Hostname: page-component-6766d58669-zlvph Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-17T04:00:21.157Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

No Malibu Surfer Left Behind: Three Tales About Market Coercion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 June 2017

Åsbjørn Melkevik
Åsbjørn Melkevik*
Affiliation:
Harvard University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

This article examines the question of private coercion in market societies, arguing for an unconditional basic income guarantee from a classical liberal viewpoint. It proposes three main arguments. First, classical liberals view the purpose of government to be the reduction of coercion, both public and private. Second, a proper understanding of the nature of coercion indicates that parties subject to certain types of hardship are being coerced. Third, where the total amount of coercion is reduced by eliminating the hardship, the classical liberal state must do so as to fulfill its purpose. Hence, this article argues that if the total amount of coercion in society can be reduced by the state employing the amount of coercion necessary to maintain an unconditional basic income guarantee, then the classical liberal state is obligated to maintain such a guarantee by its underlying justification.

Keywords

basic incomeclassical liberalismFriedrich Hayekmarket capitalismprivate coercionsocial safety net

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Business Ethics Quarterly , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , July 2017 , pp. 335 - 351
Copyright
Copyright © Society for Business Ethics 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

REFERENCES

Bentham, Jeremy. 1843. “Outline of a Work Entitled Pauper Management Improved.” In The Work of Jeremy Bentham Vol. VIII, 369–439. Edinburg: William Tait.Google Scholar
Bertram, Chris, Robin, Corey, and Gourevitch, Alex. 2012. “Let It Bleed: Libertarianism and the Workplace.” Crooked Timber, July 1. http://crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleed-libertarianism-and-the-workplace/.Google Scholar
Brennan, Jason, and Tomasi, John. 2012. “Classical Liberalism.” In Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, edited by Estlund, David, 115-32. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cohen, Gerald A. 1983. “The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12: 3–33.Google Scholar
Director, Aaron. 1964. “The Parity of the Economic Market Place.” Journal of Law and Economics 7: 1–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, Richard. 1985. Takings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Epstein, Richard. 2002. “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?” Social Philosophy and Policy 19: 140–71.Google Scholar
Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Fried, Barbara. 2001. The Progressive Assault on Laissez Faire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Friedman, Milton. 2002. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Gourevitch, Alex. 2016. “The Limits of a Basic Income: Means and Ends of Workplace Democracy.” Basic Income Studies 11: 17–28.Google Scholar
Gowder, Paul. 2014. “Market Unfreedom.” Critical Review 26: 306–47.Google Scholar
Gray, John N. 1982. “F. A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism.” Literature of Liberty 5: 19–66.Google Scholar
Hale, Robert L. 1923. “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State.” Political Science Quarterly 38: 470–94.Google Scholar
Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James, and Jay, John. 1999. The Federalist Papers. Edited by Rossiter, Clinton. New York: Signet Classic.Google Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich. 1978. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich. 2013. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Locke, John. 2003. Two Treatises of Government. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Macleod, Alistair M. 2008. “Coercion, Justice, and Democracy.” In Coercion and the State, edited by Reidy, David A. and Riker, Walter J., 63-76. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich. 1998. The German Ideology. New York: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar
Melkevik, Åsbjørn. 2016a. “No Progressive Taxation Without Discrimination? On the Generality of the Law in the Classical Liberal Tradition.” Constitutional Political Economy 27: 418–434.Google Scholar
Melkevik, Åsbjørn. 2016b. “Four Concepts of Rules: A Theory of Rule Egalitarianism.” European Journal of Political Theory. doi: 10.1177/1474885116653366.Google Scholar
Mill, John S. 2008. On Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Mises, Ludwig von. 1953. “Review of Freedom through Law.” The Freeman 410, March 9.Google Scholar
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Nozick, Robert. 1997. “Coercion.” In Socratic Puzzles. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Pettit, Philip. 2006. “Freedom in the Market.” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 5: 131–149.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1988. “The Priority of Right and the Ideas of the Good.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 17: 251–76.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 2000. Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Ripstein, Arthur. 2009. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Rothbard, Murray. 1978. For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto. New York: Collier Books.Google Scholar
Smith, Adam. (1776) 1976. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edited by Campbell, R. H., Skinner, A. S., and Todd, W. B.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Taylor, Robert S. 2013. “Market Freedom as Antipower.” American Political Science Review 107: 593–602.Google Scholar
Tomasi, John. 2012. Free Market Fairness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Viner, Jacob. 1960. “The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire.” The Journal of Law and Economics 3: 45–69.Google Scholar
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Weinstein, Michael A. 1972. “Coercion, Space, and the Modes of Human Domination.” In NOMOS XIV: Coercion, edited by Pennock, J. Roland and Chapman, John W., 63-80. Chicago: Atherton.Google Scholar
Wertheimer, Alan. 1987. Coercion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
White, Stuart. 2006. “Reconsidering the Exploitation Objection to Basic Income.” Basic Income Studies 1: 1–17.Google Scholar
Zwolinski, Matt. 2015. “Property Rights, Coercion, and the Welfare State: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income for All.” The Independent Review 19: 515–529.Google Scholar