In this chapter, we present our analytic framework. First, we describe what can be regarded as the three major pitfalls in the field of language and politics. Second, we present our methodology, through which these pitfalls can be avoided. In this methodology we approach politically relevant data by contrastively examining language use in different units of analysis. We also point out that it is important to focus on conventionalised and ritual aspects of political language use. Finally, we discuss issues surrounding data types in the field.
2.1 Pitfalls in Language and Politics
As noted in Chapter 1, in language and politics we advise that the following three pitfalls be avoided:
Pitfall 1: Following an ethnocentric view in the study of one’s data.
Pitfall 2: Uncritically associating values with political actors and entities.
Pitfall 3: Using one’s research to demonstrate a pre-held conviction.
Such pitfalls often occur together. To illustrate this tendency, let us consider the following extract from an article of the political-discourse analyst Shi-Xu (Reference Shi-Xu2012: 168):
The discourse of Asian, African and Latin American and their diasporic peoples are characterised by a shared past and present of colonialism, cold war and imperialism since at least the 19th century, in which they were (and continue to be) dominated, exploited and excluded from social, political, economic, scientific and various other spheres. Under these historical circumstances, the Eastern communities face common problems and challenges and have their similar concerns and aspirations … Very importantly, but far too often ignored or misunderstood, Eastern cultures have their own norms and values, in terms of age, kinship, gender, the state, etc., for human life in general and linguistic communication in particular. For instance, some Eastern societies take humane and communal consciousness and harmony with others and with nature to be the highest principle of conduct and communication, in contrast to Western values of individual reason and control.
This quote starts from an ethnocentric view (Pitfall 1) and it sets out to prove a claim which the author accepts as valid at the outset, confirming the author’s conviction (Pitfall 3): the author argues that ‘Eastern communities’ and ‘Eastern cultures’ are different from their ‘Western’ counterparts and associates the behaviour of these major social groups with ideological notions such as ‘shared past and present of colonialism’. The quote also pursues a clear ideological agenda, which is to be proven by the arguments. It would be just one more step for the author to associate certain ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ values with political actors (Pitfall 2), even though this particular pitfall does not occur in the above quote. We believe that the reason why these pitfalls tend to occur in accounts like Shi-Xu’s (Reference Shi-Xu2012) is that they follow a typically top-down train of thought in the study of language and politics.
The problem with such top-down approaches becomes clear as soon as we consider their accuracy. For example, in Shi-Xu’s argument above one is faced with the following fundamental problems:
1 Individuals are treated as cultural robots with no independent agency. For example, Shi-Xu (Reference Shi-Xu2012) subordinates individual behaviour to values such as ‘harmony’ and ‘individual reason’, which are overgeneralising and orientalist (for an overview see Said Reference Said1978). When using overgeneralising notions such as ‘harmony’, it may be impossible to take a neutral view on the language use of an ‘Eastern’ political decision maker as a strong and individual actor because any of her utterances may ultimately be associated with deep-seated overgeneralising cultural values.
2 Notions such as ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ cultures are difficult to apply (see Mills and Kádár Reference Mills, Kádár, Kádár and Mills2011; House and Kádár Reference House and Kádár2021b) in any serious linguistic analysis of political language use. Clearly, both the pragmatic conventions and political systems of so-called ‘Eastern and Western cultures’ often significantly vary within such macro-groups, and many linguists, such as Leech (Reference Leech2007) in his renowned work, have pointed out that the infamous ‘East–West dichotomy’ cannot be rigorously applied in pragmatic analysis. For example, the value of ‘harmony’ – which is attributed to ‘Eastern’ political cultures in the account of Shi-Xu (Reference Shi-Xu2012) – has long been associated with various East Asian countries, including Japan (e.g. Ide Reference Ide1989; Hirata and Warschauer Reference Hirata and Warschauer2014). Such an association is, however, problematic because, unlike countries such as China and Korea, Japan has never been a victim of ‘colonialism’ and other ills mentioned in the text above.
3 The argument that so-called ‘Eastern cultures’ are ‘too often ignored or misunderstood’ raises two fundamental problems. First, these cultures are all but understudied: disciplines such as Sinology, Japanology and so on have several centuries of history, and so any expert in Asian studies may rightly argue that the above claim conveniently ignores a huge body of existent academic inquiries. Asian studies cannot be dismissed as ‘Western’ or ‘colonialist’, even though early East Asian studies indeed had a colonialist element (e.g. Gu Reference Gu2012): China, Japan and other East Asian countries are now at the forefront of East Asian studies! Second, the argument that East Asian languages and cultures are somehow ‘misunderstood’ not only is exoticising, but also shuts the door on the contrastive study of data drawn from these linguacultures (House and Kádár Reference House and Kádár2021b).
It is tempting to dismiss accounts like Shi-Xu’s (Reference Shi-Xu2012) as too vague and non-linguistic in scope for the linguist to consider in the study of politically relevant data. However, such top-down views have had a significant influence on the linguistic study of political discourse. For example, Shi-Xu’s account cited above represents an entire area which is called cultural discourse analysis (e.g. Carbaugh Reference Carbaugh2007), where politically relevant data are often discussed in such culturally biased top-down ways. Similar overgeneralisations of language and politics also occur in other areas. For instance, pragmaticians like Laszlo (Reference László2013), Ledoux and Bull (Reference Ledoux and Bull2017) and Rahmani (Reference Rahmani2022) applied overgeneralising concepts like ‘collectivism’ in their work, while scholars of political communication such as Richey (Reference Richley2009), Wang and Chen (Reference Wang and Katherine Chen2010) and Kim and Kwak (Reference Kim and Kwak2022) described how generalising concepts like ‘hierarchy’ influence the behaviour of entire political linguacultures. The following extract from Richey (Reference Richley2009: 137) illustrates this point:
Chiefly, cultures that emphasize subservience to social superiors may have deleterious effects on the goal of bringing about increased political comprehension through informal discussion. Obedience to hierarchical superiors will limit one’s ability to engage in open, frank discussions that increase political knowledge. Considering the impact of cultural norms on unstructured informal discussion, we must scrutinize whether political discussion can help people make wise decisions.
Further, in the subsequent chapters we will show that many such arguments – which denigrate ‘Eastern’ politicians and other actors as ‘collectivist’ – are orientalist in nature. We will also point out that the pitfall types outlined in this chapter are lurking in many forms in the study of language and politics, well beyond linguacultural overgeneralisations.
2.2 Our Approach
As we argued in Chapter 1, our framework operates with the four features of linguistic anchor, bottom-up approach to language use, pursuit of replicability and a contrastive view underlying any analysis. ‘Linguistic anchor’ refers to a terminological and conceptual choice. Simply put, in this book we attempt to use an exclusively pragmatic inventory of concepts. For example, the reader might have noted that at various points we have used the term ‘linguaculture’ instead of ‘culture’ because we are interested in culturally embedded language use, rather than (national) cultures per se. As regards our bottom-up view, as we argued in Chapter 1, we follow Karl Popper’s experimental paradigm (see also Edmondson and House Reference Edmondson and House2011 for an overview).
Unlike our linguistic anchor and bottom-up approach, replicability and a contrastive view need to be discussed in more detail as part of our framework. Figure 2.1 summarises the essential elements of our framework.

Figure 2.1 Our framework
Our pragmatic approach departs from the tenet that, in order to analyse politically relevant data in a rigorous and replicable way, it is necessary to look at and compare such data with the aid of different units of analysis. In our view, the most important units of analysis include the three categories of expressions, speech acts and discourse. The right-hand side of Figure 2.1 features types of contrastive cross-cultural pragmatic data, which influence the way in which we look at our units of analysis in the study of political language use.
2.2.1 Expressions
Expressions in the pragmatic study of language and politics include lexical items which are politically relevant, such as ‘nationalism’ and ‘democracy’, as well as expressions which become important in a particular political context, such as ones through which speech acts like apology are realised in political interaction.Footnote 1 A related category of politically relevant expressions includes political metaphors, which have been widely studied in the field (e.g. Lakoff Reference Lakoff1995; Fauconnier and Turner Reference Fauconnier, Turner and Gibbs2008; Musolff Reference Musolff2021). In our model, the phenomenon of ‘expression’ also covers conventionalised multi-word sequences. Many such expressions indicate a specific speech act or an interactional move. In the realm of language and politics, many expressions are formulaic, with strongly conventionalised pragmatic use (see Coulmas Reference Coulmas1979). Such expressions often indicate the participants’ awareness of the broader ritual frame holding for a particular political situation. Because of this, in House and Kádár (Reference House and Kádár2021a) we defined them as ‘ritual frame indicating expressions’ (RFIEs). For example, as Bull et al. (Reference Bull, Fetzer and Kádár2020) pointed out, the expression ‘Mr Speaker’ addressed towards the Speaker of the House in the British Parliament indicates awareness of ritual rights and obligations in a situation in which a politician can only make an attack on another Member of the House by addressing the Speaker of the House (see more in Chapter 9).
Among the expression types outlined above, the study of the category of politically relevant expressions such as ‘nationalism’ can be particularly challenging. This is because, in the study of such expressions, one or more of the pitfalls outlined above are prone to influence one’s analysis. For example, in her study of the notion of ‘Bulgarian-ness’, Sotirova (Reference Sotirova2021) used an East–West dichotomy-like analysis to study issues such as why ‘Bulgarian-ness’ triggers negative emotions like anger and frustration. A key problem with an analysis like Sotirova’s relates to the previously mentioned issue that the outcome of the analysis is decided before the analysis itself is conducted: while Sotirova uses interesting data to prove her point, her study ignores the possibility that, for many individuals, the politically relevant notion of ‘Bulgarian-ness’ may actually be positive.
2.2.2 Speech Acts
When it comes to the study of speech acts in politically relevant data, we rely on a finite and minimalist speech act typology (Edmondson and House Reference Edmondson and House1981; Edmondson et al. Reference Edmondson, House and Kádár2023), illustrated by Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Our speech act typology
Having a finite typology of speech acts allows us to rigorously analyse and compare speech acts through which politicians and other actors in politics interact with one another. It also allows us to capture the interactional patterns and broader pragmatic conventions holding for any pragmatically relevant situation under investigation. Further, in written political language use, the above typology also allows us to break down written messages into speech acts. An advantage of a finite speech act typology like the present one is that it precludes inventing ‘political speech acts’ ad libitum (see more below). Another key advantage of relying on such a finite system of speech acts is that it also allows us to break down discourse into components.
Ever since Austin and Searle, the idea that speech act categories need to be finite has been present in pragmatics (Habermas Reference Habermas and McCarthy1979; Vanderveken Reference Vanderveken1990; Kissine Reference Kissine2013; Levinson Reference Levinson and Huang2017). The idea of finiteness precludes ‘discovering’ new and context-specific speech acts, such as ‘the speech act of persuasion’ in politics (e.g. Natsheh and Atawneh Reference Natsheh and Atawneh2021), and the more general notion of so-called ‘political speech acts’ (see e.g. Hepple Reference Hepple2003; Bolsover Reference Bolsover2018). Operating with speech act categories embedded in the realm of politics shuts the door on the replicability of our research (see House and Kádár Reference House and Kádár2021b). For example, while scholars like Saito (Reference Saito2015) distinguished the speech act of ‘political apology’, we believe that applying such a category is not useful because it precludes studying Apologise realisations in the political arena on a par with other apologies – a train of thought which we will elaborate in Chapter 6.
The speech acts we propose are such simple and basic constituents of linguistic behaviour that they can easily be replicated in the study of interaction across languages and data types (see a detailed discussion in House and Kádár Reference Juliane and Kádár2023). In annotating our data in terms of speech acts, we rely on the standard speech act–analytic procedure of inter-rater coding.
Following our bottom-up approach, we naturally do not assume that a particular political phenomenon is realised by one particular speech act. For example, in Chapter 4 we examine the political ritual of diplomatic mediation. While one could assume that – in the context of a diplomatic conflict which requires the involvement of a mediator – future-related Attitudinal speech acts like Request are frequented, we do not set out to investigate such an assumption. Instead of zeroing in on any speech act, we first examine frequent speech acts in our data and then interpret the outcomes of the analysis. When it comes to quantifying our data in speech act analyses, we annotate our corpus or corpora manually.
In the study of speech acts in freely co-constructed interaction, like in Chapter 8 where we analyse ideologically loaded clashes in public spaces, we break down interaction into moves and examine how speech acts in moves relate to one another, as Initiating, Satisfying, Countering and Contra-ing moves (see Edmondson Reference Edmondson1981).Footnote 2 ‘Initiating’ refers to speech acts through which an exchange is started; ‘Satisfying’ includes speech acts through which an Initiating speech act is satisfied; ‘Countering’ points to speech acts through which an initiation is countered – that is, objected to but not entirely rejected; whereas if an utterance is turned down entirely it would be ‘contra-ed’ in our terminology. Let us explain how these categories can be operationalised with a simple example. In a politically relevant conflict like a clash between a protester and a public figure, a speech act through which a morally loaded verbal attack is initiated by the protester may be either ‘contra-ed’ with another speech act, or responded in an unrelated manner, which we will define as the lack of alignment below. In such a case, the responding speech act operates as a ‘re-Initiation’.
With the aid of our interactionally interpreted set of minimal speech act categories, which are formulated on the basis of corpus-based interaction projects (see Edmondson et al. Reference Edmondson, House and Kádár2023), we are able to distinguish interactional moves from speech acts. For example, we do not interpret ‘refusal’ as a speech act because we combine speech acts with interactional moves like ‘counter’, and so we are able to break down more complex interactional phenomena such as refusal into speech acts through which a Countering or Contra-ing move is realised.
Using our typology implies that, for us, speech acts represent utterance-level phenomena which do not span different turns in face-to-face interaction. Further, in written or scripted data such as the case of Apologise in political settings (see Chapter 6), we break down the phenomena under investigation into different speech acts.
An advantage of defining speech acts on the utterance level and approaching discourse by examining the relationship between speech acts is that this procedure allows us also to examine how an interactional goal is achieved through speech acts in subsequent moves. For example, in Vladimirou et al. (Reference Vladimirou, House and Kádár2021) we examined a social protest on Twitter through the lens of realisations of speech acts, in particular Complain. Examining the relationship between speech acts in Tweets allowed us to consider how the interactional behaviour of complaining escalated as the participants in the protest reflected on others’ Complains in their own Complain realisations.
As noted in Chapter 1, in the present book we capitalise all speech acts; for example, we use ‘Apologise’ instead of ‘apology’. When we talk about an interactional phenomenon like ‘complaining’ (versus the speech act Complain) we do not use capitals.
2.2.3 Discourse
Discourse is the highest unit in our analytic framework. The importance of discourse in the study of language and politics relates to the fact that our ultimate goal is to understand political language use as a discourse process, and we often apply smaller units of analysis like speech acts and expressions to break down this process into replicable components. Our definition of discourse is linguistic; that is, we interpret discourse as a unit larger than a sentence or an utterance. This is different from how ‘discourse’ is used in social theory and in many CDA inquiries, in which discourses – often in the plural – describe social engagement and language use unified by a certain goal or set of characteristics (e.g. Wodak Reference Wodak, Zienkowski, Östman and Verschueren2011). As Jaworski and Coupland (Reference Jaworski and Coupland1999: 6) argue,
If we ask what is the purpose of doing discourse analysis, the answer from critical discourse analysts would go well beyond the description of language in use. Discourse analysis offers a means of exposing or deconstructing the social practices which constitute ‘social structure’ and what we might call the conventional meaning structures of social life.
Following the renowned debate between Widdowson (Reference Widdowson1995) and Fairclough (Reference Fairclough1996), we do not argue that discourse is simply synonymous with ‘text’ because it is a product of interaction often involving a complex participation framework in language and politics. For us, discourse is therefore a unit of analysis which can be best studied if we break it down into contextually embedded components and first analyse the contextually embedded use of these components, and then consider whether such uses reflect broader pragmatic conventions or not. It is also possible to have a systematic look at discourse by categorising context and role types in a corpus of discourse data (see e.g. Chapter 9).
It is also necessary here to consider types of discourse through which one can reflect on the nature of a politically relevant data type under investigation. Figure 2.3 overviews our system of types of discourse.

Figure 2.3 Types of discourse
Discourse in pragmatics always interrelates with a specific medium. In language and politics, medium is particularly relevant to the way in which a message is formulated. As an example, let us here refer to Tweets, which have played a significant role in recent political events worldwide (see, among many others, Breeze Reference Breeze2020; Scott Reference Scott2021). Furthermore, many key topics in the field of language and politics – which are to be covered in Part Two of this book – need to be considered through the medium of discourse (see the right-hand side of Figure 2.3). A particular issue which one is advised always to consider is whether a piece of political data is spontaneous or not. ‘[–marked]’ in Figure 2.3 refers to the fact that spoken data are non-premeditated due to their real-time synchronous nature, whereas ‘[+marked]’ indicates that many types of asynchronous written interaction are premeditated. The line pointing from ‘spoken’ to ‘[+marked]’ shows that some types of spoken data, such as institutional ritual interaction, often lack ad hoc character, at least to some degree, and are of a premeditated nature. Computer-mediated communication (CMC) represents an ‘in-between’ category, as some types of CMC are of a synchronous nature whereas others are of an asynchronous nature (an excellent overview is Susan Herring’s work, e.g. the edited volume Herring Reference Herring1996). As studies such as Smith et al. (Reference Smith, John and Sturgis2013) have shown, the (a)synchronous nature of politically relevant data has a significant influence on the dynamics of such data. What we define as ‘examples’ in Figure 2.3 represents discourse types.
As we have shown thus far, Figure 2.3 presents a basic typology of discourse types based on the pragmatic dynamics of the (a)synchronous nature and the related degree of premeditatedness of a data type. Another distinction we need to consider when it comes to the study of discourse in language and politics is whether a particular instance of discourse is created by a single producer or multiple producers (multiple producers of a single-source discourse like an anonymous news item may be invisible). This is different from the standard terminology in various areas of the humanities and social sciences like literature where a frequently used binary pair through which types of discourse are analysed is ‘dialogue’ and ‘monologue’ (see also studies like Musolff Reference Musolff2011 in the field of language and politics). We propose to use another terminology, to align with the strictly linguistic scope of our inquiry, namely single-source and multiple-source discourse. As House (Reference House, House and Blum-Kulka1986: 179, 180, references elided) argues,
Multiple-source discourse arises whenever more than one participant is overtly involved in purposefully creating linguistic structures, and single-source is a type of discourse where there is only one participant overtly involved. Compare the following diagram:

… As has been stressed by Sinclair … and Widdowson … written discourse is, in fact, more closely related to spoken discourse than has traditionally been assumed, and both single-source spoken and single-source written discourse may be considered to be derived from the primary mode of communication: multiple-source spoken discourse, in which meanings are negotiated by a constant shift of perspectives in the on-going interaction.
In using the three analytic units outlined above, it is important to bear in mind what we have already emphasised: they are distinct but always interrelated. For example, as already noted, in order to analyse discourse from both qualitative and quantitative points of view, it is preferable for the pragmatician to break manifestations of discourse down into expressions and speech acts, and also to consider expressions through which, for example, the broader ritual frame of an institutionalised political interaction is indicated. Expressions often indicate speech acts as well, they are discursively embedded, and they also have an intrinsic relationship with the context of the interaction. Finally, speech acts are never ‘stand-alone’ or isolated phenomena: similar to expressions, they are discursively embedded, and they are often realised through conventionalised formulae.
2.2.4 Context
As Figure 2.1 shows, we interpret our units of analysis in context, which often imposes a ritual frame onto the participants in the realm of language and politics.
In the tradition of pragmatics, conceptualisations of context have played such an important role that the very definition of pragmatics is often bound up with the notion of context. Thus Stalnaker (Reference Stalnaker1999: 43) writes, ‘Syntax studies sentences, semantics studies propositions. Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed.’ And we might even say, with Levinson (Reference Levinson1983: 32), that pragmatics is ‘a theory of language understanding that takes context into account’. The underlying assumption here is that in order to arrive at an adequate theory of the relation between linguistic units and what they express, one must consider the context in which these units are realised. In pragmatics, attention is given to how the interaction of context and content can be represented, and how the linguistic realisations used relate to context. The relationship between content and context is, however, never a one-way street: content expressed also influences context; that is, linguistic actions influence the context in which they are performed. The effects of this dependency are omnipresent and decisive for the construction and recovery of meaning. But context also plays a role in the overall organisation of language, affecting its syntactic, semantic, lexical and phonological structure to the point that, as Ochs (Reference Ochs, Ochs and Schieffelin1979: 5) puts it, ‘we could say that a universal design feature of language is that it is context-sensitive’. Any pragmatic framework of language and politics, then, needs to include a general representation of contextual features that determine the values of our pragmatic units, with context being represented by a body of information presumed to be available to the participants in the interactional situation.
Studying context in the realm of language and politics implies that the researcher needs to consider as much information about the historical events and the participants as possible. For example, in Chapter 5 we examine a corpus of colonial-era documents. For us, these documents represent the unit of discourse, and in order to analyse their contents by breaking them down to sequences of speech acts, we consider as much contextual information as possible, including information on the participants, the diplomatic event which brought these documents alive, and so on. Such information not only helps us to consider patterns of language use in our data, but also allows us to draw inferences regarding the replicable pragmatic features of our results, for example by considering how the pragmatic patterns emerging from our data represent the aggressive language use of the coloniser. We do not, however, assume at the very outset that the data we study constitute a particular historically embedded genre or discourse(s). This latter approach is preferred in CDA, in particular in its discourse-historical approach (for a summary see Reisigl and Wodak Reference Reisigl, Wodak, Wodak and Meyer2001). The discourse-historical approach argues that a text always belongs to something much broader, and this broader phenomenon defines the features of discourse(s) in an intertextual and interdiscursive way. As Flowerdew (Reference Flowerdew, Flowerdew and Richardson2018: 166, original emphasis) argues,
A particular type of contextual relation that has received a lot of attention in … [CDA] is that of intertextuality … the process whereby textual features of one text reappear in another. This means that an individual text may not be analysed without considering other prior texts with which it may relate … Fairclough (Reference Fairclough1992) breaks intertextuality down into manifest intertextuality and constitutive intertextuality: the former refers to overt uses of citation, quotation and paraphrase, while the latter refers to generic features that do not leave an obvious trace … Constitutive intertextuality is sometimes referred to as interdiscursivity.
Studying intertextuality and interdiscursivity allows the CDA scholar to capture broader social discourses, which influence the formation of a particular text. For instance, Flowerdew (Reference Flowerdew, Flowerdew and Richardson2018) illustrates the use of context by interpreting particular features of a data set he studies through abstract intertextual and interdiscursive notions, such as ‘Western conceptions of democracy’ (Flowerdew Reference Flowerdew, Flowerdew and Richardson2018: 172). However, in a language-anchored pragmatic investigation like ours it is problematic to interpret features of a particular data set through a pre-existing extratextual notion like ‘Western conceptions of democracy’ without conducting a data-driven contrastive analysis of relevant discourse corpora. Intertextuality therefore may only be used in our analysis if it evidently emerges from individual discourse units in our corpus, while we do not consider interdiscursivity at all because it assumes that an inquiry operates with corpus-external phenomena. Context in our pragmatic framework therefore only includes historical information relating to the particular interaction under investigation, which helps us to interpret what is said in our data in the here and now.
2.2.5 Ritual Frame
Along with context, the frame in Figure 2.1 also includes the notion ‘ritual frame’. ‘Ritual frame’ refers to the fact that many instances of political language use, in particular institutionalised ones, are ritual in nature (see more in Chapter 9). Following Goffman (Reference Goffman1967) and Kádár’s (Reference Kádár2017; Reference Kádár2024) pragmatic adaptation of Goffman’s view, we argue that political language tends to represent a form of interaction ritual where pragmatic conventions follow underlying rights and obligations, indicate an invisible ritual frame, are often ostensible in nature and embody a moral order. Furthermore, political language use is also ritual in a more ceremonial sense in settings such as parliaments, where ritual in the very literal sense of the word is frequent. The more institutionalised a political interaction is, the more visible the ritual frame becomes; for example, in a televised presidential debate the pragmatic rights and obligations of the participants are regulated by rules and by a mediator who can enforce such rules. While in less institutionalised political settings the ritual rights and obligations are not set in stone, and political actors often have means to follow strategic agendas, any form of strategic behaviour often needs to be hidden under a veneer of ritual conventions (see e.g. Chapter 5).
Unlike intertextuality and interdiscursivity, the features of a ritual frame cannot be taken for granted but should rather be examined in a bottom-up way across data types. Let us take diplomatic mediation as an example, which is to be studied in Chapter 4. While we assume that a frame is in place in diplomatic mediatory situations right at the outset of our research, we have no way to know how it actually influences discursive behaviour before conducting a bottom-up examination of our data.
The term ‘frame’, which we use in the context of the ritual nature of political language use, is also frequently used in linguistics, as witnessed by high-impact cognitive research such as Schank and Abelson (Reference Schank and Abelson1977), Tannen (Reference Tannen and Friedl1979), Fillmore (Reference Fillmore1982), Barsalou (Reference Barsalou, Lehrer and Feder Kittay1992), Chafe (Reference Chafe1994), Bednarek (Reference Bednarek2005) and so on. What distinguishes our use of the term ‘ritual frame’ from other interpretations of ‘frame’ is our predominantly bottom-up focus, which traces a path from linguaculturally embedded units of analysis to the underlying cognitive frame. This path is rarely discussed outside pragmatic inquiries. Using the concept of frame implies that we look at conventionalised and ritual aspects of language use and we exclude idiosyncratic behaviour from the scope of our analysis.
2.2.6 The Right-Hand Side of Figure 2.1
In Figure 2.1, the right-hand side includes contrastive approaches (see also Chapter 1). As already noted, these contrastive views are rooted in cross-cultural pragmatic research. Contrasting can be done in many different ways, and what we advocate in this book only represents certain types of contrasting, without the claim of being comprehensive.
2.3 Data Types in the Study of Language and Politics
Many scholars in pragmatics have considered whether naturally occurring data are more ‘valuable’ than elicited and constructed data (see e.g. Eelen Reference Eelen2001; Bednarek Reference Bednarek, Bublitz and Norrick2011). Such discussions are not relevant for the study of language and politics, where spontaneous data are rare, even though they exist and are worth studying (e.g. in Chapter 4 we examine a closed-door emergency meeting which is spontaneous in nature). This is why, in the field of language and politics, it is more fruitful to consider which type of discourse a particular data set represents, instead of speculating about whether a piece of data is more or less ‘natural’.
Following our approach, we recommend using corpora in the study of language and politics whenever possible. As already noted, the term ‘corpus’ refers to a searchable collection of machine-readable texts of varying size. Using corpora does not mean that we dismiss the value of rigorously conducted case studies, provided that such case studies are carefully designed. It is also advisable to combine corpus studies with case studies. A case study is often used to further investigate what was initially observed in a corpus. In all endeavours of collecting and analysing pragmatic data, we are faced with a fundamental conflict between the goal of pragmatic analysis and the means of reaching this goal. On the one hand, we want to recognise, understand, describe and explain systematic, generalisable linguacultural tendencies of political language use. On the other hand, every single interaction is a separate linguistic action. The renowned linguist Wallace Chafe (Reference Chafe1994: 10) captures this brilliantly: ‘Understanding of whatever kind is the ability, through imagination, to relate limited, particular, concrete observations to larger, more encompassing, more stable schemas within which the particular experiences fit.’
As the corpus linguist Partington argues, in language and politics the two perhaps most important data types include the language use of political actors and the media. As Partington (Reference Partington2012) points out,
In both types of study, researchers will typically need to compile their own data set, very generally by downloading texts from the Internet, rather than exclusively accessing large pre-existing so-called ‘general language’ corpora such as the Bank of English or the British National Corpus. A number of political institutions make available a good number and variety of political texts, for example, the White House Library, the UK government Web site and the Web sites of political parties. Several countries make available transcripts of their parliamentary discussions, though this raises the vexed question of authenticity. UK Hansard reports, for example, are frequently altered after the actual speeches have been delivered.
This argument is important for the present book due to our contrastive and multilingual view of language and politics. We often compare data drawn from linguacultures like anglophone ones, where corpora are readily available, with data from linguacultures where no comparably large corpora of political texts are available. An additional problem that is worth mentioning here is that, for example in the case of Chinese, certain digitalised politically relevant corpora such as the Hong Kong Newspaper ArchiveFootnote 3 consist of scans which can only be used as images, and so if one wants to use them one needs to manually input every utterance into one’s analysis.
In this chapter, we have outlined elements of our framework, including our units of analysis, the way in which we look at data, and data types in the field of language and politics. In the following, we move on to study the pitfall types presented in Chapter 1.
2.4 Recommended Readings
Noam Chomsky. Reference Chomsky1988. Language and Politics. Oxford: AK Press.
Chomsky interprets the concept of ‘politics’ in a broad sense, and this interpretation may be useful to readers with interest in how politics can be pinned down. In the following section, Chomsky discusses the problematics of relying on data to draw generalisations about language use, which we also discussed in the present chapter:
If you go back to the time of Galileo and look at the array of phenomena that had to be accounted for, it seemed prima facie obvious that the Galilean theory, the Copernican theory, could not be supported. That is, there were just masses of unexplained, or even apparently refuting, data. Galileo plowed his way through this, putting much of the data aside, redefining what was relevant and what was not relevant, formulating questions in such a way that what appeared to be refuting data were no longer so, and in fact very often just disregarded data that would have refuted the system. This was not done simply with reckless abandon, but out of a recognition that explanatory principles were being discovered that have insight into at least some of the phenomena. Now, a willingness to move towards explanatory principles that give insight into some of the phenomena at the cost of not being able to handle all of the phenomena: that I think was one of the most striking intellectual achievements of the great scientific revolution.
Michal Krzyżanowski and Joshua Tucker. Reference Krzy, anowski and Tucker2018. Re/constructing politics through social & online media: Discourses, ideologies, and mediated political practices. Journal of Language and Politics 17(6): 1–14.
The work of Krzyżanowski and Tucker is relevant for readers with interest in issues of data in the field of language and politics. The study of language and politics not only involves clearly ‘political’ data such as reports on political news, but also many seemingly ‘non-political’ manifestations of language use, such as social media uses. Krzyżanowski and Tucker describe this phenomenon as follows:
Thus, we build on the premise that whether within ‘elite’ or ‘mass’ politics, or at the intersection of the former and the latter, the role of language as a carrier of political ideologies and practices remains central. It hence requires us to build on the key language-related ‘turns’ in interdisciplinary research accelerated by the ascent of the political use of online and social media. Accordingly, we set off from a very peculiar ‘linguistic turn’ in the broad field of political research – including the traditional political science but also political sociology, democracy studies, electoral studies, analysis of new social movements, international relations, etc. – and argue that social media have recently very effectively put language – whether seen as ‘discourse’ or ‘data’ – at a central point of political analysis. Although political communication research has since the arrival of methods of content analysis paid attention to the ‘contents’ or to the ‘language’ of political messages, the arrival of online media has very significantly deepened that trend. It has also shown that the political-scientific explorations of, in particular, social media language require new approaches to dealing with the quantity as well as quality of mediated political messages.
On the other hand, looking from the perspective of language and discourse analysis as well as of the wider communication research, we also draw from a ‘political’ turn that, spawned by the development of online and social media, has very significantly deepened linguistic, discourse-analytic and communication-scientific interest in the increasingly political character of mediated communication. We recognise, however, that the new character of communication on online media – including brevity of social media texts, huge quantity and volume of messages, irregularity of language use, etc. – have all posed very significant challenges to many language- and discourse-oriented theories and methodologies.
3.1 Introduction
In the present chapter, we examine the first of the pitfall types outlined in Chapter 2 – the problem of following an ethnocentric view when studying politically relevant data. Here, and in Chapters 4 and 5, we will discuss how to avoid these pitfalls, and we will also provide case studies where we put our methodology into practice.
As the political scientist Hooghe (Reference Hooghe and Darity2008: 11) argues,
Ethnocentrism is a basic attitude expressing the belief that one’s own ethnic group or one’s own culture is superior to other ethnic groups or cultures, and that one’s cultural standards can be applied in a universal manner. The term was first used by the American sociologist William Graham Sumner (1840–1910) to describe the view that one’s own culture can be considered central, while other cultures or religious traditions are reduced to a less prominent role. Ethnocentrism is closely related to other attitudinal indicators for racism, xenophobia, prejudice, mental closure, and, more generally, an authoritarian personality structure. Ethnocentrism is widely used in research on social and political attitudes because it proves to be a very powerful and easily identifiable attitude that can be measured in a valid manner with a limited number of variables.
Clearly, ethnocentrism is an important phenomenon to be studied for its own sake in language and politics (for an overview see Cunningham et al. Reference Cunningham, Nezlek and Banaji2004). However, we aim to investigate a very different manifestation of ethnocentrism, namely the way in which ethnocentric conceptions influence researchers themselves.
Ethnocentric views emerge in the study of language and politics if politically relevant notions are used in an uncritical way, without taking potential variation in their meanings across linguacultures into consideration. A representative example is the notion of ‘democracy’. As Schaffer (Reference Schaffer1997; Reference Schaffer2000; Reference Schaffer2012; Schaffer and Gagnon Reference Schaffer and Gagnon2023) has shown in many studies, the word ‘democracy’ is subject to significant linguacultural variation and because of this it simply cannot be used in a neutral way without considering what it means in different linguacultures. Yet various scholars used ‘democracy’ and other concepts as grand notions, reflecting their own understandings of these notions. As an example, let us refer to the following excerpt from the study of Kirsch and Welzel (Reference Kirsch and Welzel2019: 59):
An intriguing phenomenon consists in the fact that widespread support for democracy coexists in many countries with the persistent absence of democracy itself. Addressing this phenomenon, we show that in most places where it exists people understand democracy in ambiguous ways, such that ‘authoritarian’ notions of what democracy means mix with – and even overshadow – liberal notions, in spite of the contradiction between these two notions. Underlining this contradiction, our evidence shows that authoritarian notions of democracy question the authenticity of liberal notions when both are endorsed conjointly. Worse, the evidence further suggests that authoritarian notions reverse the whole meaning of support for democracy, indeed indicating support for autocracy instead … In a nutshell, the prospects of democracy are bleak where emancipative values remain weak.
This is a heavily ethnocentric argument in which certain nations are conveniently dismissed as less ‘emancipated’ than others – an error which also paves the way to Pitfall 2, namely the association of values with certain actors or entities at the outset. While it is possible to academically measure the degree of democracy across countries and political systems, even though any such measures need to be handled with some caution (for an overview see Boese Reference Boese2019), the argument that there is only one appropriate and generally accepted understanding of the concept ‘democracy’ is clearly ethnocentric and colonial in nature. As we will show below, a serious danger of claiming ownership of notions like ‘democracy’ is that these notions can be self-righteously used as interactional resources (see Thornborrow Reference Thornborrow2002) not only by non-liberal actors like the ones mentioned by Kirsch and Welzel above, but also by the very actors who associate themselves and are associated with liberal political systems.
3.2 Methodological Approach
Following the contrastive approach pursued in this book, we now propose an analytic procedure through which it is possible to systematically compare politically relevant notions across different linguacultures. This contrastive take involves the following three methodological steps outlined in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 Our analytic approach to avoiding Pitfall 1
As Figure 3.1 shows, the first and second steps in our approach allow us to examine and compare the ways in which political actors and the media use particular politically relevant expressions, hence teasing out contrastive similarities and differences between their use with the aid of different corpora. While these steps involve a diachronic analysis, they are different from the discourse-historical approach discussed in Chapter 2. In the third step in Figure 3.1, we propose relying on an ancillary methodology, by means of which the contrastive outcomes of the first two steps can be tested. Here we follow a broader contrastive procedure suggested in House and Kádár (Reference House and Kádár2021b), where we argued that involving an ancillary step is a good practice in contrastive pragmatic analysis.
3.3 Case Study
In this study we investigate uses of the expression M/minzu-zhuyi 民族主义 in the Chinese linguaculture and the expression nationalism in the US linguaculture. Our case study will not only show that M/minzu-zhuyi differs significantly from nationalism, but also that in the Chinese linguaculture M/minzu-zhuyi is used in two essentially different ways: in a positive ‘native’ and a negative ‘foreign’ sense. This fits into a major lexical pattern that one can often observe in Chinese language and politics. As Kádár and Ran (Reference Kádár and Ran2015) have highlighted, in the context of early twentieth-century politics, the Chinese borrowed a number of expressions, and at the same time began to use various of their own ‘native’ terms alongside these borrowed expressions. Thus a set of dual expressions emerged in Chinese language and politics, which often only had a single English (or other Western) translation. In summary, in Chinese M/minzu-zhuyi has a very different meaning and diachronic trajectory than nationalism in English, and ‘nationalism’ as a macro-sense technical term may not be suitable to account for such cross-cultural differences.
In terms of the general methodology outlined in Chapter 2, in this case study focusing on politically relevant expressions our key unit of analysis is expressions, and we engage in a contrastive procedure whereby we compare corpora drawn from different languages and different data types.
3.3.1 ‘Nationalism’ in CDA Research
In order to position our case study, let us briefly summarise previous CDA research involving the concept of nationalism. In a body of such inquiries, cross-cultural research has been used to validate dominant ‘Western’ conceptualisations of ‘nationalism’ as an exclusively negative phenomenon. For instance, KhosraviNik and Zia (Reference KhosraviNik and Zia2014) adopted a CDA approach to study how a form of Iranian national(ist) identity is constructed and presented on the popular Facebook page ‘Persian Gulf’. While KhosraviNik and Zia used Persian data, they interpreted Iranian ‘nationalism’ without considering native conceptualisations of this notion. Others, such as Setiyadi et al. (Reference Setiyadi, Hersulastuti and Widayanti2018), examined linguacultural equivalents of the term ‘nationalism’, and they approached these equivalents in a top-down manner, assuming that ‘nationalism’ is an essentially negative phenomenon in the linguacultures studied. By so doing, they unavoidably fell into Pitfall 1: notwithstanding whether or not a scholar is a linguacultural insider of Persian or other linguacultures involved in the inquiries outlined above, the uncritical use of a Western definition of ‘nationalism’ shuts the door on any objective study of this subject.
The work of Ruth Wodak and her colleagues deserves particular attention here. Wodak (Reference Wodak, Flowerdew and Richardson2017) defined ‘nationalism’ using cultural and ethnic criteria, by proposing a discourse-historical approach to this notion (see also Chapter 2). Further, Wodak and Boukala (Reference Wodak and Boukala2015) explored the diachronic patterns in the emergence of ‘nationalism’ across various European countries, providing a model for the historical development of nationalism. While we agree with Wodak that examining the historical development of nationalism (and its equivalents) provides a key to understanding ‘nationalism’ as a concept, our approach is very different from it because we do not start from the assumption that equivalents of nationalism always have a negative default connotation across different linguacultures.
3.3.2 Methodology and Data
Following the tripartite design proposed in Figure 3.1, in our case study we proceed as follows:
1 Contrastive analysis 1. We study the diachronic development of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism in China and the US respectively, by examining the ways in which politicians used these expressions over time. This research revealed major cross-cultural contrastive pragmatic differences between the use of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism. The results also revealed a certain rupture which followed the end of early modern Chinese politics, coinciding with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
2 Contrastive analysis 2. In order to investigate whether this rupture holds for language use beyond speeches made by politicians, we explore the ways in which M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism have been used in the Chinese and US print media between 1949 and the present day.
3 Testing the results of the contrastive analyses. We conduct a set of semi-structured interviews with Chinese and US respondents of two different age groups in order to measure – at least in a modest way – how present-day language users in China and the US perceive the meanings of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism.
Adopting this approach, we examined the following three corpora:
1 Corpus for contrastive analysis 1. Transcripts of speeches made by politicians between the 1920s and 2019. The Chinese corpus consists of 951,887 Chinese characters, while the US corpus has 978,768 words. The Chinese corpus was collected from twelve Chinese websites. The US corpus was retrieved from millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches.
2 Corpus for contrastive analysis 2. Newspaper articles published between 1949 and 2019. The Chinese corpus of newspaper articles consists of approximately 630,000 characters, while the US corpus has 205,500 words. The Chinese newspapers studied include China Daily and Global Times, while the US newspapers include the Washington Post and the New York Times. We studied data drawn from these newspapers because, internationally, they are among the best-known newspapers published in the two countries involved in our case study.
3 Testing the results of the contrastive analyses – interviews. Our interview corpus includes two lots of thirty interviews with Chinese and US respondents from two different age groups: under and over thirty-five years. We chose thirty-five years in a relatively arbitrary manner, arguing that by reaching this age people have usually settled down, and so after this age interviewees may have a different view on politics than younger respondents. We assumed that the age factor is a crucial determinant when it comes to evaluations of the expressions M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism. Due to the effect of globalisation and related exposure to international media, younger people have a different view of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism than members of the older generation. This assumption was based on previous research on the pragmatics of globalisation, such as Sifianou (Reference Sifianou2013) and House and Kádár (Reference House and Kádár2020).
When constructing our corpora, we used the computer software AntConc v. 3.5.8 to search for occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism. We examined not only occurrences of these expressions, but also their collocations with adjectives: up to three words before and after the occurrence of nationalism and, similarly, up to three words before but not after the occurrence of M/minzu-zhuyi because Chinese adjectives only occur before nouns. We examined adjectives to determine whether they tended to have a positive, negative or neutral meaning in the linguacultures being contrasted. As part of this analysis we also examined the broader contextual use of each example, to determine whether the expressions under investigation were used positively or negatively in a particular text. Typical examples of positive and negative adjectives modifying M/minzu-zhuyi in our Chinese corpus are the following: fandiguo-de-Minzu-zhuyi 反帝国主义的民族主义(‘anti-imperialist Minzu-zhuyi’) [positive meaning] and youyi-de-minzu-zhuyi 右翼的民族主义 (‘right-wing minzu-zhuyi’) [negative meaning]. In the case of our US corpus, while we could not identify positive adjectives modifying nationalism, we found various adjectives such as economic, which we initially classified as ‘neutral’. However, as our more detailed analysis later revealed, in many cases such semantically neutral adjectives also gain a negative meaning in US political language use. A typical adjective negatively modifying nationalism is nastiest.
In our semi-structured interviews, we asked three questions in English and Chinese (see more below). When selecting our respondents, we included people with a university education background who said ‘yes’ to our question whether they are interested in politics and frequently read or watch different media. The interviews were conducted via email and Skype or WeChat in two steps. First, we provided our respondents with the interview questions by email or WeChat and then arranged the Skype or WeChat interviews. The average interview lasted approximately ten minutes. The interview data were stored in compliance with the standard ethical-research requirements of linguistic inquiries. The participants’ names were anonymised and any sensitive information was removed from the interview transcripts.
3.3.3 Analysis
The following Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 summarise the quantitative analysis of parts 1 and 2 of our research. They include the number of occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism in our diachronic corpora:
Table 3.1 Number of pre-1949 and post-1949 occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism in the political-speeches corpus
| Pre-1949 political speeches | Post-1949 political speeches | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M/minzu-zhuyi | Nationalism | M/minzu-zhuyi | nationalism | |
| Total | 26 | 1 | 56 | 4 |
| Negative uses | 1 (minzu-zhuyi) | 1 | 56 (minzu-zhuyi) | 4 |
| Positive uses | 25 (Minzu-zhuyi) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Table 3.2 Number of occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism in the media corpus
| Media data | M/minzu-zhuyi | nationalism |
| Total | 460 | 137 |
| Negative uses | 443 (minzu-zhuyi) | 137 |
| Positive uses | 17 (M/minzu-zhuyi) | 0 |
Table 3.3 Number of occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism in the political speeches and media corpora with numbers of qualifying adjectives
| Both corpora | M/minzu-zhuyi | nationalism |
|---|---|---|
| Number of occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 542 | 142 |
| Number of adjectives collocating with minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 506 | 34 |
| Number of negative adjectives collocating with minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 490 | 24 |
| Number of positive or neutral adjectives collocating with minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 16 | 10 |
The figures given in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 clearly show major cross-cultural contrastive differences between the Chinese and US expressions under investigation – we will revisit this point in more detail later. More importantly here, they also point to the existence of a diachronic rupture in the Chinese data. While Table 3.1 indicates that M/minzu-zhuyi was almost always used positively in pre-1949 political speeches, it also shows that, after 1949, Chinese politicians used it only negatively. This is in accordance with the fact that, in pre-1949 Chinese political speeches, M/minzu-zhuyi had a dual use: it was used as a proper noun in a positive sense, and (rarely) as a common noun in a negative sense.
After 1949, Chinese politicians only used minzu-zhuyi as a common noun (see more below), in a negative sense. Table 3.2 (in conjunction with Table 3.1) shows that this rupture is less valid for post-1949 media texts, in which M/minzu-zhuyi can be used in both negative and positive ways, although the negative uses are much more marked than the positive uses. Table 3.2 (in conjunction with Table 3.1) also indicates that it is not always clear in post-1949 media texts whether M/minzu-zhuyi is a proper or common noun when used positively. That is, unlike the situation in pre-1949 political speeches, in post-1949 media texts there is a sense of ambiguity surrounding the modern use of this expression. Table 3.3 confirms this ambiguity: while in our corpus of political texts Minzu-zhuyi as a proper noun is never modified by an adjective, in the media texts one can observe cases where M/minzu-zhuyi has been modified by an adjective and expresses a positive meaning. Table 3.3 also confirms that negative uses of M/minzu-zhuyi are substantially more frequent than positive uses. It is worth noting that the ambiguity regarding whether M/minzu-zhuyi is a proper or common noun stems from the nature of Chinese writing. Unlike with many other writing systems, when using Chinese characters, one cannot indicate whether a word is a proper or common noun, and so the status of a noun can only be discerned from its context. While we attempted to resolve this ambiguity by carefully analysing the contextual use of M/minzu-zhuyi in each example in our corpus, and also by validating our interpretation with the aid of a panel of native speakers, in certain cases the ambiguity could not be completely resolved.
In the following, we first conduct a qualitative interpretation of the above quantitative results and then check the validity of the findings by implementing the third interview-based step in our model.
3.3.3.1 Contrastive Analysis 1: Speeches by Political Figures
In order to interpret the aforementioned quantitative differences between the positive and negative uses of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism, we begin our investigation with an overview of how politicians have used the concepts of M/minzu-zhuyi in China and nationalism in the US over time.
The term M/minzu-zhuyi was coined during the early modern period in China: it was borrowed from Japanese in the late nineteenth century (see Cui Reference Cui2004; Hao Reference Hao2004). At this time, the Chinese attempted to modernise the country. As part of this endeavour towards modernisation, Chinese intellectuals borrowed many ‘modern’ Western expressions, often via Japanese (Fairbank Reference Fairbank1982). Japan had earlier undergone modernisation, following the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The Japanese equivalent of M/minzu-zhuyi is minzoku-shugi 民族主義, which the Chinese directly imported (see Levenson Reference Levenson1953).
M/minzu-zhuyi later became a fundamental ‘Principle’ under the influence of Sun Yat-sen 孙中山 (1866–1925), the first president of the Republic of China (1911–1949). Sun’s political philosophy was based on what he called the Three Principles of Governance (Sanmin Zhuyi 三民主义), with the first of these Principles being Minzu-zhuyi. Bearing in mind that, in Sun’s work, Minzu-zhuyi is a proper noun with a positive meaning, it is not surprising that during the first half of the twentieth century Minzu-zhuyi was essentially associated in the Chinese linguaculture with a positive political principle. The fact that during this time Minzu-zhuyi was essentially used as a proper noun in Chinese is neatly illustrated by the authoritative Mathews’ Chinese–English Dictionary (1931), which translates the characters of this expression as ‘Principle of Nationalism’ rather than just ‘nationalism’. In Sun’s philosophy, Minzu-zhuyi was the political philosophical equivalent of aiguo-zhuyi 爱国主义 (‘patriotism’) – the latter was used by Sun in reference to the feelings of an individual rather than a political principle:
(3.1) … 做人的最大事情是什么呢?就是要知道怎么样爱国,怎么样可以管国事 … 什么是民族主义呢?就是要中国和外国平等的主义。要中国和英国、法国、美国那些强盛国家都一律平等的主义,就是民族主义。
… What’s the most important thing for a human being? It is to know how to be patriotic (aiguo) [as an individual] and how to administer the affairs of our state [in public] … What is Minzu-zhuyi? It is the doctrine of equality between China and foreign countries. Minzu-zhuyi is the doctrine according to which China is an equal of the powerful nations of Britain, France and the United States.
In pre-1949 texts, Minzu-zhuyi is almost always used in a positive sense (see Table 3.1) as a proper noun, representing a revered Principle. This implies that its positive meaning prevails whenever it appears as a proper noun. The following extract (3.2) illustrates this point. In this case, minzu-zhuyi is used as a common noun, in reference to nationalism in a foreign sense:
(3.2) 白种人以此为本位,去吞灭别色人种。 … 白种人民族主义很发达。因为白种人的民族主义很发达,所以他们在欧洲住满了,便扩充到西半球的南北美洲,东半球东南方的非洲、澳洲 …
It is standard for white people to devour other races … White nationalism (minzu-zhuyi) is highly developed. Because white people’s nationalism (minzu-zhuyi) is so much more developed, they have spread beyond Europe, and have colonised the western hemisphere of North and South America, the eastern hemisphere of Africa, Australia …
Besides the dual meaning of M/minzu-zhuyi in Sun’s political philosophy, Sun also used another term – Guozu-zhuyi 国族主义 – as a synonym of Minzu-zhuyi in his works, as the following excerpt illustrates:
(3.3) 我说民族主义就是国族主义,在中国是适当的,在外国便不适当。外国人说民族和国家便有分别。 … 在中国文中,一个字有两个解释的很多。即如「社会」两个字,就有两个用法:一个是指一般人群而言,一个是指一种有组织之团体而言。本来民族与国家相互的关系很多。不容易分开,但是当中实在有一定界限,我们必须分开什么是国家,什么是民族。我说民族就是国族,何以在中国是适当,在外国便不适当呢?因为中国自秦汉而后,都是一个民族造成一个国家。外国有一个民族造成几个国家,他们国内的民族是用白人为本位,结合棕人、黑人等民族,才成「大不列颠帝国」。所以在英国说民族就是国族,这一句话便不适当。
When I use my Principle of Minzu-zhuyi I mean Guozu-zhuyi (‘equal nations of our country-ism’). This notion [Minzu-zhuyi] is appropriate in China and inappropriate in foreign countries. Foreigners say that there is a difference between a ‘nation’ and a ‘country’ … In Chinese, many more words have two meanings than in foreign languages. For example, the word shehui (‘society’) has two interpretations: it can refer to both the general population and a community. In a similar way, when we talk about Minzu-zhuyi, the relationship between nation and state is intrinsically related in many aspects. It is not easy to separate them, but there is a line between what is a state and what is a nation. I say that ‘nation’ (minzu) includes the nations of our country (guozu). Why is it appropriate to use Minzu-zhuyi in China but not in a foreign country? China has been a nation state country since the Qin [221 to 206 BC] and Han [202 BC to 220 AD] Dynasties. This differs from Western countries which consist of various nations, including the white colonising nation and other – brown, black and other races – forming the nation, such as what we can see in the case of ‘Great Britain’. This is why, when it comes to Britain, a ‘nation’ (minzu) does not consist of the equal nations (guozu) of the country. Therefore ‘Minzu is Guozu’ is inappropriate in Britain.
Sun Yat-sen here provides an insightful metapragmatic analysis of his own conception of Minzu-zhuyi. The description in example (3.3) reveals that Sun was fully aware of the potential dangers of using the Chinese equivalent of nationalism in a positive way.
As a result of the importance of Sun’s political heritage, various political figures continued to use the expression M/minzu-zhuyi in the aforementioned dual manner. As our Chinese corpus shows, between Sun’s death in 1925 and 1949, leaders of different political parties tried to claim ‘ownership’ of Sun’s legacy, by providing different interpretations of Sun’s Minzu-zhuyi. Despite the ideological debates surrounding Minzu-zhuyi at that time, this expression was used primarily in a positive way, as our data have shown.
In 1949, with the unification of the mainland of China, state socialism became the official form of governance, with Russian Marxism having a fundamental influence on the language used in Chinese politics (e.g. Hodge and Kam Reference Hodge and Kam1998: 17). Mao Zedong – and Chinese national leaders after him – used minzu-zhuyi as a Marxist common noun, and because of this change the term minzu-zhuyi started to be used essentially differently from what we could observe in our pre-1949 corpus. However, as we will later show, this shift in the use of M/minzu-zhuyi by Chinese politicians does not mean that Minzu-zhuyi as a Principle lost its positive connotation.
It is important to note that, in our post-1949 Chinese corpus of political speeches, minzu-zhuyi always collocates with an adjective to indicate a negative meaning. A typical example of this use is difang minzu-zhuyi 地方民族主义 (‘local nationalism’), featured in example (3.4) below. ‘Local’ in this context refers to local (domestic) nationalistic opposition to Marxism that needed to be ‘overcome’:
(3.4) … 无论是大汉族主义或者地方民族主义,都不利于各族人民的团结 …
… Neither Han chauvinism nor local nationalism (defang-minzu-zhuyi) can contribute to the unity of our ethnic groups …
In summary, we may argue that M/minzu-zhuyi changed from an expression used in a dual way to a more ambiguous term, without a clear-cut difference between its ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ uses. However, as our follow-up contrastive analysis of media texts will show, the situation is more complex than meets the eye: in other data types featuring Chinese language and politics, such as our post-1949 media corpus, M/minzu-zhuyi has retained some of its dual meaning.
In English, the expression nationalism was, to the best of our knowledge, first used in 1844, although the concept of ‘nationalism’ can be traced back to the seventeenth century (Kohn Reference Kohn2005). An early description of nationalism in the US appeared in the New Englander and the Yale Review in July 1845, according to the Corpus of Historical American English.Footnote 1 In the nineteenth century, nationalism in the US was primarily used in relation to European nationalist movements, adopting the negative meaning of ‘social unrest’ (see Zimmer Reference Zimmer2003). Nationalism became increasingly negative in the US after the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 (Hayes Reference Hayes1931). Between the end of the First World War and the late 1940s, nationalism gradually became a symbol of war and the lack of international co-operation in the US, as the analysis of our corpus of political speeches shows. Furthermore, according to our corpus analysis, from the beginning of the 1950s nationalism in the US was associated with social instability in the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, until the collapse of the Soviet Union (see also Fousek Reference Fousek2000). Since then, nationalism has been a highly dispreferred term in mainstream US political language use.
The following examples represent a pre-1949 and a post-1949 use of nationalism taken from our corpus of US political speeches. These examples illustrate that, unlike M/minzu-zhuyi, nationalism has been used in a consistently negative way by leading US politicians, according to our US corpus.
(3.5) The economic depression has continued and deepened in every part of the world during the past year. In many countries political instability, excessive armaments, debts, governmental expenditures, and taxes have resulted in revolutions, in unbalanced budgets and monetary collapse and financial panics, in dumping of goods upon world markets, and in diminished consumption of commodities … In a number of countries there have been acute financial panics or compulsory restraints upon banking. These disturbances have many roots in the dislocations from the World War. Every one of them has reacted upon us … Such ‘economic nationalism’ exacerbates both the international depression and nationalist tensions …
(3.6) The disarray of the Communist empire has been heightened by two other formidable forces. One is the historical force of nationalism – and the yearning of all men to be free. The other is the gross inefficiency of their economies. For a closed society is not open to ideas of progress – and a police state finds that it cannot command the grain to grow.
The use of the English word nationalism in examples (3.5) and (3.6) seems to us to represent the main ‘Western’ pattern of using nationalism. Although in the current study we have not dealt with other linguacultures, we may assume that the term nationalism is used in an equally negative way in other ‘Western’ linguacultures such as French and German. Due to the essentially negative meaning of nationalism, adjectives cannot ‘positively’ modify the meaning of this expression. For instance, while ‘economic’ in economic nationalism normally has a neutral meaning, in example (3.5) economic nationalism is used in a negative way because the strong negative meaning associated with nationalism is projected onto the modifying adjective.
As Table 3.1 shows, after 1949 the Chinese and US uses of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism became much more similar than in the period before 1949, although it is also clear that leading US politicians very rarely used nationalism in public speeches, at least as far as our corpus is concerned. If we compare our post-1949 Chinese data with its US counterpart, one can conclude that minzu-zhuyi became ‘internationalised’ in Chinese political speeches.
3.3.3.2 Contrastive Analysis 2: The Media
The examination of our Chinese media corpus shows that, even after 1949, M/minzu-zhuyi retained some positive connotations in the Chinese media. However, such positive uses are often more ambiguous than the pre-1949 uses of these expressions, in that it is not always clear whether M/minzu-zhuyi is used as a proper or a common noun when it occurs in a positive sense. In some cases, media texts make explicit reference to Sun’s Principle, whereas in other cases this reference is either implicit or unclear. This implies that, in modern Chinese media language, M/minzu-zhuyi is a somewhat ambiguous term even in the context of domestic politics. The following example illustrates a typical implicit positive use of M/minzu-zhuyi:
(3.7) 另一种则是指向现代中国、中华民族层次的民族主义,或者称为“国族主义”。奥运火炬遭遇干扰、激起国人以及海外华人的抗议后,国外一些媒体将这种情绪曲解为政府煽动的民族情绪; … 不加分析地贴上了“民族主义”标签,好像但凡民族主义都是洪水猛兽。
another sense of M/minzu-zhuyi or Guozu-zhuyi (‘equal nations of our country-ism’) should be used in reference to modern China and the Chinese nation. After the disruption of the Olympic torch relay [reference to the politically loaded éclat during the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch relay], the people of China and also Chinese people living overseas felt greatly frustrated, and some foreign media outlets smeared their emotions as nationalistic emotions fuelled by the government … and labelled their feelings as gross ‘nationalism’ (minzu-zhuyi), seemingly pulling together various types of minzu-zhuyi under a dreadful umbrella.
Example (3.7) is interesting not only because here M/minzu-zhuyi is used to describe both a Chinese phenomenon and a translational issue, in both cases without an adjective, but also because the author of this text makes an implicit reference to Sun’s work, by using the now archaic expression Guozu-zhuyi 国族主义 (‘nations of our country-ism’), which was coined by Sun as a synonym for Minzu-zhuyi (see extract 3.3). The reason why we consider this reference to Sun’s principle to be an ‘implicit’ reference is that, in the present-day Chinese linguaculture, it is not common knowledge that Sun coined the term Guozu-zhuyi, and the text does not explicitly mention this fact.
In our Chinese media corpus, the ambiguity triggered by implicit references to Sun’s legacy in positive interpretations of M/minzu-zhuyi is often skilfully resolved by the author of the text explaining that the positive use of M/minzu-zhuyi reflects a domestic tradition. The following example illustrates this point:
(3.8) 民族主义曾是世界潮流,在它的推动下,中国推翻了满清帝制,坚持了八年抗战,创造了今天的经济奇迹。
Minzu-zhuyi used to be a global pattern, which in China triggered the downfall of the Manchu Qing Dynasty, and which gave the Chinese persistence during the eight-year anti-Japanese war and created our current economic miracle.
Sometimes the authors of Chinese media texts engage in intrinsic metapragmatic work to explain why M/minzu-zhuyi is a positive expression in the domestic context. This is particularly the case whenever a text does not disambiguate whether M/minzu-zhuyi is being used as a proper or common noun. See the following example:
(3.9) 与被侵略的历史同步发展起来的中国人的民族主义,本身就是一个被动型的民族主义 … 而在今天 … 依旧是一个不断地向中国的对外民族主义提供着发酵条件的温床。
The Chinese people’s M/minzu-zhuyi – developed in the historical context of our country being invaded by the colonialist powers – is a non-aggressive type of M/minzu-zhuyi … Today … some foreign countries misinterpret M/minzu-zhuyi and its foreign counterparts.
The fact that M/minzu-zhuyi is used for positive purposes in our Chinese media corpus does not mean that this expression is predominantly used with a positive meaning in the Chinese media (see Table 3.2). It is no coincidence that when it is used in a positive sense, the authors of the media texts practically always provide an explanation for this positive use, as examples (3.8) and (3.9) above have shown.
In comparison, neither any sense of ambiguity nor any positive use of nationalism is observed in the US media corpus. The use of nationalism in our media corpus is illustrated by extracts (3.10) and (3.11):
(3.10) President Trump delivering a video message to the delegates of the World Jewish Congress Plenary Assembly in New York on Sunday. Credit … Brendan Mcdermid/Reuters
A virulent nationalism, tinged with bigotry, is on the rise across much of the world …
(3.11) ‘… The Department of Justice, as you know, initiated the request for inclusion of the citizenship question,’ Ross told the committee. He was referring to a much-debated question that the Trump administration was proposing to add to the 2020 census, asking people whether they were American citizens … But the Justice Department, Ross claimed, ‘initiated’ the question, because it believed that knowing where citizens lived could somehow help the federal government protect the voting rights of African-Americans. It’s almost a perfect distillation of the Trump political philosophy: A mix of white nationalism and falsehoods.
These examples illustrate that nationalism is rarely used ambiguously in ‘Western’ cultural contexts such as the US. This may be the reason why this expression is frequently used in the speech act Complain, as in examples (3.10) and (3.11), in which the producer of a text ‘expresses his negative view of a past action’ (see Edmondson and House Reference Edmondson and House1981: 144).
Table 3.3 Number of occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism in the political speeches and media corpora with numbers of qualifying adjectives
| Both corpora | M/minzu-zhuyi | nationalism |
|---|---|---|
| Number of occurrences of M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 542 | 142 |
| Number of adjectives collocating with minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 506 | 34 |
| Number of negative adjectives collocating with minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 490 | 24 |
| Number of positive or neutral adjectives collocating with minzu-zhuyi and nationalism | 16 | 10 |
At this point, it is worth revisiting Table 3.3, which is inserted again at the top of page 45. In the US corpus, nationalism is modified by an adjective in 34 of the 142 cases. Interestingly, while in ten of these cases the modifying adjective itself does not have a negative meaning – witness white in white nationalism in example (3.11) – the meaning of the adjective + nationalism sequence remains clearly negative because of the overriding negative meaning of the noun. This differs essentially from the case in Chinese, in which a positive adjective always gives minzu-zhuyi a positive meaning, as witnessed in example (3.9) above.
The analysis thus far has shown the benefits of using a multi-layered analysis for the examination of politically relevant expressions such as nationalism and M/minzu-zhuyi: as the current analysis of media texts has illustrated, once various types of data are considered, the seemingly simple and systematic picture gained from the study of a single type of data becomes much more complex. More specifically, the study of Chinese and US media texts has illustrated that
a M/minzu-zhuyi has retained a positive connotation in the Chinese linguaculture due to its specific historical trajectory;
b nationalism in the US linguaculture has no comparable positive connotation and is essentially negative in meaning; and
c a major contrastive pragmatic difference continues to exist between the two linguacultures under investigation, as our above analysis of adjectives has also shown.
In the following section, we now turn to the third layer of our analytical model, whereby we attempt to test the findings of our contrastive analyses.
3.3.3.3 Testing the Results of the Contrastive Analyses: Interviews
The following three questions were posed to our interviewees in Chinese and English:
1 Do you think that nationalism (minzu-zhuyi for Chinese respondents) is a positive, neutral or negative term?
2 Please describe your understanding of nationalism (minzu-zhuyi for Chinese respondents).
3 Would you consider yourself to be a nationalist?
Table 3.4 summarises the results of the responses given by our interviewees to Question 1. As Table 3.4 shows, the Chinese and US respondents differed when assigning positive, neutral or negative values to minzu-zhuyi and nationalism. While such differences are themselves noteworthy, due to the small size of our corpus – a total of sixty interviews – they should not be overinterpreted. However, the results of the interviews gained further significance when we asked the interviewees to expand on their thoughts regarding the concepts under investigation; that is, when they provided responses to the open-ended questions 2 and 3.
Table 3.4 Chinese and American interviews on minzu-zhuyi/nationalism
| Positive | Neutral | Negative | |
|---|---|---|---|
| minzu-zhuyi | 24 | 6 | 0 |
| Age of the Chinese respondents |
|
| n/a |
| nationalism | 0 | 9 | 21 |
| Age of the US respondents | n/a |
|
|
Regarding question 2, the Chinese interviewees stated that they not only considered minzu-zhuyi to be a positive notion, but also defined it as being part of the ‘Chinese cultural heritage’, and associated this ‘heritage’ with concepts such as ‘national unity’. The following extract represents such an association:
(3.12) 嗯(.),就是70周年大庆的时候(.),我感觉这个民族对吧(..),就是到处都插满了国旗(.),民族主义,我觉得挺好的,嗯(.),然后(.)还有一个新冠疫情的时候,一个民族精神,大家很团结(.),我觉得这个也挺好。爱国主义↑情怀,我认为它是积极的,非常好。
uhm (.), It’s now the seventieth anniversary of the foundation of our country (.), and I really have a sense of national belonging together (..). There are flags everywhere (.), and nationalism (minzu-zhuyi), um, I think it’s good, er (.), then (.), in particular in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. I think now we are united (tuanjie) (.) by our national spirit (minzu-jingshen). I think this is an excellent matter. Minzu-zhuyi means patriotism (aiguo-zhuyi)↑, which I think is positive, it is very good.
We were rather surprised by the above interview because it echoes Sun Yat-sen’s thinking on Minzu-zhuyi: according to the interviewee, the Principle of Minzu-zhuyi is closely related to the concept of aiguo-zhuyi (‘patriotism’). Neither had we revealed any historical information regarding M/minzu-zhuyi to our interviewees, nor did we assume that the interviewees were familiar with the specific history of this expression.
In the English interviews, two key notions surrounding nationalism were found to be ‘superiority’ and ‘harm’. The following extract (3.13) illustrates this tendency:
(3.13) I believe (.) um, that in the world in which we are living today (..) the concept of nationalism has a very negative! connotation. My understanding (.) of the meaning of nationalism, um, is belief (.) in the act of placing one’s own country above those of any other … This could result in (.) actively harming members of another country (.) or by ignoring the needs of another country …
As extract (3.13) shows, our US interviewees held very negative views regarding nationalism.
With regard to question 3, it emerged that several of the Chinese interviewees considered themselves to be minzu-zhuyizhe 民族主义者(‘nationalists’), whereas the US interviewees strongly denied being nationalists. The following examples (3.14) and (3.15) from our interview corpus illustrate these two tendencies:
(3.14) 我认为 (.),嗯,什么时候我都可以说自己是一个民族主义者,那个(.)因为一般的民族主义吧,嗯(.),良性?的民族主义,是(.)为了(.)民族的发展和幸福,嗯,能够继承民族的优良传统,(.)并善于向其他民族学习,对本民族有种深沉的爱,但(.)不等于不对本民族的缺点进行批判。
I think (.), er, I can say that I am a nationalist (minzu-zhuyizhe) under any circumstance, well (.), because, in general, em (.), nationalism (minzu-zhuyi), in particular benign? [sic] nationalism (liangxing-de-minzu-zhuyi), serves (.) a nation’s development and happiness. Er. It is good way of inheriting excellent national traditions, and (.) learning from another nation’s excellent culture. Benign nationalism unfolds a deep love for one’s own nation, but (.) it does not mean that one ignores one’s nation’s shortcomings.
(3.15) I would, um, typically not regard myself as a nationalist again. I would describe myself as a patriot. But under certain circumstances, like, em, if in times of war or as far as rules break and following the rules or line order, then I would consider myself a nationalist (.).
As Table 3.4 shows, the age of the Chinese respondents had implications for the different ways in which they evaluated minzu-zhuyi, although clearly our interview corpus is too small to argue that these differences hold for a larger number of Chinese-language users. More specifically, it was only the younger (under thirty-five) respondents who held relatively neutral views about minzu-zhuyi, whereas every respondent over the age of thirty-five evaluated this notion positively. A similar generational difference was not observed in the US corpus, which again confirms that a negative meaning is persistently assigned to nationalism in the US American linguaculture irrespective of the age of the respondents.
3.4 Reflections
In this chapter, we have proposed a tripartite model, demonstrating how one can avoid Pitfall 1 in the study of language and politics. We have illustrated the use of this model with our case study, providing a contrastive pragmatic analysis of the ideologically loaded expressions M/minzu-zhuyi and nationalism. The results of the case study have shown that, despite the main diachronic rupture in the Chinese data, the historical trajectory of M/minzu-zhuyi continues to influence modern uses and evaluations of this term. The uses and evaluations of nationalism in the US corpora are fundamentally different from this: the concept of nationalism is essentially negative in nature. A key advantage of using various types of corpora in contrastive pragmatic analysis like ours is the following: if we had only compared Chinese and US political speeches, our conclusion would have been that the understanding of nationalism and M/minzu-zhuyi in the two linguacultures under investigation became similar after 1949. The results obtained from analysing the media and interview corpora have, however, revealed that the situation is more complex than meets the eye.
In summary, it is clear that the first pitfall type is dangerous because politically relevant notions can have significantly different meanings across linguacultures, which remain hidden unless we look at our data by using a bottom-up methodology. What makes such differences particularly complex is that they are rarely clear-cut: for example, our case study has shown that in modern political speeches nationalism and M/minzu-zhuyi are both negative, in spite of their different connotations.
3.5 Recommended Readings
Paul Chilton. Reference Chilton2004. Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. London and New York: Routledge.
We have already mentioned Paul Chilton’s book, which is one of the classics of the field of language and politics, in Chapter 1. In the following section, Chilton (Reference Chilton2004: 4) discusses the problematic nature of providing set definitions for the notion of democracy, which is an issue that has emerged in this chapter as well:
How can politics be defined? It is not the business of this book to answer this question definitively. We shall, however, say that politics varies according to one’s situation and purposes – a political answer in itself. But if one considers the definitions, implicit and explicit, found both in the traditional study of politics and in discourse studies of politics, there are two broad strands. On the one hand, politics is viewed as a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it. Some states are conspicuously based on struggles for power; whether democracies are essentially so constituted is disputable. On the other hand, politics is viewed as cooperation, as the practices and institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, influence, liberty, and the like. Again, whether democracies are intrinsically so constituted is disputed.
Teun van Dijk. 2015. Critical discourse analysis. In Deborah Tannen, Heidi E. Hamilton and Deborah Schiffrin (eds.), The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Vol. 2. London: Wiley, 466–485. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118584194.ch22.
While our pragmatics-anchored approach is different from CDA, many issues which we pointed out in this chapter are also present in CDA analyses, albeit in a different form. For example, Van Dijk (2015: 476, 477) pointed out that ethnocentrism is a highly problematic phenomenon:
Many studies on ethnic and racial inequality reveal a remarkable similarity among the stereotypes, prejudices, and other forms of verbal derogation across discourse types, media, and national boundaries. For example, in a vast research program carried out at the University of Amsterdam since the early 1980s, we examined how Surinamese, Turks, and Moroccans, and ethnic relations generally, are represented in conversation, everyday stories, news reports, textbooks, parliamentary debates, corporate discourse, and scholarly text and talk … Besides stereotypical topics of difference, deviation, and threat, story structures, conversational features (such as hesitations and repairs in mentioning Others), semantic moves such as disclaimers (‘We have nothing against blacks, but …’, etc.), lexical description of Others, and a host of other discourse features also were studied. The aim of these projects was to show how discourse expresses and reproduces underlying social representations of Others in the social and political context. Ter Wal … applies this framework in a detailed study of the ways Italian political and media discourse gradually changed, from an antiracist commitment and benign representation of the ‘extracommunitari’ (non-Europeans) to a more stereotypical and negative portrayal of immigrants in terms of crime, deviance, and threat.
…
The major point of our work is that racism (including antisemitism, xenophobia, and related forms of resentment against ‘racially’ or ethnically defined Others) is a complex system of social and political inequality that is also reproduced by discourse in general, and by elite discourses in particular …
4.1 Introduction
In language and politics, the second pitfall covers the practice of the researcher determining at the very outset the nature of how a political actor uses language. There is an assumption here that the linguist is somehow ‘objective’, and this presumed ‘objectivity’ allows one to use a morally ‘superior’ and ‘rational’ stance to describe the behaviour of an ‘irrational’ political actor. The sociolinguist Gal (Reference Gal1989: 352) captured this phenomenon as follows:
It is exactly on the basis of its own supposedly special and superior forms of talking and knowing – which it defines as decontextualized, autonomous, rational, and therefore universal and value-free – that this new class [of Western intellectuals] justifies its claims to power.
Gal refers to the work of the American sociologist Alvin Gouldner, and Gal’s arguments here mainly relate to sociolinguistic power. However, we believe that what Gal outlined is also applicable to how certain linguists set out to moralise about political actors and their behaviours.
While this pitfall type very often comes hand in hand with ethnocentrism discussed in Chapter 3, it can also occur in marginally ethnocentric analyses. The following extract from the study of Silva (Reference Silva2019) illustrates such a case:
Scholars, political commentators and portions of the Brazilian society seem to agree that the success of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency is largely dependent on social chaos and institutional collapse. Brazilian philosopher Marcos Nobre … has neatly summarized this point: ‘To undertake his authoritarian project, Bolsonaro needs to (…) keep the existing democratic institutions in the same state of collapse in which they have been since the mass protests of June 2013 – one of the decisive reasons underlying his election, by the way.’ In this article, I resort to some basic principles of linguistic theory in order to explain how Bolsonaro enacts his ‘pragmatics of chaos’ in language. Inspired by Jacquemet’s analysis of Trump’s deceitful relation to truth … my parsing of Bolsonaro’s linguistic pragmatics of chaos singles out three levels: Bolsonaro’s jocular and incendiary locus of enunciation …; the texture of chaos and denial in his text and talk …; and his interested assembling of semiotic and digital resources that produce a toolkit for recursive and permanent agitation of audiences, both pro and against his politics …
From the pragmatician’s point of view, a major error of descriptions like that outlined above is that they simply do not give a chance to any neutral empirical investigation because the outcome of the investigation is already known at the very beginning. While Jair Bolsonaro, the former president of Brazil, may be an unsympathetic politician whose decisions triggered controversies, by deciding beforehand that he is an authoritarian decision maker who unleashes a ‘pragmatics of chaos’, Silva already makes a judgement on Bolsonaro’s practices of language use before analysing data produced by Bolsonaro himself. Further, Silva’s judgement is heavily moralising, as the quasi-academic expression ‘pragmatics of chaos’ shows.
Pitfall 2 often occurs in top-down comparisons of political actors and entities. For example, in her study of language change in the former Yugoslavia, Šarić (Reference Šaric, Šarić, Musolff, Manz and Hudabiunigg2010: 56) describes various inquiries which presented interaction between politicians in the former Yugoslav state of Slovenia and their colleagues representing the EU (then the European Economic Community, henceforth EEC) as an essentially positive and constructive process, as a result of which ‘Slovenia’s mission [was] to be the “Europeanization” and “enlightenment” of the Balkans.’ A problem with pre-categorising interaction between organisations in the above way is that by doing so an altruistic value is assigned to one of them – in this case, representatives of the EU – and a negative value is assigned to the other organisation, such as the former Yugoslavia in this case. Our case study in this chapter will show that during the break-up of the former Yugoslavia the language behaviour of EU representatives was in certain cases far from altruistic. This outcome, in turn, shows that any pre-assigned altruism is unrealistic in the realm of politics.
4.2 Methodological Approach
When collecting and analysing data featuring how political actors use language, we are faced with a fundamental conflict between the goal of pragmatic analysis and the means of reaching this goal. As Chafe (Reference Chafe1994, cited in Chapter 2) argues, on the one hand, we want to recognise, understand, describe and explain systematic, generalisable patterns of language use. On the other hand, every single interaction is a separate linguistic action. This is why it is problematic to project what one thinks one knows on political actors before considering their language use with the aid of case studies. Furthermore, since every single interaction is a separate linguistic action, ultimately it is very difficult to put the language behaviour of a political actor under one single grand umbrella (e.g. Bolsonaro = ‘pragmatics of chaos’; see Silva Reference Silva2019). For instance, in our case studies, featured below, we found that, during the break-up of Yugoslavia, representatives of the EEC behaved at one point of history in a way which runs counter to the way the behaviour of representatives of the EEC is often perceived. This finding does not, however, lead us to any grand conclusion about the communicative patterns of the EEC; rather it illustrates our main point that it is counterproductive to assign any value to any political actor at the very outset of an analysis.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the methodological take we are proposing here. In Figure 4.1, the bold circles represent our preferred analytic direction, which helps us to avoid falling into Pitfall 2.

Figure 4.1 Our analytic approach to avoiding Pitfall 2
We do not intend to argue that aiming to make generalisations about political actors is wrong per se in the study of language and politics. However, we believe that from a pragmatic point of view it is more productive to work out the pragmatic constraints and affordances of a particular political context or situation with the aid of case studies than to make (often predictive) generalisations about how political actors use language.
4.3 Case Study
To illustrate how to put into practice Chafe’s methodological recommendation, outlined above, here we present a bipartite case study featuring diplomatic mediation and a follow-up political meeting. In the following, we will refer to elements of this bipartite case study as our ‘first’ and ‘second’ case studies. First, we examine the transcript of an unofficial tape recording of a diplomatic exchange between representatives of Slovenia and Croatia and members of an EEC delegation in the wake of the Slovenian War of Independence, the first of the ensuing Yugoslav wars in 1991. The representatives of the EEC had agreed with the Yugoslav side before the meeting that the Slovenian and Croatian implementations of the declarations of independence must be postponed and that Yugoslavia must remain intact for the time being, despite the fact that the Slovenians and Croatians had already held plebiscites on independence and had requested a meeting with the EEC exactly because they wanted the EEC to help them to legitimise their independence and persuade the Yugoslav state to stop the ongoing fighting. In this first case study, we investigate patterns of language use through which the mediator with a vested interest in one particular outcome of a diplomatic meeting upheld the tone of ‘neutrality’ due in the ritual frame of diplomatic mediation, which prevents mediators from revealing any partiality. It can be argued that, in such a scenario, there is even a larger pressure on the mediators to uphold the conventions of the frame of ritual mediation than in other – more balanced – diplomatic exchanges, and so their patterns of language use may represent archetypal mediatory conventions of language use. We also consider how the EEC could exert pressure on the Slovenian and Croatian delegates under the veneer of a ‘neutral’ style, using concepts such as ‘democracy’ as interactional resources (see section 3.2).
Second, we examine the tape recording of a meeting between Slovenian decision makers shortly after the mediation session. During this meeting, the Slovenian politicians reflected on the diplomatic mediatory negotiation with the EEC representatives and discussed what to do next. Studying these two data sets helps us to capture how power manifests itself in the diplomatic mediatory negotiation studied, and how it is judged by the powerless afterwards. We consider whether there is a tension between the ideally ‘neutral’ language of diplomacy in mediation settings and the presence of a powerful actor who takes up the role of the mediator, with the powerless side facing defeat from the start. Focusing on language behaviour during the mediatory negotiation session and ex post facto reflections of the powerless side helps us to achieve a deeper interpretation of the presence of power in a diplomatic situation where it should in theory not be played out.
Through these two case studies, we are able to capture how diplomatic mediatory negotiation operates when there is a salient power difference between the participants. This outcome leads to a language-based and – as such replicable – description of language use in the context of mediation. However, we have no means to generalise about the actors and their patterns of language use beyond the here and now: while representatives of the EEC behaved in a clearly controversial way in our data, we do not think that this behaviour leads to any value judgement about the ‘democratic value’ of the EEC beyond the actual case.
In terms of the general methodology outlined in Chapter 2, in both our case studies our key unit of analysis is speech act, allowing us to break down our interactional data into replicable components. Further, in the following two case studies we compared various corpora, representing different participation frameworks (see Figure 2.2): in our first case study the Slovenian politicians are members of a delegation, while in our second case study they are in a debriefing session, reflecting on the outcomes of the previous mediatory negotiation. Another contrastive element which emerges here includes the comparison of the behaviour of political actors in different participation roles (Goffman Reference Goffman1981). Our second case study is about a situation in which the participants of a political negotiation where they were powerless report on the outcomes of this negotiation during a debriefing to other politicians. It is interesting to compare their language use during and after the negotiation because such a comparison allows us to capture how the lack of power in diplomacy manifests itself in terms of language use.
4.3.1 Background
Mediatory negotiation as a form of preventive diplomacy has been studied from many angles, such as international relations (e.g. Bercovitch and Rubin Reference Bercovitch and Rubin1994; Bercovitch and Gartner Reference Bercovitch and Gartner2007), conflict (e.g. Wallensteen and Svensson Reference Wallensteen and Svensson2014; Beardsley et al. Reference Beardsley, Cunningham and White2018), history (e.g. Gürkan 2015; Van Gelder and Krstić Reference van Gelder and Krstić2015; Ciftci Reference Ciftci2022) and rhetoric and argumentation (e.g. Murau Reference Murau2012). Some scholars also examined the phenomenon of imbalanced and partial mediation: Wehr and Lederach (Reference Wehr and Lederach1991), Tome (Reference Tome1992), Svensson and Lindgen (Reference Svensson and Lindgen2013), Blakemore (Reference Blakemore2019) and others explored the role of partial mediator in conflict management.Footnote 1 Covertly imbalanced diplomatic mediation – where the conflicting sides did not agree that the mediator can be imbalanced – has been studied by Siniver (Reference Siniver2022) and Awwad (Reference Awwad2023), who considered problems caused by partial mediators in Middle Eastern conflicts. Further, Rosoux (Reference Rosoux2022) argued that certain seemingly ‘democratic’ mediation attempts in postcolonial conflicts are doomed to fail due to the mediator’s inherently biased position. This latter body of inquiries is particularly relevant for both our case studies because we also consider language use in an event where the mediator was supposed to remain ‘neutral’.
Research on back-door diplomatic negotiations is clearly relevant for our study (for an overview see De Lange Reference Lange and Lange2010). In language and politics, negotiation and mediation have been studied in three different areas:
1 various scholars have examined mediation in the context of translation where the interpreter/translator of a diplomatic text is referred to as a ‘mediator’ (e.g. Ayyad Reference Ayyad2012; Pérez-González Reference Pérez-González2012; Bendazzoli Reference Bendazzoli2023);
2 others have considered the role of institutionalised media in conflict resolution (see Gilboa Reference Gilboa2001; Kampf Reference Kampf and Tracy2015; Friedman Reference Friedman2017; Friedman et al. Reference Friedman, Kampf and Balmas2017);
3 a few scholars have examined the actual face-to-face language use of the mediator in mediation and conflict resolution (e.g. Smith Reference Smith2012; Barbé et al. Reference Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés and Natorski2015).
For us, the third area above is of particular relevance. We hope to contribute to previous research in the field by conducting a pragmatic investigation of what happened to the powerless party during a closed-door diplomatic mediation session, and also by considering ex post facto reflections of this powerless side.
Research on mediation in legal contexts (e.g. Maley Reference Maley1995; Jacobs Reference Jacobs2002) and ritual conflict resolution (e.g. Ran and Zhao Reference Ran and Zhao2018) also bears relevance for our study. Such research has focused on how the pragmatic conventions through which mediation is realised are constrained by a ritual frame, which cannot be violated due to the institutionalised nature of mediation. Since in our first case such a violation was kept under the veneer of diplomatic ‘civility’, it is interesting to consider how it was interpreted by the representatives of the powerless side.
Finally, historical research, like the studies conducted by Lyddon (Reference Lyddon1996) and Glaurdic (Reference Glaurdic2013), provides a detailed outline of the diplomatic strategies of the EEC in the historical events discussed in our case studies.
4.3.2 Data
The data in our first case study consist of the transcript of a tape recording of a mediation event between EEC representatives and the newly established Slovenian and Croatian states. Following the Slovenian and Croatian declaration of independence on 25 June 1991, the Yugoslav People’s Army launched an attack on Slovenia. The EEC intervened partly because they had a vested interest in Yugoslavia’s remaining intact and politically and economically stable (Repe Reference Repe2002), and partly out of fear that similar independence movements might occur elsewhere in Europe. On 28 June 1991, after reaching an agreement with Yugoslavian state representatives that they will convince the Slovenian and Croatian representatives to temporarily suspend further steps towards independence, the EEC representatives met with the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia, Milan Kučan; the Slovenian foreign minister, Dimitrij Rupel; the president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman; and Croatia’s representative in the Presidency of Yugoslavia, Stjepan Mesić. Kučan was persuaded to agree to recommend to the Slovenian assembly suspending the independence process for at least three months in the form of the so-called ‘Brioni declaration’.
The data in our second case study are a transcript of another tape recording taking place on 8 July 1991, between Kučan and other Slovenian representatives, some of whom were not present in the diplomatic mediation session. The participants in this second meeting faced the following dilemma: implementing the agreement by having the Brioni declaration ratified by the Slovenian parliament meant that Slovenia would militarily put itself at the mercy of Yugoslavia, with no guarantee from the EEC that they would intervene if the Yugoslav state backtracked on what they had promised, blocking Slovenian attempts to reach independence. However, were the Slovenians not to implement the agreement and the declaration, the Yugoslav state would have most likely declared war on Slovenia, and Slovenia would consequently have lost all support from the EEC. In this second meeting, the Slovenian leadership regarded what was said during the first meeting as a ‘dictate’. Still, they convinced the Slovenian parliament to ratify the Brioni declaration and suspend the independence process temporarily (for three months) a few days later (Repe Reference Repe2004: 146–148).
The transcript of the first meeting under investigation consists of approximately 7,000 words, and the second data set consists of approximately 14,500 words. As far as we are aware, the original tape recordings of these events are not available, but owing to Repe’s (Reference Repe2004) comprehensive historical work the transcripts of the events are available in Slovenian. While the first data set included speakers of other languages as well, what was said by the EEC representatives is only available in a Slovenian translation (with elements of Serbo-Croat), provided by an interpreter who was present in the meeting.
4.3.3 Methodology
We interpret diplomatic mediatory negotiation as a ritual. As outlined in Chapter 2, following Goffman (Reference Goffman1967) and Kádár’s (Reference Kádár2017; Reference Kádár2024) pragmatic adaptation of Goffman’s view, we argue that in ritual situations – which involve both ceremonies and as seemingly more ad hoc interactions – pragmatic conventions follow underlying rights and obligations and a related moral and interactional order. In the context of mediatory negotiation, while such rights and obligations are not set in stone and both the mediator and the conflicting parties have significant leeway to pressurise the others, any form of pressurising needs to be hidden under a veneer of civility (House et al. Reference House, Kádár, Liu and Song2023). Pragmatic constraints are particularly strict for the mediator: provided he has an outsider and non-partial footing (i.e. takes such a participant role in an interaction; see Goffman Reference Goffman1979), he is bound by the ritual frame to sound ‘neutral’, while the other side is not bound by such a pragmatic constraint; that is, the parties in conflict can afford to sound ‘subjective’. Setting out from this basic difference, which is in the DNA of the ritual, the contrastive approach is particularly useful in the analysis of our first case study: we aim to capture recurrent patterns in the language use of the EEC representatives and the Slovenian and Croatian representatives and contrast these patterns. In our second case study, we consider how the Slovenian representatives reflected on what happened during the mediatory session once they were not constrained by its ritual frame.
We break down our data in both our first and second data sets into speech acts, relying on our finite speech act typology. To help the reader to follow our analysis below, here we present our typology again (see Figure 4.2 below).

Figure 4.2 Our speech act typology
Following our bottom-up take, we do not assume that the ritual phenomenon of diplomatic mediation or the ex post facto debriefing is realised by one particular speech act. Instead of zeroing in on any speech act, we first examine frequent speech acts in our data from both qualitative and quantitative points of view, and then interpret our outcomes. In quantifying our data, we annotated our corpus manually, and so broader speech act annotation issues relevant to the study of large corpora are not relevant to the current investigation (see here Weisser Reference Weisser, Aijmer and Rühlemann2014). To keep our manual annotation rigorous, we used sentences rather than utterances as a unit to be categorised as a speech act.
In both our analyses – in particular in the first case study – we refrain from using the concepts of ‘politeness’ and ‘impoliteness’, and instead use the notion of ‘covert aggression’ (e.g. House et al. Reference House, Kádár, Liu and Song2023) to refer to cases where significant pressure is exerted on the other in a diplomatic exchange. In diplomatic exchanges, one can rarely observe fully fledged ‘politeness’ and ‘impoliteness’ in Brown and Levinson’s (Reference Brown and Levinson1987) sense simply because the participants are bound to follow the ritual conventions holding for the situation, so attempts to pressurise the other normally represent a covert form of ‘civil’ aggression rather than impoliteness. The notion of ‘covert aggression’ therefore includes instances of language use which have an aggressive overtone but which are not explicitly aggressive and rude, and which do not afford the other’s making the speaker accountable.
4.3.4 Case Study 1
Table 4.1 summarises recurrent speech acts in our first data set. As Table 4.1 shows, by far the most frequent speech acts in data set 1 are the Informative speech acts Tell and Opine. While this tendency accords with what we previously observed about the language of diplomatic conflicts in general, it is noteworthy that there are more Opines than Tells in the utterances of the Slovenian and Croatian representatives. Other salient tendencies are the following:
the EEC representatives realise more Requests than the Slovenian and Croatian representatives;
Willings are nearly exclusively realised by the Slovenian and Croatian representatives.
Table 4.1 Speech acts in our first data set
| EEC representatives | Slovenian and Croatian representatives | |
|---|---|---|
| Tells and Opines | 51 and 25 (76 in total) | 66 and 106 (172 in total) |
| Requests | 33 | 21 |
| Willings | 1 | 19 |
In the following, we interpret these tendencies from the point of view of the power imbalance which they reflect in the seemingly ‘impartial’ procedure of diplomatic mediation in our case.
4.3.4.1 Tells and Opines
As we argued in Edmondson et al. (Reference Edmondson, House and Kádár2023: 169, original emphasis),
The assumption behind a Tell is that the content of the illocution – the ‘fact’ communicated – is of interest and relevance to the hearer’s concerns and interests, and Tells are therefore made as a response … to the hearer’s explicit or implicit desire to know that fact. If, however, the hearer goes on to argue the fact, by doubting or disputing it, then we shall have to say he has treated the preceding illocution as an Opine, and not as a Tell.
If one looks at the proportion of Tells and Opines in our data (see Table 4.1), it becomes clear that the Slovenian and Croatian representatives realised Opines much more frequently than Tells (61.6 per cent of their Informative speech acts are Opines), whereas the EEC representatives frequented Tells (67.1 per cent of their Informative speech acts are Tells). Due to space limitation, in the following we only provide a limited number of extracts to illustrate how the speech acts Tell and Opine are used in our data, in order to cement the superiority of the EEC representatives.
EEC representatives often realise Tells to refer to claimed violations of broader European norms and the international law that the Slovenian and Croatian representatives should have been aware of but failed to observe. Openly criticising the Slovenian and Croatian representatives would normally fly in the face of diplomatic conventions in a mediatory negotiation session (see e.g. various studies in Bercovitch and Rubin Reference Bercovitch and Rubin1994). Yet, considering that the EEC delegation included expert diplomats, it can be assumed that their language use only violated the conventions of the event implicitly, and the ‘objective’ speech act Tell helped them to covertly pressurise the Slovenian and Croatian delegates. Extract (4.1) illustrates such a critical chain of Tells:
(4.1) Evropska skupnost je izredno zaskrbljena zaradi te situacije zato tudi Evropski svet, ki se danes in jutri sestaja v Luxemburgu razpravlja o tej situaciji. Evropski svet misli, da dogodki, ki so se zgodili v Sloveniji in na Hrvaškem, predstavljajo grožnjo ne le državljanom Jugoslavije predvsem pa slovenskemu in hrvaškemu narodu, kakor tudi ogrožajo stabilnost celotnega kontinenta Evrope čigar del ste tudi vi. Zato danes pozivamo k vašemu čutu odgovornosti.
The European Community is extremely concerned about this situation, which is why the European Council, which is meeting today and tomorrow in Luxembourg, is discussing the situation. The European Council believes that the events that have taken place in Slovenia and Croatia are a threat not only to the citizens of Yugoslavia, but above all to the Slovenian and Croatian peoples, and a threat to the stability of the whole continent of Europe, of which you are a part of. That is why today we call on your sense of responsibility.
In the above chain of Tells, one of the EEC representatives describes the Slovenian and Croatian policies as ‘threats’ not only to the citizens of Yugoslavia but also to the whole of Europe. What aggravates aggression here is that this chain of Tells ends with the moralising – and patronising – words ‘which you are a part of’: clearly the recipients are here given a piece of information which they are supposed to know.
Such Tells are in clear contrast with many Tells realised by the Slovenian and Croatian representatives, which are often self- rather than other-oriented (Blum-Kulka et al. Reference Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper1989), and which have a much clearer Informative value. This does not mean that Tells realised by the Slovenian and Croatian representatives are always Informative in the fully fledged sense of our typology of speech acts. For instance, as part of exchanging arguments, the leading Slovenian representative Kučan states the following:
(4.2) Na drugo vprašanje, da sedaj skrajšam, mi smo od našega plebiscita naprej ponujali razgovor o vrsti vprašanj. Nekateri od vas so že imeli priliko govoriti z mano in vedo kakšne so bile naše ponudbe. Šest mesecev od plebiscita do predvčerajšnjim, do razglasitve samostojnosti Slovenije, ni bilo nobene pripravljenosti za razgovor o teh vprašanjih. Praktično se je obšlo, oziroma se ni priznavalo plebiscita, na katerem je 93% udeležencev, teh je bilo p. 86% vseh prebivalcev Slovenije, glasovalo za samostojno in suvereno Slovenijo, ki ne bi bila več v sestavi SFRJ.
Regarding the second question, in short, we have offered to discuss a range of issues since our plebiscite. Some of you have already had the opportunity to talk to me and know what our offers have been. For six months since the plebiscite until the day before yesterday, until the declaration of Slovenia’s independence, there was no willingness to talk about these issues. The plebiscite, where 93% of the attendants voted in favour of an independent and sovereign Slovenia that would no longer be part of the SFRY, which is 86% of the total entire population of Slovenia, was practically bypassed or not recognised.
Here Kučan refers to the fact that although, on 23 December 1990, 93 per cent of the attendants (86 per cent of the entire population of Slovenia) voted for an independent Slovenia, the EEC ignored their requests to negotiate with the Yugoslav state regarding the plebiscite until a military conflict evolved (Osojnik Reference Osojnik2022: 464). Yet even this ‘non-innocent’ Tell is self-oriented, lacking a negative description of the other and reflecting the footing of a powerless participant.
The Slovenian and Croatian representatives realise many Opines. These speech acts reflect on actual events but are realised in a defensive and emotively loaded manner, which makes it difficult to interpret them as merely factual utterances; that is, Tells. Extract (4.3) illustrates such an Opine realisation:
(4.3) Nismo ogrožali miru in varnosti evropskih držav, nismo ogrožali normalnega pretoka ljudi, blaga, kapitala, idej čez naše meje. Šele ko so se tanki Jugoslovanske armade pojavili na mejah in ko so rakete in lovci šli tudi čez zračni prostor prek Avstrije, je vse to bilo ovirano. Po stališčih dvanajsterice je bilo očitno, da se bojijo, da bi naš odhod sprožil državljansko vojno in etnične konflikte v Jugoslaviji. Etnični konflikti in kršitve pravic so v Jugoslaviji bile že prej.
We have not threatened the peace and security of European countries; we have not threatened the normal flow of people, goods, capital, ideas across our borders. It was only when the tanks of the Yugoslav army appeared on the borders and when the missiles and fighters also crossed through the airspace via Austria that all this was hindered. It was obvious from the positions of the Twelve that they feared our departure would trigger a civil war and ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. Ethnic conflicts and violations of rights had already existed in Yugoslavia.
Here Slovenian representative Kučan responds to the accusatory Tell that the Slovenians and Croatians destabilised peace in the European continent by declaring independence. He first realises an utterance which we coded as an Opine because it reflects on a perception rather than factual information. Kučan here uses two ‘we’-s and states what he believes the Slovenians and Croatians did not do, which are typical features of ‘subjective’ narratives (see e.g. Santora Reference Santora2013). Following this, he realises two utterances which we coded as Opines because they present the course of perceived events as an interpretation: Kučan uses the formulation ‘it was obvious’. In contrast to the Opines of the Slovenian and Croatian representatives, Opine realisations by the EEC representatives are less frequent and represent covert attacks on the Slovenian and Yugoslavian delegates. To keep the present case study analysis focused, we do not cite such Opines here.
4.3.4.2 Requests
Table 4.2 illustrates realisation types of Requests in our first data set. As Table 4.2 shows, the EEC representatives predominantly realise direct Requests with no mitigation (for an overview of the degree of directness of Requests see Blum-Kulka et al. Reference Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper1989). For example, extract (4.4) features direct Requests uttered by one of the EEC representatives:
(4.4) Zato smo vprašali, v naših predhodnih sestankih s predsednikom vlade gospodom Markovićem in predsednikom Srbije gospodom Miloševićem, tri vprašanja. Tudi vam jih bomo zastavili na isti način. Posredovali smo isto sporočilo in uporabili bomo iste besede pri vsebini. Centralno vlado smo prosili, da ukaže takojšnjo prenehanje ognja in da naj še nocoj ukaže vojski, da se vrne v kasarne, da umakne vojsko z vseh okupiranih področij in da se vrne v kasarne. Prosimo vas, da zadržita uresničevanje vaših deklaracij o samostojnosti začasno, ali recimo za obdobje treh mesecev, samo odgodite jih, da boste dosegli demokratičen dialog, za katerega se zavzemate v vašem današnjem sporočilu. In tretjič, prosimo, da spoštujete ustavni red in da se izvrši rotacija v kolektivnem predsedstvu, kakor je zahtevano. To pomeni, da bo gospod Mesić izvoljen in proglašen za predsednika jugoslovanske republike in Jugoslovanov.
That is why we asked, in our previous meetings with the prime minister, Mr Marković, and the president of Serbia, Mr Milošević, three questions. We will raise them to you in the same manner. We forwarded the same message, and we will use the same wording in their contents. We asked the central government to order an immediate ceasefire and to order the military to retreat to the barracks this very night. We ask you to suspend the implementation of your declarations of independence temporarily, or for example for a period of three months, just postpone them, so you can establish a democratic dialogue for which you are advocating in today’s message. And finally, we ask that you respect the constitutional order and that the rotation in the collective presidency is realised as required. This means that Mr Mesić will be elected and proclaimed president of the Yugoslav Republic and Yugoslavs.
Table 4.2 Allocation and realisation types of Requests in our first data set
| EEC representatives | Slovenian and Croatian representatives | |
|---|---|---|
| Indirect | 5 | 11 |
| Direct | 28 | 10 (7 realised with formulae) |
| Total | 33 | 21 |
As the underlined section shows, after outlining the EEC’s previous negotiations with Yugoslavia,Footnote 2 an EEC representative, Van den Broek, starts negotiating with the Slovenian and Croatian representatives by uttering two non-mitigated Requests (to-do-x). In this connection, the content of these Requests is also worth mentioning: Van den Broek Requests the Slovenian and Croatian representatives to postpone validating their populations’ independence vote in order to ‘establish a democratic dialogue’ and to ‘respect the constitutional order’ of a country which essentially ceased to exist due to the plebiscites. In our data, representatives of the EEC recurrently use the expressions ‘democracy’ and ‘order’ in a patronising and as such covertly aggressive way, assuming that the Slovenian and Croatian representatives can only uphold these values by providing the requestable. This tactic of pressurising is also reinforced by the supportive move Grounder: Van den Broek tells the Slovenian and Croatian representatives that the same Requests were made to the Yugoslav side, which on the one hand creates an air of ‘objective neutrality’ (see e.g. Murau Reference Murau2012), and on the other hand presents a fait accompli for the Slovenian and Croatian representatives.
In contrast to the EEC representatives, the Request realisations of the Slovenian and Croatian representatives are often indirect, as the following extract shows:
(4.5) Torej mi smo se na podlagi razglasitve Slovenije, deklaracije oziroma ustavne listine o samostojnosti in suverenosti Slovenije, pripravljeni pogovarjati o postopnem prevzemanju suverenih funkcij z ravni zveznih organov, tako kot smo to predlagali že prej. Moj odgovor na drugo vprašanje je pozitiven, če razumem, da je stališče, da naša ustavna listina velja, da velja to kar je bilo narejeno in da je drugo stvar dogovorov, tako kot smo to sami predlagali.
So, based on the declaration of Slovenia, the declaration or the constitutional charter on the independence and sovereignty of Slovenia, we are ready to discuss the gradual takeover of sovereign functions from the level of the federal authorities, as we have proposed before. My answer to the second question is positive, if I understand that the position is that our constitutional charter is valid, that what has been done is valid, and that the rest is a matter of arrangements, like we ourselves have proposed.
In extract (4.5), Slovenian representative Kučan first realises the speech act Tell (‘my answer to the second question is positive’), followed by a Request for the EEC representatives to confirm that what serves as the baseline for negotiations by himself and his Croatian colleague is acceptable. This preference for indirect Requests is logical because tentative/indirect Requests for certain conditions may be preferred in a context where the requestable is granted by the more powerful EEC representatives. This tendency is also reflected by the orientation of the Requests realised by the two sides: Requests realised by the Slovenian and Croatian representatives tend to be speaker-oriented (e.g. ‘if I understand’), whereas representatives of the EEC prefer addressee-oriented Requests (e.g. ‘we demand from you’) (see also Blum-Kulka et al. Reference Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper1989).
What makes the contrast between the Request realisations of the two sides even clearer is the following: as the diplomatic meeting unfolds, a negotiation of terms and conditions begins and – as part of this – representatives of the EEC start to reflect on the nature of their own Requests. However, none of these self-reflections is mitigated in any way, as the following extract illustrates:
(4.6) V zvezi z drugim vprašanjem moram biti zelo jasen, ko rečemo odgoditi uresničitve, ne zahtevamo od vas, da na kakršenkoli način razveljavite plebiscit vaših ljudi. Suverenost je pri narodu in narod je tisti, ki odloča, mi delamo isto v Evropski skupnosti, da skupno uresničujemo nekatere naše pravice suverenosti. To je delegacija v zvezi skupnosti, federaciji in ni pomembno kako jo imenujete. Torej kar vas zelo precizno prosimo je, da začasno odgodite …
Regarding the second question, I must be very clear, when we say to postpone implementation, we are not asking you to in any way annul the plebiscite of your people. Sovereignty is with the nation and the nation is the one that decides, and we are doing the same in the European Community, so we can exercise some of our sovereign rights together. This is a delegation in a union, in a federation, it does not matter what you call it. So, what we are very precisely asking you to do is to temporarily suspend …
While here the EEC delegate Van den Broek clarifies the demands he made earlier in the negotiation, he continues to realise the EEC’s Requests in a direct and addressee-oriented way (‘what we are very precisely asking you …’).
4.3.4.3 Willings
Table 4.3 illustrates the use of Willings in our data.
Table 4.3 Allocation of Willings in our first data set
| EEC representatives | Slovenian and Croatian representatives | |
|---|---|---|
| Willings | 1 | 19 |
Willing is a speech act through which a speaker communicates that she is in favour of – or at least not against – performing a future act as in the interest of the hearer. The uneven allocation of the speech act Willing in our data is not surprising, considering that it is the Slovenian and Croatian representatives who need to commit themselves to acting according to the outcomes of the mediation event. Yet, considering that in our first data set the Slovenian and Croatian representatives made many different indirect Requests to the mediators to grant that certain conditions be met, the very low frequency of Willings realised by the EEC representatives clearly shows that they had the upper hand throughout the diplomatic mediation event.
Extract (4.7) illustrates a typical Willing realisation in our data:
(4.7) Prema tome na vaš drugiji prijedlog mi možemo pristati u tom smislu da ostajemo kod svojih odluka o samostalnosti i suverenosti na koji nas obvezuje referendum koji je na najdemokratskiji način izražavanje volje naroda na prava samoodredženje na prava demokratskog odlučivanja o sebi …
Therefore, we can agree to your second proposal in the sense that we stand by our decisions on independence and sovereignty, which we are obligated to by the referendum, which is in the most democratic way the expression of the people’s will on the rights of self-determination and the rights of democratic self-decision …
Here the Croatian president Dr Franjo Tuđman states that he is willing to fulfil the EEC’s second demand (suspension of declaration), while he keeps reiterating that the referendum is the right of the people to self-determination and self-government, and that this declaration is a direct result of the most democratic form of expression.
4.3.4.4 Summary of Our Analysis of Data Set 1
We found that the uneven power relationship in the diplomatic mediation event studied manifests itself in the following unequal distribution of speech acts:
Tells are more frequently used by the EEC representatives, who realise them in an other-oriented fashion, while the Slovenian and Croatian representatives more frequently use Opines, with their Tells being mostly self-oriented; the EEC representatives exert pressure on the participants through covert aggression realised with both Tells and Opines.
The EEC representatives can realise direct Requests, often in a covertly aggressive way; the Slovenian and Croatian participants, on the other hand, frequent indirect realisations of Requests.
The speech act Willing is frequently used by the powerless participant in the negotiation event – that is, in our case, the Slovenian and Croatian representatives – as it is the powerless side who need to commit themselves to act in a certain way, in order for the mediation event to succeed.
Since all the EEC representatives were professional politicians, it is safe to argue that their language use represents diplomatic mediation in its quintessential form in a scenario where the mediator has a vested interest in the negotiation’s success, and so he may use language in an even more ‘objective’ way than in other settings. We could also see that the EEC representatives – who actually blocked the implementation of democratic plebiscites – hid their agenda behind a veneer of ‘democracy’, lecturing the Slovenian and Croatian delegates, who rather sheepishly endured the criticisms. But how did they perceive what happened during the event? In the second case study we investigate this question.
4.3.5 Case Study 2
In the following, we focus on those parts of our second data set which feature a meeting between Slovenian decision makers who reflect on what happened during the diplomatic mediatory meeting. Such ex post facto reflections are realised by the speech acts given in Table 4.4 below.
Table 4.4 Types of speech act in our second data set
| Slovenian representatives | |
|---|---|
| Opines | 178 |
| Tells | 127 |
| Justify | 24 |
| Request (for information) | 13 |
4.3.5.1 Opines
As Table 4.4 shows, the most frequent speech act in our second data set is Opine. Many Opines are negative reflections on the diplomatic style of the EEC representatives, as extract (4.8) illustrates:
(4.8) Janez, še enkrat povem: to ni bil rezultat našega pogajanja. To je bil enostranski diktat, ki smo ga mi, kolikor-toliko, moderirali. In nič drugega! In na koncu je bilo rečeno: Ali sprejmite, ali pa pustite. In, če ne sprejmete, mi dvignemo roke in gremo!
Janez [Defense Minister Janez Janša, one of the participants], I’ll say it again: this [the agreement] was not the result of our negotiation. It was a one-sided dictate, which we moderated as far as possible. And nothing else! And in the end it was stated: either take it or leave it. And if you don’t accept, we raise our hands and leave!
In this chain of Opines, France Bučar – president of the Slovenian parliament who later declared Slovenian independence – evaluates the veiled aggression of the EEC delegates during the mediatory negotiation session. The participants in the meeting in our second data set use such Opines most likely because they were defeated, and also because, through such negative Opines, giving agency exclusively to the EEC, they could minimise their own responsibility for signing the agreement. This latter function of Opines becomes particularly clear in the following excerpt:
(4.9) Torej še enkrat jasno in glasno, da to ni rezultat pogajanj, ker pogajanj ni bilo. To je enostranski diktat, ki smo ga s svojim nastopom nekoliko omilili.
So once again, loud and clear, this is not the result of negotiations because there were no negotiations. This is a unilateral dictate which we somewhat softened by our performance.
Here Bučar reflects again on the behaviour of the EEC delegates, who did not negotiate with the Slovenian and Croatian delegates but rather handed over a dictate to them. More importantly, he also evaluates their own performance during the diplomatic mediatory meeting as an attempt to ‘soften’ the impact of the dictate. Such self-evaluations are as frequent in our data as other-evaluating Opines: among the 178 Opine realisations (see Table 4.4), 109 are other-oriented while 69 are self-oriented. Interestingly, as the meeting unfolds some participants move away from negatively evaluating the diplomatic mediation session and begin to reinterpret the way in which the Slovenian delegates handled the negotiations with the EEC representatives. Extract (4.10) illustrates such a case:
(4.10) Te sestanke bi lahko povzel takole: vi ste politično zmagali, moralno ste zmagali, dajte še probat speljat še te tri mesece, tako da pridemo skozi.
I could sum up the meeting as follows: political victory and moral victory, so let’s try to get through these next three months so that we get through.
As the above extracts illustrate, a key function of the speech act Opine in our second data set is to negatively evaluate the EEC representatives’ behaviour and reinterpret what happened during the diplomatic mediatory negotiation.
4.3.5.2 Tells
Tells in our second data set are used by those participants in the meeting who were present during the diplomatic negotiation with EEC representatives. The following is a typical Tell realisation by Kučan:
(4.11) Jaz sem povedal, jaz sem na to včeraj pristal z oceno, da je to edino realno, če želimo imeti mednarodno podporo in pogajalsko pot zunaj.
I said it: I accepted this [agreement] yesterday because I think that it is the only realistic thing if we want to have international support and a negotiating position abroad.
Here the Tell is followed by the supportive move Grounder, through which Kučan explains the reason behind making the decision reported through the speech act Tell.
As part of the debriefing process, various participants also realise Tells which are in clear contrast with what happened according to our transcript of the first meeting. For example, in response to criticisms of various other participants who were not present in the diplomatic meeting, Bučar realises the following Tell:
(4.12) Mi smo izrecno rekli ničesar ne sprejemamo, ničesar ne podpišemo o vsem tem bo odločal slovenski parlament.
We explicitly said we accept nothing, we sign nothing, the Slovenian parliament will decide about all this.
While indeed the signed agreement with the EEC representatives did not commit the Slovenian parliament to accepting what was agreed, the agreement was in fact signed by the Slovenian and Croatian representatives. We can therefore conclude that, in the present emotively loaded debriefing, seemingly ‘objective’ Tells are also part of the facework through which the powerless participants in the biased mediation event reconstruct what happened.
4.3.5.3 Justifies
The speech act Justify is also relatively frequent in our second data set featuring the debriefing. Justify is most frequently realised by Kučan, as illustrated by extract (4.13):
(4.13) Jaz tega nič ne branim, mi ki smo bili zraven, smo presojali vsako stvar, vsako potezo sproti ali z razgovorov ali potem, ko smo dobili informacije kakšni so rezultati teh razgovorov.
I am not defending anything; we who were there evaluated every single thing, every single move, either on an ongoing basis, or through discussions, or after we were informed what the results of those discussions were.
Along with the Justifies outlined above, another important Justify realisation type in our second data set involves cases where those who signed the agreement with the EEC representatives distance themselves from the agreement, similar to what we observe with Tell realisations shown in extract (4.13) above. The following extracts illustrate this Justify realisation type:
(4.14) Jaz pa to nič ne branim, da ne boste mislili, da je to kakšen moj veliki osebi pristanek.
I am not defending this [agreement], so that you do not think that this is some kind of personal endorsement.
(4.15) Ne zagovarjam tega. Hočem stvar samo postaviti v realne okvire.
I am not advocating that [i.e. proceeding according to the agreement]. I just want to put it in a realistic context.
It is noteworthy that the above utterances were realised by Kučan, who had actually signed the agreement, and Bučar, who had endorsed it.
4.3.5.4 Requests (for Information)
Although most Requests in our second data set occur as the participants in the meeting begin to discuss how to proceed, in the present ex post facto discussion Requests are also realised either as Requests (for information) addressed to those who conduct the debriefing, or Requests (for information) through which the participants speculate about the mindset of the EEC representatives. The following extract illustrates the latter case:
(4.16) Mislite da si oni predstavljajo Slovenijo neodvisno čez tri mesece?
Do you think they [the EEC representatives] imagine an independent Slovenia in three months’ time?
This Request (for information) concerns an issue that the other has no way of answering, and as such it is clearly speculative in nature.
4.3.5.5 Summary of Our Analysis of Data Set Two
We found that ex post facto reflections of the powerless side manifest themselves in the realisation of the following speech act types:
Opines through which the participants either negatively evaluate the diplomatic behaviour of the EEC representatives or reinterpret what happened during the negotiation.
Tells through which the participants – especially those who lead the debriefing – report what happened. In spite of the seemingly ‘factual’ way in which such Tells are realised, they often refer to an alternative reality, helping those who led the powerless delegation to reinterpret and thus reconstruct what happened and minimise loss of face.
Justifies through which those who led the powerless delegation present their course of action to others, and others through which they distance themselves from what happened.
Requests (for information) through which other participants ask for information from those who participated in the meeting, and others through which the participants speculate about the mindset of the powerful EEC delegates.
4.3.6 Reflections
In this section, we have considered how to avoid Pitfall 2 with the aid of a bipartite analysis, featuring two closely related case studies. We investigated whether there is a tension between the ideally ‘neutral’ language of diplomatic negotiation during mediation and the presence of a powerful actor who takes up the role of the mediator, with the powerless side facing defeat from the start. We studied this tension by using a speech act-anchored approach, allowing us to precisely capture differences between the behaviour of the powerful and the powerless sides in our first data set, and to interpret ex post facto reflections by the powerless side in our second data set. Figure 4.3 summarises our findings from a contrastive pragmatic point of view.

Figure 4.3 Outcomes of our analysis
As Figure 4.3 shows, while only a small variety of speech acts are frequented in both our data sets, looking at the realisation patterns of these speech acts has still allowed us to tease out the power dynamics underlying the first meeting and reflections about this during the second meeting.
Our findings suggest that although diplomatic language use on the part of a mediator – like the EEC representatives in our case – is ideally ‘neutral’, such ‘neutrality’ is often covertly violated. While various scholars, such as Rosoux (Reference Rosoux2022), have noted that diplomatic negotiation is often biased, here we have been able to capture such a bias from a speech act point of view. Furthermore, we have found that representatives of the powerless side are often clearly aware of such violations. The powerless side may also reinterpret their own behaviour after the diplomatic event, in order to save face. For example, we were able to witness various cases when negatively reflecting on the aggressive behaviour of the powerful side also prompted representatives of the powerless side to reinterpret very basic facts, such as whether the agreement was signed or not.
Through these case studies, we are able to capture how diplomatic mediatory negotiation operates when there is a salient power difference between the participants, which is often the case in such settings. This outcome led to a replicable description of this context, but not so much of the actors: while in our case studies the representatives of the EEC behaved in a controversial – not to say arrogant – way, we do not think that this behaviour should lead to any grandiose value judgement about the ‘democratic values’ of the EEC beyond the actual case.
4.4 Recommended Readings
Julian Aichholzer and Johanna Willmann. Reference Aichholzer and Willmann2020. Desired personality traits in politicians: Similar to me but more of a leader. Journal of Research in Personality 88: 103990. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103990.
Not only is it futile to associate a political actor with a value from a linguistic point of view, but also psychology experts often argue that it is more productive to examine the values that electors expect from a politician than the values of the politician himself. The contrastive study of Aichholzer and Willman represents such a psychological investigation, as the following extract illustrates:
From citizens’ perspective, what kind of a personality should the ideal politician have? We suggest two answers. First, to carry out leadership duties, politicians are expected to have exceptional traits that distinguish them from the general population. As a consequence, we expect that voters, on average, design the ideal politician to hold more of those traits that are commonly associated with leadership qualities. Second, we argue that voters will differ in preferred candidate traits, because they seek personality congruence with their candidates. This is partly due to the well-known similarity-attraction principle or attachment to likeness. In the realm of politics, however, personality congruence may also ensure ideological representation of citizens by their legislators. In particular, we expect that citizens seek representation (congruence) in basic value-related personality traits that, at the same time, mirror the content of core ideological attitudes.
We examine our research questions and test our hypotheses in two samples surveyed in Germany and Austria. The two countries represent very similar socio-political contexts of multi-party systems with a relatively stable and long-lasting democratic regime.
Jennifer Sclafani. Reference Sclafani2017. Talking Donald Trump: A Sociolinguistic Study of Style, Metadiscourse, and Political Identity. London: Routledge.
While we do not advise approaching the language use of individual politicians through pre-held assumptions, this argument does not mean that one cannot tease out invaluable information regarding political actors and their language use patterns with the aid of rigorous language-based analysis. A good example is the work of Sclafani, who examined the language use of Donald Trump without starting from the personality traits of Trump. In the following section, Sclafani (Reference Sclafani2017: 1, original emphasis, references elided) discusses why the style of what Trump says – rather than exactly what he said – triggered controversies:
Donald Trump became famous, and infamous, not so much for his political stances, which were rarely expressed in any detail during his primary campaign. It was rather how he expressed his stances linguistically that fascinated pundits and the public alike. The language of Donald Trump – at the time of writing, President Trump – has been the subject of much debate, both in terms of the rhetorical style in which he has delivered criticism of various individuals and groups, and what some have referred to as the candidate’s general oratorical lack of coherence and substance.
It is not the case that Mr. Trump was the first American presidential candidate in history to have received criticism for his oratorical skills or lack thereof. In recent presidential history, President George W. Bush became known for his ‘folksy’ style and awkward diction. In fact, as Lim … has documented, presidential rhetoric has been considered to be on a downhill path since the birth of the nation. However, the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump has brought studies on the declining discourse of American presidential figures into the mainstream media limelight over the past two years, and has even spurred new studies and commentary in academic and journalistic circles. Scholars of language and gender have weighed in on the sexism and misogyny … prevalent in his speech; others have homed in on Trump’s racist discourse …
5.1 Introduction
When it comes to Pitfall 3, ideological beliefs tend to be present in language and politics in two different ways. First, scholars often put the behaviour of political actors under one particular preset ideological umbrella, representing beliefs held about these ideologies and their role by the researchers. As an example, let us refer here to the study of Winfield et al. (Reference Winfield, Mizuno and Beaudoin2000: 329, 332) who examined how press systems and their language operate in China and Japan:
The strong focus on the collective in both China and Japan stems largely from Confucianism and, to a lesser extent, from Buddhism. Confucianism, founded by Confucius (551–479 B.C.) during the Han Dynasty, became a system of social ethics more than a religion. Confucianism persisted as a great and pervasive ethical tradition. In western societies, politics and economics have been influenced by industrial, business and trade groups, but in China, such matters, as well as the general conceptions of family and cultural life, still have Confucian roots. Those values today blend with the needs of the village economy …
Such [social] ranking [of Confucianism] extends to politics and society as a whole. In Analects 1.2, Confucius wrote: ‘Master Yu said, “Those who in private life behave well toward their parents and elder brothers, in public life seldom show a disposition to resist the authority of their superiors.”’ A role for an individual or the press as a type of ‘watch-dog’ in an American sense would be difficult to obtain in such a philosophy.
While we agree with Winfield et al. (Reference Winfield, Mizuno and Beaudoin2000) that an ideology like Confucianism may strongly influence the language of politics, the argument above is heavily overgeneralising, representing a conviction about the social role of one particular ideology. That is, Winfield et al. essentially claim that press systems in China and Japan are somehow ‘prisoners’ of the ideology of Confucianism. This, in turn, flies in the face of a body of inquiries dedicated to power negotiation between spokespersons and journalists and other related issues in East Asian press events (see e.g. Gu Reference Gu2018; Mao and Zhao Reference Mao and Zhao2020). A particular problem in our view is that grand ideological assumptions often emerge when language and politics are discussed with reference to non-Western – in particular East Asian – linguacultures. Because of this, academic accounts like that of Winfield et al. (Reference Winfield, Mizuno and Beaudoin2000) are postcolonial in nature and ignore more complex research on the influence of ideology on language use (e.g. Cameron Reference Cameron2006; Fairclough Reference Fairclough and Fairclough2010; Verschueren Reference Verschueren2012). The exoticising postcolonial nature of such descriptions becomes clear once one begins to hypothetically twist them, such as by making a hypothetical claim that all European press conferences are Judaeo-Christian in nature. Should we have made such a claim, it would have been dismissed on the grounds that press conferences are secular in Europe, and so it is clear that in many academic accounts exotic ideologies somehow ‘belong’ to certain countries and not others.
Second, beliefs also emerge in the study of language and politics whenever scholars set out to prove convictions held by many at the outset. In this book, we have already referred to cases where significant energy is devoted to proving that political actors like Trump and Bolsonaro use language in ways that are non-ethical, disturbing and so on. Since in academia there is a relative consensus about the problematic nature of the language use of these political actors, any attempt to unveil this problem is, in a sense, futile. However, not all academic convictions which are to be proven by the researcher are so straightforward. For example, a noteworthy conviction – which we also consider in the present case study – includes the belief that colonialism is evil. What is wrong with an academic inquiry motivated by an attempt to reveal the evils of colonialism? The linguist Mufwene (Reference Mufwene2002: 163) answers this question clearly:
I submit that the subject matter of language endangerment will be better understood if discussed in the broader context of language vitality, with more attention paid to factors that have favoured particular languages at the expense of others, factors which lie in the changing socio-economic conditions to which speakers respond adaptively for their survival. Linguists have typically bemoaned the loss of ancestral languages and cultures especially among populations colonised by Europeans, arguing that relevant languages and cultures must be revitalised or preserved by all means. Missing from the same literature are assessments of the costs and benefits that the affected populations have derived from language shift in their particular socio-economic ecologies.
Indeed, it is not problematic to accept that colonialism and neo-colonialism are evil – we ourselves are of this opinion. However, once we build our actual analysis to prove such an argument, we may lose our objectivity and are thus prevented from unearthing hitherto neglected phenomena, such as the issue of cost and benefit insightfully pointed out by Mufwene.
5.2 Methodological Approach
In order to avoid proving pre-held convictions, a self-reflexive procedure which we recommend here is to look at the subject of conviction in actual politically relevant interactional events from both quantitative and qualitative angles. Figure 5.1 represents our approach.

Figure 5.1 Our analytic approach to resolving Pitfall 3
Politically relevant events are those in which one of the participants enacts or represents behaviour which falls under the umbrella of the (usually negative) conviction that the researcher may hold at the beginning of his study. For example, typical politically relevant events in our interpretation would involve interactions between Bolsonaro and another politician, a coloniser, representatives of the colonised party and so on. In this approach, our question is naturally not so much whether the politically relevant interactional event is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, but rather how the subject of our inquiry who enacts a form of behaviour which reinforces a conviction actually behaves. By contrastively examining such an interaction, we may reach outcomes beyond what we know at the outset of our analysis. For example, in the following case study we attempt to tease out recurrent pragmatic behavioural forms of the ruthless coloniser, by looking at the speech act realisation patterns of a typical coloniser. In Figure 3.5, the upper box is indicated in bold because in the procedure outlined above the central figure of the analysis is an actor like a coloniser whose behaviour we hope to systematically and critically analyse, by contrasting his behaviour with the other participant – in our case, the colonised.
5.3 Case Study
In the current case study, we examine the operation of veiled aggression in diplomatic language use from the point of view of speech acts. In particular, we explore how what we define as the speech act Tell is deployed to realise aggression in a nineteenth-century exchange of diplomatic notes between representatives of China and the United States, at a time when the US wanted to join other Western nations in colonising China. As already noted, Tell is an informative illocution which can simultaneously convey information and become intertwined with other speech acts to realise threat.
5.3.1 Key Concepts
We use the collective term diplomatic note to refer to a note deployed in national conflicts of interest. In modern diplomacy, this subgenre of diplomatic notes is often known as démarche (zhaohui 照會 in historical Chinese). In diplomatic notes, aggression is veiled through the operation of a conventionalised ritual frame (Kádár and House Reference Kádár and House2019): as already pointed out, covert aggression in diplomacy always occurs under a veneer of civil diplomatic language. In our present case study, the intensity of veiled aggression correlates with the power of the coloniser over the colonised.
In diplomacy, especially exchanges of written discourse studied here, interaction often takes place in the form of genres with strict conventionalised ritual features (see Kádár Reference Kádár2017; Reference Kádár2024), including
the intensive use of expressions of deference, such as ceremonial forms of address;
the operation of complex participation and ratification in Goffman’s (Reference Goffman1967; Reference Goffman1974) sense: while a diplomat may exchange seemingly ‘personal’ remarks with the recipient, ultimately he corresponds as a representative of a country rather than as an individual;
the operation of a ritual frame, which manifests itself in participants’ rights and obligations (see also our previous case studies).
In diplomatic notes, aggression tends to be realised in the form of veiled threats; that is, aggressive behaviour hidden behind conventional diplomatic civility with the goal of coercing representatives of the other state to do what the aggressor wants. As Culpeper et al. (Reference Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann2002: 1572) argue, veiling threats is usually ‘insincere’, provided that the goal of the language user is to realise a real threat. Considering that the veneer of diplomatic ‘civility’ precludes being explicitly impolite while at the same time affording aggression, in the current study we use the term ‘covert aggression’, similar to our previous case study. The aggressive veneer in written diplomatic language studied in our present case study resembles what Watts (Reference Watts1999) defined as the ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’. The ‘velvet glove’ implies that the aggressor uses insincere ‘politeness’ to frame his aggression as ‘civil’, but also allows him to morally legitimise the aggression (see Kádár et al. Reference Kádár, Parvaresh and Ning2019).
The ritual characteristics of diplomatic notes mentioned above manifest themselves in the operation of a ritual frame, imposing a certain sense of ritual ‘constraint’ (Goffman Reference Goffman1967) on aggressive language use: what a diplomat can and cannot do is tightly regulated, and it is practically impossible to cross a certain invisible conventionalised threshold in a ritual diplomatic genre.
5.3.2 Positioning the Case Study
The genre of diplomatic notes has received limited attention in pragmatics, and it has been mostly examined by historians and political scientists (e.g. Fendrick Reference Fendrick2012; Beres Reference Beres2015). A major contribution to this area involves research on ‘coercive diplomacy’, such as George (Reference George1991), Jakobsen (Reference Jakobsen2011) and Schettino (Reference Schettino2011). Our study relates to this latter body of research: we examine a case in which a colonising state coerces a state to be colonised into ‘coping’ with the claimed needs of the so-called ‘international community’. Such claimed needs involve the coloniser’s demand to be allowed to represent himself in the capital of the colonised and establish free trade, only benefitting the coloniser. From a contemporary point of view, enforcing such demands may be more than sheer ‘diplomacy’, in that such coercive behaviour violates what we today understand as normal international diplomacy. However, at the time of colonialism many Western countries officially claimed that they were entitled to colonise ‘underdeveloped’ nations, and when making threats their representatives often argued that they were simply enforcing their countries’ perceived diplomatic ‘rights’ (see Fitzmaurice Reference Fitzmaurice2003).
Chinese linguists have devoted particular attention to diplomatic notes, due to the humiliating role such notes played in the nineteenth-century colonisation of the country. For example, various scholars have used such notes to explore diplomatic issues surrounding translation problems in late imperial China (see e.g. Qu Reference Qu2017). Another interesting line of inquiry in this area is represented by the study of Ding and Mao (Reference Ding and Mao2000), who investigated the diachronic development of diplomatic documents in China and explored the diplomatic issues which the archaic style inherited from ancient China triggered during nineteenth-century Chinese diplomatic encounters with Western nations. Other scholars, such as Guo (Reference Guo2003), explored how diplomatic notes evolved in late imperial China under the influence of exchanges with Westerners. Guan (Reference Guan2017), on the other hand, explored Chinese influence on British diplomatic notes written to the Chinese government. Our present case study fills a knowledge gap by approaching nineteenth-century diplomatic notes between China and a Western power, the US, and by focusing on the ways in which an American diplomat realised aggression through veiled threats. While we mostly focus on covert aggression in our US corpus because we are interested in the behaviour of the coloniser (see Figure 3.4), we also briefly examine Chinese diplomatic responses to the US diplomatic notes to enrich our analysis from a cross-cultural pragmatic point of view.
The context of colonialism provides insights into the relationship between aggressive threats and aggression (see Kádár et al. Reference Kádár, Parvaresh and Ning2019). In our case study, the coloniser who has the military might to cause significant harm and loss of face to the other practically always embeds threats in his realisation of diplomatic ‘politeness’ rather than impoliteness proper. In this respect, the data under investigation are very different from what (im)politeness and impoliteness-anchored research studied in the realm of language and politics. That is, while a small body of studies touched on aggressive language use in diplomacy (e.g. Swain Reference Swain2015) and other political settings (see e.g. Bull Reference Bull2013), such analyses mostly focused on impoliteness rather than on the role of politeness as a veneer of civility – our phenomenon of covert aggression. Also, while ritual has received considerable attention in pragmatic research on language and politics (see e.g. Chilton Reference Chilton1990; Kampf Reference Kampf, Aldar, Danziger and Schreiber2019), little work has been done on ritual as an interactional frame facilitating and condoning aggressive political exchanges under the polite veneer discussed above.
Furthermore, while a number of scholars have studied the role of aggression in institutional language use (see e.g. Harris Reference Harris2001; Grainger Reference Grainger2002; Archer Reference Archer, Bousfield and Locher2008), little attention has been devoted to the institution of diplomacy. Also, in terms of the mode of realising aggression, pragmaticians frequently examine spoken and computer-mediated modes of interaction (see e.g. Vladimirou et al. Reference Vladimirou, House and Kádár2021), while the type of written interaction which we analyse in our case study has been backgrounded.
5.3.3 Methodology
In the present case study, we investigate the following research question: ‘How is aggression realised in the ritual genre of diplomatic notes?’ The rationale behind asking this question is that one may assume that diplomatic communication is blandly professional, avoiding aggression and conflict, considering that diplomats are responsible for upholding international relationships.
As elsewhere, we follow the logic of Karl Popper’s empirical research methodology, which we already discussed in detail in Chapter 2. An advantage of such an empirical procedure is that it often leads us to falsify our own assumptions. For example, when conducting the present case study we had an initial assumption, namely that aggression in diplomatic notes is essentially realised through upgraded Requests (see Blum-Kulka et al. Reference Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper1989). This was a logical assumption because, in a context where a more powerful party wants the powerless side to do something, the speech act Request is a ‘natural’ choice. This is all the more because Request can be realised on a wide scale of (in)directness. Notwithstanding our assumption, we decided to explore our corpus without any pre-categorisation, by basing our work on our typology of speech acts. Our examination has shown that the speech act Tell is by far the most frequent speech act in our corpus; that is, our initial assumption turned out to be completely wrong.
As already noted, in our speech act typology Tell is an Informative illocution, which is defined as follows:
The Tell we might call the most ‘neutral’ informative illocution … The assumption behind a Tell is that the content of the illocution – the ‘fact’ communicated – is of interest and relevance to the hearer’s concerns and interests, and Tells are therefore made as a response … to the hearer’s explicit or implicit desire to know the fact.
Our category Tell is close to what Searle (Reference Searle1979) in his classic study defines as ‘Representatives (Assertives)’; that is, a speech act category consisting of speech acts committing the speaker to the truth of his proposition. The reason why we use the category of Tell rather than ‘Representatives (Assertives)’ is that we pursue interest in the interactional features of Tell following our typology of speech acts and related analytic system; that is, we do not assume that Tell is always informative. More specifically, we focus on cases when Tell is not about committing the speaker to the truth, but rather serves other pragmatic functions.
Our analysis will reveal that in the US corpus (see below) the coloniser’s aggression is overwhelmingly realised through the Informative speech act of Tell, which not only changes its default Informative function as a means of covert aggression, but also is often intertwined with other speech acts, such as Request and Complain. By the ‘intertwinedness’ of speech acts we mean that the speech acts under investigation in our diplomatic data cannot always be rigorously disentangled. This has a significant implication for the understanding of covert aggression in the ritual genre of diplomatic notes: whenever diplomats have the power to act as aggressors and realise threats, they often ‘package’ aggression in the insincerely ‘harmless’ informative speech act Tell.
5.3.4 The Historical Background of Our Corpus
In 1842, the First Opium War ended with the Treaty of Nanking between Britain and the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), through which Britain forced China to open its ports. This was not a harmless ‘opening of trade’: the British ruthlessly swamped China with opium. Following this treaty, many Western powers, including the US, decided to follow the example of Britain. The US government appointed Caleb Cushing (1800–1879) as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary and dispatched him to the south of China to negotiate a treaty similar to the one signed between the British and the Chinese. In February 1844, Cushing arrived at Macao, then a Portuguese colony. He immediately contacted Ching Yucai (Pinyin: Cheng Yucai 程矞採, 1783–1858) – China’s acting governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces – with a series of diplomatic notes. Cushing demanded that Ching allow him to proceed to Peking (Beijing) to negotiate a ‘treaty of peace’ (i.e. an open-trade arrangement) with the imperial government. Cushing’s demands rang alarm bells in the Chinese government, and Ching responded to Cushing’s notes by attempting to prevent, or at least delay, Cushing’s proceeding to the capital. Cushing, on the other hand, was very well aware that China, having recently suffered a humiliating defeat by the British, had essentially no power to prevent him signing a treaty for his government. Because of this, Cushing’s diplomatic notes became increasingly assertive. Not surprisingly, the exchange ended with the Chinese government giving in to Cushing’s demands.
5.3.5 Data
Our corpus consists of the twenty-five diplomatic notes exchanged between Cushing and Ching, between 27 February and 24 May 1844. Within this corpus, we devote special attention to the twelve notes written by Cushing, with occasional references (for contrastive purposes) to Ching’s diplomatic notes. Originally Cushing’s diplomatic notes were translated into Classical Chinese, and a sinologist in Cushing’s team translated the Chinese diplomatic notes into English. In this case study we only mention translational problems in passing, as they do not relate to the main issue we wish to investigate – how the coloniser behaves. The translations of the examples featured in this case study are the original translations. The size of our corpus is given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Our corpus
| Diplomatic notes | Number of English words/Chinese characters |
| Cushing’s diplomatic notes | 6,700 |
| Ching’s diplomatic notes | 7,315 |
Diplomatic notes in our corpus are publicly available.Footnote 1 Note that while our corpus is relatively small, we agree with Sharoff et al. (Reference Sharoff, Rapp, Zweigenbaum and Fung2013) that a certain degree of ‘imperfection’ of corpora does not invalidate pragmatic research, in particular if we look at historical data.
5.3.6 Analysis
5.3.6.1 Cushing’s Diplomatic Notes through the Lens of Speech Acts
As already noted, our analysis of Cushing’s diplomatic notes has shown that an overwhelmingly frequent speech act type in these notes is Tell. As our analysis of the corpus has shown, Cushing realises many Tells to deliver covertly aggressive threats in a seemingly informative way, often as a fait accompli; that is, he simply announces a menacing piece of information to Ching without bothering to justify it. Considering the importance of Tell in our corpus, in the following we examine realisation patterns of aggression in Cushing’s diplomatic notes by centring our analysis on Tell.
The Speech Act Tell as an Instrument of Aggression
The analysis of the Cushing corpus shows that many of Cushing’s Tells are not purely informative, but also simultaneously fulfil non-informative functions. Such uses are typically covertly aggressive, and they are not to be confounded with argumentation. The following extract (5.1) illustrates this use of Tell:
(5.1) SIR: I have the honor to inform your excellency that the United States frigate Brandywine, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Parker, proceeds this day to Whampoa [a port in Guangzhou], on a visit, for a few days, of courtesy and civility to the capital of the Province.
In order to contextualise the Tell in extract (5.1), it is relevant to note that straight after the first note in which Cushing greeted Ching and initiated an exchange of diplomatic notes, he immediately started to demand to be permitted to proceed to the capital in person, to sign a treaty with the emperor. Ching tried to gain time and requested that Cushing stay in extraterritorial Macau, which was a Portuguese colony at the time. However, following Ching’s response, Cushing informed him in extract (5.1) above that his military officer, Commodore Parker, is actually already en route to Whampoa to prepare the ground for Cushing’s journey to the north. That is, in extract (5.1) Cushing realises a diplomatic Tell presenting the other with a fait accompli, which is a form of threatening aggression as it signals that the previous prohibition of the other’s coming is ignored. It is exactly due to this aggressive character that the Tell does not merely fulfil its default Informative function in this context. Importantly, extract (5.1) does not represent an intertwine between Tell and another speech act, such as Request, but rather it provides information tainted with covertly aggressive threatening and related threat to face. To use a colloquial example, diplomatic Tell here resembles a mafia person uttering ‘We are coming’ in a sing-song voice.
Extract (5.1) represents a relatively ‘restrained’ Tell in the Cushing corpus. The following extract (5.2) represents a less ambiguously aggressive Tell, in which threat is cleverly packaged as informing the other about a hypothetical situation in a manner-of-fact voice:
(5.2) The rules of politeness and ceremony observed by Sir Henry Pottinger were doubtless just and proper in the particular circumstances of the case. But, to render them fully applicable to the United States, it would be necessary for my Government, in the first instance, to subject the people of China to all the calamities of war, and especially to take possession of some island on the coast of China, as a place of residence for its Minister.
Here Cushing demands that his warship to be allowed to anchor close to Peking and dismisses Ching’s argument that not even the British colonisers have ever been allowed to do this.Footnote 2 In extract (5.2), Cushing does not explicitly threaten his interlocutor: rather, his veiled threat outlines in detail a hypothetical situation, basically telling the other what he, as an aggressor, might be capable of doing.
If we observe the Cushing corpus from a sequential point of view, it emerges that Tells in Cushing’s notes become increasingly aggressive, albeit within the realm of covert aggression; that is, there is a sense of escalation in the manner in which Tells are realised across the individual notes. While in the first three of the twelve notes in our corpus Tells are relatively ‘moderate’ in tone, in that they simply announce what Cushing plans to do, in later notes various Tells gradually become underhandedly more menacing, and also the information they convey increasingly becomes an arrogant lecturing of the other about ‘Western diplomatic manners’, hence reflecting the face-threatening power talk of the coloniser. Interestingly, at the same time Cushing does not openly violate the norms of diplomacy by being overtly aggressive. The following example illustrates the way in which increasingly menacing Tells manifest themselves in our data:
(5.3) It is customary, among all the nations of the West, for the ships of war of one country to visit the ports of another in time of peace, and, in doing so, for the commodore to exchange salutes with the local authorities, and to pay his compliments in person to the principal public functionary. To omit these testimonies of good will is considered as evidence of a hostile or at least of an unfriendly feeling.
What makes Tell particularly threatening here is that Cushing basically announces that his warship will be anchored in a Chinese port close to Peking, hence precluding any objection. The lecturing on the part of the coloniser in this Tell operates as an escalatory mechanism; witness the negative terms ‘hostile’ and ‘unfriendly’.
Other Speech Acts Intertwined with Tell: Complains
Tells in Cushing’s notes are often intertwined with other speech acts, with the most frequent ones being Complains and Requests. As already noted, by ‘intertwining’ we mean not only that Tell sequentially precedes other speech acts, but also that there is a pragmatic ‘co-operation’ between Tell and other speech acts in the realisation of covert aggression. Let us start the analysis of these speech acts and their relationship with Tell by first focusing on the speech act Complain (see also Vásquez Reference Vasquez2011). Our definition of Complain is as follows. The speech act Complain occurs when the speaker expresses his negative view of a past action by the addressee (i.e. for which he holds the addressee responsible), in view of the negative effects or consequences of that action for himself. Clearly, the scope of this speech act may include Complains made of third parties.
Complains are frequently employed in diplomatic notes because they point to the rationale triggering the note. Such a basic use of a Complain, combined with a Tell, is illustrated by the following extract (5.4), where the Complain is underlined:
(5.4) When I addressed your excellency on the 13th, thanking you for copies of the treaty of Nanking and of that of Portugal, I was not aware of the fact, which I have since discovered with much regret, that your excellency did not deem it convenient to communicate to me the whole of the treaty of Nanking.
Extract (5.4) shows a neat transition from the speech act Tell to the subsequent Complain. In our corpus the use of Complains intertwined with Tells is often more complex than we can observe in extract (5.4). That is, Cushing often uses Tell–Complain intertwines to make Ching accountable for the threat realised by the Tell. The following extract (5.5) illustrates this phenomenon (Complain is underlined):
(5.5) The people of America have been accustomed to consider China the most refined and the most enlightened of the nations of the East; and they will demand, how it is possible, if China be thus refined, she should allow herself to be wanting in courtesy to their Envoy; and, if China be thus enlightened, how it is possible that, having just emerged from a war with England, and being in the daily expectation of the arrival of the Envoy of the French, she should suffer herself to slight and repel the good will of the United States. And the people of America will be disposed indignantly to draw back the proffered hand of friendship, when they learn how imperfectly the favor is appreciated by the Chinese Government.
Here the Complain is intimately intertwined with a menacing and lecturing Tell: this Tell does not simply ground the Complain, but rather describes a dreadful consequence which may be the respondent’s responsibility. Here we can witness a fully fledged intertwine between the speech acts Tell and Complain, in that there is no one single transition between the two speech acts, but rather the intertwined speech acts recur in the threatening message.
Other Speech Acts Intertwined with Tell: Requests
Another speech act which frequently recurs in Cushing’s diplomatic notes is Request. We define Request as follows (Edmondson and House, 1981; Edmondson et al. Reference Edmondson, House and Kádár2023: 42):
In performing a Request, the speaker wants his hearer to do P, which is in the speaker’s own interest; that is, not in the hearer’s interest. When we analyse Requests, we need to distinguish between the types of goods requested – between Requests for non-verbal goods and services, and Requests for verbal goods and services. Some requests are realised as Request to-do-x, while others are realised as Request not-to-do-x.
Cushing’s diplomatic notes reveal the following pragmatic pattern: he rarely uses Requests (to-do-x) and rather frequently uses Requests (not-to-do-x). This pattern is logical if one considers the aforementioned argument that Cushing often realises demands through his Tells announcing a fait accompli. Thus Requests in his diplomatic notes often concern prohibitive behaviour, with Ching being Requested, in a rather menacing way, not to do certain things. Such Requests (not-to-do-x) are always intertwined with face-threatening lecturing Tells, as the following extract (5.6) illustrates (Request is underlined):
(5.6) Least of all, should such apprehension be entertained in reference to any ships of war belonging to the United States, which now feels, and (unless ill treatment of our public agents should produce a change of sentiments) will continue to feel, the most hearty and sincere good will towards China.
In his Tell, Cushing once again announces the fait accompli that his warship will be anchored close to the capital of China. At the same time, Cushing inserts – literally, in brackets – a Request (not-to-do-x), warning the Chinese not to try to ‘ill treat’ the crew of the American ship.
In many cases in Cushing’s notes, the Tell is intertwined not only with Request (not-to-do-x), but also with the speech act Complain. More specifically, the Request (not-to-do-x) in such Tells often fulfils a dual Requestive and Complain-like function. This fits into a broader pragmatic pattern which Blum-Kulka et al. (Reference Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper1989) have already pointed out in the Cross-cultural Speech Act Realisation Project (CCSARP). The following extract (5.7) illustrates this point (Request is underlined):
(5.7) Foreign ambassadors represent the sovereignty of their nation. Any disrespect shown to them, is disrespect to their nation, Government, or sovereign. They possess the right, in the discharge of their public duty, to come and go, without let or hinderance. Causelessly to molest them, is a national injury of the gravest character.
Unlike in his other Tells (see above), Cushing here not only refers to a hypothetical clash between the US and China. Rather, his Tell is a response to a move by the Chinese, and so the strongly worded phrase ‘Causelessly to molest them’ is a face-threatening Request for Ching not to dare to make similar attempts at ‘molestation’ in the future, with the negatively connoted verb ‘molest’ also entailing a Complain.
In our corpus, Tells including information about Ching’s Requests (not-to-do-x) can also become Complains. In such cases, Cushing usually gives Ching a face-threatening ‘lecture’ about the ‘inappropriacy’ of the latter’s Request (not-to-do-x), as in the following case (we underline that part of the Tell where Cushing informs Ching about Chiang’s own Request, framing it as ‘importunate’):
(5.8) Permit me to observe, that your excellency misapprehends the nature of my communications, if you look upon them as conveying an importunate request on any subject whatever; not having understood that your excellency has any power to negotiate with foreign Ministers; and having contented myself with courteously replying to what seemed to me the importunate request of your excellency to have me abstain from going to Peking.
Indeed, my sole object, originally, in addressing your excellency was, to signify my high personal respect, and that of my Government, for the August Sovereign, by seizing the earliest moment, after my arrival in China, to make inquiry for his health.
Cushing’s Requests (to-do-x) in his notes mainly concern Requests (for information), which are Requests for ‘verbal goods’. The following extract (5.9) represents such a Request intertwined with a Tell (Request is underlined):
(5.9) The United States are at peace alike with China, Great Britain, and Portugal; and I trust that this happy state of things may long continue as to all these Powers, and especially as between the United States and China.
But the Government of the United States would be liable to commit errors injurious to a good understanding, and capable of disturbing mutual good will, unless it were fully and exactly informed as to the terms of the treaties existing between Great Britain and Portugal on the one hand, and China on the other, by which their political as well as their commercial relations are regulated.
In extract (5.9), the Request legitimises the threatening Tell; that is, the potential that the US ‘would be liable to commit errors’ and end the ‘peaceful’ relationship with China.
Other Speech Acts Intertwined with Tell: Suggests
Another speech act which occurs intertwined with Tells in our corpus is Suggest, a speech act category which in other research has also been referred to as the speech act of ‘advice’ (see e.g. Hinkel Reference Hinkel1997). We define Suggest as follows. In the speech act Suggest, the speaker states that she is in favour of the addressee’s performing a future action, which is in the addressee’s own interest. Suggest is therefore essentially different from the speaker-oriented speech act category Request.
In Cushing’s notes, Tells can be intertwined with Suggests which are apparently in the interest of the recipient but are certainly not ‘innocent’: such Suggests are often deployed as aggressive threats. The following extract (5.10) illustrates such a use of a Suggest embedded in a Tell (the Suggest is underlined):
(5.10) Accordingly, in the West, foreign ministers, on arriving at the borders of the Government to which they are sent, are accustomed to enter the country immediately, and to proceed, without delay or obstacle, to the Court, where, after paying their respects to the sovereign, they address themselves at once to the appropriate minister of State, for the transaction of the business of the mission. Such are the usages followed by the West, in the general interests of humanity. For, when great nations deal together as such, they must deal through the medium either of ambassadors, the instruments of friendship, or of fleets and armies, the instruments of hostility. There is no other alternative. And thus it is, that the agency of ambassadors is found to be of the greatest utility, not only as the means of terminating the calamities of war, but also as the means of securing the continuance of the blessings of peace.
Such uses of Suggest are not only aggressively threatening because they are intertwined with face-threateningly lecturing Tells, but also because the recipient’s ‘interest’ here is ambiguous at best: Ching is provided with a choice between being assaulted (unsuggested outcome) and avoiding the assault (suggested outcome).
Other Speech Acts Intertwined with Tell: Excuse/Justify and Sympathise
Tells in Cushing’s diplomatic notes can also be intertwined with the speech acts Excuse/Justify (see also Searle Reference Searle1975) and Sympathise (see also Nakajima Reference Nakajima2002). While in ‘ordinary’ interpersonal interaction these non-Future-related speech acts are typically positively connoted and relationally constructive, in Cushing’s correspondence they are part of realising aggression because they tend to be embedded in threating and ‘lecturing’ Tells.
We define Excuse/Justify and Sympathise as follows (Edmondson et al. Reference Edmondson, House and Kádár2023: 152–153):
If we seek to interactionally distinguish between an Excuse and a Justify, we might say that in the first case a speaker admits that what she did was undesirable but suggests that there are or were mitigating circumstances which lessen the blame attached to herself. With a Justify, however, the speaker seeks to persuade someone that what she did was ‘justified’, such that no blame attaches to herself for having done it. When we analyse naturally occurring interaction, it is often difficult to rigorously distinguish between these two speech acts. A Sympathise is an appropriate response whenever the speaker hears that something unfortunate has happened to the addressee.
While in daily interaction Excuse/Justify tends to be relationally constructive because it relates to the producer of a given Excuse/Justify, in Cushing’s notes this speech act always occurs in reference to other colonising powers, such as the British. Thus, in Cushing’s notes, this speech act aggravates lecturing Tells, usually ‘educating’ Ching about why his worries regarding the aggressive US moves, and his Complains about the actions of the British and other colonisers, are unjustified. The following extract (5.11) illustrates this use of Excuse/Justify (Excuse/Justify is underlined in the extract):
(5.11) I have examined the article referred to; and find that by it England is required to keep a Government vessel at anchor in each of the five ports of Kwangchow, Fuchow, Amoy, Ningpo, and Shanghai; but I find nothing in the article to limit the size and the armament of that vessel, and nothing which prohibits England from keeping two or ten Government vessels in each of the five ports, if it suits her pleasure. I presume she consults her own convenience in keeping at present only one Government vessel, and that of small size, anchored at Kwangchow, which she may well do having a fleet of large vessels so near at hand, at Hong Kong.
Cushing’s argument here is that the British are justified keeping warships in Chinese ports. This argument also validates the US demand to anchor military ships in Chinese ports.
While Sympathise is relatively rare in our corpus, whenever it occurs it expresses anything but sympathy for Ching. Rather, Cushing’s realisations of Sympathise are typical expressions of the face-threatening condescension which is typical of an interaction between the powerful coloniser and the essentially powerless colonised. The following extract (5.12) shows this use:
(5.12) I have only to add, that when the Brandywine went to Whampoa, it was the intention of Commodore Parker to return so soon as the state of the tide should admit of her crossing the bar in safety; and to this original intention he will still adhere. I have no disposition to increase the embarrassments to which your excellency is already subjected, by the grave omission of the Imperial Government in neglecting to make proper provision for the American legation, immediately on receiving notice of its intended arrival.
5.3.7 Summary of Analysis
Our analysis has shown that Tells are fundamental in our US data for realising aggression under a veneer of civility. We have also examined other speech acts which, being intertwined with Tells, are also used to realise covert aggression. In the following, we summarise the results of our analysis from a quantitative point of view. Note that in this analysis we only count the approximate length of covertly aggressive speech acts in our corpus, bearing in mind all the difficulties which speech act annotation entails, and also that intertwinedness only allows us to quantify our data for illustrative purposes.Footnote 3 Based on our annotation of the data, here we simply refer to the number of words representing speech acts in our annotation, rather than arguing that Cushing used a particular ‘quantity’ of speech acts. In annotating our data, we manually distinguished sections which are relevant for the realisation of aggression from others which we regarded as ‘neutral’; we dismissed the latter from our quantitative analysis. Table 5.2 provides a summary of our quantitative findings.
Table 5.2 Quantitative features of aggression realisation in Cushing’s diplomatic notes
| Type of aggression-relevant speech acts | Distribution of aggression-relevant speech acts (in words) | Proportion (overall size of the Cushing corpus: 6,700 words) |
|---|---|---|
| Tell | 3,165 | 47.23% |
| Complains (intertwined with Tell) | 587 | 8.76% |
| Requests (intertwined with Tell) | 470 | 7.01% |
| Suggests (intertwined with Tell) | 186 | 2.77% |
| Excuse/Justify and Sympathise (intertwined with Tell) | 121 | 1.80% |
| Total | 4,529 | 67.57% |
In the following, we will conduct a comparison of the outcomes of our analysis of Cushing’s notes with the pragmatic features of Ching’s responsive diplomatic notes. We keep this comparison brief because in the procedure provided for resolving Pitfall 3, we propose to analytically prioritise the behaviour of the actor whose behaviour we aim to investigate.
5.3.7.1 Ching’s Diplomatic Notes through the Lens of Speech Acts
Before engaging in an analysis of speech acts in Ching’s diplomatic notes, it is worth noting that the aggression in Cushing’s Tells appears to be at the same time exaggerated and mitigated by the Chinese translators of Cushing’s notes. That is, the Chinese translators not only translated but also liberally interpreted Cushing’s notes, reflecting Chinese assessments of these notes (see House Reference House2024 on the evaluation of translations):
1 Exaggeration: The translators added a ‘militant’ exaggerating interpretation to both the personnel and ships of Cushing. For example, while Cushing often refers to his own ship simply as ‘Brandywine’ in his own diplomatic notes, in the Chinese version of these notes the Chinese translators always refer to ‘Brandywine’ as ‘warship Brandywine’ (Bolandiwan bingchuan 沒蘭的灣兵船).
2 Mitigation: The translators attempted to mitigate the face-threat of Cushing’s notes to the emperor by adding honorific nouns and verbs. For example, Cushing’s menacing Tell that he will ‘deliver a letter … addressed to his Imperial Majesty’ was translated into Chinese as chengxian Dahuang yulan 呈獻大皇帝御覽 (lit. ‘presenting humbly for the majestic reading of the Heavenly Emperor’).
All Tells in Ching’s notes are ‘innocent’; that is, devoid of aggression. The following example illustrates this point:
(5.13) 現在大皇帝福壽安康,遐邇同慶,理合复知貴公使,以答慕義之忱。
At the present time, the great Emperor is in the enjoyment of happy old age and quiet health, and is at peace with all, both far and near; of which it is proper, in reply, to inform the honorable Plenipotentiary, in order to answer his sincere desire of what is just and proper.
Here the Tell simply operates in its default informative function.
An additional pragmatic function of such ‘innocent’ Tells is the following: in various cases, Ching realises Tells essentially to appease the aggressor. For example, in the following extract (5.14) Ching realises a Tell to inform Cushing that he is trying his best to cope with Cushing’s wish.
(5.14) 又本兼護部堂於二月十四日具奏貴公使仍請進京,並願由內河行走一案,本月十九日,接奉軍機大臣字寄大皇帝諭旨,頒給調任兩廣總督耆欽差大臣關防,與貴公使酌商定議。
Again: I, the acting Governor General, upon the 2nd moon, and the 4th day, (April 1, 1844) memorialized the Emperor, that the honorable Plenipotentiary still requests to go to Peking, and is willing to go by the inner rivers. This, too, is on record. Upon the 19th of the present month (May 6) I received a communication from the Privy Council, stating that the August Emperor’s will has been promulgated, to deliver over the seal of Imperial High Commissioner to Tsiyeng, Governor General of the two Kwang, in order that with the honorable Plenipotentiary he may negotiate and settle deliberations.
When it comes to other speech acts, our analysis has not only shown that they are rather defensive in nature, but also, and more importantly for the present analysis, that they are rarely intertwined with a Tell. Rather, Tell simply occurs in a sequential preparatory relationship with other speech acts, providing necessary informational background for an ensuing speech act. Thus the pragmatic dynamics of Ching’s diplomatic notes are very different from those of Cushing’s notes: Ching responds with speech acts such as Request and Complain to Cushing’s menacing Tells, instead of reciprocating with similar Tells. Let us here refer to two Chinese examples including first a Request (not-to-do-x) and then a Complain:
(5.15) 若不待奏請,徑以兵船駛往天津,殊與體制未協。
Again: if [the Plenipotentiary] presumes to go the capital, still he must stop; for if he do not wait to memorialize the Emperor, and request permission, but proceed hastily, by a narrow passage, with a man-of-war to Tien Tsin, this will be to put an end to civility, and to rule without harmony.
The Request (not-to-do-x) in extract (5.15) is a direct ‘hedge performative’ (Blum-Kulka et al. Reference Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper1989). However, this level of directness does not translate into aggression; rather, it represents an attempt to fend off Cushing’s aggressive fait accompli. The following Complain, in extract (5.16) fulfils a similar function:
(5.16) 軍機大臣字寄。道光二十四年三月初五日,奉上諭:據程奏米利堅仍復籲請進京,並願由內河行走等語。
We, great Ministers of State, Members of the Privy Council, communicate that, on Taou Kwang, 24th year, 3rd moon, and 5th day, (22nd April) we received the Imperial mandate, that whereas Ching has memorialized the Throne, that the American Envoy still again importunately requests to enter Peking, and is willing, by the inner rivers, to make the journey,
While the speech act Complain in extract (5.16) is upgraded, it again represents an attempt to fend off aggression. The word ‘importunately’ in the English text was added by the American translator, supposedly to escalate the conflict between the two parties.
Our Chinese corpus reveals a major cross-cultural pragmatic difference between the two corpora of diplomatic notes under investigation. While Cushing produces mainly Tells, often intertwined with other speech acts, he refrains from realising these other speech acts in a direct manner. As an aggressor with power, it might simply not have been necessary for him to do this. The Chinese respond to Cushing’s Tells by realising speech acts in a rather direct manner. While there is very little upgrading (see Blum-Kulka et al. Reference Blum-Kulka, House and Kasper1989) in Cushing’s notes, Ching’s responses are generally upgraded: he uses many expressions such as xu 須 (‘must’) and bude 不得 (‘should not’).
From a quantitative point of view, if one counts attempts at fending off the American aggression as aggressive behaviour and dismisses non-aggressive language use, the quantitative properties of aggression realisation in our Chinese corpus are given in Table 5.3. As Table 5.3 also indicates, the aggression-related speech acts in Ching’s notes are Complains and Requests.
Table 5.3 Quantitative features of aggression realisation in Ching’s diplomatic notes
| Type of speech acts fending off aggression | Distribution of speech act occurrences fending off aggression (in characters) | Proportion (overall size of the Ching corpus: 7,315 words) |
|---|---|---|
| Complains | 2,251 | 30.77% |
| Requests | 1,927 | 26.34% |
| Total | 4,178 | 57.11% |
5.4 Reflections
In the current case study, we have examined the use of the Informative speech act Tell in diplomatic notes, by focusing on its role in the realisation of aggression in Cushing’s notes. We investigated the research question ‘How is aggression realised in the ritual genre of diplomatic notes?’ Our analysis has shown that, in the US corpus, realisations of aggression are centred on the particular speech act type Tell, which in the context of covert aggression is often used beyond its default Informative function. More specifically, when a Tell is used to announce a forthcoming menacing action, it gains an aggressive character. There is a cluster of speech acts which are deployed intertwined with Tell to realise covert aggression in our data. The prevalence of Tell in the genre of diplomatic notes is due to the fact that diplomats are supposed to uphold a veneer of civility, especially when they realise covertly aggressive threats. Our analysis of the Chinese corpus has shown that Tells in Ching’s notes are only realised with their original ‘innocent’ Informative function. It is not a coincidence that the pragmatic qualities of Cushing’s and Ching’s notes are not in parallel, given the power difference between these two politicians.
In summary, this case study has shown that it is possible to pin down the behaviour of the coloniser from a pragmatic point of view. Any negative predisposition towards colonialism has not (and could not have) influenced our perceptions of this behaviour because we had no way to know at the outset of our research exactly what to expect in our data. Therein resides, in our view, the effectiveness of a strictly language-anchored bottom-up approach to language and politics.
In Chapter 3, 4 and 5 we have discussed how the methodology proposed in Chapter 2 can be used to avoid the three major pitfall types we outlined for the study of language and politics. Having presented our methodology and its application in Part One of this book, in the following Part Two we move on to cover what we regard as the key topics in the pragmatic study of language and politics.
5.5 Recommended Readings
Popper, Karl. Reference Popper1954. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge.
Karl Popper’s seminal work has influenced our framework enormously, and most ideas outlined in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have their roots in Popperian thought. We therefore highly recommend Popper’s above book for readers with interest in empirical research. In the following section, Popper discusses the problem of pre-held convictions influencing the research procedure – an issue at the heart of Pitfall 3 discussed in this chapter:
We may now return to a point made in the previous section: to my thesis that a subjective experience, or a feeling of conviction, can never justify a scientific statement, and that within science it can play no part except that of an object of an empirical (a psychological) inquiry. No matter how intense a feeling of conviction it may be, it can never justify a statement. Thus I may be utterly convinced of the truth of a statement; certain of the evidence of my perceptions; overwhelmed by the intensity of my experience: every doubt may seem to me absurd. But does this afford the slightest reason for science to accept my statement?
… Even the fact, for me to so firmly established, that I am experiencing this feeling of conviction, cannot appear within the field of objective science except in the form of a psychological hypothesis which, of course, calls for intersubjective testing: from the conjecture that I have this feeling of conviction the psychologist may deduce, with the help of psychological and other theories, certain predictions about my behaviour; and these may be confirmed or refuted in the course of experimental tests. But from the epistemological point of view, it is quite irrelevant whether my feeling of conviction was strong or weak; whether it came from a strong or even irresistible impression of indubitable certainty (or ‘self-evidence’), or merely from a doubtful surmise. None of this has any bearing on the question of how scientific statements can be justified.
Considerations like these do not, of course, provide an answer to the problem of the empirical basis. But at least they help us to see its main difficulty. In demanding objectivity for basic statements as well as for other scientific statements, we deprive ourselves of any logical means by which we might have hoped to reduce the truth of scientific statements to our experiences. Moreover, we debar ourselves from granting any favoured status to statements which describe experiences, such as those statements which describe our perceptions (and which are sometimes called ‘protocol sentences’). They can occur in science only as psychological statements; and this means, as hypotheses of a kind whose standards of inter-subjective testing (considering the present state of psychology) are certainly not very high.
Whatever may be our eventual answer to the question of the empirical basis, one thing must be clear: if we adhere to our demand that scientific statements must be objective, then those statements which belong to the empirical basis of science must also be objective, i.e. inter-subjectively testable. Yet inter-subjective testability always implies that, from the statements which are to be tested, other testable statements can be deduced. Thus if the basic statements in their turn are to be inter-subjectively testable, there can be no ultimate statements in science: there can be no statements in science which cannot be tested, and therefore none which cannot in principle be refuted, by falsifying some of the conclusions which can be deduced from them.







