I Introduction
Over the past few decades, corporate governance in Asia has undergone dramatic changes. On the surface, many Asian jurisdictions appear to have converged toward Anglo-American corporate governance laws and practices. Independent directors, a corporate governance mechanism invented in the United States (US) in the 1970s, are now ubiquitous in boardrooms across the region.Footnote 1 Stewardship codes, a United Kingdom (UK) corporate governance solution to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, exhort institutional investors to be active owners in most of Asia’s important economies.Footnote 2 Derivative actions, a historical hallmark of US and UK company law, are now enshrined in company laws across Asia – ironically being more consequential in Japan than almost anywhere else in the world, despite Japan’s civil law roots and ostensible culture of non-litigiousness.Footnote 3 To a casual observer, it may seem that corporate law and governance in Asia has converged on the Anglo-American-cum-global corporate law and governance model. From this perspective, as predicted by two of the most prominent corporate law scholars in the US, maybe we have reached, or at least are very close to, “The End of History for Corporate Law.”Footnote 4
However, this superficial convergence masks a far more complex reality. As this chapter will demonstrate, the adoption of Anglo-American corporate governance laws and mechanisms in Asia often amounts to “faux convergence” – a phenomenon where jurisdictions implement foreign laws and corporate law and governance mechanisms in name and form, but not in substance or function.Footnote 5 By closely examining three key areas – independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship – we can see how Asian jurisdictions have selectively borrowed and adapted Anglo-American corporate law and governance concepts to fit their own unique jurisdiction-specific contexts, producing outcomes that often diverge significantly from Anglo-American corporate governance practices.
Crucially, this chapter goes beyond merely highlighting the divergence between Asian and Anglo-American practices. It emphasizes the rich diversity within Asia itself, advocating for the power of inter-Asian comparisons in advancing our understanding of comparative corporate law.Footnote 6 By examining how different Asian jurisdictions have adapted and implemented similar governance mechanisms, we can uncover nuanced insights into the dynamics of formal legal transplants and functional jurisdiction-specific practices in comparative corporate law and governance that are often overlooked in broader East–West comparisons. Using Erie and Lin’s taxonomy of analytical frameworks for Inter-Asian Law (IAL) the theory of faux convergence could be seen as an attempt to carve out an overlooked form of “types and methods of interactions” among Asian jurisdictions and between them and Western jurisdictions by analyzing the superficial nature of convergence achieved as “effects, consequences, and conflicts” caused by such interactions.Footnote 7
The theory of faux convergence, coupled with a focus on inter-Asian comparisons, provides a powerful lens for understanding the true nature of corporate governance reforms and practices in Asia. It reveals how policymakers and companies in the region have responded to global pressures for governance reform while maintaining systems that reflect deep-seated local norms, power structures, and institutional logics. Faux convergence allows Asian jurisdictions to signal compliance with international standards while preserving space for locally appropriate governance models. Meanwhile, inter-Asian comparisons illuminate the diverse strategies employed by different jurisdictions in this process of adaptation and localization.
This chapter develops the theory of faux convergence and demonstrates its explanatory power through an in-depth examination of independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes across major Asian jurisdictions.Footnote 8 It builds on our previous work analyzing the complex reality of these mechanisms in Asia,Footnote 9 which challenged oversimplified notions of legal transplants and convergence. By synthesizing insights across these areas and emphasizing inter-Asian variations, we can construct a more nuanced understanding of how corporate governance actually functions in Asian contexts.
The faux convergence framework, combined with inter-Asian comparative analysis, makes several important contributions. First, it provides a more accurate picture of the state of corporate law and governance in Asia, moving beyond surface-level observations to uncover the underlying dynamics and diversity within the region. Second, it offers a new theoretical perspective that transcends the traditional convergence–divergence debate in comparative corporate law and governance. Third, it yields practical insights for policymakers, investors, and companies seeking to navigate Asia’s complex and varied corporate law and governance landscape.
Ultimately, embracing the reality of faux convergence and the value of inter-Asian comparisons pushes us to rethink fundamental assumptions about the evolution of corporate law and governance around the world. It highlights the persistent diversity and path-dependence of national systems, even as globalization drives superficial harmonization. And it underscores the need for nuanced, contextual analysis rather than universalist theories in the field of comparative corporate law and governance.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section II elaborates on the theory of faux convergence, explaining its core elements and how it differs from existing frameworks. Section III examines independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes in Asia through the lens of faux convergence, with a particular emphasis on inter-Asian variations. Section IV concludes by synthesizing key insights from these case studies, highlighting the power of inter-Asian comparisons, and discussing broader implications for comparative corporate law and governance scholarship.
II The Theory of Faux Convergence
Faux convergence refers to the phenomenon where jurisdictions adopt the outward form of foreign corporate governance practices, without implementing their substance or intended function.Footnote 10 It involves the selective borrowing and adaptation of governance mechanisms to fit local jurisdiction-specific contexts, often producing outcomes that diverge significantly from the source model.Footnote 11 Faux convergence allows jurisdictions to signal compliance with global norms while maintaining governance systems that reflect deep-seated local power structures, norms, and institutional logics.Footnote 12
Several key elements characterize faux convergence. To begin, there is superficial adoption, where jurisdictions implement the basic form or structure of a foreign governance mechanism, but not its underlying substance. For instance, independent directors may be mandated, but lack true independence.Footnote 13 This is often accompanied by functional divergence, where the adopted mechanism serves different purposes or functions than in its jurisdiction of origin. For example, stewardship codes may aim to entrench rather than challenge corporate insiders.Footnote 14
Contextual adaptation is another hallmark of faux convergence.Footnote 15 Foreign practices are modified to fit local jurisdiction-specific contexts, power structures, and cultural norms. This reshaping fundamentally alters how the mechanism operates in practice. A key driver of adoption is often the motivation to signal adherence to global governance standards, rather than a genuine desire for reform. This signaling function allows jurisdictions to gain legitimacy in international markets.Footnote 16
Importantly, faux convergence involves the preservation of local practices. Core features of the local governance system are often maintained beneath a veneer of foreign practices. This allows jurisdictions to balance external pressures for reform with internal resistance to fundamental change.Footnote 17
Faux convergence differs from several existing theoretical perspectives on comparative corporate governance. Unlike traditional convergence theory, which posits movement toward a single optimal model (usually Anglo-American shareholder primacy),Footnote 18 faux convergence recognizes persistent functional diversity in governance outcomes. It goes beyond the notion of “divergence within convergence”Footnote 19 by highlighting how adopted practices may serve entirely different functions than in their source jurisdictions.Footnote 20
The concept of faux convergence also moves past simplistic cultural or legal origins explanations for governance differences. Instead, it emphasizes how local actors strategically adapt foreign practices to serve their interests within jurisdiction-specific contexts.Footnote 21 This produces complex hybrid models rather than wholesale transplantation or rejection of foreign approaches. The faux convergence framework builds on institutional approaches to comparative corporate law and governance, which emphasize how governance practices are shaped by their broader institutional environment.Footnote 22 However, it particularly highlights the agency and strategic behavior of local actors in selectively implementing and reshaping governance mechanisms to work within their local jurisdiction-specific contexts.
Crucially, the theory of faux convergence builds upon, but importantly differs from, Ronald Gilson’s influential distinction between formal and functional convergence in corporate law and governance.Footnote 23 Gilson posited that while formal convergence of corporate law rules might be impeded by path dependence, jurisdictions could achieve functional convergence by developing substitutes that fulfill similar economic functions.Footnote 24 However, the concept of faux convergence turns Gilson’s theory on its head in several crucial ways.
First, faux convergence suggests that even when there is apparent formal convergence in corporate governance laws or mechanisms, this may mask significant functional divergence. Unlike in Gilson’s framework, where functional convergence could occur without formal similarity,Footnote 25 faux convergence highlights cases where there is surface-level formal adoption without true functional alignment.Footnote 26
Second, while Gilson’s theory assumes that functional convergence is driven by efficiency imperatives and will ultimately lead jurisdictions to similar economic outcomes,Footnote 27 faux convergence recognizes that adopted mechanisms may be repurposed to serve entirely different economic or political functions than in their jurisdictions of origin. The motivations behind faux convergence often have more to do with signaling conformity to the global norm than with achieving functionally similar governance outcomes.Footnote 28
Third, faux convergence goes beyond Gilson’s binary of formal versus functional convergence, coined in the subtitle of his seminal article,Footnote 29 by illuminating the complex ways in which governance mechanisms are strategically adapted and reconfigured as they move across borders. It emphasizes how local actors may deliberately subvert the intended functions of adopted practices to serve their own interests, rather than simply finding alternate means to achieve similar functional ends.Footnote 30
Finally, whereas Gilson’s theory suggests that functional convergence might be a pathway toward more fundamental formal convergence over time,Footnote 31 the concept of faux convergence highlights how superficial formal adoption may actually serve to prevent deeper functional changes.Footnote 32 By creating the illusion of convergence, faux convergence can relieve pressure for more substantive reforms while allowing core features of local governance systems to persist.Footnote 33
Ultimately, faux convergence provides a more nuanced and realistic account of how corporate law and governance evolves in the face of global and local pressures. It moves beyond simplistic narratives of convergence or resistance to foreign models. Instead, it illuminates the complex processes through which governance practices are negotiated, contested, and reconfigured as they move across borders.
The concept of faux convergence is particularly valuable for understanding corporate law and governance developments in Asia. As we will see in Section III, the adoption of independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes across Asian jurisdictions exemplifies the dynamics of faux convergence. While these mechanisms may superficially resemble their Anglo-American counterparts, their actual implementation and impact often diverge dramatically from Anglo-American models. The faux convergence lens reveals how Asian jurisdictions have strategically responded to global governance pressures while maintaining systems that reflect local jurisdiction-specific realities. Moreover, the faux convergence framework helps explain why decades of governance reforms modeled on Anglo-American practices have often failed to fundamentally reshape corporate behavior in many Asian markets.Footnote 34 By recognizing how adopted mechanisms are reconfigured to serve local purposes, we can better anticipate their actual impact and limitations.
In the next section, we will examine how faux convergence dynamics have played out in the implementation of independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes across major Asian jurisdictions. This analysis will demonstrate the explanatory power of the faux convergence concept and yield insights into the true nature of corporate governance in Asia.
III The Complex Reality of Corporate Governance in Asia: Independent Directors, Derivative Actions, and Stewardship Codes
As briefly highlighted in Section I, corporate law and governance mechanisms that originated in Anglo-America have been widely adopted across Asia, often with the encouragement of international organizations and experts advocating for “global best practices.”Footnote 35 At first glance, this trend appears to provide evidence of formal convergence in corporate law and governance. However, a closer examination reveals a much more complex reality.
This section will explore three key corporate governance mechanisms that have been widely adopted across Asia – independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes – to demonstrate how their implementation and function often diverge significantly from their Anglo-American origins. This analysis reveals that while there may be superficial convergence in the formal adoption of these mechanisms, there is substantial divergence in how they actually operate within Asia’s unique jurisdiction-specific contexts. Understanding this “faux convergence” is critical for developing a more nuanced view of comparative corporate law and governance.
A. Independent Directors
The independent director, a corporate governance mechanism with roots in the US,Footnote 36 has become ubiquitous across Asia’s leading economies over the past few decades.Footnote 37 On the surface, this appears to be a clear example of corporate law and governance convergence, with Asian jurisdictions adopting a key feature of the Anglo-American model. Indeed, most Asian jurisdictions now mandate that public companies have a certain number or percentage of independent directors on their boards.Footnote 38 However, a closer examination reveals that the form and function of independent directors in Asia often diverge significantly from the US model.
While the original US concept of the independent director focuses primarily on independence from management, most Asian jurisdictions have adopted definitions that require independence from both management and significant shareholders.Footnote 39 This reflects the prevalence of concentrated ownership structures in Asia, where controlling shareholders rather than management often dominate corporate governance.Footnote 40 The position of independent directors within corporate law and governance structures also varies widely. While some jurisdictions like Hong Kong and Singapore have adopted one-tier board structures similar to the US, others like Japan and China have unique board structures that create different roles for independent directors.Footnote 41
In many Asian jurisdictions, controlling shareholders retain significant influence over the selection and removal of ostensibly “independent” directors, potentially compromising their true independence in their intended role as monitors of controlling shareholders on behalf of minority shareholders.Footnote 42 In addition to the powerful role played by controlling shareholders in most of Asia’s leading economies, independent directors in Asia are driven by unique local factors, which often have resulted in them serving significantly different purposes than their US counterparts. For example, in China, many independent directors are academics who may lack business expertise to be effective independent directors, but provide legitimacy and government connections.Footnote 43 In Singapore’s family-controlled firms, independent directors often act as mediators in family disputes rather than as monitors of management.Footnote 44 In Japan, which is one of the latest among Asian jurisdictions to promote or require independent directors, independent directors are now expected to champion investors’ interests in the boardroom, which has been traditionally dominated by managerial directors.Footnote 45 This might sound similar to the role of independent directors in the US, but the difference is that independent directors are promoted by the Japanese government as a part of its policy to overcome Japan’s long-time economic malaise.Footnote 46
Equally important as illuminating the distinction between independent directors in Asia from the original US concept of the independent director, is the insight that the “faux convergence” lens provides into the functional diversity of independent directors within Asia. As one of us observes in a summary chapter in a book on independent directors in Asia:
Although there are important similarities in the form and function of “independent directors” within Asia, there are also significant intra-Asia jurisdictional differences. While intra-Asia comparisons of ‘independent directors’ may have more utility than Asia–US comparisons, jurisdictional differences in the form and function of “independent directors” within Asia must also be recognised and accounted for in comparative analyses.Footnote 47
This diversity in the actual implementation and function of independent directors across Asia demonstrates how a corporate law and governance mechanism can be formally adopted while being adapted to serve very different purposes across jurisdictions and cautions against assuming that the mere presence of independent directors indicates convergence toward an Anglo-American model of corporate law and governance.Footnote 48
B. Derivative Actions
The derivative action, which allows shareholders to pursue a lawsuit for and on behalf of the company, is another corporate law and governance mechanism that has been widely adopted across Asia. Again, this appears on the surface to demonstrate convergence toward Anglo-American corporate governance norms. However, a closer examination reveals significant divergences in both the legal frameworks and practical utilization of derivative actions across Asian jurisdictions.
While common law jurisdictions in Asia inherited the restrictive English rule in Foss v. Harbottle, many have since adopted statutory derivative actions to facilitate minority shareholders’ utilization of the derivative action.Footnote 49 Meanwhile, civil law jurisdictions have often created derivative action mechanisms without this historical baggage. Jurisdictions vary widely in who can bring derivative actions.Footnote 50 Some impose minimum shareholding requirements, while others allow any shareholder to sue.Footnote 51 This significantly impacts the practical availability of the mechanism. The specific procedures for initiating and maintaining derivative actions differ substantially across jurisdictions, affecting their accessibility and effectiveness.Footnote 52
The allocation of legal costs and the availability of contingency fees greatly influence the economic incentives for shareholders to pursue derivative litigation. These factors vary significantly across Asia.Footnote 53 The types of corporate wrongdoing that can be addressed through derivative actions and the available remedies differ across jurisdictions.Footnote 54
Despite similar formal rules in some cases, the actual use of derivative actions varies dramatically. Japan and Korea saw a significant spike in derivative actions after they lay moribund for decades,Footnote 55 while the derivative action has remained rare in listed companies in many other Asian jurisdictions throughout its history.Footnote 56 As one of us notes in an article on the derivative action in Asia:
The point is simple. There are a myriad of complex factors which result in varying levels of derivative litigation in Asia’s leading economies. Ironically, the one factor that is conspicuously absent as a defining force of derivative litigation in all of Asia’s leading economies is Asia’s ostensibly non-litigious culture.Footnote 57
This diversity in the implementation and use of derivative actions across Asia demonstrates how transplanted legal mechanisms can evolve in unexpected ways when introduced into different jurisdiction-specific contexts.Footnote 58 It also highlights the danger of making broad generalizations about “Asian” approaches to corporate law and governance or litigation.
C. Stewardship Codes
The rapid adoption of stewardship codes across Asia since 2014 appears, at first glance, to be a clear example of corporate law and governance convergence. These codes, inspired by the UK Stewardship Code of 2010, ostensibly aim to promote active ownership by institutional investors.Footnote 59 Their widespread adoption has been hailed by some as evidence that Asian jurisdictions are embracing a more shareholder-centric model of corporate law and governance with a focus on less managerial risk-taking and maximizing long-term shareholder value.Footnote 60 However, a closer examination reveals that the adoption of UK-style stewardship codes in Asia often represents a form of “faux convergence.” While the codes may be similar in form,Footnote 61 their intended and actual functions often diverge significantly from the UK model, the purpose of which is to motivate institutional investors to monitor corporate management to prevent them from engaging in the type of excessive risk-taking and short-termism that led to the Global Financial Crisis and, more recently, to promote an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) agenda.Footnote 62
Unlike the UK, most Asian jurisdictions do not have dispersed ownership structures dominated by institutional investors. Many listed companies have controlling shareholders, fundamentally altering the context in which stewardship operates.Footnote 63 The types of investors targeted by stewardship codes also vary among Asian jurisdictions. While most focus narrowly on traditional institutional investors, Singapore stands out for its code that focuses on controlling families – a unique attempt to make the UK’s idea of stewardship “fit” Singapore’s (and most of Asia’s) local context.Footnote 64
The goals driving the adoption of stewardship codes differ widely across Asian jurisdictions. In Japan, the stewardship code was part of a broader economic growth strategy aimed at making companies take more risk to use capital more efficiently.Footnote 65 In Korea, the code was seen as a tool to address governance issues in family-controlled conglomerates (chaebols).Footnote 66 In Singapore and Hong Kong, the adoption of stewardship codes appears driven more by a desire to signal compliance with global governance norms – a form of “halo signaling“ than to address specific domestic issues.Footnote 67
The concept of “halo signaling” as a driver for adopting stewardship codes has now received empirical support. Nguyen and Wang find evidence consistent with stewardship codes acting as a “halo” signal that attracts broader equity ownership by US institutional investors in adopting countries, particularly in firms that previously had less US investor presence.Footnote 68
While all Asian stewardship codes are technically voluntary, the level of regulatory pressure for adoption varies. Some jurisdictions have used soft governmental pressure to encourage compliance,Footnote 69 while others have left it entirely to market forces.Footnote 70 The actual impact of stewardship codes on investor behavior and corporate governance practices varies widely across jurisdictions, often differing significantly from their stated ambitions.Footnote 71 As we observe elsewhere:
It appears that a variety of jurisdiction-specific factors – including market signalling, politics, and ESG considerations – drove governments in Asia to adopt UK-style stewardship codes. As a result, the intended and actual functions of UK-style stewardship codes in Asia have significantly departed from – and in some cases run counter to – the intended and actual functions of the UK Code.Footnote 72
This divergence in the function of stewardship codes across Asia, despite their similar form, highlights the importance of understanding the specific jurisdiction-specific contexts in which corporate law and governance mechanisms operate. It also demonstrates how jurisdictions can use the adoption of “global standards” strategically to serve local purposes, a phenomenon that extends beyond stewardship codes to other areas of corporate law and governance.
The above examination of independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes in Asia reveals a common pattern: formal adoption of corporate law and governance mechanisms originating in Anglo-America, followed by significant divergence in their implementation and function. This pattern of “faux convergence” – superficial similarity in form masking significant diversity in function – creates challenges for both academics and policymakers in accurately assessing corporate law and governance practices globally. As we argue elsewhere:
Faux convergence turns this assumption on its head. As the Asian jurisdiction case studies canvassed in this chapter have demonstrated, mechanisms originally intended as tools of “good” corporate governance can be subverted by elites for their own ends. A superficially adopted corporate governance tool can be simultaneously wielded to maintain or reinforce a jurisdiction’s existing corporate governance system, to further the jurisdictional elites’ own agendas and to signal to the world – notwithstanding little to no commitment to real change – that the jurisdiction’s elites have adopted “good corporate governance”.Footnote 73
For scholars of comparative corporate law and governance, these findings emphasize the need for nuanced, context-specific analysis that goes beyond surface-level comparisons. As Asian jurisdictions often adapt and repurpose corporate law and governance mechanisms to serve local needs and goals, including “halo signaling,” rather than simply emulating Anglo-American models, significant diversity in corporate law and governance practices persists both between Asia and Anglo-America, and within Asia itself. Local contexts, including ownership structures, legal systems, and domestic and international political economies, significantly shape how these mechanisms operate in practice. Surface-level comparisons based solely on the presence or absence of certain mechanisms without knowledge of such local jurisdiction-specific contexts can be misleading. For policymakers and international organizations promoting corporate law and governance reform, they highlight the limitations of one-size-fits-all approaches and the importance of understanding local dynamics.
Ultimately, the experience of corporate law and governance reform in Asia suggests that while globalization has led to some convergence in form, the substance of corporate law and governance remains deeply embedded in local contexts. Understanding this complex reality is crucial for developing more effective approaches to corporate law and governance both within Asia and globally.Footnote 74 This is especially the case as globalization appears to be moving toward a more regional approach to corporate law and governance around the world.Footnote 75
IV The Power of Inter-Asian Comparisons and Faux Convergence in Reshaping Comparative Corporate Law
Our examination of independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes across Asia demonstrates the explanatory power of the faux convergence framework and the untapped potential of inter-Asian comparisons for enriching comparative corporate law scholarship more broadly.
The concept of faux convergence, as introduced earlier, provides a powerful lens through which to understand the complex reality of corporate law and governance in Asia. It explains how Asian jurisdictions have adopted the outward form of Anglo-American corporate law and governance mechanisms while strategically adapting their substance and function in various ways to serve local purposes. Notably, the adoption of globally recognized corporate law and governance mechanisms can serve important signaling functions, allowing jurisdictions to demonstrate compliance with international norms, which may sometimes be more important than the actual function of the mechanism. This phenomenon results in superficial similarity masking significant functional diversity, challenging simplistic narratives of global convergence.
The diverse implementation and functions of these corporate law and governance mechanisms within Asia provide a unique laboratory for understanding how similar legal transplants evolve in different yet related contexts, exemplifying faux convergence in action. For instance, while both Japan and Korea had derivative actions that lay dormant for decades and then suddenly saw a spike in activity, the driving forces behind this trend differed significantly,Footnote 76 illustrating how seemingly similar legal mechanisms can serve distinct purposes in different local contexts.
Inter-Asian comparisons also reveal the diverse strategies jurisdictions employ when adapting foreign corporate law and governance concepts, further highlighting the dynamics of faux convergence. The case of independent directors is particularly illustrative.Footnote 77 While most Asian jurisdictions have formally adopted independent director requirements, their roles vary significantly across the region. In Japan, independent directors are expected to champion investors’ interests in the boardroom as a part of the government’s policy to overcome the long-time economic malaise, while in Singapore’s family-controlled firms, they frequently act as mediators in family disputes. These functional variations within Asia demonstrate the creative ways in which jurisdictions can repurpose corporate law and governance mechanisms to serve local needs, often diverging significantly from their original intended functions.
Furthermore, the adoption of stewardship codes across Asia showcases how seemingly similar reforms can serve vastly different purposes in different jurisdictions, epitomizing faux convergence.Footnote 78 While Japan’s stewardship code aims to promote shareholder-centric governance to promote more risk-taking as part of a broader economic strategy, Korea’s code was seen as a tool to address governance issues in family-controlled conglomerates (chaebols). These inter-Asian differences provide rich insights into how global corporate law and governance norms are negotiated and reconfigured within diverse jurisdiction-specific contexts.
By focusing on these inter-Asian variations through the lens of faux convergence, scholars can move beyond simplistic East–West comparisons and develop a more sophisticated taxonomy of convergence for understanding legal transplants and governance evolution.Footnote 79 This approach, which aligns with broader trends in comparative law toward more contextual, pluralistic frameworks,Footnote 80 allows us to identify local factors that shape corporate law and governance outcomes, which might be overlooked in broader global comparisons.
Moreover, inter-Asian comparisons offer valuable lessons for other regions grappling with similar challenges. As many Asian jurisdictions navigate the tension between global pressures and local institutional logic, their experiences with faux convergence provide a roadmap for other emerging economies seeking to reform their corporate law and governance systems while maintaining local relevance. This may be especially relevant as globalization appears to be moving toward a more regional approach to corporate law and governance around the world – a trend that may accelerate with the election of Donald Trump in the US.
V Conclusion
Ultimately, embracing the complexity revealed through inter-Asian comparisons and the faux convergence framework can significantly advance the field of comparative corporate law and governance. It pushes us to develop more robust and nuanced taxonomies that capture the true state of convergence and diversity of global corporate law and governance practices. The time has come to recognize the reality of “faux convergence” as an important lens for understanding corporate law and governance within Asia and beyond.
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