Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511983474

There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning, and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity.

"...a first class collection of essays that should both advance the foundations of modern game theory and give philosophers an excellent and up-to-date view as to what is going on in this recently and increasingly important area of philosophy." Ellery Eells, University of Wisconsin

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-iv
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Contents
pp v-vi
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Preface
pp vii-xiii
- By Cristina Bicchier, Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara
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List of contributors
pp xiv-xiv
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1 - Feasibility
pp 1-20
- By Isaac Levi, Department of Philosophy, Columbia University
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2 - Elicitation for games
pp 21-26
- By Joseph B. Kadane, Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University, Isaac Levi, Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, Teddy Seidenfeld, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University
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3 - Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions
pp 27-46
- By Joseph B. Kadane, Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University, Teddy Seidenfeld, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University
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4 - Rational choice in the context of ideal games
pp 47-60
- By Edward F. McClennen, Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University
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5 - Hyperrational games: Concept and resolutions
pp 61-92
- By Jordan Howard Sobel, Department of Philosophy, Scarborough College, University of Toronto
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6 - Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation
pp 93-106
- By Brian Skyrms, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine
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7 - Tortuous labyrinth: Noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players
pp 107-126
- By Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz, Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet
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8 - On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation
pp 127-140
- By Stefano Vannucci, Dipartimento di Economia, Università di Siena
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9 - Algorithmic knowledge and game theory
pp 141-154
- By Ken Binmore, Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Hyun Song Shin, University College, Oxford
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10 - Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators
pp 155-166
- By Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università di Firenze
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11 - Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic
pp 167-196
- By Giovanna Corsi, Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università di Firenze, Silvio Ghilardi, Dipartimento di Matematica, Università di Milano
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12 - Epistemic logic and game theory
pp 197-226
- By Bernard Walliser, CERAS, Ecole Nationale Des Ponts et Chaussees, Paris
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13 - Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses
pp 227-238
- By Vittorioemanuele Ferrante, Dipartimento di Economia, Università di Firenze
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14 - Representing facts
pp 239-256
- By Krister Segerberg, Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet
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15 - Introduction to metamoral
pp 257-274
- By Roberto Magari, Dipartimento di Matematica, Università di Siena
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16 - The logic of Ulam's games with lies
pp 275-284
- By Daniele Mundici, Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Milano
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17 - The acquisition of common knowledge
pp 285-316
- By Michael Bacharach, Christ Church, Oxford
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18 - The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”
pp 317-326
- By Ariel Rubinstein, Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University
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19 - Knowledge-dependent games: Backward induction
pp 327-344
- By Cristina Bicchieri, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University
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20 - Common knowledge and games with perfect information
pp 345-354
- By Philip J. Reny, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario
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21 - Game solutions and the normal form
pp 355-376
- By John C. Harsanyi, School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley
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22 - The dynamics of belief systems: Foundations versus coherence theories
pp 377-396
- By Peter Gärdenfors, Filosofiska Institutionen, Lund Universitet
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23 - Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games
pp 397-413
- By Hyun Song Shin, University College, Oxford
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