For living beings inhabiting the finite created world, time is inescapable. It shapes every aspect of our lives and permeates even the most basic theological questions concerning the relationship between God and creation. Something so challenging and so ubiquitous deserves our attention, even if it is notoriously nebulous and difficult to pin down. This work has been an attempt to explore the relationship between the deeply interconnected issues of time and salvation. My particular focus has been on the problem of personal salvific transformation in the seemingly static world of the block universe.
I set out to identify the specific problems posed for salvation by Einstein’s relativity theories – and the block universe model of spatiotemporal reality that they support – and reconstruct Paul Tillich’s doctrine of salvation in light of what was learned. This was motivated in part out of a desire to identify and address general problems for any form of salvation that requires a transformation in time. Though Tillich was my theological interlocutor, the problems I identify are relevant to personal salvation in a much broader sense. I was also motivated to embark upon this project by Tillich’s own words. Tillich encourages his readers to use the theological system presented in Systematic Theology (ST) as a point of departure; a starting point from which one can advance along the unending road towards deeper understanding (Tillich Reference Tillich1964, vii). This project sought to do just that.
The overarching structure of this work reflects Tillich’s method of correlation – philosophical questions are identified and are then correlated with theological answers. I began the present work by setting the metaphysical scene, presenting McTaggart’s famous argument for the unreality of time and the influential ‘A-series’, ‘B-series’, and ‘C-series’ introduced therein. I agreed with McTaggart that the A-series contains deep structural problems that render it uncompelling and rejected Craig’s claim that belief in the passage of time is properly basic. Instead, I argued that McTaggart’s argument provides a logical defeater of the passage of time.
I then turned to the best empirical evidence for the B-series and C-series, and the block universe model that has been built upon them, namely Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (SR). I traced the history of the physics of time from Newton to Einstein, drawing attention to the particular features of SR that undermine the core claims of the A-theory. The relativity of simultaneity and time dilation, I argued, dissolve the notion of a global now that is so integral to the A-theory’s success. Two rival interpretations of SR were considered, namely the block universe spacetime interpretation of Einstein and Minkowski and the A-theoretic neo-Lorentzian interpretation of William Lane Craig. Craig’s neo-Lorentzianism was found wanting on both scientific and theological grounds. This empirical evidence offers, I argued, a rebutting defeater against belief in the A-theory as it provides good evidence against the A-theoretic commitment to an absolute, universal now.
I then turned to General Relativity (GR). Though SR tends to play less of a leading role in temporal metaphysics, GR is the more fundamental theory. Therefore, if GR is compatible with the A-theory, then the block theorist faces a problem. Richard Swinburne, amongst others in the literature, argues that Friedman–Lemaître–Robertson–Walker (FLRW) solutions of GR save the A-theory by introducing an extra structure that is sufficient to ground an objective present moment. This structure, cosmic time, is held as a standard of absolute time against which local times can be measured. Swinburne claims that this reintroduces the possibility of absolute simultaneity and a global now, thus vindicating the A-theory. Swinburne’s argument, and the caesium clock thought experiment intended to demonstrate its operational coherence, was shown to induce a dilemma neither horn of which is acceptable. The first horn commits one to the claim that cosmic time is sharply distinct from local time and is thus phenomenologically inaccessible. The second horn holds that cosmic time is phenomenologically accessible, but as such operates over the same domain as local time. Neither horn generates favourable conclusions for the A-theorist. As such, I concluded that GR gives no further reason to be an A-theorist than metaphysics or SR provides. Both these theories actually offer powerful defeaters of the A-theory.
In Chapter 4, I presented and assessed two rival block theoretic explanations of passage phenomenology: Veridicalism defined and defended by Natalja Deng, and the Illusionism of Adolf Grünbaum. I argued that Illusionism was the better explanation as it took our experience of passage seriously, whereas Veridicalism either failed to do this or collapsed back into the Illusionism it sought to replace. Block theoretic explanations of temporal passage function as undercutting defeaters for belief in the A-theory – they undermine one of the strongest reasons to endorse it (i.e. our pervasive and persuasive first-person temporal experience). This concluded my case for the coherence and explanatory power of the block universe. A key concept for the final analysis, namely mind-dependent becoming, was introduced as the means by which dynamic experience is generated from static temporal ontology. From the end of Part I onwards, I accept the block universe as the best metaphysical model of time on offer.
Part I served a dual purpose. First, it contained an extended argument for the block universe that drew upon metaphysics, physics, and experience. Together, these provide both defeaters of the A-theory of time and reasons for endorsing the alternative block universe. Second, Part I raised the philosophical questions that are to be addressed in Part II. What is time? Does reality allow the type of change required for a personal salvific transformation? How might we understand such a dynamic transformation in a seemingly static world? The method of correlation dictates that theology, at least to some degree, ought to be written in response to the most pressing questions in our cultural milieu. Part I sought to identify these. At its close, we were ready to turn to the theological answers found in Paul Tillich’s Systematic Theology.
In Part II, I turned to ST in search of answers to the aforementioned philosophical questions. I began by setting out Tillich’s method of correlation, as this methodology is fundamental to both his work and my own. I then explicated the core themes of ST, going through the work volume by volume. This was necessary because each aspect of Tillich’s theological system is related fundamentally to the whole. This point is frequently reiterated through the term ‘theological circle’ – commitment to the Christian message as a matter of faith enters one into a (non-vicious) circle in which the beliefs are mutually self-consistent. Therefore, examining one feature of the system illuminates all the others. Similarly, to properly understand one aspect, in this case the doctrine of salvation, one must understand the larger whole of which it is part.
Following a general overview of ST, we were able to delve deeper into Tillich’s doctrine of salvation presented in Existence and the Christ. I argued that though Tillich defines salvation as the transformation from Old Being to New Being, and thus his soteriology seems committed to an ontological transformation, the psychological dimensions of this process are the more significant. His existentialist framing of fallenness leads to an existential understanding of salvation – existence, and the failure to actualise potential, fear of meaninglessness, and the threat of non-being, causes deep anxiety. This is Old Being. Christ represents the soteriological potential latent in humanity by uniting that which finite existence draws asunder. He is God and human; he is the fullest realisation of human potential; he took on the conditions of existence and overcame them. In so doing, he embodied New Being and showed the rest of humanity that such a thing is possible.
Tillich repeatedly emphasises the psychological healing power of Christ the redeemer whose soteriological significance sits in the context of putatively universal human experiences of estrangement and anxiety. Christ brings atonement by embodying the unity of essential humanity with the actuality of fallen human existence. He unites that which was separated: God and humanity; humanity and the fullest realisation of its latent potential. I argued that the significance of this for personal salvation is in the psychological consequences of New Being, namely an alleviation of anxiety, alienation, guilt, fear of meaninglessness, and the relational consequences of New Being, namely reconciliation to God. At this point, the existentialist concerns that dominated their previous mode of existence melt away.
Constructive communication between science and theology on the matters of time and salvation was the primary theological goal of this work. Chapter 7 contains my original contribution to this neglected debate – the argument for mind-dependent salvific becoming that occurs via qualitative change. I argued that, given a tenseless theory of time, Tillich’s doctrine of salvation as the transformation from Old Being to New Being should be read as denoting mind-dependent salvific becoming, which I describe as a qualitative change. This hangs on a reading of Tillich’s soteriology that emphasises the psychological, existential, and relational dimensions of fallenness and salvation over and above the ontological dimensions. My argument had two stages. The first, employing an argument from Carl Hoefer, showed that free choice can be compatible with a block universe. The second utilised the work of Adolf Grünbaum to argue that the precise mechanism of salvific change is best conceived as mind-dependent becoming. I then argued that in order for Tillich’s work to be coherent in light of relativity and the block universe, the type of becoming salvation required must be a qualitative, not a robust, change.
Through Carl Hoefer’s argument for ‘freedom from the inside out’, I explain how individuals are free to respond to the grasping power of the Spirit and attain salvation. Hoefer argues that free action is generated by individuals and not determined by prior regions of the block universe. The standard block universe view appears hostile to the kind of counterfactual choice required for libertarian freedom. Hoefer, however, uses John Dupré’s concept of downward causation to explain how free action can be causally efficacious in the block universe. Downward causation holds that higher level processing, namely our choices and intentions, is the primary explanation for the effects produced on the ‘lower’ ontological levels, namely our actions. Thus, human agents are free to make soteriologically meaningful choices within the block universe.
After showing that freedom can exist in the block universe, I explicated my argument for mind-dependent salvific becoming. Using Grünbaum’s concept of mind-dependent becoming, I argued that a salvation-transformation should be understood as a subjective, qualitative, phenomenological change. This claim sits somewhat comfortably in the historical tradition of Christian theology, insofar as salvific change comes from within and is of the mind/soul, but I offer an alternative route to arriving at this long-held conclusion. Though this change is qualitative and not robust, the Christian need not fear that salvation must be unreal or unconnected to God. The block universe prohibits robust, ontological change, as persons exist as four-dimensional worms extended in Minkowski spacetime. Therefore, an individual tenselessly possesses all their properties, though these are spread out at different points on their world-line. When human consciousness is contemporaneous with certain points in which they are fallen, their psychological existence will be coloured by the existentialist consequences of fallenness Tillich identifies.
Importantly, this does not mean that salvation itself is illusory, though the argument uses concepts from Illusionism. The individual can still be understood as being objectively saved. On this matter, Tillich’s claims have been preserved. Yet that this change is objective, robust, or ontological is illusory. This is an inevitable consequence of life in the block universe in which all moments of your life are laid out eternally in four-dimensional Minkowski spacetime. No moment is ontologically privileged, though your consciousness picks out phenomenologically immediate points along your world-line. Through experiencing your life-events successively, you experience qualitative change. I applied this to salvation. Though this may be a weaker form of soteriological change than some may like, it is the best possible model within a block universe. A static spatiotemporal ontology poses a genuine threat to the possibility of personal salvation under the conditions of existence insofar as it is hostile to robust change. If such a model is true, then I argue this is the most compelling explanation for a salvation-transformation available. Moreover, it is an appropriate reinterpretation of Paul Tillich’s doctrine of personal salvation in the block universe.
Areas for Future Research
A single book cannot hope to cover all the important issues that arise in relation to the chosen subject matter. As my interdisciplinary project involves a multiplicity of topics and each of them is incredibly broad, much has had to be left aside for future work. An entire book could be devoted to each of the principal areas I address here, namely the metaphysics of time, the philosophy of Special and General Relativity, the phenomenology of temporal experience, systematic theology, and soteriology. Inevitably, questions will have arisen that I am unable to answer here. In this final section, I identify some areas for future research.
Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Gravity
For the purposes of this present work, I decided to stay within the boundaries of so-called classical (i.e. non-quantum) physics. Einstein’s relativity theories have received a century’s worth of empirical and theoretical scrutiny, and there is relatively little disagreement about their most fundamental claims. There are merits and pitfalls in this approach, but when working within the philosophy of any science one must select certain theories over others with which to engage. The strengths of favouring the relativity theories are that the metaphysical argumentation stands on empirically solid foundations, and the theories are highly successful in their domains of application. The weakness of this approach, however, is clear. Both theories of relativity are at best approximately true, as they are yet to be reconciled with Quantum Mechanics (QM).
QM is a formal theory with several interpretations. Until disputes between rival interpretations, each of which paints a slightly different picture of the nature of time, are resolved, time remains an open question. Answers may only be provided when a quantum theory of gravity is developed, in which a relativistic understanding of spacetime is incorporated into QM.Footnote 1 When describing the large-scale interactions of massive bodies in curved spacetime, GR models time as continuous. QM describes the counter-intuitive behaviour of sub-atomic systems; it introduces discreteness into a multiplicity of properties, for example energy and length. The need to reconcile what these disparate understandings mean for time is known as the problem of time (Anderson Reference Anderson2017) (Muga et al. Reference Muga, Sala Mayato and Egusquiza2008). In recent years, several possibilities have been advanced.
One possibility, advanced by Carlo Rovelli, holds that a fruitful search for a quantum theory of gravity requires physicists to forget time. Rovelli argues that to give a fundamental description of nature ‘we must forget the notion of time altogether, and build a quantum theory of gravity where this notion does not appear at all’ (Rovelli Reference Rovelli2009, 1). Time may then be reconstructed in particular situations, despite the fact that it must disappear when moving to a deeper level of description. Rovelli urges his colleagues to take GR’s lack of a preferred independent time notion seriously, viewing mechanics as describing the relative evolution of variables (and not, as in the Newtonian picture, the evolution of a system in absolute time). Time, then, is understood as an emergent property of macroscopic systems that is not present or effectual at the level of quantum physics. Julian Barbour goes even further than Rovelli’s claim that time is not fundamental, arguing that time is not actually real at all (Barbour Reference Barbour1994) (Barbour Reference Barbour1999) (Barbour Reference Barbour2009). For further arguments that time is non-fundamental, see (Huggett and Wuthrich Reference Huggett and Wuthrich2013, 276–285).
An opposing view, that time is irreducible and cannot be left out of fundamental descriptions of nature, is advocated by Lee Smolin. Smolin argues that the problem of time can be resolved by reformulating the basic mathematical framework used in classical and quantum physics, as opposed to eliminating time as a fundamental concept (Smolin Reference Smolin2000, 3). In effect, by incorporating observers into complex quantum descriptions of the universe, time is shown to be fundamental. He claims that arguments that deny this fail to recognise the observations and experiences of real observers within the universe.
Smolin describes Quantum Cosmology in terms of histories. Whilst a conventional quantum system requires only one observer to take a measurement of the whole system, the cosmos is far larger, more complex, and has a greater number of variables. Because a quantum description of the cosmos requires multiple simultaneous observations to be made by multiple observers, it need not be conceived of as static, as conventional quantum systems tend to be. Instead, the causal structure of the history of the universe defines a context, and observers experience the reality of time within this context (Smolin Reference Smolin2000, 24). By reconceptualising quantum physics to accommodate real observers, Smolin argues that time’s fundamentality is recovered.Footnote 2 On Smolin’s view, time is the most fundamental feature of reality – everything else, including the laws of physics themselves, emerge from and evolve in time.
As is clear, the so-called problem of time is very much an open question.Footnote 3 QM operates over the sub-atomic realm and paints an entirely different metaphysical picture than the relativistic one. Until a quantum theory of gravity is formulated, many metaphysical questions relating to the nature of time must remain open. The search for a quantum theory of gravity is a highly speculative science at the present stage, with multifarious alternatives (that are often diametrically opposed on key issues) abounding.
Baptise Le Bihan disagrees, arguing recently that the search for a quantum theory of gravity can yield important metaphysics now. Whilst he acknowledges that it is difficult to ‘defend a particular ontological interpretation’, he argues ‘that looking at research programs in Quantum Gravity allows us to take a step back in order to evaluate which part of the quantum and relativistic revolutions are – beyond reasonable doubt – to be preserved in the future’ (Le Bihan Reference Le Bihan2020, 2). Though this is undoubtedly interesting and valuable work, I believe it is too speculative an area upon which to build a project such as this one. I have decided to remain on the sturdier ground provided by relativity.
Quantum Gravity may well answer some of the open questions in the philosophical and physical enquiries into the nature of time. Alternatively, it may open a whole new set of debates. Until this unified theory is developed, it will be impossible to answer temporal questions with certainty. For this reason, QM and Quantum Gravity have been left to one side for the purposes of this project. I have written on these issues elsewhere and hope to develop my thoughts on this further in future work (Qureshi-Hurst and Pearson Reference Qureshi-Hurst and Pearson2020) (Qureshi-Hurst Reference Qureshi-Hurst2020).
Past Salvation, Future Salvation, and Cosmic Salvation
As Alister McGrath notes, the Pauline literature ‘sees salvation as having past (e.g. Romans 8:24), present (e.g. 1 Corinthians 1:18), and future (e.g. Romans 13:11) dimensions’ (McGrath Reference McGrath2014, 94). This scriptural sentiment echoes down Christian tradition. I have been primarily concerned with present salvation here, though I have considered elements of past salvation insofar as I discuss the Christ event bringing the possibility of salvation into the cosmos at a fixed point in history. Nevertheless, there is much more work to be done to assess the implications of the block universe for the notion of past salvation. Comfortingly for the Christian, the block universe dictates that Christ physically exists in a distant spatiotemporal region. He has not left the finite realm of human existence completely, as he would if presentism were true. This gives metaphysical weight to his claim that ‘I am with you always, even to the end of the age’ (Matthew 28:20). Christ’s redemptive presence is secured; he will remain within the physical universe until the eschaton. However, this also means that every version of each person is also ‘out there’, each as real as the others. In what sense might one say the saved version of you should take precedence? That the saved version of you is the final version of you depends on the claim that later than events have priority over earlier than events. This fact cannot be substantiated by the metaphysics of the block universe alone – in order to establish that the (relational) past version of you is not the final version of you, a relation of precedence of ordered events must be introduced. This type of approach has already been explored by Le Poidevin via the asymmetric nature of causal relations (Le Poidevin Reference Le Poidevin2016). An additional, related, problem is that in the block universe past sin cannot be eliminated (viz. it cannot vanish out of existence) and so, the argument goes, it is never truly overcome. Andrew Hollingsworth has taken on this problem, arguing that the elimination of sin and evil is essential to the Christian story. As such, one ought to endorse presentism, the only temporal ontology that denies the concrete existence of past moments and so allows for the total elimination of sin and evil from the world (Hollingsworth Reference Hollingsworth2023). It remains to be seen whether a robust response to the problem of the elimination of sin that affirms the block universe can be developed. Future scholars may wish to delve deeper into these issues.
Moreover, the type of salvation with which I am concerned is present, personal salvation experienced in an individual’s lifetime. The future question of life after death has been set to one side. This is partly due to Tillich’s limited treatment of the issue, and partly due to its tangential relevance to the issue of time. Christian theology generally holds that heaven and hell exist outside the spatiotemporal realm, and so a book on the nature of time and salvation cannot consider these. Nevertheless, there is scope for important future work on the issue. Scripture speaks of a bodily resurrection. Though Tillich does not place the soteriological emphasis on physical, bodily resurrection, this point cannot go unacknowledged. More work needs to be done to establish a model for bodily salvation given a block universe. Whilst there is no space for this here, it is worth noting that in a block universe the body of a deceased person does not vanish into a non-existent past as it would with presentism. So, the concept of bodily resurrection is coherent within the block universe, as the body is in principle recoverable.
As my focus in this book was the personal salvation that, according to Christianity, occurs within spatiotemporal reality, as opposed to the eschatological redemption that Christians believe happens after or outside spatiotemporal reality, I was unable to consider eschatologies that focus on future transformations occurring at the end of time. The Pauline scheme, for example, sees the future eschaton as the decisive act of divine salvation, at which point the dead are to be raised together and judged. Crucially in Paul, the resurrection of Jesus is the token (in historical time) that this decisive salvific event will come to pass (in the eschatological future). This futurist tradition has occupied the centre stage in much of Christian thought, appearing, for example, in the Nicene and Apostles’ Creeds. If one sees salvation largely in terms of a future transformation of spatiotemporal creation, at which point it becomes an entirely new creation, then the temporal structure of this creation is at best tangentially relevant, since its salvation consists in a total transformation in the eschatological future. On this understanding of eschatology, the block universe is not unduly problematic, and so consideration of such eschatologies fell outside the scope of this work.
Other science and religion scholars have considered the relationship between time and eschatology, however, specifically relating to the infamous question of ‘freeze or fry’ in Big Bang cosmology. According to contemporary cosmology, the universe is destined either to expand and cool into an uninhabitable soup of high-entropy radiation or collapse back in on itself in another infinitely hot, dense, and lethal Big Bang (Russell Reference Russell and Walls2007, 565–566). Either option means the end of the world and the destruction of its contents, presenting a serious challenge to any Christian eschatology that involves the bodily resurrection of Jesus and the transformation of the universe into the new creation. Robert Russell, John Polkinghorne, and David Wilkinson have all responded with arguments that the resurrection of Jesus should be understood as the starting point for an eschatological model of transformation of this cosmos into a new creation (Polkinghorne Reference Polkinghorne2002) (Russell Reference Russell2008) (Russell Reference Russell2012) (Wilkinson Reference Wilkinson2010). I explore this literature in depth in my book God, Salvation, and the Problem of Spacetime, and I encourage readers to look there to learn more about these fascinating questions (Qureshi-Hurst Reference Qureshi-Hurst2022d).
As my focus has been on salvation for the individual, experienced in an individual life, eschatological questions regarding future salvation and cosmic salvation remain open. The question remains: what would my reinterpretation mean for the salvation of the world? By ‘world’, I mean both physical cosmos and non-human animals. Tillich puts the concern this way:
The problem [of the relation between man and nature] is most urgent when Christian theology deals with the fall and salvation of the world. Does ‘world’ refer to the human race alone? And, if so, can the human race be separated from other beings? Where is the boundary line in the general biological development; where is the boundary line in the development in the individual man? Is it possible to separate the nature which belongs to him through his body from universal nature? Does the unconscious realm of man’s personality belong to nature or to man? Does the collective unconscious admit of isolation of the individual from the other individuals and from the whole of living substance?
When considering such questions, one may well bring in insights from evolutionary biology. If there is no clear boundary line that denotes a difference in kind between humanity and non-human animals with respect to certain soteriologically salient properties, then theologians will have to face the question of non-human salvation. Tillich’s preliminary answer is this: ‘these questions show that the element of participation in the polarity of individualisation and participation must be considered much more seriously with respect to the mutual participation of nature and man. Here theology should learn from modern naturalism, which at this point can serve as an introduction to a half-forgotten theological truth. What happens in the microcosm happens by mutual participation in the macro-cosmos, for being-itself is one’ (Tillich Reference Tillich1951, 290). Here we see Tillich’s enthusiasm for a more integrated world view that included a broader swathe of the natural world than traditional Christian theology has previously included. The relationship between cosmic salvation, the natural world, and the nature of time is outside the scope of these pages. It is certainly a potential area for future work, both in Tillich scholarship and theology more widely. My own feeling is that humanity has seen itself as occupying a moral status far above our non-human Earthly companions for too long, and with extremely damaging consequences. As our scientific understanding of non-human animals develops, we see more and more similarities emerging between non-human animals and ourselves. Many non-human animals appear to possess properties of the kind that make them beings worthy of moral consideration. Perhaps it is time to develop robust animal soteriologies and rectify this exclusion of our non-human kin.
Final Remarks
In the preceding pages, I have brought together soteriology and the physics and metaphysics of time in an original, though not unprecedented or unjustified, way. The result has been, I hope, a thorough and empirically sound reconstruction of Tillich’s doctrine of salvation. I hope to have been radical in my re-reading of doctrine whilst remaining faithful to the core claims set out in ST. Tillich encourages this sort of dialogue between theology and culture, including science and philosophy, and here I have taken up the baton. By bringing his theological system into conversation with metaphysics, physics, and phenomenology, I hope also to have demonstrated how valuable the method of correlation can be for those of us doing ‘science and religion’.
I argued at the outset that understanding the nature of time is of utmost importance to a comprehensive account of personal salvation, as both require the reality of change. I have not only shown this throughout the preceding pages, but I have also provided a truly novel solution to the problems identified. Debates on the nature of time are far from conclusive, and scientific advancements may yet undermine relativity’s depiction of time. For now, however, I believe that the block universe stands on firm ground, and a reading of Tillich’s soteriology through this lens offers a deeper understanding of his central claims.
Embarking upon a project of this breadth – drawing upon physics, philosophy, and theology – has taught me the value of true interdisciplinarity, and the result of such an endeavour is more than the sum of its parts. It is my belief that academic disciplines ought to have porous boundaries, and those who work in the academy ought to be willing to converse with other disciplines in a deep, sustained, and responsive way. Only with this kind of dialogue can we reach the richest type of understanding. Perhaps the method of correlation can help with this, at least in my own fields of science and religion and the philosophy of religion. I close with the hope that our budding field, science and religion, continues to blossom, and that engagement with the nature of time will draw out some of its brightest blooms.
