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Discussion of ‘The Cotton Sector: History of a Capture’

from Part II - A Deeper Investigation of Some Key Sectors and Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2023

François Bourguignon
Affiliation:
École d'économie de Paris and École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris
Romain Houssa
Affiliation:
Université de Namur, Belgium
Jean-Philippe Platteau
Affiliation:
Université de Namur, Belgium
Paul Reding
Affiliation:
Université de Namur, Belgium

Summary

In Benin, top businesspeople not only capture the economy but also the executive, and possibly legislative power. This book develops a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying and reducing the institutional constraints that impede Benins rapid, sustainable, and inclusive development. The research reveals a chain of causality between four main categories of institutional weaknesses in Benin, namely corruption, inefficiencies in governance, opacity in public decision-making, and excessive informality in the Beninese economy. These institutional weaknesses are traced back to proximate and ultimate causes. The immediate causes include political instability, elite capture of key state functions, weakness of the state, and the possibility of easy but illegal rents. In turn, these causes are linked to deep-rooted underlying factors such as the nature of the political game, essentially neo-patrimonialism with multiple economic and/or political Big Men, but also geographical or ethnic factors. We elaborate on policy reforms aiming at overcoming or circumventing these institutional problems.

Type
Chapter
Information
State Capture and Rent-Seeking in Benin
The Institutional Diagnostic Project
, pp. 207 - 211
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Along with starchy staple crops, cotton dominates the farming landscape in West Africa. Cotton is primarily cultivated under rainfed conditions in rotation with maize, sorghum, and/or millet on small family farms that average fewer than ten hectares. Being the primary source of income for millions of smallholder farmers, cotton can help reduce poverty and improve food and nutrition security. As a main source of export revenue, cotton has wide-reaching implications for poor developing economies in West Africa.

The extent that cotton contributes to the socio-economic development of West African countries depends heavily on the economic performance of their cotton sectors. In turn, the incentive structure embodied in institutions influences the cotton sector’s economic performance. Supportive institutions positively affect the ability of individuals and organisations to respond to new opportunities and challenges. Well-designed institutions provide incentives for individuals and organisations to invest, can limit the economic and political power of the elites, and create more economic equal opportunities for a greater share of the population (Acemoglu, Reference Acemoglu2003).

Over the last several decades, major institutional changes have been experimented with in West African cotton sectors, with the goal of increasing economic performance. These have included changes in social, political, and economic institutions, coming especially from market liberalisation and privatisation. With institutional changes come shifts in incentives and distributional power. These shifts have affected the economic performance of multiple West African cotton sectors, including those of Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali.

West African cotton sectors compete in a highly competitive and global environment. Although cotton production and exports are key to their economies, West African countries play a relatively small role in the international cotton market compared to larger cotton producers and exporters, such as China, India, and the USA. As smaller players on the global stage, they need the ability to adapt to external forces (e.g. price fluctuations, tariffs, subsidies). In addition, West African cotton sectors face internal constraints that can impede economic development, such as missing or imperfect access to inputs, financing, and insurance. Well-designed and implemented cotton-based institutions can help mitigate both external and internal challenges and support the socio-economic development of their countries.

Many institutional changes have occurred in the West African cotton sectors since achieving independence and a common goal has been improving economic performance. These changes can be grouped into four general periods: (1) contract with the French parastatal; (2) nationalisation of cotton gins; (3) implementation of market-oriented reforms; and (4) post-market reforms. Several indicators have been used to assess the economic performance of West African cotton sectors. These include production and yield; price; access to inputs, credit, and extension services; cotton quality; farm technical efficiency; research and development; export revenues; and profitability (Thériault and Serra, Reference Thériault and Serra2014; Thériault and Tschirley, Reference Thériault and Tschirley2014; Tschirley et al., Reference Tschirley, Poulton and Labaste2009).

John R. Commons’ institutional economic framework is well adapted to understanding the evolution in institutions and their related effects on economic performance (Thériault and Sterns, Reference Thériault and Sterns2012; Commons, Reference Commons1934). According to Commons’ framework, actions to address limiting factors are the drivers of institutional changes. These actions have both intended and unintended consequences that affect economic performance, which in turn can lead to the advent of a new set of limiting factors. New sets of limiting factors resume the cycle of institutional change. Each institutional change generates a new incentive structure and affects power dynamics within the sector. Stakeholders are more likely to resist changes that would decrease their power.

I Contract with the French Parastatal (1960 to MID-1970s)

Before the country’s independence, the French parastatal, CFDT, had significant control over the cotton sectors in which it operated, managing farm input delivery and the grading and weighing of seed cotton, as well as exports. In return for its monopoly status, the French parastatal agreed to purchase all cotton production at guaranteed fixed prices announced before the planting season. During this period, production went up and the CFDT was profitable. However, much of the profits were retained by the French parastatal and little was reinvested in West Africa, and this impeded economic development.

II Nationalisation Of Cotton Gins (Mid-1970s to Mid-1990s)

One of the major institutional changes corresponds to the end of the monopoly contract with the CFDT. To encourage economic development after independence, several West African governments nationalised their cotton sectors, which gave them control over the allocation of cotton export revenue. During this nationalisation period, cotton became a primary vehicle for boosting agricultural productivity and helped to promote integrated rural development (Thériault and Tschirley, Reference Thériault and Tschirley2014). Both cotton and cereal yields benefited from greater public investments. State-owned enterprises played an important role in developing and maintaining rural roads infrastructure, providing access to drinkable water, and reducing illiteracy. Yet, in the absence of strong institutions, greater power created incentives for rent-seeking behaviours and political interference. Farmers were still lacking a voice in decisions related to cotton activities. The combination of low farm-gate prices, mismanagement, and inefficiencies in ginning operations led to significant debts and discontent among farmers.

III Market-Oriented Reforms (Mid-1990s to Late 2000s)

In response to poor financial performance, donors started to push for market privatisation and liberalisation. The market-oriented reform process gave farmers the opportunity to better organise themselves to increase their voice within the cotton sector. Village-wide, multipurpose farmer associations were transformed into formal groups focused on cotton farmers. More responsibilities, such as the management of farm input credit, were transferred to them. Even though farmers, through their organisations, became more involved in management activities, their limited negotiation power in the determination of the price they received from the gins remained a limiting factor (Thériault and Sterns, Reference Thériault and Sterns2012).

Market reforms were unevenly and partially implemented (Thériault and Serra, Reference Thériault and Serra2014). Benin made stronger attempts to privatise and liberalise its cotton sector than Burkina Faso and Mali. However, the establishment of several new cotton ginneries in Benin did not lead to increased competition, since the vast majority of them fell under the same, private rather than public, ownership. Despite the creation of new gins in Burkina Faso, the former state-owned enterprise continues to be the dominant player. After years of privatisation discussions, the Malian cotton sector remains managed by the state-owned enterprise, although it did undergo a change in management. Several factors can explain the uneven and partial implementation of the reforms, including resistance to change due to a loss of governmental power, as well as scepticism about the need for change and expected outcomes.

IV Post-Market Reforms (Late 2000s to Date)

In the post-market reform era, most efforts have been channelled towards increasing production. When world prices are high, increased production translates into greater export revenues. With greater export revenues, poor financial performance is less apparent, and therefore there is less push for market reforms. Cotton has been and continues to be produced under contract farming conditions, with guaranteed purchase of seed cotton at fixed pre-planting pan-territorial prices, and provision of inputs on credit. Both farm-gate and input prices have been key limiting factors to increased production. Price incentives, in particular through governmental fertiliser subsidies, have been used to encourage farmers to increase cotton production and productivity. But this has not always been enough to keep farmers content, as evidenced by the repeated farmer boycotts in Burkina Faso recently. After years of decline, Benin cotton production has been rising again over the last few years. This increase coincides with the arrival of the new president, who has a vested interest in the Beninese cotton sector (Honfoga et al., Reference Honfoga, Houssa, Dedehounaou, Bourguignon, Houssa, Platteau and Reding2019).

The current economic performance of West African cotton sectors remains highly affected by institutional structure. There is a trade-off between competition and effective coordination (Tschirley et al., Reference Tschirley, Poulton and Labaste2009). Effective coordination tends to facilitate the provision of services and improve the quality of cotton. Market competition tends to provide incentives for higher farm-gate prices and greater cost efficiency at the gin level. In more regulated cotton sectors, such as in West Africa, farmers are provided with extension services and inputs on credit, but receive lower farm-gate prices due to limited competition. The fact that no institutional structure performs unambiguously better across all performance dimensions can, in part, explain the abandonment of market reforms.

The institutional structure also affects the ability of cotton to spur food crop productivity (Thériault and Tschirley, Reference Thériault and Tschirley2014). This indicator has been the strongest in the regulated cotton sectors of West Africa. Direct and indirect pathways, through which state-owned enterprises have contributed to food crop intensification, include input provision and extension advice for food crops and agronomic spill-overs. Moving from a regulated to a more competitive market structure could have affected the food–cotton crop interdependence in West Africa, which may have threatened food security in the region.

Other limiting factors to the economic performance of West African cotton sectors include climate change, invasive species, low technology adoption, and lack of market influence. The increasingly erratic rainfall as a result of climate change has a detrimental impact on cotton production and productivity. The proliferation of counterfactual pesticides makes it more challenging to control for pests, while posing human, environmental, and financial risks to cotton farmers. With limited investment in agricultural research and development, West African cotton sectors are facing low and stagnant yields. Low adoption of technologies by farmers and gins results in low yields, limited traceability, and quality issues from contamination. With low processing capacity and domestic consumption, they are vulnerable to global development.

Moving forward, it is essential that any proposals to reform the West African cotton sectors take into account the institutional setting, such as the strong intertwined relationship between food and cotton crops, in order to avoid major discrepancies between expected and realised economic performance. Increasing farm productivity, while strengthening farmer resilience as well as ginning efficiency, is key to improving the economic performance of the West African cotton sectors. The promotion of regional integration is a viable approach for West African cotton sectors to increase their influence in the international market. Building strong institutions take times, but once built, they help to ensure that economic development occurs in an effective, accountable, and inclusive way.

Footnotes

1 It is, however, difficult to understand the methodology underlying many indicators related to the importance of cotton in Benin. The values of some indicators are inconsistent across sources and important information needed for the analysis is sometimes simply not available. For instance, it was not possible to get information from the website of the Association Interprofessionnelle du Coton au Bénin (AIC; www.aicbenin.org) because the website has been down since 2018. Therefore, there is a need to develop a coherent framework for data and other historical documents related to the cotton sector.

2 Before cotton, palm oil – promoted by King Ghézo (1818–1858) – played the leading role in Benin’s development. In 1962, for instance, palm oil products accounted for around 60 per cent of export revenue, against only 2 per cent for cotton. From 1972, however, the share of palm oil decreased dramatically, to 19 per cent, and in 2016 palm oil became almost non-existent in Benin’s official export statistics. By contrast, cotton’s share increased to 30 per cent in 1972 and in 2016 it stood at 45 per cent of export revenue.

3 Benin’s total population is 10.7 million.

4 For instance, cotton farmers finance local infrastructure and a number of them hold political power at village and district levels.

5 Another source for an international comparison is the International Cotton Association (ICA), but we currently do not have access to its database.

6 Burkina Faso is a good comparator for Benin not only because the two countries share a common border, but also because the initial performance of Burkina Faso (in 1961) was close to that of Benin. Production in Benin and Burkina Faso was 2,482 tonnes and 2,352 tonnes, respectively. The yield figure was 1,204 and 1,026 hectogram per hectare, respectively, while land area allocated to cotton was 20,608 and 22,925 hectares, respectively. Côte d’Ivoire and Mali are two other possible comparators, but their initial production levels were much higher than that in Benin while their performance did not significantly improve over time (FAOSTAT).

7 Except for the 1994 devaluation in the CFA Franc, the variations in the currency mainly reflect movement in the French Franc (prior to 1999) and the Euro (after 1999), to which the currency has been pegged.

8 For instance, Minot and Daniels (Reference Minot and Daniels2005) report that cotton is 15 per cent more labour intensive than the area-weighted average of other crops analysed in their study on Benin (maize and cassava, cowpeas, groundnuts, sorghum, millet, yams). Moreover, the cultivation of cotton requires 23 per cent more hired labour per hectare than the average of other crops.

9 Moreover, the authors estimate the cross-price supply elasticity related to alternative crops to cotton (maize, millet, sorghum and related crops, rice, yam, cassava and other tubers, beans and related crops, and peanuts and related crops) in the range of –0.28 to –0.39%.

10 The baseline poverty incidence is estimated at 40 per cent.

11 During the years 1984–1993, the continuous appreciation of the CFA Franc also contributed to low cotton prices, yet this did not prevent cotton supply from rising perceptibly, not only in Benin but also in Burkina Faso. This again suggests that other factors than producer prices have been at work.

12 ‘Side-selling is the sale of seed cotton to a buyer other than the company that provided the producer with inputs on credit during the production season’ (Poulton et al., Reference Poulton, Gibbon, Hanyani-Mlambo, Kydd, Maro, Nylandsted Larsen, Osorio, Tschirley and Zulu2004).

13 However, Benin represents a special case as regards the timing and nature of these liberalisation programmes, as we will discuss in the rest of the chapter.

14 The idea of taxation of African farmers goes back to Bates (Reference Bates1981).

15 Before 1999 Benin was divided into six departments: Atacora, Atlantique, Borgou, Mono, Ouémé, and Zou. In the 1999 reform each of these six department was divided into two departments, such that the country now includes twelve departments, as displayed in Map 5.1: Atacora has been split into Atacora and Donga; Atlantique into Atlantique and Litoral; Borgou into Borgou and Alibori; Mono into Mono and Couffo; Ouémé into Ouémé and Platteau; and Zou into Zou and Collines. Because of these changes it is difficult to trace the production of specific departments before 1999. Thus, when we refer to information related to Borgou department (before 1999) in the text we have in mind that this information also includes the Alibori department.

16 There was also a project in the central region, but it seems that more efforts were put into developing the northern region. For instance, in the 1980s and 1990s there were more projects for cotton development in the northern area.

17 Cotton was also encouraged in other former French colonies at that time. French entrepreneurs were motivated to do this because of difficulties in importing cotton from the USA (Fok, Reference Fok1993 and Kpadé and Boinon, Reference Kpadé and Boinon2011). For this purpose, they created the Association Cotonière Coloniale (ACC), which had a representative in each of the colonies. Emile Poisson was the representative for Benin at that time (D’Almeida-Topor, Reference D’Almeida-Topor1995 and Manning Reference Manning1980, Reference Manning1982).

18 In addition, farmers were coerced to produce cotton with the help of the colonial administration.

19 The construction of the first ginneries in the central region can be explained by the relative proximity of that region to the port of Cotonou, through which cotton lint is exported to France. The fact that the colonial power settled first in the central region before the northern region could be an additional reason.

20 1904 coincided with the period when Benin became a member of the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF), the federation of the eight French colonial territories in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo).

21 The Great Depression (1929) and World War II (1939–1945) also caused volatility in exports.

22 In 2001 the CFDT became Développement des Agro-Industries du Sud (DAGRIS).

23 The plans supported the development of agriculture, industry, infrastructure, and other public services. In agriculture, palm oil was promoted as well.

24 In September 1955 a stabilisation fund, the Caisse de Stabilisation des Prix du Coton de la Fédération de l’AOF (CSPC), was created to jointly manage the producer price in the francophone cotton-producing colonies in West Africa. CSPC set the producer price and was managed by the general government of AOF, based in Dakar. It was financed from cotton revenue, but also from subsidies received from the French textile marketing board (Fond de Soutien des Textiles). When AOF ceased to exist in 1958, CSPC was replaced in September 1959 by a new regional stabilisation fund (the Caisse de Stabilization Inter-Etats du Coton), which from then on was jointly managed by the West African francophone countries. We currently lack additional details on these funds.

25 There were many coups d’état that toppled several governments. For details see the Appendix to this chapter, Chapter 1, and Akindes (Reference Akindes2016).

26 Other agricultural products, especially palm oil, were supported as well. For this purpose, the parastatal organisation Société Nationale pour le Développement Rural du Dahomey (SONADER) was created in 1961 to take over the management of agricultural production in the country. Another parastatal organisation, the Office de Commercialisation Agricole du Dahomey (OCAD), was created in 1962 to take over the management of the other components of the supply chain for these products (primary marketing, transport, processing, and export).

27 We currently lack information on how the collection was organised before independence.

28 Specific decisions were also taken as regards farmers. In June 1962, for instance, the government introduced a law imposing collective land for agriculture (champs collectifs) in each village in Benin. The idea was that groups of village farmers would join forces to generate income that would be used to finance local infrastructure. Besides these collective lands, however, farmers cultivated their individual land. Similar practices of local public goods financing were imposed by the colonial authorities through the organisations Société Indigène de Prévoyance (SIP) in 1929 and the Sociétés Mutuelles de Développement Rural (SMDR) in the 1950s.

29 The FS was initiated in parallel with the regional fund CSPC, because the price support was seen to be insufficient for a number of cotton growers who followed illegal routes to export their production to neighbouring countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1962).

30 The lowest tax was applied to cotton (CFA Franc 0.010 per kg), whereas the highest was applied to groundnuts (CFA Franc 0.75 per kg). For palm oil products, the tax amounted to CFA Franc 0.10 per kg.

31 The French parastatals are locally known in Benin as Sociétés d’Intervention.

32 The major increase, however, took place after 1966, when the project’s operations really started (see Figure 5.1a). The delay was due to administrative and technical difficulties (World Bank, 1969). These problems were partly related to the political instability at the time.

33 The ginnery in Djougou become defective sometime in the 1960s or 1970s.

34 Other activities of the project included the creation of a fund to provide credit for inputs and equipment, the construction of two additional ginneries, and the rehabilitation of rural roads to facilitate the transport of cotton from the fields.

35 Project preparation started in 1967 and its implementation should have started earlier, in 1970, but political instability, characterised by many government changes, caused delays in its definition and approval. The rule of Colonel Christophe Soglo, who seized power through a coup in November 1965, was interrupted by a coup executed by Colonel Maurice Kouandoté on 17 December 1967, then followed by another military coup, this time at the initiative of Colonel Alphonse Alley on 21 December 1967. Alley organised a general election, the results of which were not validated, and Dr Émile Derlin Zinsou was finally appointed as the new president in July 1968. Thereafter, a new coup was executed by Kouandoté in December 1969, followed by a new general election in 1970, which was again contested. Thereafter emerged the triumvirate system of government first led by Hubert Maga (May 1970 to May 1972), then by Justin Ahomadégbé (May 1972 to 26 October 1972), and finally by Mathieu Kérékou. After Kérékou took power, several administrative bottlenecks delayed the effective start of the project till April 1973.

36 In the strategy developed by the government, GRVCs were expected to become CAETS at village level, which would themselves become CATS at commune (district) level. In practice, however, CAETS and CATS did not succeed and only GVs and GRVCs have survived today.

37 The CCCE is the French development cooperation agency, which holds a share in the CFDT. The CCCE became the Caisse Française de Développement (CFD) in 1992 and the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) in 1998.

38 The input supply was managed through a procurement system with international bidding. We do not currently have details about the firms that were assigned the import of input supply.

39 It seems that the government reduced subsidies on inputs during that period, but it is currently difficult to check this information.

40 TV is a management method for organising extension services in a way that establishes a personal relationship between an extension agent and a farmer. The extension agent regularly visits the farmer (every one or two weeks) to provide advice on any matter related to the activities in the production cycle. Unsolved problems are reported back to the extension service for advice or research to find solutions.

41 In the meantime, two ginneries were constructed for SONAPRA in Borgou to address the under-capacity problem: one in Banikoara and the other in Bemberekè. These were financed by IDA and CCCE.

42 The first parliamentary election took place in February 1991.

43 Only the declining residual share was procured by international firms.

44 See details of the letter in Soglo (Reference Soglo2018).

45 The devaluation also made the inputs more expensive in CFA Franc terms, but we do not have the necessary information to further pursue this analysis here.

46 It seems that the current President Talon was the owner of these three gin factories.

47 One of the new factories replaced the old government ginnery in Parakou.

48 For details on ownership and geographical locations of the gin factories, see Fludor Benin (2012) and Honfoga et al. (Reference Honfoga, Houssa, Dedehounaou, Bourguignon, Houssa, Platteau and Reding2019).

49 A lower producer share price following the CFA Franc devaluation was also observed in other West African countries. It was criticised and fuelled further pressure for reforming the cotton sector in these countries (e.g. Badiane et al., Reference Badiane, Ghura, Goreux and Masson2002, Baghdadli et al., Reference Baghdadli, Cheikhrouhou and Raballand2007).

50 The other critical functions include research for new variety development; quality control; production and distribution of cotton seed; statistical data production; and rural road maintenance.

51 During the survey the experts had to provide a score between a value of 0 (strongly negative opinion) and 4 (strongly positive opinion) on questions related to institutional performance. In addition, respondents were allowed to reply with ‘I do not know’ when they could not provide relevant answers to a question. The average score related to the reform in the agricultural sector was around 2 and 23 per cent of respondents either reported a neutral opinion or did not answer the question. See Chapter 3 for more detail.

54 The textile sector is currently less efficient, mainly because of electricity costs and excessive imports of second-hand clothes from Europe and Asia.

References

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