1 Smart Idealism and the Peace Formula: Introduction
1. See the CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/real-gdp-per-capita/country-comparison/).
2. See the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia).
3. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023 Report (https://freedomhouse.org/).
4. See Dominic Rohner. “COVID-19 and conflict: Major risks and policy responses.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 26, no. 3 (2020) (https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0043).
6. See Eugen Dimant, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks. “Paying them to hate US: The effect of US military aid on anti-American terrorism, 1968–2018.” Working Paper (2022) (https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3639277).
7. See Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu. “Bases, bullets, and ballots: The effect of US military aid on political conflict in Colombia.” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (2015): 249–267.
8. See Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian. “US food aid and civil conflict.” American Economic Review 104, no. 6 (2014): 1630–1666.
9. See Dominic Rohner and Alessandro Saia. “Education and conflict: Evidence from a policy experiment in Indonesia.” CEPR Discussion Paper 13509 (2019).
10. See Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter. “Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq.” Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 4 (2011): 766–819.
12. The video of the corresponding speech is available here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KESjF-W79Y.
2 Loss of Lives, Livelihoods and Love: Wars Are not Good Business
1. See Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg. “Organized violence 1989–2021 and drone warfare.” Journal of Peace Research 59, no. 4 (2022): 593–610.
3. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on “History of 1918 Flu Pandemic” (www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I) and Encyclopedia Britannica on “Casualties of World War I” (www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I).
4. See Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett. “Civil wars kill and maim people – long after the shooting stops.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003): 189–202.
5. See Charles H. Anderton and Jurgen Brauer. “Mass atrocities and their prevention.” Journal of Economic Literature 59, no. 4 (2021): 1240–1292.
6. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
7. See Hannes Mueller and Julia Tobias. “The cost of violence: Estimating the economic impact of conflict.” International Growth Centre (2016).
8. See Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes. The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. WW Norton & Company, 2008.
9. See Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal. “The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country.” American Economic Review 93, no. 1 (2003): 113–132.
10. See Encyclopedia Britannica on “ETA” (www.britannica.com/topic/ETA).
11. See Luis Garicano, Dominic Rohner and Beatrice Weder di Mauro (eds.). Global Economic Consequences of the War in Ukraine: Sanctions, Supply Chains and Sustainability. CEPR Press, 2022.
12. See Timothy Besley, Thiemo Fetzer and Hannes Mueller. “The welfare cost of lawlessness: Evidence from Somali piracy.” Journal of the European Economic Association 13, no. 2 (2015): 203–239.
13. See Massimo Guidolin and Eliana La Ferrara. “Diamonds are forever, wars are not: Is conflict bad for private firms?” American Economic Review 97, no. 5 (2007): 1978–1993.
14. See the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) country profile on “Angola (1975–2002).”
15. See Stefano Della Vigna and Elian La Ferrara. “Detecting Illegal Arms Trade,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 (2010): 26–57.
3 Vicious Cycles of Conflict: Why Wars Today Threaten Our Future
1. See Jose Galdo. “The long-run labor-market consequences of civil war: Evidence from the Shining Path in Peru.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 61, no. 4 (2013): 789–823.
2. See W. Martin James III. A Political History of the Civil War in Angola: 1974–1990. Transaction Publishers, 2011.
3. See Sirimal Abeyratne. “Economic roots of political conflict: The case of Sri Lanka.” World Economy 27, no. 8 (2004): 1295–1314; Nisha Arunatilake, Sisira Jayasuriya and Saman Kelegama. “The economic cost of the war in Sri Lanka.” World Development 29, no. 9 (2001): 1483–1500.
5. See Stephanie Oum, Jennifer Kates and Adam Wexler. “Economic Impact of COVID-19 on PEPFAR Countries.” KFF Global Health Policy (2022).
6. See Erhan Artuc, Guillermo Falcone, Guido Port and Bob Rijkers. “War-induced food price inflation imperils the poor.” In Luis Garicano, Dominic Rohner and Beatrice Weder (eds.), Global Economic Consequences of the War in Ukraine: Sanctions, Supply Chains and Sustainability. CEPR Press, 2022.
7. See Robert Putnam. Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. Simon and Schuster, 2001.
8. See Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Zilibotti. “War signals: A theory of trade, trust, and conflict.” Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 3 (2013): 1114–1147.
10. See Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Zilibotti. “Seeds of distrust: Conflict in Uganda.” Journal of Economic Growth 18 (2013): 217–252.
11. See Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Zilibotti. “War signals: A theory of trade, trust and conflict.” Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 3 (2013): 1114–1147.
12. See Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales. “Cultural biases in economic exchange?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, no. 3 (2009): 1095–1131.
13. See Vasiliki Fouka and Hans-Joachim Voth. “Collective remembrance and private choice: German–Greek conflict and behavior in times of crisis.” American Political Science Review 117, no. 3 (2023): 851–870.
14. See Gianmarco Leon. “Civil conflict and human capital accumulation: The long-term effects of political violence in Perú.” Journal of Human Resources 47, no. 4 (2012): 991–1022.
15. See Olga Shemyakina. “The effect of armed conflict on accumulation of schooling: Results from Tajikistan.” Journal of Development Economics 95, no. 2 (2011): 186–200.
16. See Saurabh Singhal. “Early life shocks and mental health: The long-term effect of war in Vietnam.” Journal of Development Economics 141 (2019): 102244.
17. See Eric B. Elbogen, Sally C. Johnson, H. Ryan Wagner, Connor Sullivan, Casey T. Taft and Jean C. Beckham. “Violent behaviour and post-traumatic stress disorder in US Iraq and Afghanistan veterans.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 204, no. 5 (2014): 368–375.
18. See Eric B. Elbogen, Sally C. Johnson, H. Ryan Wagner, Connor Sullivan, Casey T. Taft and Jean C. Beckham. “Violent behaviour and post-traumatic stress disorder in US Iraq and Afghanistan veterans.” The British Journal of Psychiatry 204, no. 5 (2014): 368–375.
19. See Mathieu Couttenier, Veronica Petrencu, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “The violent legacy of conflict: evidence on asylum seekers, crime, and public policy in Switzerland.” American Economic Review 109, no. 12 (2019): 4378–4425.
20. See Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “The elusive peace dividend of development policy: From war traps to macro complementarities.” Annual Review of Economics 13 (2021): 111–131.
4 Poverty, Populations and Petrol: Why Do People Fight?
1. See James D. Fearon. “Rationalist explanations for war.” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.
2. See Matthew O. Jackson and Massimo Morelli. “Political bias and war.” American Economic Review 97, no. 4 (2007): 1353–1373.
3. See Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett. “Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986.” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 624–638.
4. See Eoin McGuirk, Nathaniel Hilger and Nicholas Miller. “No kin in the game: Moral hazard and war in the US congress.” Journal of Political Economy 131, no. 9 (2023): 2370–2401.
5. See Dominic Rohner. “Mediation, military and money: The promises and pitfalls of outside interventions to end armed conflicts.” Journal of Economic Literature 62, no. 1 (2024): 155–195.
6. See Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti. “Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 4 (2004): 725–753.
7. See Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray. “On the measurement of polarization.” Econometrica 62, no. 4 (1994): 819–851; Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray. “Conflict and distribution.” Journal of Economic Theory 87, no. 2 (1999): 379–415.
8. See José G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. “Ethnic polarization, potential conflict, and civil wars.” American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 796–816; Joan Esteban, Laura Mayoral and Debraj Ray. “Ethnicity and conflict: An empirical study.” American Economic Review 102, no. 4 (2012): 1310–1342.
9. When it comes to the determinants of ethnic divisions in various countries, a key factor is the arbitrary border drawing imposed by colonial powers (see Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. “The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa.” American Economic Review 106, no. 7 (2016): 1802–1848).
10. See the numbers of the Federal Statistical Office (www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/languages-religions/languages.html).
11. See Thorsten, Rogall. “Mobilizing the masses for genocide.” American Economic Review 111, no. 1 (2021): 41–72.
12. See Hannes Mueller, Dominic Rohner and David Schönholzer. “Ethnic violence across space.” The Economic Journal 132, no. 642 (2022): 709–740.
15. See Francesco Caselli, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner. “The geography of interstate resource wars.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 1 (2015): 267–315.
16. See Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner. “Resource concentration and civil wars.” Journal of Development Economics 117 (2015): 32–47.
17. See Nicolas Berman, Mathieu Couttenier, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa.” American Economic Review 107, no. 6 (2017): 1564–1610.
18. See Oeindrila Dube and Juan F. Vargas. “Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia.” The Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 4 (2013): 1384–1421.
20. See Joan Esteban, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner. “Strategic mass killings.” Journal of Political Economy 123, no. 5 (2015): 1087–1132.
5 The Killer in the Boardroom: How Fighting Is Funded
2. See Massimo Guidolin and Eliana La Ferrara. “Diamonds are forever, wars are not: Is conflict bad for private firms?” American Economic Review 97, no. 5 (2007): 1978–1993.
3. See James D. Fearon. “Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 275–301.
4. See Michael D. König, Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Zilibotti. “Networks in conflict: Theory and evidence from the great war of Africa.” Econometrica 85, no. 4 (2017): 1093–1132.
5. The exact death toll of the Rwandan genocide is still debated in the academic literature. The recent work of André Guichaoua gives an account of the different fatality estimates. See for example André Guichaoua. “Counting the Rwandan victims of war and genocide: Concluding reflections.” Journal of Genocide Research 22, no. 1 (2020): 125–141.
7. See Nicolas Berman, Mathieu Couttenier, Dominic Rohner, and Mathias Thoenig. “This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa.” American Economic Review 107, no. 6 (2017): 1564–1610.
8. See Raul Sanchez de la Sierra. “On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo.” Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 1 (2020): 32–74.
9. See Oliver Vanden Eynde. “Targets of violence: Evidence from India’s naxalite conflict.” The Economic Journal 128, no. 609 (2018): 887–916.
6 Power to the People: Inclusive Democracy and Power-Sharing
2. See Encyclopedia Britannica, “Bloody Sunday” (www.britannica.com/event/Bloody-Sunday-Northern-Ireland-1972).
3. See Hannes Mueller and Dominic Rohner. “Can power-sharing foster peace? Evidence from Northern Ireland.” Economic Policy 33, no. 95 (2018): 447–484.
4. See Encyclopedia Britannica, “Omagh Bombing” (www.britannica.com/event/Omagh-bombing).
5. This illustrates well the multidimensionality of inclusion, where equal democratic representation needs to be guaranteed for everyone, independently of ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation or socioeconomic background, among others.
6. See Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min. “Why do ethnic groups rebel? New data and analysis.” World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 87–119.
7. See Andrea Marcucci, Dominic Rohner and Alessandro Saia. “Ballot or bullet: The impact of the UK’s Representation of the People Act on peace and prosperity.” The Economic Journal 133, no. 652 (2023): 1510–1536.
8. See Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo and James A. Robinson. “Democracy does cause growth.” Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 1 (2019): 47–100. See also their work on how colonial history affected institution building: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. “The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation.” American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401.
9. Ronald Wintrobe. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
10. See Jeremy Laurent-Lucchetti, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “Ethnic conflict and the informational dividend of democracy.” Journal of the European Economic Association 22, no. 1 (2024): 73–116.
12. See Michael Mann. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
13. See Joan Esteban, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner. “Strategic mass killings.” Journal of Political Economy 123, no. 5 (2015): 1087–1132.
14. See Rudolph J. Rummel. “Power, genocide and mass murder.” Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 1 (1994): 1–10, on page 1.
15. See Paul Collier and Dominic Rohner. “Democracy, development, and conflict.” Journal of the European Economic Association 6, no. 2–3 (2008): 531–540.
7 State Capacity for Stability
1. See Sarah M. Glaser, Paige M. Roberts and Kaija J. Hurlburt. “Foreign illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in Somali waters perpetuates conflict.” Frontiers in Marine Science 6 (2019): 704.
2. See Oriana Bandiera. “Land reform, the market for protection, and the origins of the Sicilian mafia: theory and evidence.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19, no. 1 (2003): 218–244.
3. See Paolo Buonanno, Ruben Durante, Giovanni Prarolo and Paolo Vanin. “Poor institutions, rich mines: Resource curse in the origins of the Sicilian mafia.” The Economic Journal 125, no. 586 (2015): F175-F202; Arcangelo Dimico, Alessia Isopi and Ola Olsson. “Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The market for lemons.” The Journal of Economic History 77, no. 4 (2017): 1083–1115.
4. See Daron Acemoglu, Giuseppe De Feo and Giacomo Davide De Luca. “Weak states: Causes and consequences of the Sicilian Mafia.” The Review of Economic Studies 87, no. 2 (2020): 537–581.
5. See Patrick Premand and Dominic Rohner. “Cash and Conflict: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence from Niger.” American Economic Review: Insights 6, no. 1 (2024): 137–153.
6. See Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter. “Can hearts and minds be bought? The economics of counterinsurgency in Iraq.” Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 4 (2011): 766–819; Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro and Erin Troland. “Modest, secure, and informed: Successful development in conflict zones.” American Economic Review 103, no. 3 (2013): 512–517.
7. See Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu. “Bases, bullets, and ballots: The effect of US military aid on political conflict in Colombia.” The Journal of Politics 77, no. 1 (2015): 249–267.
8. See Eugen Dimant, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks. “Paying them to hate US: The effect of US military aid on anti-American terrorism.” Working Paper (2022) (http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3639277).
9. See Navin A. Bapat. “Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent.” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 3 (2011): 303–318.
10. See Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon. “United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection in civil war.” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 4 (2013): 875–891; Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon. “Beyond keeping peace: United Nations effectiveness in the midst of fighting.” American Political Science Review 108, no. 4 (2014): 737–753; Andrea Ruggeri, Han Dorussen and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis. “Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict.” International Organization 71, no. 1 (2017): 163–185; Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman and Desirée Nilsson. “Protection through presence: UN peacekeeping and the costs of targeting civilians.” International Organization 73, no. 1 (2019): 103–131.
11. See Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. Princeton University Press, 2011.
12. See Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene and Ragnar Torvik. “Institutions and the resource curse.” The Economic Journal 116, no. 508 (2006): 1–20.
13. See Charles Tilly. Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992. Blackwell, 1992.
14. See Kai Gehring. “Can external threats foster a European Union identity? Evidence from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.” The Economic Journal 132, no. 644 (2022): 1489–1516.
15. See Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara. “Participation in heterogeneous communities.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 3 (2000): 847–904.
16. See Dominic Rohner and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “Nation Building: What Could Possibly Go Wrong?” In Dominic Rohner and Ekaterina Zhuravskay (eds), Nation Building: Big Lessons from Successes and Failures. CEPR Press, 2023.
17. See Bruno Caprettini and Hans-Joachim Voth. “New Deal, New Patriots: How 1930s Government Spending Boosted Patriotism During World War II.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 138, no. 1 (2023): 465–513.
8 Plenty Makes Peace: Education, Health and Labor Market Policies
1. See Bénédicte de la Brière, Deon Filmer, Dena Ringold, Dominic Rohner and Anastasiya Denisova. From Mines and Wells to Well-built Minds: Turning Sub-Saharan Africa’s Natural Resource Wealth into Human Capital. World Bank Publications, 2017.
2. See Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris. “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash.” Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper 16-026 (2016).
3. See Dominic Rohner and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, eds. Nation Building: Big Lessons from Successes and Failures. CEPR Press, 2023.
4. See Clayton L. Thyne. “ABC’s, 123’s, and the golden rule: The pacifying effect of education on civil war, 1980–1999.” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2006): 733–754.
5. See Esther Duflo. “Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an unusual policy experiment.” American Economic Review 91, no. 4 (2001): 795–813; Dominic Rohner and Alessandro Saia. “Education and conflict: Evidence from a policy experiment in Indonesia.” CEPR Discussion Paper DP13509 (2019).
6. See Madhuri Agarwal, Vikram Bahure, Katja Bergonzoli and Souparna Maji. “Education and domestic violence: Evidence from a school construction program in India.” SITES Working Paper No. 17 (2023).
7. See Willa Friedman, Michael Kremer, Edward Miguel and Rebecca Thornton. “Education as liberation?” Economica 83, no. 329 (2016): 1–30.
8. See Matteo Cervellati, Uwe Sunde and Simona Valmori. “Pathogens, weather shocks and civil conflicts.” The Economic Journal 127, no. 607 (2017): 2581–2616.
9. See Andrea Berlanda, Matteo Cervellati, Elena Esposito, Dominic Rohner and Uwe Sunde. “Medication against conflict.” CEPR Discussion Paper DP17125 (2022).
10. See Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan. “Can employment reduce lawlessness and rebellion? A field experiment with high-risk men in a fragile state.” American Political Science Review 110, no. 1 (2016): 1–17.
11. See Thiemo Fetzer. “Can workfare programs moderate conflict? Evidence from India.” Journal of the European Economic Association 18, no. 6 (2020): 3337–3375.
12. See Mathieu Couttenier, Veronica Petrencu, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “The violent legacy of conflict: evidence on asylum seekers, crime, and public policy in Switzerland.” American Economic Review 109, no. 12 (2019): 4378–4425.
13. See Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter and Patrick B. Johnston. “Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines.” Journal of Development Economics 118 (2016): 171–182.
9 Forgiving Not Fighting: Fostering Trust and Reconciliation
1. See Encyclopedia Britannica, “Rwanda genocide of 1994” (www.britannica.com/print/article/1762747).
3. See David Yanagizawa-Drott. “Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 4 (2014): 1947–1994.
4. See Dominic Rohner, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Zilibotti. “War signals: A theory of trade, trust, and conflict.” Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 3 (2013): 1114–1147.
5. See Charles de Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
6. See Saumitra Jha. “Trade, institutions, and ethnic tolerance: Evidence from South Asia.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (2013): 806–832.
7. See Julio Cáceres-Delpiano, Antoni-Italo De Moragas, Gabriel Facchini and Ignacio González. “Intergroup contact and nation building: Evidence from military service in Spain.” Journal of Public Economics 201 (2021): 104477.
8. See Oyebola Okunogbe. “Does exposure to other ethnic regions promote national integration?: Evidence from Nigeria.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 16, no. 1 (2024): 157–192.
9. See Salma Mousa. “Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims through soccer in post-ISIS Iraq.” Science 369, no. 6505 (2020): 866–870.
10. See Emilio Depetris-Chauvin, Ruben Durante and Filipe Campante. “Building nations through shared experiences: Evidence from African football.” American Economic Review 110, no. 5 (2020): 1572–1602.
11. See Jacobus Cilliers, Oeindrila Dube and Bilal Siddiqi. “Reconciling after civil conflict increases social capital but decreases individual well-being.” Science 352, no. 6287 (2016): 787–794.
12. See Arthur Blouin and Sharun W. Mukand. “Erasing ethnicity? Propaganda, nation building, and identity in Rwanda.” Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 3 (2019): 1008–1062.
13. See https://rsf.org/en/index.
14. See Elena Esposito, Tiziano Rotesi, Alessandro Saia and Mathias Thoenig. “Reconciliation narratives: The birth of a nation after the us civil war.” American Economic Review 113, no. 6 (2023): 1461–1504.
15. See Elizabeth Levy Paluck and Donald P. Green. “Deference, dissent, and dispute resolution: An experimental intervention using mass media to change norms and behavior in Rwanda.” American Political Science Review 103, no. 4 (2009): 622–644.
10 A Role for All of Us? smart idealism, Global Public Opinion and International Support for Peace
2. See Joan Esteban, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner. “Strategic mass killings.” Journal of Political Economy 123, no. 5 (2015): 1087–1132.
3. See Encyclopedia Britannica on “Khmer Rouge” (www.britannica.com/print/article/316738).
4. See Leonard Wantchekon, Marko Klašnja and Natalija Novta. “Education and human capital externalities: evidence from colonial Benin.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 2 (2015): 703–757.
6. See Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. “The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 4 (2002): 1415–1451.
7. See David Strömberg. “Radio’s impact on public spending.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 1 (2004): 189–221.
8. See Thomas Eisensee and David Strömberg. “News droughts, news floods, and US disaster relief.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 2 (2007): 693–728.
9. A recent edition is Bertolt Brecht, Die Dreigroschenoper. Suhrkamp, 2021.
10. See Ruben Durante and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2018). “Attack when the world is not watching? US news and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Journal of Political Economy, 126(3), 1085–1133.
11. See Siwan Anderson, Patrick Francois, Dominic Rohner and Rogerio Santarrosa. “Hidden hostility: donor attention and political violence.” United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2022.
11 Global Coordination to Curb Conflict
3. Anjan Sundaram. Breakup: A Marriage in Wartime. Catapult, 2023.
4. See Christine Binzel, Dietmar Fehr and Andreas Link. “Can International Initiatives Promote Peace? Diamond Certification and Armed Conflicts in Africa.” Working Paper (2023) (https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4567734).
5. See Nicolas Berman, Mathieu Couttenier, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa.” American Economic Review 107, no. 6 (2017): 1564–1610.
6. See Tommaso Sonno. “Globalization and conflicts: The good, the bad and the ugly of corporations in Africa.” CEP Discussion Paper No. 1670 (2020).
7. See Frederik Noack, Dominic Rohner and Tommaso Sonno, “Multinationals vs Mother Nature? The Impact of Multinational Firms on the Environment,” preprint (2023).
8. See Mathieu Couttenier, Veronica Petrencu, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “The violent legacy of conflict: Evidence on asylum seekers, crime, and public policy in Switzerland.” American Economic Review 109, no. 12 (2019): 4378–4425.
9. See Quentin Gallea. “Weapons and war: The effect of arms transfers on internal conflict.” Journal of Development Economics 160 (2023): 103001.
11. See Solomon William Polachek. “Conflict and trade.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 55–78.
12. See Martin, Philippe, Thierry Mayer, and Mathias Thoenig. “Make trade not war?” The Review of Economic Studies 75, no. 3 (2008): 865–900.
13. See Mathias Thoenig. “Trade policy in the shadow of war: A quantitative toolkit for geoeconomics.” In Massimo Morelli, Debraj Ray, Tomas Sjostrom and Oeindrila Dube (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Conflict, 1st edition. Elsevier, 2024.
14. See Quentin Gallea and Dominic Rohner. “Globalization mitigates the risk of conflict caused by strategic territory.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 39 (2021): e2105624118.
15. See Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. Cambridge University Press, 1970.
16. See Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett. “Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986.” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 624–638.
17. Freedom House. “Freedom in the world 2023: Marking 50 years in the struggle for democracy.” Report (2023).
18. See Christian Gollier and Dominic Rohner (eds.). Peace not Pollution: How Going Green Can Tackle Climate Change and Toxic Politics. CEPR Press (2023).
19. See Marshall Burke, Solomon M. Hsiang and Edward Miguel. “Climate and conflict.” Annual Review of Economics 7, no. 1 (2015): 577–617.
20. See Ulrich J. Eberle, Dominic Rohner and Mathias Thoenig. “Heat and Hate: Climate security and farmer-herder conflicts in Africa.” Working Paper (2020); Eoin F. McGuirk and Nathan Nunn. “Transhumant pastoralism, climate change, and conflict in Africa.” Review of Economic Studies (2024) (https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae027).
21. See Kai Gehring and Paul Schaudt. “Insuring peace: Index-based livestock insurance, droughts, and conflict.” CESifo Working Paper No. 10423 (2023).
12 Conclusion
1. See Hannes Mueller and Julia Tobias. “The cost of violence: Estimating the economic impact of conflict.” International Growth Centre (2016).
2. See Dominic Rohner, Michael Lehning, Julia Steinberger, Nicolas Tetreault and Evelina Trutnevyte. “Decentralized green energy transition promotes peace.” Frontiers in Environmental Science 11 (2023): 1118987.
