The specialized vocabularies of lawyers, ethicists, and political scientists obscure the roots of many real disagreements. In this book, the distinguished American international lawyer Alfred Rubin provides a penetrating account of where these roots lie, and argues powerfully that disagreements which have existed for 3,000 years are unlikely to be resolved soon. Attempts to make 'war crimes' or 'terrorism' criminal under international law seem doomed to fail for the same reasons that attempts failed in the early nineteenth century to make piracy, war crimes, and the international traffic in slaves criminal under the law of nations. And for the same reasons, Professor Rubin argues, it is unlikely that an international criminal court can be instituted today to enforce ethicists' versions of 'international law'.
‘The book is a well argued articulation of a positivist understanding of authority in international law. Its particular focus on universal criminal jurisdiction is timely in light of the expanding scope of international humanitarian law and the ad hoc and permanent criminal tribunal projects. Observations are always informed and insightful; the style is witty with engaging turns of phrase.’
Source: Yale Journal of International Law
‘This book comes highly recommended for anyone who is beginning to study, or ready to test his/her perception of the essence on International Law.’
Source: ASIL Newsletter
'… a very significant work by a meticulous scholar … international law academics need books of this type that force us to introspection and towards a more rigorous reconciliation of ‘desirable’ with ‘feasible’. Every international scholar should read Ethics and Authority in International Law … the subject of the book is important and timeless … [a] major contribution for which we owe Professor Rubin a debt of gratitude.
Source: Canadian Yearbook of International Law
‘… a book that demands active engagement by the reader. The reinstatement of authority as a central concern is valuable, representing a Benthamite turn in contemporary theory of international law by insisting that a clear distinction should be drawn between law as it is and law as it ought to be, thus 'differentiating moral indignation from legal argumentation'’.
Source: The American Journal of International Law
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