding of the international history of commercial recorded sound in its formative era.
From imports to domestic manufacturing
Everett Frazar, who had served as Thomas Edison’s local agent in China and Japan since 1889, gave a broadly pessimistic assessment of the region’s business climate in 1893 (Lubinski and Steen Reference Lubinski and Steen2017, 277–278).Footnote 6 His opinion, however, did not deter several multinational record companies from attempting to enter those markets, taking advantage of new technology for wax disc recording. Frederick Gaisberg recorded in China from September 1902 to August 1903, visiting Shanghai and Hong Kong with support from S. Moutrie & Co. (Gaisberg Reference Gaisberg1942, 62–63).Footnote 7 The Columbia Graphophone Co. and the Victor Talking Machine Co. dispatched recording engineers to China in 1904 and 1905 respectively, and they continued to organize visits afterward. The International Talking Machine Co. m.b.H. (popularly known as Odeon) and the German Beka-Records G.m.b.H. also produced records with sound sources obtained through recording tours (Steen Reference Steen, Roy and Rodriguez2021, 46–55). Other companies, namely Favorite, Lyrophone, Zonophone, and Pathé, also released these sorts of records (Min Reference Min2020). In response to growing markets in China and Southeast Asia, M. E. Labansat (?–1939) founded Pathé Orient in Shanghai in 1910 as a subsidiary of the multinational Compagnie-Générale Phonographique Pathé-Frères. He also served as the new branch’s first general manager. By 1914, Pathé Orient had established its own recording studio and pressing plant, initiating domestic commercial record production in China. The firm soon reached a dominant position in the Chinese market and began to expand its reach across Southeast Asia (A. Jones Reference Jones, Liu, Fish and Jameson2000, 214). Thus, by setting up a subsidiary for local production, Pathé Orient brought about a change in how Chinese records were produced. That is, it could produce content on-site instead of via recording tours. In this way, the company followed the general pattern of the international record industry’s global expansion.
As with China, Gaisberg’s visit to Japan prompted the multinational record companies to organize their own recording tours. The Columbia Phonograph Company, often called US Columbia, arranged three such trips in 1903, 1905, and 1906, while the Victor Talking Machine Company did so in 1907 and 1911. Others did so as well, including Beka, Lyrophone, and Pathé, which recorded in Japan in 1906, 1907, and 1911, respectively (Yamaguchi Reference Yamaguchi1936, 11; Azami Reference Azami2007a, 844–46, 848). During Gaisberg’s visit, Kairakutei Burakku (Henry James Black, 快楽亭 ブラック, 1858–1923), Japan’s first foreign-born kabuki actor, acted as a liaison between Gaisberg and the musicians and entertainers he sought to record (Gaisberg Reference Gaisberg1946, 59). However, local agencies/dealers, notably Sankōdō (三光堂), Tenshōdō (天賞堂), and the Sale & Frazer Co.,Footnote 8 assumed this role from then on, so that they had the right to handle products of the global labels. According to Azami, Sankōdō was responsible for importing and marketing records made by Gaisberg for G&T, while Tenshōdō acted as an intermediary for the first Columbia recordings and therefore owned the sales rights for the complete set of finished records. Azami highlights the intense competition among these companies with the following example. Although Gaisberg conducted his recording sessions in 1903 ahead of Columbia, Tenshōdō managed to acquire Columbia’s discs before Sankōdō received G&T’s recordings. As a result, Tenshōdō began selling Columbia records in November 1903, while Sankōdō had to wait until the following January. (Azami Reference Azami2007a, 850–51). The fact that Tenshōdō was able to beat Sankōdō to the market with its Columbia discs nullified any advantage Sankōdō had acquired with its earlier recordings. Tenshōdō, therefore, gained increased recognition in the marketplace. With support from their local agencies/dealers, international recording ventures continued to drive record production into the early 1910s. A notable early example was Columbia’s 1905 recording project, conducted by Henry (Harry) Louise Marker (1876–1966) and Charles W. Carson (1870–1961). Acting as Victor’s general agency, Sale & Frazar Co. coordinated the company’s 1907 recording tour and distributed its products through their network of dealers (Azami Reference Azami2007a, 850–851; Kurata Reference Kurata2006b, 293). Likewise, the multinational record companies’ field recording expeditions were negotiated by local actors, who influenced not only the choice of recorded content but also the later circulation of sound products. While artistic origins remained a vital marker of cultural value, commercial advantage often depended on timing and logistical coordination.
Nipponophone: a domestic enterprise with foreign management
Yamauchi aptly observes that Japan was the first Asian country to establish a recording industry, often collaborating with Western capital and technology (Yamauchi Reference Yamauchi, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 81). The Nipponophone Company played a crucial role in the early development and localization of Japan’s recording industry. It was led by the American entrepreneur Frederick W. Horne (1868–1921),Footnote 9 whose ambition and business acumen made him a pioneering figure in the introduction of gramophone technology and commercial recording techniques in Japan. According to an official history published by Nippon Columbia, Horne’s self-named company imported the American Graphophone Company’s wax cylinder graphophones to Japan for the first time in 1896, and Sankōdō distributed them. Subsequently, Horne assumed co-ownership of Sankōdō together with Matsumoto Buichirō (a.k.a. Matsumoto Takeoichirō 松本武一郞),Footnote 10 one of the firm’s original founders.Footnote 11 Between 1903 and 1904, Horne arranged for the introduction of products by the Victor Talking Machine Company to Japan. Sale & Frazer Co. managed their domestic sales (Victor Company of Japan Ltd. Fiftieth Anniversary Editorial Committee 1977, 46).Footnote 12 Furthermore, on behalf of Sankōdō, Horne oversaw the organization of all recording sessions for Columbia in 1905 (Min Reference Min2008). He and Matsumoto were also preparing to establish a domestic gramophone and record company of their own by then. Unfortunately, Matsumoto died in 1907 before this could happen.
Although Matsumoto’s untimely death has often been mentioned by scholars (Kurata Reference Kurata2006 44; Azami Reference Azami2007a 850; Reference Azami2007b 9; Hosokawa Reference Hosokawa, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 57), less attention has been given to Horne’s consistent entrepreneurial efforts. He initially set up the Japan-American Phonograph Manufacturing Company (日米蓄音器製造株式会社 JAPMC hereafter) in 1907 and then founded the Japan-American Phonograph Trading Company (日米蓄音器商会) as its sales agency. After the construction of a dedicated factory in Kawasaki was completed in July 1909, JAPMC began releasing single-sided records on five imprints—Royal, American, Globe, Universal, and Symphony—the following year.Footnote 13 The first four gramophone types under the Nipponophone trademark were also released around this time (Kawazoe Reference Kawazoe1940, 12–13). These products are considered the first domestically made gramophones and disc records in Japan. Horne also set up a new sales agency, the Nipponophone Trading Company, to replace the Japan-American Phonograph Trading Company in October 1910 (Nippon Columbia Fiftieth Anniversary Editorial Committee 1961).Footnote 14 Horne then converted the Nipponophone Company from a sole proprietorship into a joint-stock company on October 1, 1910 (Kawazoe Reference Kawazoe1940, 9), which is recognized as the official founding date of the company. By 1912, JAPMC and the Nipponophone Company (JAPMC/Nipponophone hereafter) had been combined under the Nipponophone name, establishing a centralized system for production and distribution. Throughout the acoustic recording era, Nipponophone maintained a dominant position within Japan’s recording industry.
Unlike Pathé Orient in Shanghai or G&T’s Calcutta plant, which were founded in affiliation with multinational record companies, Nipponophone was an independent domestic company. Allen Sutton, a scholar of early recording history, cites an article from The Daily Metropolis,Footnote 15 published on the last day of 1910, which notes that US investors contributed 80 percent of Nipponophone’s initial capitalization, with the remainder funded by Japanese sources. The company planned to make every dealer a stockholder, claiming that it would eventually become nearly 50 percent Japanese-owned (Sutton Reference Sutton2024).Footnote 16 Although there is no evidence that this claim was ever fully met, Nipponophone did intend to encourage dealers to acquire its stock from early on. The Talking Machine World described a way to achieve this goal: “According to the plan, the dealer is required to deposit approved security for goods sent to him on consignment and when he buys stock in the selling company and pays cash for it, he is allowed to deposit his stock as security, besides getting a discount of 2 percent on goods purchased” (Talking Machine World 1913, 50). However, this did not necessarily mean that Japanese had influential voices in the company. According to the “Fifty-year Chronological Table” in an official Nippon Columbia company history book, Nipponophone’s board of directors included two foreign and two Japanese members in 1910, but between 1912 and 1919, all successive board members were foreign nationals, judging from the katakana rendering of their names. For example, the directors elected in 1912 included F. W. Horne, J. R. Geary, H. E. Metcalf, W. T. Payne, and J. C. Fletcher (alternatively identified as H. D. Cole),Footnote 17 while W. E. Ketcham and S. H. Gray served as inspectors. (Talking Machine World, 1912, p. 4). After this time, only a single Japanese name can be occasionally found among the company’s executives up to 1925 (Nippon Columbia Fiftieth Anniversary Editorial Committee 1961). Although Nipponophone moved toward becoming a company co-owned by American settler entrepreneurs and Japanese, rooted in its local distribution network, the company’s leadership was securely in the hands of foreign settlers.
Technology, competition, and market growth
Under Horne, Nipponophone prioritized the recruitment of recording specialists from the United States, seeking to import the most current technology and expertise. A key example was the industry pioneer John O. Prescott (1871–1946), whose addition was crucial for the company’s initial growth. Prescott had significant knowledge of sound reproduction technology and professional experience in the recording business. As Sutton notes, he had helped establish the American Record Company in 1904 and served as general manager of its manufacturing operations as well as its sales agency, Hawthorne, Sheble & Prescott. Despite the success of its “Blue Indian Records” imprint, the American Record Company lost to the American Graphophone Company in a 1907 patent infringement case, which led to the company’s collapse. In May 1909, Prescott left the United States for England and then traveled to France, Russia, China, Manchuria, Korea, and finally Japan (Sutton 2023, 4–7; Reference Sutton2024). He discussed his experiences during this journey in detail in an article titled “‘Talker’ Conditions in Foreign Countries,” which appeared in the September 1909 issue of The Talking Machine World. The article introduced Prescott by emphasizing his expertise in the mechanics of talking machine devices and processes and noted that he was also an inventor. It further highlighted his extensive connections within the record industry. As indicated in the subtitle, “Discussed by J. O. Prescott,” the article primarily consisted of his own writing, including much self-promotion, presented in long block quotes. His assessment was that the general trade conditions in Europe were excellent, but both Japan and China were “poor” markets with a “dismal” outlook. Prescott at least acknowledged that Japan had made efforts to produce talking machines and records independently, although not on a large scale (Talking Machine World 1909, 41). These “imitation American talking machines and records,” as he called them, were the efforts of American settler entrepreneurs and their Japanese partners to localize technology for the nascent Nipponophone Company under the leadership of Horne.
Driven by a desire to acquire advanced technology, Nipponophone likely regarded Prescott as indispensable because of his technological skills, experience, and extensive global network of associates, including his older brother, Frederick M. Prescott (1869–1923). The older Prescott was a well-known figure in the industry, having helped found the International Zonophone Company and the International Talking Machine Company, among others. Moreover, his arrival in Japan could not have been timelier.Footnote 18 Horne probably recruited Prescott during his initial visit in the summer of 1909, at the conclusion of his round-the-world journey. Before settling in Japan, Prescott made a short visit to the United States. He left Japan on July 21, 1909, and returned on October 30, 1909 (Recording Pioneers “John Osgood Prescott,” n.d.).Footnote 19 From late 1909 to the end of 1910, Prescott worked as a laboratory recording expert and general manager for Horne (Talking Machine World 1910a, 3). This was a crucial time for JAPMC/Nipponophone, as it had completed its Kawasaki factory and begun manufacturing its own records and gramophones (Nippon Columbia Fiftieth Anniversary Editorial Committee 1961).Footnote 20 Prescott also operated a two-story recording studio in Tokyo, which featured rooms for recording, performances, manufacturing master disks, and storing them (Azami Reference Azami2007a, 847–48, 855). Acquiring source material was a necessity for gramophone and record production. A newspaper article from December 1910, based on reports by the United States Consul-General Thomas Sammons in Yokohama, states that Nipponophone relied on international trade to acquire parts and raw materials to manufacture gramophones: “All the screws, springs, steel and record-making supplies come from the United States, the shellac from India, the tin for the horns from England and the brass [sic] is Japanese” (Daily Metropolis 1910, 8). Horne and Prescott’s international networks and technical knowhow likely facilitated the global sourcing of components and raw materials for gramophone and record production.
Prescott was not Nipponophone’s only foreign expert. Marshall M. Joslyn assisted him as the superintendent of the company’s stamping and roll department. Unfortunately, Joslyn’s presence is only known through his obituary, published in October 1910. It states that, having worked for nearly a year, Joslyn abruptly died from cerebrospinal meningitis in Japan (Talking Machine World 1910b, 31). His arrival corresponds with Prescott’s brief visit to the United States a year earlier, suggesting that Prescott likely recruited him during that time. Joslyn’s prior role as a pressing plant manager at the American Record Company lends further support to this assumption. It appears that he either traveled to Japan with Prescott or followed shortly thereafter. Supported by these two experts, no domestic company could challenge the reputation and capacity of JAPMC/Nipponophone in the Japanese recording industry.
Nipponophone’s inclusion of foreign titles, particularly from American and Beka sources, and its prestige within Japan positioned the company for expansion. Discussing Prescott’s earlier ventures in the United States, Sutton notes that “Nipponophone’s ‘Foreign Records’ catalog of c. 1911 included a substantial number of the American Record Company recordings that were renumbered and offered in new couplings, sans artist credits, with the occasional amusing mistranslation” (Sutton 2024; Reference Sutton2023, 7). As noted in Nipponophone’s English-language catalog, foreign recordings were sold alongside Japanese titles, catering both to expatriate communities and foreign visitors seeking souvenirs.Footnote 21 In the East Asian region, another key consumer group consisted of young urbanites educated in Western-oriented institutions, whose listening habits often crossed linguistic and cultural boundaries. The records targeting them were companions of gramophones, with both assisting Nipponophone’s expansion into regional markets. The September 1911 issue of The Talking Machine News already acknowledged the growing market presence of Nipponophone-branded gramophones across India, China, and other parts of “the East,” describing them as a “formidable competitor.” While those gramophones were generally lower quality than similar models produced by European manufacturers, they were markedly more affordable, often retailing at just one-third the price of their European counterparts. The article implies that these easily available gramophones were perceived as a barrier to American companies hoping to expand their business operations in the region. (Talking Machine News 1911, 231; Lubinski and Steen Reference Lubinski and Steen2017, 287). By introducing lower-cost products with both local and foreign content, Nipponophone played a pivotal role in expanding access to recorded sound, making it attainable for broader segments of the population throughout its commercial reach.
Prescott was not only highly skilled in the production and manufacture of records and gramophones but also proved exceptionally adept at promoting Nipponophone to increase its public visibility and rising influence. A notable example appears in a two-page article featured in the January 1911 issue of The Talking Machine World, titled “The Talking Machine Trade in Japan.” The article’s subheading is “Interesting Letter from Tokio,” suggesting that Prescott authored the content, and it even includes a photo identifying him as general manager (Talking Machine World 1911a, 4, 6). It begins by introducing what it terms the major gramophone and record “dealers” in the Japanese market:
There are several important dealers in Tokio with attractive stores on the Ginza (the Broadway of Tokio). Jujiya & Co. handle various lines, but principally Victor. Sankodo & Co are making in their Tokio factory a very good copy of the Columbia B1 graphophone. They sell records made by the Lyrophone Co., of Germany. The Standard Talking Machine Co. sell both imported and Japanese made records and machines. The Nipponophone Co. handle exclusively goods made in Japan by the Japan-American Phonograph Co. Tenshodo & Co. makes a specialty of the Columbia line. They have a splendid location, and there is always a gaping crowd in front of their open doors listening to the graphophone, which is kept playing to attract attention.Footnote 22
In this brief passage, Prescott begins with a broad survey of Japan’s growing record industry before turning his attention to JAPMC/Nipponophone, through which he explores the cultural, legal, economic, and political contours of the industry. Stating that “Japan is entering an era of prosperity,” Prescott reverses his opinion from a little over a year prior and predicts that the outlook for Japan’s record market is brighter, with the country’s introduction of a new protectionist tariff law from 1911 and its expansion of colonial ties with neighboring countries serving as positive factors (Talking Machine World 1911a, 6). Prescott attempted to convince readers that Japan’s sovereign status, along with its imperial expansion, would facilitate the further development of the domestic recording industry. A month later, in February 1911, The Talking Machine World reported that Prescott had returned to New York due to declining health caused by the Japanese climate. He again emphasized that “Japan is a wonderful country for the talking machine, and it is a great future market” (Talking Machine World 1911b, 35). Given his contributions, Sutton’s claim that “he co-founded what would become the Nipponophone Company in Japan” merits consideration (Sutton Reference Sutton2024).
The business environment in Japan nonetheless remained challenging, with piracy continuing to pose a serious problem. The April 1911 issue of The Talking Machine World addressed the issue by quoting a letter from Horne, who detailed the extent of unauthorized duplication:
For your information I would advise you that dubbing records of all makes is in full force in this country, including the Victor, Columbia and Nipponophone. There is one particular concern in the city of Osaka that has dubbed and cataloged 175 of the Nipponophone records of native talent, for which they have not paid one cent to the artist for recording. They are offering and selling these dubbed records at forty sen (twenty cents gold) each. It remains to be seen whether this can be stopped by the proposed law, and our attorney has advocated and requested the Bureau of Patents to so construe the copyright law. This law, if so interpreted, will only affect the artists who virtually sell the right to their voice, which in the great majority cannot be obtained (Talking Machine World 1911c, 13)
Nipponophone was not a powerless victim, however. In 1912, Sankōdō released the first records of the naniwa-bushi Footnote 23 performer Tōchūken Kumoemon (桃中軒 雲右衛, 1873–1916) through one of its labels, Starkton-Record.Footnote 24 According to Kerim Yasar, the process was overseen by a German merchant named Richard Werdermann, with German engineers conducting the recordings at Sankōdō’s Tokyo studio. The records were then pressed by the Lyrophone company in Germany and marketed at a premium price of 3.8 yen per record. The royalty was set at approximately 21 sen per disc, amounting to just 5.5 percent of the retail price, with the release in May 1912. However, within two months, Tōkyō Onpu Mfg. Co. began selling unauthorized copies of these records for a mere 1 yen, leading to a protracted legal dispute with Werdermann. Moreover, Nipponophone also issued its own records with Kumoemon. It did not outright copy Sankōdō’s products, but it undoubtedly exploited the prevailing legal ambiguity to make new recordings, which were sold for 1.5 yen, less than half of those from Sankōdō. Kumoemon’s releases with Nipponophone were prompted by the surge in popularity of his rival, Yoshida Naramura II (1880–1967),Footnote 25 following the success of Naramura’s own records with the company. Werdermann again sued Nipponophone, but the case was resolved out of court. (Yasar Reference Yasar2018, 96–103, 108). Yasar notes that Japan’s amendment of its copyright law in 1920, inclusive of all types of sound recordings, was driven by the economic interests of record companies and followed a typical modern trajectory, rather than being belated (Yasar Reference Yasar2018, 107–109).
Prescott’s predictions about the Japanese market appeared to be accurate in light of the recording industry’s rapid expansion, as the early 1910s witnessed a surge in the establishment of new companies, including Tōyō Chikuonki (Oriental Phonograph Mfg Co.)Footnote 26 and Ōsaka Chikuonki in 1912, Yamato On’ei (弥満登音影) in 1913, and Tōkyō Chikuonki in 1914 (Nippon Columbia Fiftieth Anniversary Editorial Committee 1961). It also meant that many firms found themselves vying for market niches that had not yet reached full development. Some continued to release pirated records, which intensified price competition across the market and destabilized the industry. To make matters worse, although the record industry in Japan briefly benefited from the economic upswing brought on by the First World War, it soon entered a prolonged economic downturn. Yamauchi, however, argues that this change was driven more by the disruptive impact of piracy than by global economic conditions (Yamauchi Reference Yamauchi, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 82). Whatever the original cause, Kurata Yoshihiro has called the decade “the era with no prospects” (shikai zero jidai 視界ゼロ時代), reflecting the deep uncertainty then prevailing (Kurata Reference Kurata2006, 78).
Nipponophone under Horne’s leadership did not evade the challenges of this era, but it maintained its crucial international collaborations by finding a new foreign expert to replace Prescott. The Talking Machine World states that this person was Thomas Kraemer, former general manager of the Hawthorne & Sheble Manufacturing Company in Philadelphia, who made a contract with Nipponophone as general manager and factory superintendent. Otto H. Wätzig (1881–1945), the former recording director for the British Neophone Company, would assist him and lead the recording department (Talking Machine World 1911c, 30). Given Prescott’s earlier association with the businessmen Hawthorne and Sheble, it is likely that he played a role in identifying Kraemer as a suitable successor. Wätzig, in contrast, may have been promoted internally. Recording Pioneers cites a 1912 article from the German trade journal Phonographische Zeitschrift that states, “The experts are two Germans, Thomas Kraemer from Philadelphia, who serves as the superintendent of the machine department, and Otto Wätzig, the superintendent of plate production. The latter has been with the company for over three years” (Recording Pioneers “Otto Heinrich WATZIG,” n.d.).
Backed by its experienced recording engineers, Nipponophone began producing double-sided records in February 1913. These records offered superior audio quality and were considerably more resistant to unauthorized duplication, thereby enhancing the company’s competitive position (Kurata Reference Kurata2006, 294–295).Footnote 27 This transition required not only the acquisition of new manufacturing technology but also a substantial investment of labor and capital. To match the output of its previously issued 400,000 single-sided records, Nipponophone produced approximately 200,000 double-sided discs and undertook the retrieval and disposal of the earlier format. As a result, the company had to decrease its contributed capital by 10 percent, lowering it from 100,000 to 90,000 yen in 1915. To fight a dumping offensive in 1916, Nipponophone took a step further and temporarily reduced the price of its double-sided records by half (Kawazoe Reference Kawazoe1940, 25–27). Horne and his associates made extraordinary efforts to maintain the company’s status in Japan.
Following Prescott’s example, Kraemer, now serving as general manager, quickly began promoting Nipponophone in the pages of The Talking Machine World. Published in March 1912 under the title “Development of Talking Machine Trade in Japan,” his first report identified Nipponophone as the dominant force in the Japanese market, which he described as “practically controlled by one Company.” In the subheading, he emphasized that the company’s management was “in the hands of Americans,” highlighting its foreign-led structure to appeal to international investors. The tone of the article resembles that of a corporate report, detailing how the consolidation of JAPMC and Nipponophone that year had contributed to increased capital stock, higher annual dividends, and a doubling of manufacturing capacity, alongside an anticipated growth in trade. It also lists the departmental directors and inspectors elected for the upcoming year and highlights Nipponophone’s expansive network of 31 branch offices and over 106 agents. The article further asserts that the company was in a strong position because of its patents, especially for hornless gramophones, and its willingness to prosecute those who infringed on them. Kraemer expressed confidence in Nipponophone’s products, stating that “It is with pleasure that we can say that our records have steadily improved in quality and today, I believe, they are equal to any in the world, taking into consideration durability and quality of tone.” The overall success of Nipponophone was credited to Horne, recognized as its initial promoter and principal shareholder. However, the article also highlights the contributions of the technical experts, Kraemer himself and Wätzig, as key figures in Nipponophone’s development (Talking Machine World 1912, 4). Although self-promotional in nature, their guidance in the company’s introduction of hornless gramophones in 1911, as well as the transition from one-sided to double-sided records in 1913, warrants recognition.
Kraemer’s description of Nipponophone as being “in the hands of Americans” contrasted with the way the company presented itself in Japan, which emphasized its local identity. Given that The Talking Machine World was published in the United States, Kraemer’s framing was likely tailored to appeal to American investors by foregrounding foreign control and commercial reliability. Conversely, Nipponophone utilized what I term “image politics” to secure a presence in Japan and its colonies. As I have argued elsewhere, image politics refers to Nipponophone’s strategic adaptation to, and appropriation of, local culture and language to cultivate the impression of a distinctly Japanese enterprise. A key example is the deliberate removal of “America” from its original name, resulting in Nihon Chikuonki Shōkai (日本蓄音器商会), despite the company’s substantially American managerial and technological foundations. This renaming produced the impression that Nipponophone was a representative entity within Japan’s record industry. Rather than adopting a literal English equivalent such as “Nihon Phonograph Company,” the firm judiciously coined the name “Nipponophone,” drawing on Japanese linguistic conventions to evoke “the sound of Japan” for both domestic and international audiences. By using this title for its principal label, the company amplified the effect. In addition, it adopted a new jacket logo modeled after His Master’s Voice, the trademark of the Gramophone Company, replacing the iconic image of the dog Nipper with that of a Buddha.Footnote 28 Nipponophone employed similar tactics to produce culturally attuned representations of its products for Japan’s colonial markets. For example, it incorporated Korean imagery – replacing the Buddha with a dancing kisaeng on record covers – and even printed Korean script on its labels (Choi Reference Choi2018, 26–28). Kraemer’s emphasis on Nipponophone’s American managerial ties may therefore be seen as a facet of its image politics, aimed at enhancing the company’s standing in the international recording industry by emphasizing its US connections. Despite ongoing challenges, including widespread piracy and lack of legal protections, along with intense competition, Kraemer followed Prescott’s example and articulated Nipponophone’s future with a mix of partial truths and aspirational language, offering a hopeful narrative to international observers.
When Wätzig left Nipponophone in 1912, the company temporarily hired George Laurence Holland (1878–1940) to replace him (Recording Pioneers “Otto Heinrich WÄTZIG,” n.d.). The Talking Machine News reports that before he was hired by Nipponophone in late 1912, Holland had extensive experience producing so-called ethnic records in various countries, listing Egyptian, Arabic, Syrian, Greek, Turkish, Indian, and Formosan releases. He had made numerous masters for Nipponophone entering 1913, including five hundred Japanese recordings in Tokyo and two hundred Chinese discs in Osaka (Talking Machine News 1913, 468, 470). According to Du Jun Min, the Osaka masters were the first recordings Nipponophone made of performers from Taiwan (then known as Formosa) (Min Reference Min2008). Holland also produced Korean recordings in Tokyo during the spring of 1913, known as “Nipponophone’s second Korean recordings.” Its initial Korean recordings had taken place about two years earlier, and the ensuing records were released when the firm opened a branch office in Korea in September 1911. The 1913 sessions were larger in scale than the first, with approximately ten performers producing a total of 164 recordings. (Pae and the Korean Records Archive Research Group Reference Pae2011, 39–40, 46–49; Pae Reference Pae1991, 95–97, 110–11). A seminal text on the study of Japan’s recording history, Yamaguchi Kamenoske’s Rekōdo bunka hattenshi (A history of the development of record culture) provides a rare glimpse into the recording trip for these sessions, which was organized by Nagashima Ichirō (永島逸郞).Footnote 29 In the book’s account, around twenty Korean individuals, including accompanists and staff, stayed in Shibaguchi, now known as Shinbashi. They recorded at a studio there and enjoyed the season’s cherry blossoms in their free time (Yamaguchi Reference Yamaguchi1936, 137). Yamauchi rightly notes that Nagashima oversaw the newly established Korean branch of Nipponophone, and the practice of Japanese managing directors leading such recording trips soon became a recurring pattern (Yamauchi Reference Yamauchi2009, 106–107). Japan’s status as the imperial metropole gave rise to a reversed recording model, with performers from its colonies traveling there to produce records.
Like Yamaguchi and Yamauchi, most Japanese scholars tend to focus on the colonial relationship between Nagashima and the Korean musicians. What has not been mentioned is that it was Holland who oversaw the recording sessions. Although the results were not discussed in The Talking Machine News, an article featured a photograph of Korean musicians at a recording session, accompanied by the caption “Korean Band Making Records” as seen in figure 1 (Talking Machine News 1913, 467). The same photo was featured in an advertisement for the newly produced records in the Maeil Sinbo newspaperFootnote 30 on May 30, 1913, but its small size and lack of clarity obscured Holland’s presence. By contrast, Holland in Figure 1 is clearly identifiable, standing beside the recording horns and facing forward. Subtitled “A Recording Expert in the Land of the Rising Sun,” the accompanying article centered on the London-born Holland’s professional activities in Japan. (Talking Machine News 1913, 467–470).
Figure 1. Korean band making records in spring 1913.
The article relates that Holland had brought a “magnificent set of nicely tuned-up recording instruments” to Japan but found that he was not fully prepared to record Japanese performers: “The Japanese artiste’s idea of a song commences with a long series of yells at the top of his voice with powerful head notes, switching off suddenly to low guttural tones varied by weird chants as interludes.” This uncomplimentary description was used as a set-up to demonstrate Holland’s competence. The article continues, “Nothing daunted, Mr. Holland re-arranged the instruments and managed to get the desired results.” As this was written from Holland’s perspective, there is no information about how the Japanese musicians felt. Hosokawa mentions that such recording sessions were often characterized by mutual dissatisfaction and sometimes even hostility. Those doing the recording and those performing had difficulty communicating with each other, caused by a respective lack of musical and technical understanding (Hosokawa Reference Hosokawa, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 58). Nevertheless, these early recording sessions in Japan worked like a contact zone, as suggested by Mary Louise Pratt (1991), where Japanese or other performers of vernacular music and storytelling negotiated and cooperated with Euro-American recording engineers to achieve the same goal of producing marketable sound products.
After the conclusion of his recording sessions in Japan, Nipponophone dispatched Holland to China to make further master discs before the conclusion of his term. Min writes that he made approximately one hundred recordings in Tianjin during May and June 1914, as arranged by Nipponophone’s Dalian office. Some of these were unfortunately broken by the time they arrived in Japan, so Nipponophone was only able to press 10,000 records from the surviving masters. The company sent the completed records to Shanghai for sale, but they did not succeed in the Chinese market (Min Reference Min2008). Nipponophone did not produce any more “ethnic” records until the late 1910s. Although negative conditions during the aforementioned “era with no prospects” composed the primary deterrent, the commercial failure of its Chinese records undoubtedly discouraged Nipponophone from producing additional non-Japanese titles. It is not surprising that there is no record of new hires between Holland’s departure in 1914 and 1917.
Interestingly, the first new hire following this period was Holland himself, although he was not directly employed by Nipponophone. His employment certificate, available at Recording Pioneers, was instead issued by the F. W. Horne Company. It informed the US Secretary of State that Holland had been hired on a salary basis and would leave the United States on January 8, 1918. While visiting China and Japan, he would manufacture goods and trade machinery and tools for “a period of not less than three years” (Recording Pioneers “George Lawrence HOLLAND,” n.d.). Although it was not indicated in his job description, he also worked for Nipponophone. A photo featured on Recording Pioneers shows Holland conducting a recording session with the Japanese soprano Miura Tamaki (三浦環, 1884–1946), accompanied on piano by Aldo Franchetti (1883–1948).Footnote 31 The photo was sourced from the 1922 Nipponophone catalog. (Recording Pioneers “George Lawrence HOLLAND,” n.d.). In other words, Nipponophone once again utilized his expertise for its record production.
Nipponophone entered a new era in June 1919 when Horne resigned from his longtime position as president. He was succeeded by J. R. Geary, under whose leadership the firm rapidly expanded by acquiring several other well-known Japanese record companies as subsidiaries. Geary’s ambition was demonstrated by his negotiation of a merger between Osaka Chikuonki and Tōyō Chikuonki, based in Osaka and Kyoto respectively, under the name of the latter, followed by Nipponophone’s acquisition of the combined Tōyō Chikuonki. Geary made these accomplishments in 1919, the same year he took up his post (Ōkubo Reference Ōkubo2015, 30). Azami explains that Tōyō Chikuonki’s Orient Record label was influential in the Kansai area, centered on Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, so the Kanto-based Nipponophone wanted to strengthen its influence in Kansai through this strategic move (Azami Reference Azami2007b, 9–10). It then acquired Standard Gramophone Co. in 1920, Teikoku Gramophone Co. in 1921, and Sankōdō Menophone Co. along with Tokyo Record Company in 1923 (Nippon Columbia Fiftieth Anniversary Editorial Committee 1961).Footnote 32 Through this process, Nipponophone made its dominant position even more secure.
Geary resumed the hiring of established foreign talent, starting with Russell Hunting Jr (1897–1966).Footnote 33 The January 1921 issue of The Talking Machine World reports that he had become the head of Nipponophone’s recording department. According to the article, “Japanese music, due to its numerous peculiarities, has proven challenging to record in the past. However, Mr. Hunting has mastered the subject and is now busily engaged in turning out records for his company” (Talking Machine World 1921, 3). Hunting was soon joined by the recording engineer Lewis E. Gillingham, who likewise brought with him extensive professional experience. The Talking Machine World made the bold claim that Gillingham was “the best-known phonograph recording expert in the East,” with a description of his long career in the recording industry. Before joining Nipponophone, Gillingham had an eighteen-year tenure at the Victor Talking Machine Company and directed the recording laboratory at the Aeolian Company for several years. He also served as general manager of the Rodeheaver Record Company and maintained professional ties with the Columbia Graphophone Company (Talking Machine World 1922, 49).Footnote 34 Another of the American professionals recruited by Nipponophone was Ralph Richmond Layte (1893–1964), who joined in late 1923 and initially worked as the company’s construction engineer and assistant work manager (Recording Pioneers “Ralph Richmond LAYTE,” n.d.). Hunting left Japan early in 1923, but both Gillingham and Layte helped rebuild the company following the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. The next year, Gillingham accompanied Nipponophone’s president J. R. Geary to New York City in the dual positions of manager and chief engineer. The Talking Machine World’s July 1924 article about them does not specify what they did during this time, but it does stress that Nipponophone remained robust even after the earthquake, stating that “There was no fire at the plant and 90 percent of the machinery was intact.” They thus continued to produce over one million records and fifteen thousand phonographs per month (Talking Machine World 1924, 132). Judging from this information, one of the purposes of Geary and Gillingham’s visit was likely to convince others of Nipponophone’s ongoing stability. By mid-1925, Gillingham had been promoted to assistant general manager and Layte to chief engineer, demonstrating their value to the company. In addition, A 1925 article in The Talking Machine World reports that Wallace C. Ougheltree (1896–?) and John Huson, formerly with Victor and Columbia respectively, were also enlisted for their manufacturing knowhow. At the end of the article, Gillingham confidently encouraged his business correspondents to visit Japan and learn about Nipponophone’s condition for themselves (Talking Machine World 1925, 60).
Geary visited the United States again in early 1927 and stayed for two months, during which he again demonstrated his proactive management style by giving a promotional interview to The Talking Machine World (Talking Machine World 1927a, 122). Although he said that his plan was simply to visit various phonograph companies and examine new technology, the true purpose of his visit was soon revealed. Two months after the publication of his interview, the May edition of The Talking Machine World delivered unexpected news: “Columbia Organization Purchases Controlling Interest in Nipponophone Co.” The report explains that the Columbia Phonograph Company, the Columbia Graphophone Company of London, and the other allied firms of the Columbia organization had purchased a controlling interest in Nipponophone, but Geary would remain as president. All the patented and other processes in Columbia’s chain of factories, which spanned fifteen countries, would thus be implemented in Nipponophone’s Japanese facility (Talking Machine World 1927b, 6). In so doing, Nipponophone was transformed from a domestic company into a part of the Columbia organization in the second half of 1927, and Nippon Columbia was officially established on January 12, 1928.
Several interrelated factors help explain this transition. As noted earlier, the Japanese government’s imposition of a 100 percent import tax on luxury goods, coupled with its emphasis on promoting domestic products after the Great Kantō Earthquake, severely curtailed foreign exports to Japan. At the same time, it welcomed direct investment from foreign companies with Japanese operations. This dual economic shift led to increased investment by multinational firms, including the major global record companies (Gronow Reference Gronow1981, 282–283; Oka Reference Oka1986, 85; Mason Reference Mason1992, 38). Ōkubo Izumi, using various government data, illustrates the sharp decline in gramophone and record exports to the Japanese market in this period. The import value of gramophones and related products was 1,646,144 yen in 1924, but it plummeted to 309,402 yen in 1925 and further to 157,765 yen in 1926 (2015, 27–28).Footnote 35 In other words, exports of these products to Japan dropped by more than 90 percent within three years. This prompted foreign record companies to turn to direct investment. In 1927, Japan Polydor (日本ポリドール蓄音器商會) was established in affiliation with Deutsche Grammophon, and Nippon Victor (日本ビクター株式会社) was founded as the Japanese subsidiary of Victor Talking Machine Co. Nipponophone’s transition into Nippon Columbia took place amid a rapidly changing business landscape.
In addition to politico-economic pressures, the recording companies needed to adapt to rapid technological changes to remain competitive in the latter half of the 1920s. Joining Columbia gave Nipponophone access to much-needed capital, Columbia’s esteemed discography, and, most significantly, electrical recording technology. Nippon Columbia’s artists and entertainers, like those contracted with Nippon Victor and Nippon Polydor, no longer had to perform into oversized horns that transmitted sound waves mechanically onto a wax disc. Instead, the recording process utilized microphones and electric amplifiers that brought revolutionary improvements to sound quality and dynamic range. Hiromu Nagahara writes somewhat regretfully that “Nitchiku’s [Nipponophone’s] expansion was ultimately overshadowed by the massive insertion of Western capital into the industry from the first year of the Showa era (1926–1989)” (Nagahara Reference Nagahara2017, 32). Given Nipponophone’s longstanding status as a domestic enterprise, such a response is understandable. At the same time, it remains uncertain whether Nipponophone could have sustained its leading position in the evolving record market through minor transnational engagements alone. Nipponophone’s transition to Nippon Columbia was timely and effective, judging by the fact that Nippon Columbia has maintained a prominent role as one of Japan’s leading record companies ever since.
Conclusion
Writing about record companies in the early twentieth century presents unique challenges. Their roles extended beyond the manufacture and marketing of sound reproduction devices, in the sense that they also operated as music labels. Although the focus of this article is on its institutional history, Nipponophone’s success was not solely attributable to its relatively affordable, high-quality recordings and gramophones. With their deep insight into sound culture, market trends, and artists, the company’s Japanese staff and consultants were equally integral to its growth, as they oversaw areas such as repertoire selection, talent acquisition and management, and regional promotion and distribution. According to Nagahara, early record companies relied heavily on music and narratives that were already well-known rather than producing original hit songs or cultivating star performers. Most of Nipponophone’s catalog featured Japanese instrumental music, including the shamisen, shakuhachi, biwa, and koto, along with various singing and storytelling genres. Among these, gidayū and naniwa-bushi were especially popular (Nagahara, 29).Footnote 36 Azami echoes this view and adds that the kinds of Western-influenced music that were popular among the public primarily consisted of military songs and children’s tunes (Azami Reference Azami2005, 47). Hosokawa notes that Nipponophone responded adeptly to changing consumer preferences and expanding product offerings, swiftly promoting top-selling artists and newly released titles (Hosokawa Reference Hosokawa, Yamauchi and Wang2024, 57–58). Nipponophone’s network of dealers and agents promoted its records in urban public spaces. Hosokawa further explains how this practice impacted city dwellers, since a phonograph equipped with a horn “allows users to share the sonic vibration of air and creates a theater-like division between stage (the phonograph) and the audience (a community of fellows)” (Hosokawa Reference Hosokawa, Yamauchi and Wang2024: 52). As the top record company in the acoustic recording era, Nipponophone helped give consumers and even non-consumers expanded access to modern mediated sound in urban centers across Japan and its colonies.
In its formation, the Japanese recording industry took a unique path by showing that domestic record companies could perform well in Japan’s gramophone and record market against the global majors. By utilizing reproduction technologies obtained through their minor transnational engagements, including secondhand acquisitions, domestic Japanese record companies were able to produce catalogs of local music and narrative content at competitive prices both for the Japanese market and the broader region, and some even ventured into manufacturing gramophones in the 1910s. Their competition was sufficiently challenging that Nipponophone initiated a series of mergers and acquisitions as soon as Geary became company president in 1919. This history makes it difficult to determine how those companies obtained their recording and manufacturing technologies, since Nipponophone’s institutional narrative only records when and how they became part of it. In contrast, the activities and critical contributions of foreign entrepreneurs and recording experts throughout Nipponophone’s history are more readily traceable, thanks to archival resources such as The Talking Machine World and The Talking Machine News, company commemorative publications, and dedicated search engines compiled by early recording scholars and enthusiasts, notably the website Recording Pioneers. They reveal that Nipponophone was an independent domestic operation, and its capacity to utilize its minor transnational engagements was crucial for the company to establish and maintain its dominant position in the Japanese recording industry and expand into other countries in the region, such as China and India.
Although further study is needed, it appears that Nipponophone’s minor transnational engagements helped open new possibilities of cultural understanding, as foreign managers and recording experts worked with Japanese and others and represented their business abroad, generating multiple contact zones. For example, The Talking Machine World was where Nipponophone’s foreign representatives and recording experts regularly corresponded and where interviews and reports on its activities were published. Accordingly, the publication tended to offer nuanced, albeit commercially inflected, representations of Japan, other Asian markets, and their sound cultures. This approach contrasted with the colonial gaze evident in other accounts, such as the following article from The Talking Machine News published in 1913:
At the risk of being trite, we must say it is absolutely astounding to what enormous possibilities the art and commerce of the reproduction of sound has risen in these days of grace. Who would have thought that when the great T. A. Edison first succeeded in obtaining a repetition of sound by mechanical means that within the teens of years almost the uttermost parts of the earth would be laid under contribution to its ever widening influences, and that the inhabitants of the lands beyond the seas should be brought into direct touch with the centres of civilisation? Most of the nations have had their particular variety of music recorded nowadays by one or other of the big firms, and the busy cities of the Western hemisphere can hear in their own vernacular the vocal and instrumental gems of what we call the semi or uncivilized races quaint, barbarous, or whatever we like to label them, but still a faithful replica of the people.
Nipponophone’s transnational engagements, however limited, facilitated knowledge production and acquisition beyond its immediate business partners. They gave those on the other side of the globe the chance to better understand Japan and its business landscape, as well as its sound culture.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
Declaration on AI Usage
In writing this article, I used the Microsoft Copilot AI tool for occasional grammar and syntax suggestions.
Open access
