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  3. The Nature of Consciousness
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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      22 September 2009
      11 October 2001
      ISBN:
      9780511487538
      9780521808583
      9780521039475
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487538
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.55kg, 256 Pages
      Dimensions:
      (228 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.391kg, 256 Pages
      • Subjects:
      Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology: General Interest
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    Subjects:
    Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology: General Interest
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    Book description

    In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects of conscious experience are aspects that exist only in the directing of experience towards non-phenomenal objects, a theory that undermines reductive attempts to explain consciousness in terms of what is not conscious. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in the philosophy of mind and language, psychology and cognitive science.

    Reviews

    ‘Enter The Nature of Consciousness, a book filled with scholarly argument, well-developed - but also well-defined - complex jargon, excellent critique of all the previous important works of the field (thought experiments included) and written by a philosophy lecturer. This book is required reading not only for those wanting to get to grips with what is going on in consciousness studies, but for those who are dissatisfied with the current accounts …’

    Source: Metapsychology

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    Contents

    Contents
    References
    Bibliography
    Bibliography
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