In the introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Meaningful Work, Yeoman et al. (Reference Yeoman, Bailey, Madden, Thompson, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019:3) refer to W.B. Gallie’s (1956) notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’ to characterise the complexity and heterogeneity of meaningful work concepts: ‘Meaningful work may be considered to be an essentially contested concept because the body of work to date is characterized by the achievement of an internally complex character through a process of progressive competition, as well as scholarly openness to new conceptual development.’ This position is echoed by the second part of this book that reviews and analyses a wide range of objective and subjective dimensions of meaningful work. Hand in hand with the scholarly openness and internally complex nature of the meaningful work debate that Yeoman and colleagues address is also, however, the problem of downward- and upward conflation. Indeed, the second part of the book argues that the research fields of Management and Organisational Behaviour and Political Philosophy are pursuing the path of downward conflation, as displayed in their strong tendency to render workers as passive beings on which the objective factors of meaningful work, or their absence, impinge directly without mediation. The result of this is the neglect of agential experiences and practices vis-à-vis the objective dimensions of meaningful work. In contradistinction, contributions to meaningful work research from the field of the Humanities understand meaningful work as a product of workers’ desire for self-expression and self-transcendence at work. Here, the formative power of structures is disregarded and treated, instead, as epiphenomenal to action, thus falling into the category of upwards conflation.
To remedy the problem of upward and downward conflation, this chapter develops a theory of meaningful work that is informed by the politics of working life perspectives and grounded in Critical Realism’s stratified theory of the human being. This combination allows us to identify the structural constraints and enablers of meaningful work as objective dimensions of meaningful work that interact with agential responses that we term subjective dimensions of meaningful work. Approaching meaningful work in this way promotes an understanding of meaningful waged work as a dynamic continuum that emerges from the interplay of its objective and subjective dimensions. The objective and subjective dimensions identify autonomy, dignity and recognition as the central pillars of meaningful waged work. The three categories are derived from the analysis of the meaningful work debate in the previous part of the book, but also earlier analyses (Laaser and Bolton, Reference Laaser and Bolton2022; Laaser and Karlsson, Reference Laaser and Karlsson2022). The centrality of these dimensions across a wide range of theories and empirical contributions is showcased in Tables 9.1 to 9.3. Indeed, the reviews of each field and the tables that summarise its key contributions demonstrate that there is a strong case for integrating autonomy into the meaningful wage labour framework: It is a central category in Management and Organisational Behaviour literature in the form of job autonomy and job discretion. Likewise, in the Political Philosophy approaches, autonomy is a key dimension used to describe self-governed and self-selected work as well as personal freedom at and through work. Autonomy plays an equally important role in the Humanities as personal freedom, even though the emphasis shifts here to the personal ability to create and experience a sense of meaning. Recognition and dignity are also prevalent factors in all three fields, even though they are less widely used in comparison to autonomy. Both dimensions tend to play a significant role in the discussion of the importance of employment conditions, such as adequate pay, secure and safe employment conditions, the provision of formalised opportunities for learning and development and suchlike. Through the analytical cross-linking of the literature and the differentiation between objective and subjective dimensions, an exhaustive meaningful wage labour framework is developed with six mutually exclusive dimensions.
Table 9.1 Meaningful Waged Work according to the Management and Organisational Behaviour Tradition
| Author(s) | Definition of meaningful work | Dimensions of meaningful work | Level of analysis | Dimensions derived |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hackman and Oldham (Reference Hackman and Oldham1976) | ‘The degree to which the individual experiences the job as one which is generally meaningful, valuable, and worthwhile’ (1976:256). | Primary dimensions are task variety and task significance. Secondary dimensions are autonomy and feedback. | Organisational and Managerial level; subjective experience. | Objective autonomy as job autonomy; objective recognition as developmental personnel management. |
| Kahn (Reference Kahn1990) | ‘People experienced such meaningfulness when they felt worthwhile, useful, and valuable – as though they made a difference and were not taken for granted’ (1990:704). | Task characteristics (autonomy and stimulating tasks); job role characteristics (formal recognition of valuable status), and work interaction (promotion of dignity). | Organisational and Managerial level; subjective experience. | Objective autonomy as job and task discretion; objective dignity as work that allows positive self-identity; objective recognition as opportunity to experience self-worth and purpose. |
| Rosso et al. (Reference Rosso, Dekas and Wrzesniewski2010) | ‘Work experienced as particularly significant and holding more positive meaning for individuals’ (2010:95) | Individuation; self-connection; contribution; unification. | Individual level. | Individuation/self-agency as subjective autonomy; unification as subjective recognition. |
| Chalofsky (Reference Chalofsky2010); Chalofsky and Cavallaro (Reference Chalofsky and Cavallaro2013) | ‘Meaningful work suggests an inclusive state of being. It is the way we express the meaning and purpose of our lives through the activities (work) that take up most of our waking hours’ (Chalofsky Reference Chalofsky2010:11) | Sense of self; the work itself; the workplace (e.g. work–life balance). | Organisational and Managerial level; individual level. | Sense of self as subjective autonomy; the work itself as objective autonomy; the workplace as objective dignity. |
| Steger (Reference Steger, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019) | ‘Meaningful work is work that people gladly, gratefully, and energetically give their best selves and effort’ (2019:218). | Mutual reinforcement of CARM (clarity, authenticity, respect, mattering and autonomy) and SPIRE (strengths, personalisation, integration, resonance and expansion). | Organisational and Managerial level; subjective experience. | Objective autonomy in job and task discretion; objective recognition as respect; objective dignity as authenticity; subjective dignity as personalisation and integration; subjective recognition as resonance. |
Before we conceptualise autonomy, dignity and recognition and their objective and subjective characteristics, the first part of this chapter recapitulates the relationship between structure and agency and establishes the key parameters of the stratified social ontology of human beings that guides our undertaking. This Critical Realist perspective is the ground on which we build the meaningful wage labour dimensions of autonomy, dignity and recognition. The chapter establishes the idea that the interplay between the structure, which is represented here as the objective dimensions of meaningful work, and the agential responses to it, encapsulated in the subjective dimensions of meaningful work, culminate in the experience of different forms of meaningful work or its absence. This enables us to analyse how the structure of waged work and its organisation at the workplace level impinges upon workers’ pursuit of meaningful work, and how, in turn, workers as Corporate Agents confront, thanks to their agential powers, these structural forces.
Bridging the Objective/Subjective Meaningful Work Divide
We situate the meaningful work dimensions of autonomy, dignity and recognition at the heart of the interplay between structure and agency. As elaborated in earlier parts of this book, Critical Realism understands structure and agency as analytically distinct, but interdependent entities that each possess causal powers. The society as ‘an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions’ (Bhaskar, Reference Bhaskar1989:39) predates human beings and distributes resources, builds institutional regimes and creates social positions and roles for people to occupy. In that way, society is an essential condition for human beings’ actions. And yet, society is nothing without human beings, whose actions breathe life into the social structures and whose powers allow them to reflect, evaluate and contribute, consciously and unconsciously, organised or unplanned, to its reproduction or transformation. The relative endurance of social structures that are intermeshed in legacies, together with the relative autonomy of social actions and their effects, illustrate why social change has the strong tendency to be path-dependent and contingent (Sayer, Reference Sayer2000). Consequently, one of the central questions of Critical Realism is how social structures impinge on agents, how and why the latter respond to it and what the impact of the responses are on the social structures.
The pre-existence of society is also manifested in the fact that people are by birth involuntarily positioned in a stratified society that consists of particular social and cultural structures that impinge on them. The conceptualisation of Agency takes this into account, putting the spotlight on collectivities of people who share a ‘position on society’s distribution of scarce resources’ and possess ‘the same life-chances’ (Archer, Reference Archer2000:261). As Agency in the Critical Realist tradition is associated with structures and positions, and not individuals, Agents are necessarily Agents of something, occupying positions in the stratified society with others that are privileged or underprivileged. In the field of work and employment, the supply of limited resources and opportunities is reflected in a stratified and segmented labour market that produces injustices of contribution and distribution for groups of labour market participants in specific occupational fields, encoded amongst other things in the unequal access to meaningful work (Gomberg, Reference Gomberg2007; Honneth, Reference Honneth1982; Sayer, Reference Sayer2009). The injustice is anchored in the limited number of jobs that offer, for example, decent pay, secure employment, labour voice, representation through unions, interesting tasks that are characterised by discretion, variety and purpose, internal labour markets with intact career structures and opportunities for participating in decision making. According to what prominent discourses in the Political Philosophy, the Humanities and Social Sciences amplify, groups of workers who are subject to privileged conditions in the realm of employment and experience their work as meaningful have better life-chances than those groups of workers who are burdened with underprivileged employment conditions. How do workers relate and respond to and experience privileged employment conditions and facilitators of meaningful work? The answer depends to a significant degree on whether workers are Primary or Corporate Agents.
Primary Agents are situated, along with others, in a social order that allocates identical resources to them that form their social characteristics and determine their life chances. The defining characteristic of Primary Agents is, however, not that they belong to a certain structured group or that they enjoy certain privileges or not, but that they lack a firmly grounded and widely shared ideological position from which they identify and articulate common interests and organise to realise them. They are unsure about their own interests and those of others, are unaware of how to formulate their concerns and, indeed, are oblivious to the power of concerted action of the collective they are placed in. Irrespective of whether the positions they occupy are privileged or underprivileged, Primary Agents act within the realm of possibilities that their societal position offers and do not go beyond these bounds. Because they are not organising and attempting to change the environment they inhabit to their advantage, Primary Agents may mistakenly be perceived as passive. However, they are not puppets to whom things just happen, but meaning-endowing beings who operate within the social and economic parameters in which they are situated. Nevertheless, the fact that Primary Agents suspend their full agentic powers does contribute to their appearance as passive Agents. This suspension is often consciously, though not freely, opted for and emerges in relation to other groups of Agents who have power over the shape and form of the environment in which Primary Agents are operating. In other words, the suspension of Primary Agents’ powers develops out of the structural properties of their positions and relations with other structured and powerful collectives, their powers and resources. Nevertheless, Primary Agents are capable of deliberating about their situatedness in the environment, the social characteristics of the position they occupy and how it confers advantages or disadvantages on them. Another qualification that puts the ‘passiveness’ of Primary Agents into perspective is that their actions, despite being uncoordinated and lacking an identified aim, nonetheless have an aggregate effect on the environment in which they are placed. This is due to the power of a multitude of agents who are situated in similar positions and act in a comparable fashion. Even though these effects are unplanned and undirected, they may reconstitute the environment. Consequently, Primary Agents are social agents whose agentic capacities to articulate and meet interests beyond the ones that the social context provide is not actualised, but who nevertheless have an impact on the environment.
Due to the centrality of waged work for people in capitalist societies, being a Primary Agent in the realm of wage labour has a significant impact on the agents’ life-chances and whether and how work is experienced as meaningful. Being a Primary Agent in the structured realm of the labour process means that workers lack collectively formulated interests and demands, as well as strategies to pursue them. Consequently, Primary Agents hold positions in organisations that they have no say about. The conditions and nature of work impinges on them without significant mediation by agential powers. In that way, Primary Agents’ ability to oppose restrictive employment practices, appropriate their work and its social relations, organise to meet their wants and interests and, if they exist, take advantage of the objective dimensions of meaningful work, is impeded. We will see later in this chapter how deeply the meaningful wage labour dimensions of autonomy, dignity and recognition are ingrained in workers’ ability to confront other groups and social orders that are deemed to restrict access to the experience of meaningful work.
In order to overcome their restricted opportunities to experience meaningful wage labour, Primary Agents need to activate their agentic powers and re-group to become Corporate Agents. The leverage of Corporate Agents is characterised by their ability to form into ‘self-conscious vested interest groups, promotive interest groups, social movements and defensive associations’ (Archer Reference Archer1995:258). As a collective, Corporate Agents are driven by their vested interests. However, we distinguish between two kinds of Corporate Agents, namely Formal and Informal ones. Both coordinate collective actions in order to pursue their interests, but only Formal Corporate Agents also formulate their aims for themselves and for others. As the terms say, Formal Corporate Agents are formal organisations while Informal Corporate Agents are informal organisations. In contrast to the former, the latter do not formulate statutes, take minutes, issue official statements, write annual reports, work out written action strategies, and so on. Nevertheless, they can deliberate on short-term strategies for collective action and uphold common norms. At wage labour workplaces, trade unions are among the former and self-organisations such as worker collectivities and communities of coping among the latter. However, as we are interested in the subjective dimension of activities and their relation to the objective dimension of structures, in pursuing our reasoning we concentrate on what is common to both types of Corporate Agents among wage labourers at workplaces: They coordinate collective activities to influence structures according to their vested interests.
The vested interests are Corporate Agents’ own interests, even though they are bound to a particular position in a society that is external to the Agent and possesses objective properties. They are the Agents’ own interests, because vested interests emerge from the deliberation over and agreement about valuable goods that they care strongly enough about to organise actions to obtain them. They do so despite opportunity costs that are likely to emerge from concentrating their efforts on these particular goals, neglecting other goals in the process and investing energy in the push and pull between Corporate Agents. Clearly, Corporate Agents cannot shape the social order as they please. Instead, their influence on structures depends on their access to material and ideological resources as well as on the interaction with other Corporate Agents and the aggregated effects of Primary Agent’s actions. Consequently, Corporate Agents need to monitor and control the environment they are operating in and modify, if necessary, their strategies for collective action. Their awareness and articulation of their collective wants and needs, and the organised action it results in, activates their own causal powers and puts them to use, appropriating, as far as possible, the environment in which they are situated. Indeed, by developing the ability to strategically modify the environment they are operating in, Corporate Agents possess the power to not only stabilise or transform the socio-cultural system they are placed in, but may also reshape it to generate a more meaningful structure for investing in themselves. Admittedly, they are unlikely to realise all, or even most, of their interests in the light of the existence of a plurality of Corporate Agents that may compete over similar goals or have opposing interests. Consequently, Corporate Agents possess relative autonomy vis-à-vis the social structure in which they exist.
At the organisational level, the differentiation between Primary and Corporate Agency establishes the idea that the objective enablers and constraints of autonomy, dignity and recognition for meaningful work interact with workers as Primary or Corporate Agents and their agentic powers, with significant consequences for the emergence of meaningful work. Indeed, the meaningful wage labour theory we are introducing in this chapter advocates the thesis that whether workers are Primary or Corporate Agents shapes not only the nature and form of the subjective dimensions of meaningful work, but whether meaningful wage labour results at all. By way of illustration, in the case that the formal organisation of work and its objective enablers and constraints for meaningful work impinge on workers as Primary Agents, they are not responded to by collective practices and relations. In this case, the dimensions of autonomy, dignity and recognition remain external to the worker. This is not to deny the power of the objective dimensions of meaningful work and the advantages or disadvantages they offer to workers and their life chances. And yet, the dimensions need to be appropriated by human beings in order to meet their vested interests and become meaningful in the process. In Archer’s (Reference Archer2007:89) words:
Objective advantages have to be found subjectively advantageous, objective bonuses have to be considered subjectively worthwhile, and objective advancement has to be deemed subjectively desirable. Without all of this, the ‘direct effects’ of objective factors upon human subjects are inexplicable, unless all humanity is taken out of the subject and he or she is reduced to mere throughput – the ultimate ‘passive agent’.
At the organisational level, meaningful work is a vested interest for many. Workers as Corporate Agents want to activate, enhance and defend autonomy, dignity and recognition at work, because these dimensions make the activity of waged work in the realm of necessity more meaningful. Whether, and to what extent, they are able to develop strong subjective dimensions of meaningful work depends on the mutual relationships and interactions between different collectives and vested interest groups and the aggregated effects of Primary Agents’ actions. Crucial to this process is that the interactions between the Agents not only impact on the environment Corporate Agents are operating in, but also facilitate a process through which the collectives are also changed and forced to regroup.
Why workers in some workplaces cannot overcome their status as Primary Agents, whereas workers in other workplaces utilise their agentic powers as Corporate Agents, calls for an analysis of the relationship of the particularities of the labour process and the advantages and disadvantages it represents for the formation of collective agency. Yet, human agency does not cease to exist, and no matter whether Primary or Corporate Agents, workers act in various ways and deliberate over what matters to them and how this can be achieved, even though enablers for Corporate Agency are unequally distributed across the workforce. It is the stratified social ontology of Agency that informs the following sections which analyse the emerging powers of structures and agency at work, paving the way for an elaboration of the objective and subjective dimensions of meaningful work.
Autonomy
Scholars from the social and human sciences have long acknowledged autonomy as a critical ingredient for the experience of meaningful work. Autonomy is most often cited as a prerequisite for the actualisation of human beings’ capacity for self-realisation and self-actualisation. What is absent in these contributions is a robust conceptualisation of autonomy that acknowledges its complexity as a structural and agential property. Indeed, in most meaningful work discussions, autonomy boils down to managerially granted job and task discretion. The identification of autonomy in the context of meaningful work with the job structure thus represents a downward conflation, ignoring not only the Agential responses to the formal structure and how autonomy is encoded in their actions, but also how autonomy is produced by the interaction between the formal organisation of work and Agents. To remedy this shortcoming, this section differentiates between objective and subjective autonomy at work and in which way the distinction matters for the experience of meaningful wage labour. To set the stage for this, we elaborate on the idea of objective and subjective autonomy in a stratified society.
The previous section of this chapter promotes the perspective that structures, as well as human beings, possess distinctive properties and powers in relation to specific relatively autonomous strata. This stance has vast implications for conceptualising objective and subjective dimensions of autonomy. Social structures possess relative autonomy not only by virtue of the way they exist prior to actions, but also because their properties and powers are causally efficacious in relation to humans, shaping their life chances and actions independent of whether people have knowledge of them or appreciate their influence (Archer, Reference Archer2003). Thanks to the pre-existence of social structures as a manifestation of their relative autonomy, they can become ‘possible objects of investigation’ (Bhaskar, Reference Bhaskar1989:25) for illuminating the nature of the social order, such as waged work, and what enablements and constraints these offer. It is important to note that the relative autonomy of social structures does not assume the stability of the social order. Rather, the adjective ‘relative’ implies that structural elaboration is an emerging property of the co-evolving relationship between structure and agency, mediated by human agents and transforming the latter in the process (Archer, Reference Archer1995). The social relations that generate emerging properties cannot be reduced to its parts, as they are, in turn, also relatively autonomous from them. Thus, even though structures impact on people’s ability to realise projects that they have vested interests in, they do not rule out the powers and properties of human beings. Rather, human beings possess relative autonomy vis-à-vis structures as well, embodied in their ability to act one way or the other despite external circumstances that pull them towards a particular direction of action. So at the very least, Agents possess the autonomy to decide whether to act or refuse to do so, whether to consent or resist social pressures (Lukes, Reference Lukes1974). This is not to deny that alternative courses of action bear opportunity costs for Agents and, depending on the placement of the Agent in society, for some groups these costs may be greater or less. And yet, this perspective informs the understanding that Agents ‘have relative autonomy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to modify both of them’ (Archer, Reference Archer2000:87). Agential autonomy is not a gift of society, nor biologically determined, but an emerging property that is encapsulated in human beings’ unique powers. These powers are deeply relational and include the ability to care, love, deliberate, evaluate, attach, invest and hate things that matter to them and formulate goals based on their vested interests and act one way or another (Sayer, Reference Sayer2011a). Although the relative autonomy of Agents is ultimately a human, and thus social, condition, the shape and form of its expression differs.
What Agents find meaningful and have a vested interest in does not need to be in accordance with the dominant formal order, but can also be located outside of it and, indeed, be in conflict with it. At the Agential level, Agents do not have the power to create any role and position in a society they like. In fact, most Agents face serious restrictions when it comes to occupying a role in a stratified society in which they have a vested interest. At the same time, they cannot be forced to identify with a position or lifestyle against their will. Given the pre-existence of the social in which the Agent is involuntarily placed, autonomy decodes Agents’ exploration of the environment they are situated it, in the identification of its advantages and disadvantages and the activation, over time, of their agentic powers to appropriate sections of the environment, making it their own (Donati, Reference Donati2011). Agents do so by developing a sense of selfhood and thereby the capacity to understand their situatedness in a stratified social reality that offers positions that have objective properties which may enable or constrain them to do and be certain things. Within this stratified reality, they make, within the confines of available positions and roles, decisions that bring them closer to what they want to do and be. An integral part of this process is belonging to a group of people, either as Primary Agent or as Corporate Agent, and most likely both at the same time in different positions within society. As emphasised earlier in this chapter, it is the group of Corporate Agents in particular that possess relative autonomy vis-à-vis the social order, encoded in their agentic power as a collective as an ability to influence the environment they are acting in and the array of roles within it. By developing more and new positions in an environment, Corporate Agents deploy their agentic powers to enhance the autonomy of the members of the collective to subsequently make the environment their own and create positions that express their interests and which they are motivated to invest in personally and collectively. In the following, we differentiate between objective autonomy and subjective autonomy. While the former relates to the formal organisation of work and its conditions, the latter refers to Agential responses.
Objective Autonomy
Autonomy and control over the organisation of work and its content are paramount for human flourishing and meaningful work, as passionately argued by the classical social and economic theorists, such as Karl Marx and Adam Smith, and modern sociologists, like Axel Honneth and Richard Sennett. Defining the parameters of objective autonomy as an integral part of meaningful waged work under capitalism is an ambitious, potentially ambiguous, undertaking if we continue to follow the politics of working life path that we have set out in the first part of this book. Indeed, the celebration of autonomy by the aforementioned authors comes with the important caveat that work under capitalism offers no ground for experiencing autonomy as freedom from domination. On the contrary, the social structure of waged work, the prevalent division of labour and capitalist companies’ instrumental means and ends subjugate the interests, knowledge and needs of the worker. From this perspective it is coercion and lack of freedom, and not autonomy, that manifest themselves in the distinct objective dimensions of wage labour.
This section argues that even though autonomy as ‘substantial freedom, independence, and discretion’ at work (Hackman and Oldham, Reference Hackman and Oldham1975:162) does not exist in the capitalist labour process, a relative, bounded form of autonomy may. It is relative because it emerges from the formal organisation of work and is therefore a consciously designed feature of the labour process that is delegated by management with the purpose of enhancing profitability and efficiency. Thus, objective autonomy is not the opposite of control and coercion. It is, indeed, never far from the reach of managerial control and is at the heart of management’s interest in enhancing efficiency and profitability. This is illustrated by the concept of the indeterminacy of labour, a term that is at the core of Labour Process Theory. Generally, the indeterminacy of labour captures the contingency and variability of labour power, pointing towards the challenges the employer faces when aiming to transform raw labour power into ‘labour profitable production’ (Thompson, Reference Thompson1989:242). The transformation is a challenge as the precise quantity and quality of effort to be extracted from workers in the labour process cannot be determined before workers are contracted by the employer. This is why a work–effort bargain between the employer, workers and other corporate agents, such as unions and employer associations, establishes binding ‘standards of efforts’ (Smith, Reference Smith2006:390). These standards of efforts are subject to ongoing negotiations and, indeed, conflicts in the light of the dynamic relationship between capital and labour and their embeddedness in the changing political, economic and technological contexts. In order to ensure that ‘standards of efforts’ are met by workers, organisations design an array of managerial control practices. It could be argued that since it is of the utmost importance to capitalist organisations that workers meet the performance criteria, it is less important whether they do so because they are closely monitored via direct control or incentivised by rules and norms of bureaucratic control. As important as this point is, it does, admittedly, simplify the matter. Managerial control forms are not all-encompassing; they shift and turn with the interactions of Corporate Agents. The finding that the most common goals of organisations, such as efficiency and commitment, profitability and motivation, and innovation and predictability are not compatible with each other further complicates this. The incompatibility trickles down into the widely discussed contradiction management inevitably faces when managing workers. The contradiction encodes the tension-ridden exercise of displaying authority and applying control over workers, while also relying on their cooperation and motivation to meet work–effort targets. Clearly, the intensity of the contradiction varies, depending on the supply and demand dynamics in product and labour markets, industrial relations and the skills, processes and qualifications involved in the labour process
The indeterminacy of labour and the contradictions that are tacitly recognised in managerial control regimes exercise a profound influence on the control–autonomy paradox. One implication of this for the dimension of objective autonomy is that eliminating any form of decision-making and independent activity on the shop floor is neither possible nor in the best interest of work organisations. In line with Friedman’s (Reference Friedman1977) notion of ‘responsible autonomy’, objective autonomy reflects managers’ awareness of the potential benefits, and for some positions and occupations necessity, of granting workers enhanced responsibilities, opportunities for self-initiative, task autonomy and so on. In this respect objective autonomy is not a distinct managerial strategy in its own right that opposes managerial control techniques per se, but rather a complementary feature that stands in contrast to direct control, but not necessarily to bureaucratic or normative control. In this respect, objective autonomy emerges out of the inherent contradictions and tensions of the capitalist labour process. In fact, the contradictions and tensions are translated into the nature and character of objective autonomy. They come to the fore in Friedman’s (Reference Friedman1977) and Fox’s (Reference Fox1974) observation that in times of tight labour markets, high product demand and strong Corporate Agents representing worker interests, management tends to loosen direct and technological control practices and offer more positions with ‘high discretion’ work patterns. Both authors suggest that management decides to enhance workers’ autonomy primarily in order to co-opt workers and thereby avoid worker resistance and maintain, as a consequence, control over the labour process. This culminates in the thesis that the management of Corporate Agents’ resistance in the labour process by increasing autonomy at work is a central strategy of the managerial control regime. It is debateable whether management prioritises control over efficiency, so that control trumps autonomy regardless of whether such decisions cause decreasing levels of labour efficiency, or whether choices about intensifying control or granting autonomy are not based on alleged efficiency criteria alone, but are also about increasing options for organising work in the interest of capital (Thompson and Laaser, Reference Thompson and Laaser2021; Vidal, Reference Vidal2020). Friedman (Reference Friedman1977:78) takes the middle way, suggesting that responsible autonomy is not an integral part of a humanisation of work philosophy, but aims to ‘harness the adaptability of labour power by giving workers leeway and encouraging them to adapt to changing situations in a manner beneficial to the firm. To do this top managers give workers status, authority and responsibility. Top managers try to win their loyalty, and co-opt their organisations to the firm’s ideals (that is, the competitive struggle) ideologically’. In a similar vein, we conceptualise objective autonomy as encompassing strategies, practices and relations that management consciously designs and integrates into the formal organisation of work with the aim to secure and obscure surplus value. The more detailed features of objective autonomy at the workplace are influenced by the dynamics that emerge from the relationship between capital and labour more broadly and the work effort bargain at the workplace level between formal Corporate Agents. Yet, we suggest that many occupations, especially professional jobs, feature significant levels of objective autonomy, even though those who perform it are not formal or informal Corporate Agents and are not threatening the employer with resistance. Rather, as Goldthorpe (Reference Goldthorpe2000) has contended in reference to professional and administrative roles, job autonomy is an inevitable feature of occupations that are difficult for management to monitor and assess. Nevertheless, this does not change the character and orientation of objective autonomy, which remains an organisational attempt to organise a labour process in which workers meet the performance expectations of the owner of production, do not challenge the legitimacy of management or even question their ownership over the product and process.
In order to capture objective autonomy in a variety of jobs and sectors, we distinguish between two different types of objective autonomy, namely: autonomy at the job control level and autonomy at the level of having voice over working conditions. At the job control level, autonomy entails opportunities for workers to independently exercise skill and judgement throughout the different stages of production or service creation (Gallie, Reference Gallie, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019; Hodson, Reference Hodson2001). In particular, this rests on degrees of freedom workers have in making choices, on their own or as part of self-directed work teams, about the tools and methods for their work, the sequence of the necessary processes involved, as well as the rhythm and pace of work (Breaugh, Reference Breaugh1999; Felstead et al., Reference Felstead, Fuller, Jewson and Unwin2009). The reference to ‘degrees’ of freedom and choice denotes that objective autonomy is designed and situated within the confines of the instrumental logic of capitalist organisations. This is why objective autonomy does not represent freedom from domination.
Nevertheless, autonomy at the job control level is an essential source of meaningful work, as it allows workers to exercise authority over their work and the discretion to combine planning and execution in a way that permits them to apply their capacity for autonomous judgment and decision-making. Consequently, these discretionary methods offer opportunities for the development of intellectual capacities and technical skills (Yeoman, Reference Yeoman2014b). Or, as Edwards (Reference Edwards1979:147) puts it: ‘It is not immaterial, however, in deciding whether workers have autonomy in their jobs. Alienated labor – workers forced to work according to the capitalist’s criteria – is alienated no less because it has internalized these criteria, and its consequences are no less damaging to the workers.’
Certainly, features of objective autonomy are at the heart of so-called post-Fordist managerial strategies, such as ‘high commitment work practices’ (Walton, Reference Walton, Walton and Lawrence1985) or ‘flexible specialization’ (Piore and Sabel, Reference Piore and Sabel1984) frameworks that aim to establish high trust and high commitment work environments. Yet, work organisations that are characterised by a high level of objective autonomy at the job control level can nevertheless exercise a range of indirect constraints on workers’ freedom. Examples are the controls that are inscribed in technology that narrow down the options available to workers and performance management systems that incentivise certain working practices and approaches. However, these indirect constraints can be addressed by objective autonomy at the level of labour voice. This is visible in the relation between performance and pay, staffing, the workings of the internal labour market, working time, work–life balance dimensions as well as training and learning opportunities. If and how objective autonomy manifests itself at the level of worker voice depends to a significant degree on the institutional context in which the workplace regime is embedded. In coordinated and regulated market economies, Corporate Agents representing labour tend to be more widespread and dominant, pushing for the implementation of and adherence to worker voice. This endeavour tends to be supported by labour laws and systems of collective bargaining that protect workers to some degrees and institutionalise worker voice. In turn, in liberal market economies, where voice and choice in working arrangements is less supported at the regulatory level, and where labour is less strongly organised, autonomy in the form of having a voice over working conditions is fragile. Having a voice over working conditions contributes to meaningful work, as it offers opportunities for workers within the realm of necessity, coercion and strain, to express their vested interests by having a say over how, when and to what degree their capacities are deployed at work. It integrates a degree of self-determination and authority in the labour process and sets barriers to employers’ appropriation of their labour power.
Identifying job control and worker voice as two dimensions of objective autonomy allows us to understand these dimensions as connected, but essentially independent layers of meaningfulness that are shaped by different managerial decisions. For objective autonomy to be intact and strong, both dimensions of autonomy need to be present, but the components are not of equal importance: If workers have a voice over employment conditions but lack autonomy at the job control level, then objective autonomy is nevertheless considered absent. This is because having a voice over particular working conditions does not make up for the lack of space for self-determination and independent thinking.
Subjective Autonomy
The notion of subjective autonomy rests on the assumption that the formal organisation and the managerial control strategies it utilises are far from being an all-encompassing regime. The indeterminacy of labour, as elaborated in the discussion about objective autonomy, opens up opportunities for workers to appropriate dimensions of the formal organisation and the labour process and to pursue their vested interests as informal Corporate Agents. The tension between the power of the owners of production and the agentic powers of workers features strongly in Braverman’s thesis (1974:96) that worker’s ‘critical, intelligent and conceptual faculties, no matter how deadened or diminished, always remain in some degree’. Braverman claims that workers’ agentic powers are so strong that even though the capitalist mode of production is consistently extended to habituate and subordinate the worker, the ‘hostility of workers to the degenerated forms of work which are forced upon them continues as a subterranean stream [and …] expresses itself in the unbounded cynicism and revulsion which large numbers of workers feel about their work’ (1974:104). It is the idea of employees’ agentic powers as an irresistible core that forms the backbone of subjective autonomy. But whereas Braverman understands workers’ critical faculties, if activated and organised, as pathways to workplace conflicts between capital and labour that will eventually shake the foundations of the capitalist labour process, the dimension of subjective autonomy is open in terms of the direction worker actions and relationships can take. Based on the differentiation between formal and informal Corporate Agency, we argue that the strength and direction subjective autonomy can take at work depends on the particular workplace regime it is situated in, on the relationship between the relevant formal Corporate Agents and whether workers have organised as informal Corporate Agents. In this respect, subjective autonomy is home to a wide range of interests that can be located along the control-oriented resistance–consent continuum. Nevertheless, considering the nature of waged work under capitalism and its embeddedness in the structured antagonism between capital and labour, subjective autonomy has the strong tendency to be in opposition to the formal organisation and managerial interests.
In this vein, subjective autonomy requires that workers overcome their status as Primary Agents and develop, as well as subscribe to, the principles of mutuality and solidarity that characterise the ‘We’ of (in)formal Corporate Agents. Corporate Agency is essential for the realisation of subjective autonomy as it bundles workers’ agentic powers, enabling them to develop and follow their own rules and values, creating a protected, self-regulated space within the formal organisation that buffers the instrumental demands of the formal organisation. Therein, subjective autonomy rests on powers that are the workers’ own. And yet, the subjective autonomy in the realm of waged work stands in a dialectical relationship to the formal organisation of work. It emerges from a multi-layered process between employees that encompasses their interaction, identification and interpretation of their work and its conditions as Corporate Agents. In parallel to Lysgaard’s (2001) concept of worker collectivity, subjective autonomy rests on workers reaching similar conclusions about their work and their situatedness in the labour process. This process represents the ground on which employees’ vested interests flourish and activities become co-ordinated. If these conditions persist over time, a state of subjective autonomy emerges that reverses the original causality by shaping the formal organisation and the process that gave rise to it. Through subjective autonomy that represents, essentially, the ‘thick cultural ensembles of their own making’ (Vallas, Reference Vallas2006:1709), workers can not only gain protection from the one-sided demands of the formal organisation, but also appropriate organisational processes and spaces and push back their subordination and objectification. In this vein, subjective autonomy can positively influence the workers’ position in the formal work–effort bargain struggle that takes place at the level of objective autonomy by representing an informal force that the employer needs to engage with, particularly if workers’ interests and identities are opposed to employers’ demands and expectations. Subjective autonomy, therefore, is driven by employees’ positive impulse to appropriate their work and its social relationships by the construction of an independent system of social meaning. The latter grants them opportunities for defending and extending their material and social interests vis-à-vis Formal Corporate Agents that represent the interests of the employer. Consequently, subjective autonomy includes, but also goes beyond, the idea of an implicit stream of oppositional resources. It delineates a form of self-organisation that is independent from, but not unaffected by, the formal organisation and its demands.
Clearly, the power of subjective autonomy depends on the formal organisation of work and if, as well as how, objective autonomy is structured within the labour process. This position is clarified with the distinction that Ackroyd and Thompson (Reference Ackroyd and Thompson2022) make between outward- and inward-looking self-organisations. As discussed in Chapter 4, when interests dominate meaning, the outcome is an outward-looking self-organisation that establishes autonomy by pursuing material interests and focussing on self-protection against managerial abuse, while also opposing other informal Corporate Agents that could challenge the structure of the self-organisation. Following on, informal practices and relations of workers that are externally directed extend workers’ autonomy by establishing, and respectively enhancing, the degree of control they have over the pace, content and structure of work activities, their conditions and wider relations. In this way, externally directed practices include a wide range of practices that often have an oppositional, and sometimes consensual, character. These practices include internal work-rate setting, encoded for example in shop floor games that contribute to an informal bargaining between work groups and management over material rewards, but also practices of time-wasting, pilferage and soldiering. In this way, outward-looking practices seek to informally transform the formal conditions of work, whether it is by taking more or longer breaks, slowing down the pace in order to avoid exhaustion or to pursue non-work related activities at work. The sense of self-determination that employees seek to gain in the process can contribute to their experience of meaningful work as it combats the experience of self-estrangement through control. At the same time, externally oriented practices can also feature conflicts between co-workers over the pace of work, extension of oppositional practices, such as pilferage, and can in this way work against the more solidarity-inspired understanding of the worker collectivity. A prominent illustration of this comes from the aforementioned Michael Burawoy (Reference Burawoy1979), whose Manufacturing Consent illustrates the meaning workers derive from shop floor games that they create as a response to the organisation of factory work as piecework. However, these shop floor games do not prioritise the social interaction between co-workers over the actual work, but structure the game around the productivity of groups of workers and individuals with the competition for financial rewards at its heart. The title Manufacturing Consent encodes how subjective autonomy can be achieved through informal self-organisation, while also generating compliance with management’s performance expectations.
Inward-looking self-organisations, on the other hand, place meaning over interests and engage in rites and rituals that enhance group identity, foster integration in self-organisations, emphasise internal norms and hierarchies and establish principles of mutuality. Here, subjective autonomy is established through the ongoing identification and monitoring of Informal Corporate Agents’ norms, values and behaviour. A wide range of ethnographic workplace research demonstrates how work groups experience autonomy within their restrictive roles in the workplace, dulling routines and otherwise mentally exhausting practices by developing and infusing ritualised social interactions into the labour process that provide distinct meanings to the work group. Donald Roy’s (Reference Roy1960) celebrated research on ‘Banana time’ in the routine work of a factory illustrates how the work group informally separates the working day into periods that each contain a specific set of behaviour and attitudes that evolve around jokes, teasing, eating and drinking. Overcoming thereby ‘the beast of monotony’, these practices also establish rules for engaging with work in the workers’ own way and create an informal social order at work. Another case in point are the actions of employees that enhance the experience of the meaning of their work while also benefiting the job itself. Arguably, this offers parallels to the concept of job crafting, which has gained prominence in the meaningful work discourse. Referring broadly to worker-initiated changes to the job that benefit the worker as well as the work (Wrzesniewski and Dutton, Reference Wrzesniewski and Dutton2001), job crafting operates at the level of the job task and is not motivated by the politics of working life. Here, workers prioritise, add, modify, eliminate or enrich job tasks based on their personal desires and interests. We agree that employees have a strong interest in enhancing subjective autonomy at work through modifying, inventing and abandoning work tasks, but emphasise that it is a political and collective act (Hodson, Reference Hodson2001; Karlsson Reference Karlsson2012). Indeed, research on the appropriation of work tasks has a long-standing tradition in the sociology of work that puts the spotlight on how workers become socialised at the workplace, learning how to adapt to the environment and their work (Ackroyd and Thompson, Reference Ackroyd and Thompson2022). This process includes learning from each other how to bend and alter tasks, prioritise practices that are experienced as more interesting and purposeful than others and derive meaningfulness from these work activities. Clearly, inward-oriented practices are not meaningful for all workers, particularly when they involve violent and degrading habits, such as humiliating new recruits or discriminating against the characteristics of individuals for the sake of the group’s identity. This informs the qualification that subjective autonomy contributes to meaningful work only when employees are Informal Corporate Agents by their own choice and consider it a positive force. We concur with Ackroyd and Thompson (Reference Ackroyd and Thompson2022) that subjective autonomy is at its strongest when workers’ self-organisation is both inward- and outward-looking. This allows them to negotiate the material conditions of their work, distinguish themselves as a group with distinct vested interests, enhance their agentic powers in the process and establish the principles of mutuality and solidarity. The combination of both orientations serves to build a strong and balanced form of subjective autonomy. Consequently, it is through self-organisation that workers exercise their agentic powers and assert their autonomy in opposition to the control-oriented and instrumental nature of the formal organisation.
Dignity
Liberal philosophy figures most prominently in the discourse on human dignity, defining the personal freedom from necessities as an essential requirement for human dignity. The coupling of dignity with autonomy as freedom from necessities lacks an understanding of human beings’ sentient nature that colours human dependency as part and parcel of the experience of dignity. Yet, the majority of twentieth-century critical social science remains relatively silent on the centrality of dignity for the Agent and the society. The lack of conceptual development in this field has much to do with the long-standing dominance of a fact-value duality in the social sciences that tends to exclude normative categories from social analysis. Value-laden categories such as morality and dignity are further marginalised in light of the twentieth century with its two world wars, genocides and, above all, the Holocaust, which underline the human capacity for evil and thus push debates about the nature and realisation of human dignity further away from social analysis. The tensions between analysing politics and the social life as they are, while hanging on to dignity as a human and social ideal on which emerging social orders should orientate themselves, are powerfully addressed by Thomas Mann (Reference Mann1938:23–25), who, shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, discussed the centrality of democracy and dignity for justice and human flourishing:
The dignity of man – do we not feel alarmed and somewhat ridiculous at the mention of these words? Do they not savour of optimism grown feeble and stuffy – of after-dinner oratory, which scarcely harmonizes with the bitter, harsh, everyday truth about human beings? We know it – this truth. We are well aware of the nature of man, or, to be more accurate, the nature of men – and we are far from entertaining any illusions on the subject […]. Yes, yes, humanity – its injustice, malice, cruelty, its average stupidity and blindness are amply demonstrated, its egoism is crass, its deceitfulness, cowardice, its antisocial instincts, constitute our everyday experience […]. And yet it is a fact – more true today than ever – that we cannot allow ourselves, because of so much all too well-founded scepticism, to despise humanity […] we cannot forget the great and the honourable in man […]. In [men] nature becomes conscious […]. To become conscious means acquire conscience, means the knowledge of what is good and what is evil.
Placing dignity at the centre stage of politics, social structures and relational goods and evils, Thomas Mann provides a powerful example of how the concept can be integrated into critical social analysis. And some social science scholars have pursued this path over the last three decades, integrating concepts of human dignity into social thought (Bolton, Reference Bolton2007; Hodson, Reference Hodson2001; Karlsson, Reference Karlsson2012; Lamont, Reference Lamont2000; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum2000; Sayer, Reference Sayer2011a). We remain on this path. Guided by the stratified social ontology of the human being, we suggest that dignity is differential, intransitive and closely aligned with the agentic powers of agents, the human quality of attributing meaning to things and actions and deliberately contemplating them (Donati, Reference Donati2020). We approach this position by discussing the relationship between personhood and dignity.
Promoting a Critical Realist ontology of the human being that diverges from Bhaskar and Archer in its focus on the person instead of the agent, Christian Smith (Reference Smith2010) suggests that personhood is the distinct feature of being human, encoding ‘a self-subsistent, self-governing centre of being, direction, and purpose’ (p. 88). This position leads Smith to assert dignity as a ‘natural birthright of personhood’ (Smith, p. 478), a human property that is (p. 443) ‘ontologically real, analytically irreducible and phenomenologically apparent’. Virtue ethics pervades Smith’s analysis, informing the stance that dignity is a property of the person that not only possesses unique powers and is, together with the ability to love, a necessary condition of being a person, but is also pivotal to the perusal of the one single human telos that ‘fits all persons’ (p. 418). Hence, dignity is constructed as an essential human condition that defines a person. In this way, Smith renders a person as a necessarily moral being that possesses dignity and pursues an all-encompassing human telos. This understanding opposes the widely shared thesis that dignity is a contingent quality that depends on the functioning of a distinct set of human capacities. Smith refutes this by characterising dignity as an ontologically real entity that exercises its powers independently of the context and the mechanisms it is in relation with. In other words, if dignity vanishes, so does the person.
This marks the point where the stratified ontology of human beings that we advocate diverges. In fact, we understand human properties as existing ‘in potentia’ (Archer, Reference Archer2000:42). Human properties require support from others and time to develop. This is why we are not born as Corporate Agents or with a social identity, but may become Corporate Agents and may develop a social identity. Becoming is a relational process; it is enabled or constrained, jeopardised or secured by the stratified social environment in which human beings are situated. Consequently, Smith’s work fails to capture the situatedness of dignity in social life, its fragility and strength, dependency on conduct and treatment by others. This is where the work of another Critical Realist, Andrew Collier, comes in, an approach that captures the contested relationship between social structures and dignity. In Being and Worth, Collier suggests that all virtues are not equally important for the worth of human beings, nor are they equally distributed. From this follows that ‘there is a metaphysical equality of worth of all human beings as “having a life to live” independent of the various intellectual, physical or moral qualities of the person’ (1999:103). Dignity as a relational, vulnerable but powerful dimension of human life shines through in Collier’s notion of ‘having a life to live’, which he suggests has two key requirements. First, the absence of someone else’s power over one’s life. Second, the access to necessities that are essential for ‘operating in the normal way for members of the particular society concerned’ (p. 96). This represents the core of Collier’s approach to social justice, which emphasises the importance of material equality in a society in which citizens can experience and actualise their worth in relations with others. In a hierarchically structured capitalist society, however, the metaphysical equality of people is under attack by the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities that generate dependence, which constrain metaphysical and material equality. Consequently, ‘[h]aving a life to live is of no account in the market; what matters is having marketable commodities or purchasing power’ (p. 100).
This position is further illustrated by Collier’s analysis of wage labour. Here he argues that waged work poses a threat to dignity, as it is built on the owner of production’s temporary command over workers’ time and labour power and thus violates, though does not annul, workers’ autonomy. Collier’s solution to this is communism, where ‘everyone who is not the owner of their own individual means of labour should have an equal share in and right of access to some communally owned means of labour’ (p. 97). Thus, while Collier paves the way for a political understanding of dignity and its relational and fragile nature, his conclusion is less informative for developing objective and subjective dimensions of dignity for meaningful waged work. Hence, what is needed is a relational perspective that facilitates an understanding of how worth and dignity emerge and are defended in different sets of relations and structures, even when these are characterised by inequalities.
Peter Bieri’s (Reference Bieri2017) philosophy of dignity and human life offers strong parallels to Collier’s Being and Worth in its focus on the essentiality of and struggle for living a dignified life. Framing the essence of dignity as leading one’s life in a way that it is an end in itself and not an instrument for someone else’s end, Bieri defines dignity as ‘a certain way of living one’s life […] a pattern of thought, of experience, of action’ (2017:9). This position intermingles human dignity with the relative autonomous powers people possess in potentia. These are important for evaluating one’s own and other’s actions, thoughts and experiences within specific social contexts and avoid, respectively free oneself, from relations that instrumentalise oneself. Working with the premise that dignity is a fragile dimension of life that emerges from, but is also sustained or threatened by how others treat oneself adds a relational position to Collier’s focus on social structures that is based on three moments: Firstly, human dignity requires the respectful acknowledgement of one’s powers, capabilities and needs. This entails that sufficient opportunities for human beings exist to exercise self-command, have one’s intimacy respected and achievements recognised, commitments honoured and vulnerabilities and dependencies not taken advantage of. Secondly, the quality of social relations matter. It is through thick, lasting relations that people learn to value and invest in mutual recognition and respect, valuation of commitments and moral integrity. Thirdly, people need to treat each other as ends in themselves, value and respect each other’s powers, vulnerabilities and capacities to flourish and suffer. The three pillars and their interplay acknowledge the ambiguities, incoherencies and potential conflicts that emerge from the relational character of dignity and the drivers for instrumentalisation and objectification that a market society embraces. Even though Bieri’s approach is not entirely in line with the stratified ontology we advocate, it does acknowledge the unique characteristics and causal properties of people’s social relations that are created and activated by them within the context of the social setting in which they are embedded (Donati, Reference Donati, Al-Amoudi and Morgan2019). The relational and political aspect of dignity is expressed more concisely in Sayer’s (Reference Sayer2011a) Critical Realist take on dignity that characterises dignity as a precarious quality that signifies how a person treats and is treated, values and is valued by others. Sayer endorses the idea that the nature and quality of dignity goes beyond the intersubjective level and is fostered or jeopardised by social structures and whether they enable human beings to utilise their capacities for self-command and reflexivity to meet their vested interests. Dignity is thereby framed as an experience that is positioned at the intersection of social and material relations, taking ‘the concealed form of a distributional struggle for resources’ (Sayer, Reference Sayer2011a:200).
What emerges from a discussion of these various approaches is that dignity is a powerful dimension that is aligned with the actualisation of human potential in stratified social structures and social relations. As such, dignity is a mechanism and thereby emergent, possessing what Collier (Reference Collier1999) terms ‘shoving power’. This is why we identify it as a key dimension of meaningful work. The following explores the objective and subjective dimensions of dignity in relation to meaningful wage labour.
Objective Dignity
The previous discussion presents dignity as having normative, political and social aspects. A conceptualisation of the objective dimension of dignity in relation to meaningful waged work needs to bring these aspects together. Karl Polanyi’s influential The Great Transformation (1985) offers an important step in that direction. Even though dignity is not an overriding analytical category in Polanyi’s work, it is implicitly interwoven into his exploration of the construction of a market society. Indeed, in The Great Transformation and selected essays an understanding of dignity as an essential human value that amplifies the worth of each individual, the essence of ‘brotherhood’, democratic participation and the irrefutable right for livelihood shine through (1985:176). Arguably, aspects of the dignity concepts of Collier, Bieri and Mann are bundled in these descriptions. Polanyi understands the dignity of people to be in tension with the principles of a market society. In brief, he asserts that ever since the early years of capitalism political and economic forces push for a liberalisation of capitalist markets and an extension of market logics into social, that is, non-market, areas. A consequence of this is that labour is treated as if it were a commodity that can be bought and sold on markets.
Polanyi famously captures this destructive dogma by rendering labour, together with land and money, as a ‘fictitious commodity’ that cannot be exchanged on a self-regulated market without violating the dignity of its bearers and destroying them in the process. Therein, labour markets and the labour process, in order to be sustainable, must be subordinated to politics and social relations and, essentially, respect and foster the dignity of labour. Yet, the owners of production and the powerful ideology of laissez-fair capitalism threaten this embeddedness of the economy in society. This is why, as Polanyi illustrates, throughout the history of capitalism protective ‘counter movements’ emerge that aim to protect the fictitious commodities from the tentacles of the laissez-faire market and buffer the objectification of labour in order to safeguard their dignity. What Polanyi refers to as a ‘double movement’ is the ongoing tension between a market society, which pushes for an objectification of the fictitious commodities, and protective counter movements that embed the market in society and its norms. Surely, counter movements, as Polanyi (Reference Polanyi1985) acknowledges, are not per se positive forces. In the long run they can also be destructive for people and their dignity, as was Fascism.
What is pivotal about Polanyi’s thesis for formulating the objective dimension of dignity is its illustration of the partial autonomy of market forces, their inclination to jeopardise worker’s dignity and the necessity of a counter movement that pushes for the social protection of workers and the safeguarding of their dignity. Thus, the dignity of waged work is interwoven with so-called counter movements at the regulatory level that exercise their influence on a society’s industrial relations and feature a wide range of practices and strategies that regulate wage labour to varying degrees and limit the objectification of labour. Nevertheless, industrial relations are dynamic, context- and path-dependent in accordance with the power and vested interests of the Formal, and to a degree Informal Corporate Agents and the characteristics of the market economy they are unfolding in which frame the nature and conditions of waged work.
However, due to the relative autonomy of the labour process from the regulatory and accumulation regime, and hence from Industrial Relations, they do not determine the organisation of work and the dignity of the job in a particular workplace. Consequently, organisations need to strike a balance between their drive for efficiency, profitability and control and workers’ demands for dignity at work. It is out of this balancing act that objective dignity crystallises into job and working conditions. In general terms, the structure and organisation of work offers objective dignity when it contributes positively to the flourishing of the worker who is performing it (Donati, Reference Donati2020). This is the case when the work is tailored towards the skills and potentials of workers and grants them sufficient opportunities to apply and enhance their practical and technical knowledge in a self-determined and responsible manner. The work itself needs to be appropriately complex, variable and cooperative and offer opportunities to participate in decision-making processes with respect to the job and its conditions. These practices represent objective dignity in the realm of waged work because they embrace workers as co-authorities in the labour process and values them as trustworthy, responsible and competent persons that are capable of deliberating about their work and make difficult decisions. It is no surprise that organisational practices that lack these characteristics produce indignities by casting doubt on the ability, potential and trustworthiness of the worker. In other words, objective dignity manifests itself when organisational policies and practices value workers and their capacities for self-command, reflexivity and creativity in their own right and respect them as co-authorities in the labour process (Sayer, Reference Sayer2007:569). Collier’s and Bieri’s position on dignity as encapsulated in the idea of the workers being valued as ends in themselves, in an environment that grants the agent self-command, is central to the dimension of objective dignity. A concomitant feature of this non-instrumental valuation of workers is that organisations provide enablers for workers to become valuers, so that they can identify with and commit to work practices and outcomes as worthy objects.
Admittedly, objective dignity is an ambitious good under the conditions of the capitalist labour process. However, it is not just a meaningful work dimension that is achievable in well protected professions whose Corporate Agents are particularly powerful. Objective dignity can also be realised in semi- and low-skilled work when tasks are varied, fairly distributed according to existent skills and interests, respectfully rewarded and recognised by others as socially useful. Nevertheless, if and how objective dignity emerges in low-skilled and routine work is highly dependent on the institutional and political context in which it is embedded. As Thompson (Reference Thompson, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019) asserts, semi- and low-skilled work in social democratic countries is more likely to feature enablers for objective dignity thanks to their embeddedness in a wider vocational system that institutionalises opportunities for skill development, horizontal career mobility and non-instrumental valuations of work. In this respect, even though capitalist organisations are inherently instrumental, this ought not to be the prime and exclusive orientation that informs how labour is treated and valued. It is of vital importance that the principles of respect and worth also translate into material employment conditions, such as job security, just rewards, equal opportunity and occupational health and safety policies. These conditions represent another significant facet of the non-instrumental valuation of workers by respecting their ambition to secure their livelihood, that is, the desire for security, stable and lasting relationships and, in Polanyi’s words, ‘brotherhood’. In this respect, Donati (Reference Donati2020) argues that objective dignity has a relational dimension that flourishes or declines within stable and respectful social relations. These conditions become all the more important when the impact of insecure employment, such as the prevalence of short-term or zero-hour contracts, is considered. Social science research provides ample evidence that insecure employment undermines workers’ dignity by exploiting their precarious position in the labour market, treating them as replaceable commodities and second-class workers (Bolton et al., Reference Bolton, Houlihan and Laaser2012; Kalleberg, Reference Kalleberg2011). From another angle, an upsurge of work intensity that is perceived by workers as unreasonable is likely to be experienced as an exploitation of their vulnerability as human resources (Gallie, Reference Gallie, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019; Hodson, Reference Hodson2001; Lysgaard, Reference Lysgaard2001). In sum, wage labour possesses objective dignity when the capacities of the worker as a self-responsible, relational and reflective, yet dependent, person within the structured necessity of waged work are respected and supported in such a way that human capacities can be developed.
Subjective Dignity
Subjective dignity is an intersubjective dimension that emerges at the level of Formal and Informal labour-led Corporate Agency that enables agential activities, such as solidarity and resistance, to establish, defend or rescue dignity in the labour process. Concepts such as workplace collectivism, worker collectivity and employee self-organisation amplify not only the centrality of Corporate Agents for creating protected spaces and membership in workers’ organisations, but also for contributing to a ‘deeper human dignity’ (Axelsson et al., Reference Axelsson, Karlsson and Skorstad2019:125) than the formal organisation of work, even when the objective dimension of dignity is met. Consequently, subjective dignity possesses a relational dimension in two respects. Firstly, it is relational because it is about securing and manifesting workers’ dignity within the social structure of waged work and vis-à-vis the pressures of capitalist organisations in instrumentalising and objectifying workers as far as possible. Secondly, it is relational because it emerges from the collective agentic power of Corporate Agents that rests on the identification of vested interests with respect to dignity at work and leads workers to engage in organised or spontaneous actions that establish horizontal relations of mutual respect, pride, integrity, trust and worth. The collectivity concepts illuminate these characteristics and promote their importance for understanding the nature of work. Indeed, each one provides its own account of the importance of labour-led Corporate Agency for creating protected spaces and membership in workers’ organisations. This is because the underlying premise of subjective dignity is not coupled with productivity and profitability motives, as in the case of objective dignity. Instead, it is associated with a collective effort that establishes a mutual web of social, technical and emotional support that buffers the instrumentalisation of its Agents in the labour process. If bonds between workers are particularly thick and vested interests particularly strong, but nevertheless contested by the formal organisation, they can take the form of a brother- and sisterhood, to modify Polanyi’s words, in which workers can experience comradeship, connectedness and, essentially, a stable belonging that allows them to develop oppositional identities.
All of this points to the fact that the channels and webs from which subjective dignity emerge cannot be structured and built ad hoc. They require informal social structures and, to last, a stringent social order that provides, as Lysgaard with reference to worker collectives demonstrates, behavioural guidelines for its members, such as whom to identify with and how to understand their situatedness in the formal organisation. This social order can be more or less explicit and more or less strict in the enforcement of norms and values, while possessing the potential to bend the technical-economic system of the formal organisation towards workers’ interests with respect to protection, belonging and mutuality. Collective efforts from which subjective dignity emerges do not exclusively focus on job conditions and the social relations at the workplace but also includes attempts to buffer the indignities employees experience when performing a job that is perceived by the wider population as possessing little value or is stigmatised as dirty.
For example, in The Dignity of Working Men, Lamont (Reference Lamont2000) shows how working class men experience dignity by embracing and defending their moral standards at and through work. These moral standards are wide-ranging and include the pride of being the breadwinner, enduring physical work in a self-disciplined way and being a self-reliant and committed member of the society (Sennett and Cobb, Reference Sennett and Cobb1973). Framing and experiencing dignity in this way enables working class men to mediate the stigma of hard, physical and low-paid work as unworthy low-status jobs. They do so by creating relations and practices through which they articulate and celebrate their occupational identity and experience respect and worth in the process. This powerful agential re-framing process is not an exclusive feature of low-skilled physical and industrial work. Indeed, there is a rich variety of case studies about workers’ oppositional practices and their experience of dignity in contemporary workplaces (e.g. Karlsson, Reference Karlsson2012), including teaching assistants (Bolton and Laaser, Reference Bolton, Laaser and Gall2019), bank workers (Laaser, Reference Laaser2016), waitresses (Paules, Reference Paules1991) and hotel workers (Bolton et al., Reference Bolton, Laaser, McGuire and Duncan2019). The case studies richly illustrate how workers’ values and norms concerning the worth of their work and the irrefutable pride taken in resisting actions by others which pose a threat to their dignity are carried from social communities outside the workplace into the labour process by workers. Notions of worth, pride and respect become manifested in, albeit hidden and informal, structures and relations. Even though the character of these collective efforts varies depending on the particularities of the workplace and the nature of work and the relations between Corporate Agents, they do follow Polanyi’s counter movement logic at a micro scale.
For example, Darr (Reference Darr2011) demonstrates how workers in customer-oriented service jobs do not follow the organisational demand to prioritise selling over advising. Instead, they embed the interaction with customers in a social and moral context that constitutes a legitimate and dignified economic and social relationship. In a similar vein, Bolton and Boyd (Reference Bolton and Boyd2003) suggest that cabin crew workers invoke moral standards with respect to maintaining dignified relationships with customers, creating an ethical surplus when dealing with elderly passengers who need more assistance. This allows them to prevent violations of dignity when passengers demand intimacy that defy contemporary social norms. These examples emphasise the importance employees place on work that meets their wider lay notions of justice, worth and fairness. As a tension exists between the capitalist labour process and its attempt to purify operations and relations for profit maximisation and workers’ demand for dignified work, subjective dignity spills over the instrumental frame of the labour process and informs practices and relationships that ‘may vary considerably in how far they conform to the organisation’s priorities’ (Sayer, Reference Sayer, Stehr, Henning and Weiler2006:206). Consequently, subjective dignity, as Ackroyd and Thompson (Reference Ackroyd and Thompson2022) discuss, can also be restored and defended by informally organised oppositional practices that buffer and limit the disrespect workers experience through management abuse. The authors identify a wide range of oppositional practices, such as working to rule, sabotage of products or services, satirical humour, pilferage, time wasting and whistle-blowing that differ in their intensity and radicalism, but are nonetheless effective in pushing back managerial abuse. Some of these practices refer to oppositional acts that are performed by an individual and not a collective. A case in point is whistle-blowing. Individual resistant acts can buffer and restore the dignity of the individual worker, and in some cases of a group of workers, but it is a relief that is relatively short-lived, less impactful and leaves the individual vulnerable if it is not part of a collective effort by Corporate Agents to mediate and change the conditions and relations from which indignities emerge. Even though workplace collectivism and forms of self-organisation are endemic to all workplaces (Ackroyd and Thompson, Reference Ackroyd and Thompson2022), if and how they establish, defend and enhance subjective dignity depends on their strength and relative power vis-à-vis competing Corporate Agents, such as management. Thus, subjective dignity is not an inevitable feature of the labour process. It needs to be fought for and invested in. It demands the sharing of experiences over time to form social bonds that are needed to buffer the demands of the formal organisation. As Hodson’s (Reference Hodson2001) seminal work on dignity and resistance stresses, achieving and securing dignity is one of the main drivers for worker behaviour and is coupled with their interest in meaningful work. Jobs that lack meaning are also low on dignity and vice versa, so that subjective dignity also strives to increase the worth and meaning of tasks, workplace relations and conditions.
Recognition
The stratified nature of social reality that this book advocates informs the perspective that meaningful wage labour requires workers to possess agentic powers that are manifested in Corporate Agency. Becoming a Corporate Agent is a contingent part of human beings’ development that to a significant degree depends on the care and recognition the human being experiences during their formative years at the intersubjective and societal level (Archer, Reference Archer2000; Sayer, Reference Sayer2011a). That much is acknowledged by Critical Realism, which puts the spotlight on the importance of supportive intra- and interpersonal relations for the development of the ‘Self’ to a ‘Me’ and into the Corporate Agent’s ‘We’. However, the focus remains at the abstract level of the enablements and constraints of the structural and cultural domains and how they shape the development of the stratified human being, offering few insights into the dynamics of structural and intersubjective recognition. In order to capture recognition as power and mechanism and translate it into the objective and intersubjective dimensions of recognition appropriate to meaningful work, we adopt social theories of recognition.
Recognition theories play a notable role in diverse schools of thought, such as American Pragmatism, Existentialism and Critical Theory, in explaining social pathologies. Despite the different aims and objectives that these traditions pursue, they share an understanding of reciprocal recognition relations as central enablers for the development and wellbeing of Agents and communities, while emphasising that social and political dynamics influence the nature and quality of recognition relations for better or for worse. This perspective is rooted in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit that understands individual identities as emerging and mutually constituted through ongoing intersubjective interactions and confrontations between two self-conscious subjects who recognise each other as separate but equal and dignified beings. The bar for full recognition relationships is set high, as Hegel promotes the idea that freedom from domination, mutual respect and equality between the involved parties are essential requirements for mutual and ongoing recognition relationships.
The influential recognition theories of Charles Taylor (Reference Taylor1994) and Axel Honneth (Reference Honneth1995) are deeply ingrained in Hegelian philosophy, conceptualising recognition as a human need that is essential for human flourishing and is something that is pursued by Agents in all forms of social relations and interactions. In his influential version of the politics of recognition, Charles Taylor (Reference Taylor1994) distinguishes two levels of the recognition discourse: First, the intimate level, at which the importance of recognition for the positive development of one’s identity is emphasised. Second, the public level, where the seismic shift from the feudal force of honour to dignity proceeded in parallel with ‘a politics of universalism’ (Taylor Reference Taylor1994:37) that informed political claims for equal rights and entitlements. The second level has received more attention from social theorists, as this is where, as Habermas (Reference Habermas and Gutmann1995:107) poignantly suggests, ‘the articulation and assertion of collective identities that seems to be at stake’ takes place. However, Taylor argues, against the backdrop of a politics of universalism and dignity that the nature of recognition claims has changed from collective struggles for equality to more differentiated recognition claims by distinct groups of people that demand respect for their cultural difference. Maintaining that autonomy and authenticity are complementary dimensions that are integral to a dignified life and inform everyone’s right to ‘be recognized for his or her unique identity’ (Taylor, Reference Taylor1994:38), Taylor enacts a shift that is less instructive for our focus on Corporate Agency.
Axel Honneth’s (Reference Honneth1995) theory of recognition is rooted in the tradition of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory and promotes recognition as a lens for understanding the normative, and arguably political, drivers for social struggle. Honneth identifies three different forms of recognition and their embeddedness in distinct social relations: Intimate relations that hold mutual affection as recognition; legal relations that provide recognition as equally granted rights and autonomy; loose-knit social relations in which recognition is experienced as achievement. Honneth argues that the three modes of recognition are aligned with three dimensions of moral and psychological well-being, encompassing self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, that either flourish or suffer as a result of the Agents’ struggle for recognition. This widely discussed and utilised social theory differs in some respects from Critical Realism, but the overlaps are evident as well. Indeed, Honneth’s work on recognition, which he has continued to refine and extend over the last two decades, acknowledges the structural and cultural domains that impinge on the recognition relationships within the three modes of recognition (Honneth, Reference Honneth2014). Arguably, the three modes resemble the stratified ontology of the human being and work well with the distinction between objective and subjective dimensions of recognition.
The portrayal of recognition as a human need raises questions about the relationship between autonomy, freedom and human dependency. Honneth does not consider autonomy and heteronomy to be in conflict, but as part of the relational nature of the human being that needs the other for self-affirmation. Following Mead, this perspective suggests that recognition relations are about Agents’ desire to have one’s values, beliefs and actions affirmed and thus one’s self-conception acknowledged. Arguably, and contra Hegel, Honneth – and Bourdieu – suggest that this desire can also be met in vertical relationships that feature mutuality, but also power asymmetries. The relationship between employer and employee is a case in point, but also the relationship between care giver and care receiver, where recognition as esteem may emerge from mutual dependency, despite a lack of equality. In a similar vein, Bourdieu suggests, in reference to symbolic power, that relationships between Agents in a position of power and subordinate Agents can be a source of recognition when the relationship is characterised by reciprocal dependency. In reference to Bourdieu, the power of the employer depends on workers recognising, and thereby legitimising, but also esteeming, the right of the employer to exercise the power over them. Consequently, mutual dependency is characterised by ‘a definite relation that creates belief in the legitimacy of the words and of the person who utters them, and it operates only inasmuch as those who undergo it recognizes those who wield it’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, Reference Bourdieu and Wacquant1992:148). Certainly, both approaches emphasise that recognition in vertical relationships is a fragile and contested good, one that requires a robust embeddedness in shared value-horizons.
However, recognition is not a category that is relevant exclusively to Agents and their agentic powers, but also for understanding the morphogenesis and morphostasis of social structure, as the history of social change is, arguably, intertwined with the history of the struggle for recognition. Butler (Reference Butler1987) characterises this position as being all too optimistic, arguing that Agents longing for recognition make recognition relationships into an attractive conveyor of abuse and manipulation. Consequently, Butler questions whether something akin to a positive, all-embracing recognition relationship between Agents can exist, or whether recognition relationships are not always, to a degree, ambivalent and include constraints on human flourishing. Her scepticism towards the possibility of full and mutual recognition relationships are supported by Hegel and Sartre. It is not only in the master–slave dialectic that Hegel discusses how recognition relationships can turn out to be the carriers of disrespect. Despite the importance he assigns to the struggle for recognition as a way of enhancing equality and self-realisation, Hegel also acknowledges the constant danger of recognition relationships turning into relationships of subordination that establish authority over the other. Far more radical is Sartre’s (Reference Sartre1984) position that the dependence on recognition relationships and the way it affirms a certain self-conception of the Agent works against the human ideal of continuous self-transcendence. From the perspective that the key to being human is to have no essence, but to develop one, recognition relationships objectify the Agent and constrain all the various things they could become. Ideas of recognition as a source of a lack of freedom that are informed by phenomenological positions represent an upward conflation that deviates in many ways from Critical Realism. It is not the power that these accounts tend to identify in the everyday experience of human beings that conflicts with the stratified reality this book advocates, but rather the premise that the engagement in practices, and the experiences that emerge from them, are undertaken in order to create reality. In other words, the prioritisation of epistemology over ontology makes these interventions unattractive for our theory, which assumes that objective and subjective dimensions of recognition have relative autonomy, like the other two dimensions. And yet, the concern that human beings who seek recognition can be taken advantage of by masked and obscured relations of power that affirm aspects of the other that are deemed worthy and conforming, while denying respect for other characteristics that are unorthodox and may question the social order, is an objection that is worth addressing when conceptualising objective and subjective recognition in waged work.
The work of Taylor and Honneth acknowledges the contested terrain in which the ongoing struggle for recognition takes place and the many ways recognition relationships can become distorted or systematically blocked for specific groups in a society. A rejoinder to the objections articulated by Sartre (Reference Sartre1984) and others operating in this spirit could be twofold: Firstly, recognition relationships are necessarily intersubjectively constituted. Consequently, recognition relationships require that the involved Agents understand the ‘Other’ as their equal, that is, as having the same rights and entitlements to a dignified life as they themself. With reference to Mead’s notion of the ‘generalized other’, Honneth (Reference Honneth1992:194) highlights a process in which the Agent ‘learns to see himself from the perspective of his partners to interaction as a bearer of equal rights’. If this process is not enabled, recognition relationships are not activated, but distorted. Following on, there is no way that power and the desire to dominate the other can act as a Trojan horse in recognition relationships, as it undermines the mutuality of recognition relationships in a way that would be seen by the involved Agents. Secondly, recognition relationships do not affirm individual characteristics of an Agent, but, more broadly, facilitate the autonomy of the person to become and do certain things. Indeed, as Walzer asserts (1983:273), recognition is a dynamic circle in which the involved parties have relative autonomy from each other, so that ‘what we distribute to one another is esteem, not self-esteem; respect, not self-respect’. The relative autonomy of agents and their powers are twisted in Butler’s discussion of the vulnerability of recognition so that recognition and disrespect become conflated.
Honneth’s work promotes the idea that recognition and disrespect are two separate, albeit connected, dimensions. This is especially apparent in Honneth’s (Reference Honneth1995) distinction between three modes of recognition – love, rights and solidarity – and three modes of disrespect – attacks on physical integrity, denial of rights and a degradation of individual life forms. According to this thinking, if a mode of recognition is negated, the Actor suffers the consequences of a distinct form of disrespect. Yet, negations of recognition do not result, according to Honneth and Taylor, in the Actor’s subjugation, albeit they have serious psychological consequences for them. Instead, they are likely to be countered by the Actor’s attempt to overcome them via collective actions that seek to repair the structure in which recognition claims are made in order that their recognition claims are heard and addressed. The link between recognition, collective action and social change has informed a long-standing and heated debate in Political Philosophy communities over whether emphasis should be given to distribution struggles or recognition struggles to explain social order and social change (Fraser and Honneth, Reference Fraser and Honneth2003). Yet, as Fraser (Reference Fraser2009) suggests, they can go hand in hand. Indeed, E. P. Thompson’s work on The Making of the English Working Class (1963) demonstrates that transformative class struggles are not primarily and exclusively about exploitation and the unequal distribution of material resources, but are also triggered by the denial of workers’ demands for the recognition of their class culture and entitlement to a livelihood with dignity. Consequently, the struggle for recognition is not a struggle that takes place merely between two groups of Agents. It necessarily involves the societal level and is a political and historical struggle. As a consequence, Agents formulate expectations for mutual recognition not only in relation to its three spheres, but also in the context of the regulatory regime they are situated in and the institutions with which their lives are intertwined. Hence, institutional configurations and the achievements of capitalist societies are vitally important for understanding recognition struggles, as they enable or constrain the unfolding of mutual relationships, how the recognition modes can be addressed and whether some groups of Agents are more privileged than others in establishing relationships of mutual recognition. This informs the view that the objective and subjective dimensions of recognition are socially and politically structured, institutionally framed and informed by dominant understandings of what is perceived as legitimate, just and meaningful (Fraser and Honneth, Reference Fraser and Honneth2003). Objective recognition is, however, driven by vertical frameworks for recognition, and, thus, is more explicitly shaped by the regulatory regime and the methods that are used to integrate Agents into society and mediate forms of being together.
Objective Recognition
The dimension of objective recognition captures the socially and legally organised and institutionalised relations of recognition in the realm of waged work that recognise the equality of the worker with respect to the other members of the organisation, while also esteeming particular qualities of a worker. It thereby encompasses practices and relations at work that treat the worker as worthy of respect, as an autonomous, morally responsible Actor who deserves esteem and who possesses the agentic powers to engage in participatory practices at work. In the following we analytically separate three aspects of objective recognition: Legal recognition as the social protection of equality of rights, social freedom as the opportunity for workers to engage in participatory practices and esteem as mode of recognition that enhances worker’s self-esteem.
First, legal recognition is a cornerstone of objective recognition in the way it enables the worker to experience and enhance their self-respect at work. This position diverges from Honneth’s perspective that exclusively locates legal recognition in the sphere of the civil society, while identifying waged work as a potential sphere for the esteem type of recognition. Nevertheless, we consider legal recognition at work as a crucial driver for meaningful work that establishes the worker as a bearer of rights who can raise claims that are acknowledged by others independent of the hierarchical and social status of the worker. Legal recognition thus represents a vertical form of recognition that is constituted at the meso-level of the regulatory and legal system and refined, translated and enhanced for the sphere of wage labour at the micro-level of the organisation. And yet, for legal recognition to embrace worker’s self-respect at work and contribute to meaningful work it needs to be mutually esteemed by the members of the organisation in such a way that each member feels entitled to make claims, while also recognising the entitlement of others to this right. From this shared value horizon the experience emerges that ‘one is able to view oneself as a person who shares with all other members of one’s community the qualities that make participation in discursive will-formation possible’ (Honneth, Reference Honneth1995:120). Even though legal recognition is one part of what Bhaskar (Reference Bhaskar1989) calls a position in a ‘mediating system’ that lays out duties, rights and functions for Agents to engage in practices, it is essential for the structuring of the internal and necessary relations between Agents. The formal equality of Agents to engage in interest-defining discourses is a key enabler for the formulation of self-declared goals on which the formation and maintenance of Formal Corporate Agency rests.
Employment contracts and other forms of formalised workplace or industry-specific rights are the most explicit manifestations of legal recognition that constitute workers as equal bearers of rights and responsibilities. In such a way, contractually defined terms and conditions, ranging from working hours to pay, entitlements to annual leave and sick pay and so on, represent the foundations of legal recognition to which employees can take recourse. However, these employment terms and conditions become powerful enablers for objective recognition only if they do not exclusively represent the interests of the employer. Thus, it is a vital condition of this dimension that the interest and needs of workers are genuinely acknowledged and the mutual dependency between the employer and workers is formalised. A promising context for this is given in countries and industries whose industrial relations feature traditional collective bargaining relationships that give labour a strong voice in negotiations over conditions and structures. In relation to Honneth’s mode of legal recognition, Tweedie (Reference Tweedie, Bagusat, Keenan and Sedmak2010:209) reinforces this position in his analysis of the recognition of skills and capacities in the sphere of work and employment. Here he states that ‘mutually agreed industry procedures for complaints, dismissals or redundancies’ operate as a mechanism that enables workers to ‘face their employer knowing themselves to be the proper subject of basic forms of respect’, while enhancing workers’ choice and options for Corporate Agency. Transferring Walzer’s (Reference Walzer1983:310) reflections on the importance of legal recognition for the sphere of justice to the workplace, legal recognition can be perceived as a steppingstone towards an environment for workers in which the employee listens and is listened to, ‘take responsibility for what he says and does. Ready and able: not only in state, cities, and towns but wherever power is exercised, in companies and factories’.
Democratic and participatory practices at work, the foundation of social freedom in the sphere of wage labour, can emerge from legal recognition. This is most likely to be the case in regulated labour markets in which institutional settings support the cooperation between employers, workers, trade unions and employer associations. In fact, Thompson (Reference Thompson, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019) and Keat (Reference Keat2009) suggest that countries whose regulatory regimes treats the labour market as a social and economic institution that is not guided by economic rationality alone, but aims to strike a balance between the interests of employers and workers, are more likely to have workplaces that offer sufficient legal recognition and participatory practices. A strong expression of this are workplace consultative bodies, most prominently represented by work councils, and to a lesser degree by joint consultative committees. To illustrate the potential power of workplace consultative bodies for building objective recognition, we focus on work councils, which in many institutional settings tend to have legal support that guarantees ‘informational, consultative and codetermination rights’ (Brewster et al., Reference Brewster, Wood, Croucher and Brookes2007:50). Clearly, work councils vary significantly between industries and countries. Indeed, while in some countries they are chaired by the employer, in others they act exclusively as worker representation bodies (Streeck, Reference Streeck, Rogers and Streeck1995). Furthermore, some critical voices see work councils as employer-friendly institutions that hamper unionisation. Nevertheless, international research provides ample evidence that in the majority of workplaces they tend to strengthen worker voice, enhance information flow within the workplace, contribute positively to union association and enhance participatory and democratic practices at work (Streeck and Rogers, Reference Streeck and Rogers1995). In this light, they tend to act as a force at work that operates hand in hand with legal recognition and enhances workers’ self-respect. Furthermore, work councils can also contribute to social freedom at work by aggregating workers’ interests into a collective voice, thereby building essential structures for Corporate Agency to flourish at work. Without doubt, the highest form of social freedom at work is guaranteed by a democratic work organisation that is grounded in mutual ownership, placing workers as co-authorities in the labour process who can deliberate about decisions concerning their work in respectful relations with co-workers and people in power. Social freedom, then, expresses a form of social compromise between the employer and workers that goes beyond the manifestation of mutual dependency in wage labour and enables workers to acquire capabilities that are necessary for becoming valuers, that is, ‘co-authorities in the realm of value’ (Yeoman, Reference Yeoman2014a:97). Borrowing from Sennett and Cobb (Reference Sennett and Cobb1973:149), legal recognition and social freedom meet workers desire ‘to get those who are in higher social positions to admit the worthiness you share with them’.
In line with Smith’s (2009:82) notion that ‘whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward’, the third pillar of objective recognition adds the formalised recognition pattern of esteem to legal recognition and social freedom. More broadly, formalised esteem identifies and celebrates particular work activities, achievements or services that are valued by the organisation, its members or the society (Honneth, Reference Honneth1995; 2012). Voswinkel (Reference Voswinkel2012) offers a helpful differentiation of recognition as esteem, subdividing it into the dimensions of appreciation and admiration. Esteem as appreciation in organisations tends to be anchored in workplace rules and rituals that express gratitude for behaviour and attitudes that workers display over a long period of time and that benefit the organisation and its stakeholders. A case in point are formal mechanisms that appreciate, often financially but also with non-financial tokens, the service and loyalty of long-term workers. We suggest that appreciation is an important contributor to meaningful wage labour in the way it embodies a less instrumental recognition of workers that moves away from monetary and direct transactional reward exchanges for desired actions. Instead, formalised appreciation schemes can value a wider set of characteristics and behaviours that are, nonetheless, important for the social relations at work. Surely, as Voswinkel argues, appreciation can also contribute to the experience of disrespect when it is deployed as a substitute for prestige and allocated to ‘agents with little power, success or prestige’ (2012:279). This is why it needs to go in tandem with admiration.
In fact, admiration grants workers prestige by singling out individual employees, emphasising particular achievements of the worker that stand out. Admiration often rests on performance management systems in which work effort evaluations become ‘proxy judgements about the value of workers’ social contribution’ (Tweedie et al., Reference Tweedie, Wild, Rhodes and Martinov-Bennie2019:85). Widely shared organisational expressions of admiration are manifested in promotion to desired positions, financial rewards, horizontal moves into positions or projects that grant more autonomy and responsibility, but also certificates and badges. Certainly, organisational forms of admiration can take the form of ‘ritualised admiration’ (Holtgrewe, Reference Holtgrewe2001:40) that manufactures admiration on the assembly line of an all-encompassing performance management system. Consequently, organisational admiration needs to go beyond window dressing and offer rewards that are genuinely valued by workers. Furthermore, as Sayer (Reference Sayer, Thompson and Yar2011b) highlights, admiration needs to create a buffer between a distinguished performance and its reward in order to avoid coupling recognition patterns with an instrumental, transactional mode of managing people. Appreciation and admiration are also part and parcel of subjective recognition, albeit in different shapes and forms as the next section will illustrate.
Subjective Recognition
The subjective dimensions of autonomy and dignity characterise workers’ self-organisation as a separate and distinct social structure from which forms of self-regulation can emerge that represent workers’ vested interests in appropriating their work and its relations. If intact and strong, the self-organisation operates as an architecture that embeds workers’ social relations at work and their work activities in relations of mutual recognition. These recognition relations define behaviour and attitudes worthy of esteem and respect, as well as patterns and rules for their exchange. Consequently, at the heart of subjective recognition there is a social structure, developed by the self-organisation in order to interweave appreciation as a mode of respect with the everyday labour process and its social relations, while developing rules for the allocation of admiration for particular traits, abilities and contributions. Essentially, both forms of subjective recognition need to be functional for the self-organisation and aligned with the vested interests of the Corporate Agent.
Appreciation as a driver of subjective recognition displays gratitude to the employee for belonging to the self-organisation and contributing to the mutual web of obligations and commitments that underwrite the norms and values of the collective. Indeed, even though concrete interests, strategies and practices of workers’ self-organisations differ between workplace regimes and industries, they have the strong tendency to be framed by identical norms and values. The latter encompass the mutual expectation that members will watch out for each other, have confidence in each other’s knowledge, skills and judgement, and support each other practically and emotionally. What is appreciated, then, is the contribution to the collective effort of strengthening the self-organisation by establishing a collective discipline from which solidarity can emerge, while also creating rituals at work that tighten the bonds between workers. Appreciation carries, consequently, a moral texture that endorses relations and behaviour that conform to the values of reciprocity, cooperation and solidarity, while making the un-prescribed support, the daily gift-giving and give and take between workers, visible to the members of the self-organisation. Hand in hand with the moral grammar of appreciation goes its political nature, to the effect that while the self-organisation may complement the formal organisation in a way that oils the wheels of the labour process, deep down it is an oppositional force that is likely to be the spark of organisational misbehaviour (Karlsson, Reference Karlsson2012). Ackroyd and Thompson (Reference Ackroyd and Thompson2022) identify the variety of oppositional collective practices that are appreciated by the self-organisation because they are perceived to express labour agency, push back managerial agendas and offer pathways for re-appropriating work and its conditions. In this way, work limitation, systematic fiddling, sabotage, pilferage and time wasting, even the sabotage of specific services or products, are practices that can be collectively endorsed and thus the object of appreciation, depending on the workplace and its relations.
The moral and political grammar of appreciation is necessarily embedded in a set of collectively held rules that the self-organisation formulates, implements and enforces and which translate into shared understandings of what counts as worthy of appreciation among waged workers (Axelsson et al., Reference Axelsson, Karlsson and Skorstad2019). Workplace ethnographies give evidence of the dynamic, lengthy and complicated social process that is at the heart of the formulation and formation of workers’ collective understandings. Lysgaard’s (2001) research on the nature of the worker collectivity in a pulp and paper mill in Norway provides a detailed account of this process. The workplace ethnography puts the spotlight on how the self-organisation rests on the workers’ shared identity as a knowledgeable, skilled, but dependent, and thus subordinate collective which is attached to the work and its purpose, but opposes managers at the mill and what they represent. The force of distinction that the worker collectivity establishes fosters a socialisation which generates work effort bargain norms and identified behaviour and attitudes that benefit solidarity and mutual defence vis-à-vis managerial agents which are considered worthy of peer appreciation. The importance of collective appreciation is also manifested in research on service work and knowledge work (Hodson, Reference Hodson2001). For example, Bolton and Boyd (Reference Bolton and Boyd2003) pinpoint the many ways in which airline cabin crews go beyond the formal requirements of their job role to offer care and constraint to passengers who demand both positive and negative attention. To cope with the physically and emotionally demanding nature of their work, the authors describe how the cabin crew develop rules of social commitment that guide their care for each other and their passengers. In this way, they show appreciation for the implicit mutual support, the give and take that accompanies each other’s refusal to be objectified by the exploitation of their embodied capacities and affirm, instead, their status as professionals who hold the safety and well-being of passengers in their hands. Against this backdrop, appreciation and the collective understanding of workers offer an important pathway into understanding the ‘meaningful pattern of workplace relations’ (Korczynski, Reference Korczynski2023:125).
Admiration in the self-organisation expresses esteem for a worker’s special achievement or talent (Voswinkel, Reference Voswinkel2012). This raises the question as to whether admiration is compatible with the paradigm of mutual reciprocity and contributes to the vested interests of the self-organisation, even though it endorses individual workers. Voswinkel argues against this by conceptualising admiration as a celebration of the singularity of the worker that finds its expression in monetary or professional reward. From this perspective admiration is inevitably interwoven with objective recognition and the formal organisation that establishes verticality among workers. While we agree that admiration in the realm of objective recognition carries this risk, admiration by peers is capable of expressing esteem for outstanding skills and the achievements of a worker without separating them from the collective. What distinguishes admiration in the self-organisation from admiration in the formal organisation is that it celebrates skills, achievements and traits that are considered by the internal standards of the self-organisation as praiseworthy internal goods. Borrowing the concept of internal goods from MacIntyre allows us to emphasise that admiration in the field of subjective recognition esteems the ‘intrinsic performance’ (Breen, Reference Breen, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019), the mastering of the craft (Tweedie and Holley, Reference Tweedie and Holley2016) and the ‘beauty’ (Dejours, Reference Dejours, Smith and Deranty2012) of the work performed.
There is a strong tendency in virtue ethics-inspired approaches to suggest that skilled and complex work tends to offer opportunities for workers to excel at their job and enjoy the processes that it involves as a good in itself, decoupling its enjoyment from external gratification. Here, the worker receives admiration from their peers who, based on their shared internal judgments as practitioners and experts themselves, evaluate whether the individual excels at their work and achieves something praiseworthy. Thus, even though admiration esteems the individual, granting and receiving admiration is embedded in the self-organisation that is strengthened in the process. However, a wide range of workplace ethnographies conclude that self-organisations in non-craftwork settings also possess internalised standards of excellence for evaluating the quality of work. In their research on cleaners, Tweedie and Holley (Reference Tweedie and Holley2016:1893) indicate that experienced cleaners are constantly evaluating ‘the quality of their work according to internalized professional standards’, which leads them to admire the unique skills of cleaners. This admiration not only serves the individual worker but also strengthens the collective as it ‘reinforces to workers the value of their work because their contribution cannot be easily replicated’ (2016:1892). As a consequence, admiration as subjective recognition needs the self-organisation and the shared standards that Corporate Agents set, as it is they who do the work, are knowledgeable about the skills it requires and the relations it is embedded in. Dejours et al.’s (Reference Dejours, Deranty, Renaut and Smith2018:100) research supports this perspective by stating that legitimate recognition of the technical aspect of work can only be granted by workers who ‘are actually engaged in the effort, [who] are able to say what physical, mental, and emotional effort, what manual, intellectual, emotional skills went into the performance of the real work’. The internal standards that are anchored in the expertise of peers allow them to express admiration for fellow workers, reinforcing the sense of community. Indeed, this is what makes subjective recognition overall so meaningful. It is a non-instrumental social process that grants respect and esteem based on shared understandings.
Corroborating the Framework
Despite the heterogeneity of the discourse and the variety of factors that are deployed to theorise meaningful work, we suggest that our conceptualisation of the objective and subjective dimensions of autonomy, dignity and recognition capture the essential features of influential meaningful work contributions of each field. To back up this claim, we construct a table for each field of meaningful waged work that features a number of influential publications (Tables 9.1–9.3). For every publication, the tables capture its definition of meaningful work, the factors on which meaningful work is understood to rest, the level of analysis and how the factors relate to our objective and subjective dimensions of meaningful work. This overview highlights that each contribution promotes meaningful work factors that are matched by at least two of our six dimensions. How many of our dimensions that relate to the promoted factors of each approach depends on the latter’s level of analysis. For instance, if the level of analysis of one approach focuses exclusively on the formal organisation of work, the match between the factors and our dimensions is likely to be located in the objective realm of the dimensions. Further, the match between the factors and our dimensions might be explicit or implicit. In the case of the objective dimensions of meaningful work, the match tends to be explicit. An explicit match is grounded in the unambiguous usage of the term as a factor for meaningful work, such as the factor of job autonomy in Hackman and Oldham’s approach that relates directly to our conceptualisation of objective autonomy, or the concept of dignity in Yeoman’s framework that matches our conceptualisation of dignity.
Table 9.2 Meaningful Waged Work according to the Humanist Tradition
| Author(s) | Definition of meaningful work | Dimensions of meaningful work | Level of analysis | Dimensions derived |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bailey and Madden (Reference Bailey and Madden2017a) | ‘Meaningfulness arises when an individual perceives an authentic connection between work and a broader transcendent life purpose beyond the self’ (2017a:4). | Relative autonomy at work; peer recognition; recognition for good and useful work from wider public; dignity as pride in one’s work and camaraderie. | Individual and work task level. | Objective and subjective dimensions of autonomy; subjective recognition and subjective dignity. |
| Wrzesniewski and Dutton (Reference Wrzesniewski and Dutton2001) | ‘Understandings of the purpose of their work or what they believe is achieved in the work’ (2001:180). | Will to meaning and purpose. | Individual level. | Informal ‘crafting’ as subjective autonomy; subjective dignity as will to act as subject; be purposeful and impactful. |
| Schnell et al. (Reference Schnell, Höge and Pollet2013) | ‘[M]eaningfulness as full mediator of relationships between task significance, task identity, autonomy, feedback, and skill variety and work engagement’ (2013:544). | Self-efficacy; work-role fit; task significance; socio-moral climate; self-transcendent orientation. | Combination of the individual, job and organisational levels. | Objective autonomy (job discretion); objective recognition (reliable appreciation); objective dignity (attention to well-being). |
| Lips-Wiersma and Morris (Reference Lips-Wiersma and Morris2009) | Meaningful work as a ‘property of human beings’ (2009:493) that is activated by ‘a combination of work meanings’ (2009:502). | Developing and becoming one’s self; unity with others; serving others and expressing self; justice and dignity at the management level. | Individual, managerial and organisational levels. | Subjective autonomy as personal autonomy; objective dignity as justice and dignity as guiding principles for managerial decisions; subjective dignity in being able to express oneself and become oneself. |
Table 9.3 Meaningful Waged Work according to the Political Philosophy Tradition
| Author(s) | Definition of meaningful work | Dimensions of meaningful work | Level of analysis | Dimensions derived |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Schwartz (Reference Schwartz1982) | ‘Work that allows workers to act as autonomous individuals and thus foster instead of stunting their autonomous development’ (1982:642) | Job autonomy; participation in decision-making; democratic division of labour; skilled work; training; good pay. | Structure of employment and organisation of work; human needs. | Objective autonomy; objective recognition as workplace democracy. |
| Breen (Reference Breen, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019) | ‘Work that facilitates and enhances our sense of self and broader personal life’ (2019:51) | Freedom as autonomy, ‘a status basic to human dignity’ (2019:9); freedom as self-realisation; freedom as non-domination. | Organisation of work; subjective experience; human needs. | Objective autonomy; objective dignity. |
| Bowie (Reference Bowie, Yeoman, Bailey, Madden and Thompson2019) | No definition provided. | (1) Autonomy on the job; (2) work that supports development of autonomy and rationality; (3) a wage that supports independency; (4) work that develops workers’ rational capacities; (5) work that does not conflict with workers’ moral development; (6) work that is not paternalistic. | Organisation of work and managerial practices; human needs. | Objective autonomy; objective dignity; objective recognition. |
| Yeoman (Reference Yeoman2014a, Reference Yeoman2014b) | Work that allows workers to ‘satisfy their inescapable interests in freedom, autonomy, and dignity’ (2014b:235). | When work is structured by the features of dignity; autonomy as non-alienation; respect; recognition and freedom. | Organisation of work; human needs. | Non-alienated work as objective autonomy; workplace democracy as objective recognition; work that meets workers’ interests and does not objectify workers as objective dignity; workers’ inescapable interest in freedom as subjective autonomy and dignity. |
| Sayer (Reference Sayer2009) | ‘Complex, interesting work [that] allows workers […] to develop and exercise their capacities, and gain the satisfaction from achieving the internal goods of a practice, but to gain the external goods of recognition and esteem’ (2009:1). | Challenging and interesting tasks; opportunities for workers to apply and develop their capacities; internal satisfaction; recognition from others; esteem from others. | Organisation of work; structure of employment; human needs. | Objective autonomy; objective recognition; objective dignity; subjective recognition. |
The tables indicate that the case for integrating autonomy in the meaningful wage labour framework is strong: It is a central category in Management and Organisational Behaviour literature in the form of job autonomy or job discretion. In the Political Philosophy approach, autonomy is a key dimension to describe self-governed and self-selected work as well as personal freedom at and through work. In the Humanities, autonomy as personal freedom plays an equally important role, even though the emphasis shifts here to the personal ability to create and experience a sense of meaning. Recognition and dignity are prevalent factors as well in all three fields, even though they are less widely used compared to autonomy. They tend to play a significant role when the importance of employment conditions, such as adequate pay, secure and safe employment conditions, formalised opportunities for learning and development and the like are offered.
What we label subjective dimensions of meaningful work rest on explicit and, mostly, implicit matches. An implicit match is informed by a factor of meaningful work that a publication promotes and which our conceptualisation of the respective dimension captures. A case in point is Rosso et al.’s (Reference Rosso, Dekas and Wrzesniewski2010:114) factor of unification, which rests on workers’ desire for belongingness and inter-connectedness, offering an overlap with our dimension of subjective recognition. More generally, the experience of unity with others, work that enhances worker’s self-worth, self-respect and self-esteem is, in different shapes and forms, central to the majority of meaningful work discourses from all fields. The theorisation of objective and subjective recognition allows us to make these implicit connections explicit and integrate them in the concept of recognition that rests on the experiences of self-worth, self-respect and self-love. In a similar vein, the definition of the objective and subjective characteristics of dignity captures the account of scholars who use dignity as leitmotif for their understanding of meaningful work, as well as those who operate with terms that relate to the worker as a vulnerable and precious being.
Based on the analytical cross-linking of the literature and the differentiation between objective and subjective dimensions, we claim that our meaningful wage labour framework is exhaustive, considering what it wants to achieve, that is, a meaningful wage labour framework that takes the objective and subjective dimensions and their interplay into account. The six dimensions are also mutually exclusive. To ensure this, every dimension is defined and its properties are aligned into objective and subjective elements. Our conclusion is that our suggested framework is well corroborated in relation to previous research on ‘the meaning of work’.
Conclusion
Describing the paradox of meaningful work, Bailey et al. (Reference Bailey, Lips-Wiersma, Madden, Yeoman, Thompson and Chalofsky2019:491) point towards the circumstance that it is ‘a subjective assessment, yet it is also grounded in an external, objective context that shapes and legitimises what may be considered meaningful by the individual’. Indeed, this paradox is integral to the meaningful work debate of the last two decades. As the second part of this book has discussed, conceptual and empirical approaches to meaningful work across disciplines and research fields have the strong tendency to either focus on the objective or subjective dimensions of meaningful work, offering a dichotomic understanding of meaningful or meaningless wage labour. This chapter addresses this circumstance and contributes to the debate through the construction of a meaningful work theory that captures both the objective and subjective dimensions of meaningful waged work. By deploying a stratified view of agency and structure that guides the conceptualisation of the dimensions, an understanding of meaningful–meaningless work as a dynamic continuum is offered. In that way, meaningful–meaningless wage labour emerges from the interplay between the politics of working life, the nature and organisation of work and workers’ agential responses. At the heart of the theory is the thesis that the employer contributes to meaningful wage labour, but it is not a gift given to the workers. Rather, it rests on Corporate Agency in general and Formal and Informal collective worker struggles that, in particular, build sources for meaningful work.
Against this background, we define meaningful waged work as a combination of objective and subjective autonomy, dignity and recognition. In consequence, meaningless waged work is defined as a combination of a lack of objective and subjective autonomy, dignity and recognition. The concepts form poles on a continuum from meaningful to meaningless wage labour. The next chapter details the mechanisms of the framework and illustrates how the continuum of meaningful–meaningless work is encapsulated in the meaningful waged work tendencies that emerge from the interplay of the objective and subjective dimensions. To detail the workings of the theory, the chapter introduces an initial set of case studies to demonstrate the explanatory power of the dimensions and their interplay.