Contents

pp ix-xii

Foreword by William B. Quandt

pp xiii-xvi

Acknowledgements

pp xvii-xx

Prologue

pp 1-4

1 - Introduction

pp 5-12

2 - Kissinger's legacy and imprint on the Middle East

pp 13-30

Part I - Jordan in the Carter Middle East policy

pp 31-32

3 - Carter picks up the threads

pp 33-45

4 - The Camp David accords and Jordan

pp 46-61

5 - An evaluation of the development of American strategy for the 1980s

pp 62-66

Part II - Jordan in the Reagan Middle East policy

pp 67-68

6 - The evolution of Reagan's strategy

pp 69-74

7 - The US, Israel and Jordan: collaboration and discord

pp 75-89

8 - Two cases of collaboration and discord

pp 90-110

9 - The US and Jordan: how ‘much’ became ‘too much’

pp 111-118

Part III - US, Jordan and Arab approaches to peace

pp 119-120

10 - The Arab framework for peace

pp 121-134

11 - Jordan embarks on several lines of foreign policy

pp 135-157

12 - US and Jordan: more wheeling and dealing

pp 158-190

13 - Postscript: evaluation and conclusion

pp 191-210

Appendices

A - Comparison of Middle East peace proposals

pp 211-221

B - Jordan–US exchange of questions and answers on the Camp David Accords, September 1978

pp 222-230

C - US assistance to Jordan 1975–1989

pp 231-232

D - Arab assistance to Jordan paid in accordance with the 1978 Baghdad Summit Conference and 1980 Amman Arab Summit

pp 233-234

E - Peres–Hussain Agreement (The London Document), 11 April 1987

pp 235-235

F - Shamir's Four-point plan, April 1989

pp 236-237

G - Baker's Five-point plan, December 1989

pp 238-238

H - Invitation to Madrid Peace Conference, 18 October 1991

pp 239-240