Introduction

This chapter discusses fundamental definitions and core concepts, mainly derived from organizational studies and organizational sociology, which help researchers to theoretically take account of the phenomena related to politics and power in the multinational corporation (MNC). It delineates the historical and theoretical development of the central construct of ‘organizational politics’ and then reconstructs some of the more important academic debates concerning key concepts such as power, interests, agency and conflict. As we discuss below, we regard these as defining elements of ‘politics’. Since power as well as politics can be considered key concepts in the social sciences, a multitude of researchers, theories, approaches and perspectives exists, to which we cannot claim to do any justice in this chapter. At the same time, the politics and power approach as it is employed in organization studies but also in the international business (IB) literature is not a coherent theory but rather a theoretical perspective with multiple faces, many definitional facets and competing constructs. We therefore more modestly focus on concepts actually employed in existing research on power and politics in MNCs and at the same time seek to provide some avenues for a more thorough and more diversified application of theoretical approaches and concepts in the future. As we will see, the discussion on power, politics, interests and actors in organizational studies and sociology is often much more complex and advanced than the eclectic application in the IB and MNC literature might suggest (Kostova et al. Reference Kostova, Roth and Dacin2008: 994).

Politics

A first understanding of the term politics is readily at hand when we look at the tripartite vocabulary of polity – policy – politics offered by the English language. Whereas ‘polity’ denotes – in the tradition of Aristotle's politeia-concept (Aristotle 1984) – the institutional dimension of a political system and comprises the fundamental principles (law, constitution) establishing the political order, e.g. of a state (government bodies, party system), ‘policy’ describes the substantiative dimension. Policies are the strategic objectives and plans, political programmes, concepts and guidelines which (should) keep political actors on track and provide ideal-type directions for their activities. In turn, ‘politics’ denotes a procedural dimension and refers to the actual behaviour of political actors who seek to pursue or enforce their respective political interests. Machiavelli's work (Machiavelli Reference Machiavelli and Mansfield1998) is predominantly associated with this dimension of politics-as-action and also clearly marks politics as a process of employing power to further one's own ends. Polity, policy and politics are not to be considered three separate spheres of political life. Instead, they constitute a conceptual triangle in which each part/concept is interdependent with and shaped through the other two. For instance, policies (e.g. a new strategy) come about through political activities (e.g. tactics like influencing, persuading, bribing) in and around interested political bodies (e.g. parties, constituencies, governance bodies). Similarly, the effectiveness of political action (politics) in safeguarding policy goals – as we discuss in more detail below – depends on the structural positioning and the legitimacy of the political actors/bodies (polity) involved.

Regarding politics in organizations, Burns (Reference Burns1961) is generally considered to be the first to introduce the term to organizational studies. He focused on ‘micropolitics’ as political behaviour inside the organization when actors make use of available resources (material and human) in competitive situations (e.g. to further their career interests). While the focus on micropolitics, i.e. political behaviour of individual or group actors inside the organization, has developed into the dominant research focus in the field and is also our key interest here, organizational politics potentially cover a broader field: political processes also occur around and at the margins of organizations (involving stakeholder groups, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], public voices, unions, competitors etc.). In addition, the term can also refer to the political activities of the organization, e.g. in supplementing or replacing functions and institutions usually conducted by state bodies or in pursuing a strategic political agenda. To ensure terminological clarity for our further discussion we distinguish between politics of organizations and organizational politics as political behaviour on the micro-level in and around organizations.

In the literature we can identify two broad perspectives on organizational politics (Küpper and Felsch Reference Küpper and Felsch2000). (i) Approaches that view organizational politics as an aspect, a phenomenon in organizational life. Political behaviour such as mobbing, manipulating or influencing may or may not occur in organizations; organizations are less or more politicized. Studies then investigate the degree of politicization in particular organizations or seek to understand and explain the processes and consequences of this particular kind of behaviour. (ii) Approaches which consider politics as a generic concept, a root metaphor in understanding organizations per se. Organizations are then conceptualized as political systems where actors pursuing idiosyncratic interests and the strategic use of power means are constitutive of organizational life. This conceptual or generic perspective on organizational politics was mainly developed by authors based in the behavioural theory of the firm such as March, Cyert, Simon and Olson (Cyert and March Reference Cyert, March and Haire1959; March Reference March1962, Reference March1988; March and Olson Reference March and Olson1994; March and Simon Reference March and Simon1958) but also proponents from resource dependence theory (Pfeffer Reference Pfeffer1981, Reference Pfeffer1992; Salancik and Pfeffer Reference Salancik and Pfeffer1974) and organizational sociology (Crozier and Friedberg Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980; Friedberg Reference Friedberg1995; Perrow Reference Perrow1972). The image of organizations as political systems was set against the then dominating view in management research of organizations as ordered social systems structured by rationality and functionality and directed towards the achievement of coherent, identifiable objectives. As we will discuss (Chapter 3) this rationalistic view of organization has – at least implicitly – remained prevalent in IB research for an even longer period of time. The generic view of organizational politics in turn acknowledges that ‘the organization’ as a homogeneous, goal-directed entity is an essentialist chimera and that organizations are constituted by multiple individual and collective actors (groups, coalitions) with idiosyncratic interests pursuing heterogeneous objectives which make sense to them even though they might eventually clash with ‘official’ goals legitimized by a leading coalition, e.g. top management. Organizational politics as a theoretical concept consistently takes strategic actors, their behaviour and the potential conflicts arising from the heterogeneity of interests pursued in situations of mutual interdependencies as points of departure for understanding and explaining organizational behaviour. Since organizational behaviour can thus only be understood in reference to the actors’ interests and their strategies in safeguarding these interests in interactional situations, all organizational actors potentially become ‘politicians’ in this sense.

As Table 2.1 exhibits, authors working in the generic perspective still define organizational politics in quite different ways. While Pfeffer (Reference Pfeffer1981), for instance, emphasizes the intricate linkage between politics and power (politics as the mobilization of power bases), Crozier and Friedberg (Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980) draw attention to the interdependencies between local strategic actors pursuing diverging interests in a joint organizational context with overlapping scopes of action and shared rules of the ‘game’. Similarly, Bacharach and Lawler (Reference Bacharach and Lawler1981) accentuate the organizational context of politics which is both a condition and an outcome of political behaviour. For March (Reference March1962) the structural embeddedness of political behaviour and the negotiative nature of all strategies, goals and rules of an organization are constitutive of the firm as a ‘political system’.

Proponents of the aspectual view of politics in organizations tend to come from the field of organizational psychology or human resource research (Blickle et al. Reference Blickle, Meurs, Zettler, Solga, Noethen, Kramer and Ferris2008; Drory and Romm Reference Drory and Romm1990; Ferris et al. Reference Ferris, Russ, Fandt, Giacalone and Rosenfield1989; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory Reference Vigoda-Gadot and Drory2006) but also from management research (Mintzberg Reference Mintzberg1983, Reference Mintzberg1985). Politics here are understood as a particular type of behaviour (e.g. manipulation, mobbing, coercing) associated with predominantly negative consequences for some members of the organization (stress, demotivation, attendance, turnover) – even when some authors later distanced themselves from a purely negative view of politics (Ferris et al. Reference Ferris, Hochwarter, Douglas, Blass, Kolodinsky, Treadway, Ferris and Marmocchio2002). Politics thus is seen as a phenomenon organizations must seek to keep at bay, to be contained through rational and ‘better’ management. Such a definition of politics as a specific, illegitimate type of behaviour which disrupts organizational life discloses two implicit assumptions: (i) in order to see politics as disruptive, illegitimate behaviour, we must hold an understanding of organizations as generally ordered, coherent, legitimate phenomena. (ii) If politics constitute only one, specific aspect of human behaviour in organizations, the concept cannot serve as a general explanative theory of organizational life at large. Organizations here are not viewed as political systems as in the generic understanding; politics is just one (potential, disruptive, unwanted) aspect or appearance in organizations.

This rather narrow view of politics as negative and unwanted behaviour draws a further critical question: negative for whom? Whose perspective is taken when we classify behaviour as political? Whose perspective is implicitly privileged? Again, this leads us to the assertion that the aspectual approach to organizational politics is fundamentally based on an image of order and coherence about what is good and bad, what is wanted and unwanted for ‘the’ organization or its leading coalition. In our view, however, whether a specific type of behaviour is negative for an organizational actor is rather an empirical than a definitional question. Political behaviour is associated with multiple consequences; whether they are considered harmful or beneficial largely depends on the context, the perceptions and the subjective appraisal of those affected by it. It is therefore crucial for researchers on power and politics to not only pay attention to the interests and tactics of strategic actors pursuing their objectives but also to the consequences of these political actions and their assessment by the multiple stakeholders involved who might evaluate the outcomes of politics in highly diverse ways. The A-B-C-model by Buchanan and Badham (Reference Buchanan and Badham2008) neatly summarizes this concept of politics as a process of antecedents (A), behaviour (B) and consequences (C) which may be perceived as functional or dysfunctional depending on the subjective position of the actor considered. Meanwhile, many researchers agree that the narrow view of politics as illegitimate behaviour is inadequate (Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014). Work by Pettigrew and others (Blazejewski and Dorow Reference Blazejewski and Dorow2003; Pettigrew Reference Pettigrew1973/2001) has demonstrated that organizational politics is instrumental and even indispensable in conducting organizational change. Politics also plays a major role in sparking innovation, intrapreneurship and institutional entrepreneurship (Clemens and Cook Reference Clemens and Cook1999; Jones et al. Reference Jones, Conway and Steward2001) when actors with idiosyncratic interests challenge or circumvent routines, established positions and paths. In our view, politics is therefore not only unavoidable in organizational contexts, it is an important driver of organizational dynamics (Buchanan and Badham Reference Buchanan and Badham1999; Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006).

Actors

Organizational politics involves some form of enactment, behaviour or activity conducted by so called ‘actors’. But who is this? A person? An organizational entity? Can anyone be a political actor? Quite rarely do authors in the field actually elaborate on the definition and characterization of the key acting agency in their research on politics; the ‘actor’ therefore often remains a rather abstract and elusive concept (Emirbayer and Mische Reference Emirbayer and Mische1998; Hitlin and Elder Reference Hitlin and Elder2007). Even if researchers specify their approach as micropolitical and consequently focus on individual actors, it often remains unclear how these individual actors are understood and conceptualized. Based on the work by Friedberg and Crozier (Crozier and Friedberg Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980; Friedberg Reference Friedberg, Küpper and Ortmann1992) we view actors in organizational politics as concrete and identifiable, autonomous and at the same time contingent, bounded rational, reflective and self-referential humans. This definition in the first place refers to individual human beings but also allows for teams or groups of people, for instance, when they agree to politically pursue shared interests as a coalition. It does not, however, apply to unitary entities or abstract bodies such as ‘the organization’ or ‘the MNC’ that sometimes are treated as if they were a person with coherent homogeneous interests and a human-like ability to act and reflect (see the discussion of unitary organizational rationalities in Chapter 3). A necessarily inconclusive list of potential political actors will include employees, managers, customers, unionists, NGO members and corporate partners but organizational politics as a generic concept is not limited or even focused on any specific actor or group of actors. As Küpper and Ortmann (Reference Küpper and Ortmann1986: 593; our translation) emphasize, ‘Each actor in organizations is a micropolitician in his or her own way’. It is the researcher's task then to understand what his or her specific rationalities in his or her own, biographical and historical situation is or has been in order to disclose the contextual meaning of his or her political strategy. We now look at the components of our definition of the actor in more detail.

Organizational politics is concerned with the political behaviour of ‘real’ and human actors, i.e. embodied and concrete individuals (Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006: 203; Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014: 278; Granovetter Reference Granovetter1985). These actors dispose of self-conceptualized, individually reconstructable identities and interests that make sense to them in their biographically situated context (even when they may seem foolish to a bystander). In this bounded and subjective sense actors act purposefully and rationally. Being ‘human’ also means to be potentially knowledgeable and reflective about the world, others and oneself. Self-reflection, in turn, allows conscious actors to distance themselves from routines, authorities and roles legitimately ascribed in their organization (Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006; Goffman Reference Goffman1959/1990). Consequently, neither their identities nor their interests are ever fully determined by structures or institutionalized norms, although, as we discuss below, they are also never fully independent of their contingencies. For Friedberg and Crozier actors are therefore ‘autonomous’ in that they always retain an ‘irreducible margin of liberty’ (Crozier and Friedberg Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980:20) and are ‘in no case’ (Friedberg Reference Friedberg1995: 197; our translation) determined by traditions, structures and institutions. Friedberg nicely summarizes this concept of actors as human, cognisant and purposive: ‘The field of action consists of actors who think, even when they do not possess all the facts; who act intentionally, even when they do not always attain their goals; who are able to choose, even when their choices might be intuitive, and who can intelligently adapt to requirements of the situation – at least to their perception of it – and develop their behavioural strategies from there’ (Friedberg Reference Friedberg1995: 202; our translation). Although we define political actors as human agents here, we are aware that due to technological development non-human agency is on the rise and that power – as a key component of politics – does also reside in networks, discourses or technologies that go far beyond visible action or agency (Latour Reference Latour1996; Munro Reference Munro, Clegg and Haugaard2009: see also our discussion on power below). Nevertheless, politics in the understanding developed here takes the perspective of the human actor as an anchor point without, however, disregarding his or her contextual embeddedness. As we discuss next, the actor's autonomy in political behaviour is well bounded by intersubjective rules and structures as well as subjective and perceptual limits.

Individual actors although cognisant and reflective are bounded by cognitive constraints in gathering, processing and making use of information (Lindenberg Reference Lindenberg and Turner2001; Simon Reference Simon1955, Reference Simon1957). Their rationality is delimited by their subjective, biographical perspective which might make them pursue political objectives that only make sense to them and eventually forgo allegedly ‘real’ interests that others might consider – from their idiosyncratic position – more pertinent (see the section on interests below). Actors’ political behaviour is also contingent on others and their interdependent scopes of action which in organizations are additionally circumscribed by the formal and informal allocation of roles, positions and resources. The actor's scope of action is limited by his or her subjective perception of alternatives for action and the perceived availability of required resources, i.e. by his or her interpretation and processes of sensemaking about the situation at hand (Clark and Geppert Reference Clark and Geppert2011; Pettigrew et al. Reference Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron2001; Weick Reference Weick1995). In addition, there are also ‘real’ or objectified constraints of political action since one's strategies might encounter previously undisclosed or imperceptible barriers in the social and structural context or produce unexpected results which might indicate an incorrect evaluation of the situation in the first place or a suboptimal selection of political tactics (Crozier and Friedberg Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980; Osterloh Reference Osterloh1983). This is particularly relevant in MNCs where the ‘correct’ estimation of available and successful routes for action are often hindered by the ambiguity of norms, rules and meanings in culturally and institutionally diverse organizational settings (Kostova et al. Reference Kostova, Roth and Dacin2008; Kristensen and Zeitlin Reference Kristensen and Zeitlin2005). Crozier and Friedberg (Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980) employ the ‘game’ metaphor to indicate that actors in organizational politics are free to chose their moves, but according to rules and constraints that are not always of their own making or choice. Actors are therefore autonomous but also clearly embedded in social, structural, economic, political, spatial and temporal contexts, norms and institutions – without ever being caught in the ‘iron cage’ of institutional or cultural ‘dopes’ (Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006: 218). This consistent integration of the actor's perspective without forgoing the contextual constitution of the actor's scope of action, meaning and identity is in our view a core advantage of the organizational politics approach.

Interests

Even though ‘interests’ are a recurrent element of organizational politics definitions, the concept tends to remain unclear and underdefined in much of the power and politics literature. Authors often manage to circumvent a thorough definition by presenting a more or less extensive list of potential kinds of interests actors may pursue such as economic, social, cultural, biographical or identity-related interests. Actors seek to further their personal career (Dörrenbächer and Geppert Reference Dörrenbächer and Geppert2009) or to protect their local work unit (Blazejewski Reference Blazejewski2009; Kristensen and Zeitlin Reference Kristensen and Zeitlin2005). At times, the word ‘interests’ is used interchangeably with related terms such as preferences, needs, motives or intentions, without specifying the relationship between these concepts. According to March (Reference March1988: 17), with the organizational politics approach ‘we have a theory of wilful and intentional actors without a theory of will or intention’.

A brief look at other, related fields of research employing the interest concept such as psychology, political science or economics reveals that the term remains inconclusive and even contested across disciplines. Social and motivational theorists conceptualize interests as the ‘cognitive representation of needs’ (Rokeach Reference Rokeach1973), implying a distinction between unconscious deep-structure motives or needs on the one hand, and interests on the other hand, i.e. conscious aspirations that the individual has learned to think might contribute to the satisficing of her or his underlying motives (Deci and Ryan Reference Deci and Ryan2000; Kehr Reference Kehr2004). Interests as explicit goals or aspirations are potentially subject to change depending on learning processes, social influences and sensemaking processes (Silvia Reference Silvia2001). Apart from cognizance, temporality is a second, disputed dimension of the interest concepts. Similar to classical economic definitions, some psychologists define interests as enduring preferences which form part of the individual's personality (Silvia Reference Silvia2001). Interests as preferences or standards of judgement are assumed to remain stable across situations (even though it is acknowledged that over time preferences might adjust). Consciousness and stability/malleability apart, the concept remains disputed regarding the beneficiary of interested action (self-serving vs. altruistic interests), the rationality or legitimacy of interests and the coherence between organizational and individually idiosyncratic interests in the corporate context. We discuss each of these dimensions from the viewpoint of the organizational politics literature below.

March as a key proponent of organizational politics as a theoretical approach maintains that interests are inconsistent and malleable through interaction, learning and the accumulation of experiences (March Reference March1988). Actors will readjust their intentions or goals, e.g. when their level of aspiration rises (Simon Reference Simon1979). In addition, according to Küpper and Felsch as well as Lindenberg (Lindenberg et al. Reference Lindenberg, Fetchenhauer, Flache, Buunk, Fetchenhauer, Flache, Buunk and Lindenberg2006) interests and norms are in fact constructed uno actu (Küpper and Felsch Reference Küpper and Felsch2000: 299) through situational definitions and situational selection. Actor's interests change depending on her or his assessment of the situational context and the framing of the situation. If a particular situation is perceived as threatening to ones’ identity, actors are expected to focus their intentionality on protecting and maintaining their identity coherence and integrity and thus actualize their personal identity interests. This approach draws attention to the situational construction and relevance of actors’ interests rather than to enduring preferences or underlying motives (Blazejewski 2012).

When we understand interests as a situational, malleable concept, it consequently contains an element of cognisance: interests are those goals and intentions that the actor is or becomes aware of in a specific context. In this sense, actors know their interests. Organizational politics thus focuses on and takes seriously interests that people think they have and consider relevant and important in a particular context rather than their ‘real’ interests (Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006: 211). In his concept of the three faces of power, Lukes (Reference Lukes2005) argues that actors’ interests might be formed and dominated by institutional norms and powerful structures of which actors are unaware. Through the third face of power, actors are systematically kept from ever disclosing and pursing their ‘real’ interests. Legitimate, unavoidable norms, values and discourses make them follow intentions which are inherently against their own, genuine, deeply hidden interests. Based on Gramsci's idea of hegemonic power Buraway (Reference Buraway1979) shows how consent is engineered in the capitalist factory system when managers and workers, because of the alignment of their interests with the interests of employers/owners, cannot see their ‘real interests’ and therefore show little interest in active forms of resistance, e.g. against exploitative work practices. There has been considerable criticism towards Luke's approach which, according to Clegg et al., runs the danger of being ‘arrogant’ (Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006: 214) in that it implies emancipation liberating actors from their ‘false consciousness’ and making them understand their ‘real’ interests must necessarily come from some position outside this system of power and norms. Against this ‘arrogance’ we sustain that in order to understand their behaviour we must take seriously that actors are potentially knowledgeable and self-reflective about their interests – even if in the course of life we often have to realize that our well-thought intentions did not produce a desired outcome and did not do us any good. Also, Lukes himself would maintain that ‘real’ interests can never refer to ‘the last word on the matter’, i.e. one's ‘true’ interests, but instead draws attention to the ‘internalized illusions’ (Lukes Reference Lukes2005: 149) which we through processes of manipulation and misleading information have come to consider our own and genuine interests. Human beings thus do maintain the ability to consent to dominating power while at the same time resenting the mode of its exercise (Lukes Reference Lukes2005).

Once we accept that actors’ interests are as ‘real’ as they are ‘real’ and sensible to them, it seems reasonable to some authors to portray political actors as essentially egoistic. In fact, particularly the aspectual view of politics has suffered from a narrow understanding of interests as self-serving, anti-social and even malicious (Ferris et al. Reference Ferris, Russ, Fandt, Giacalone and Rosenfield1989; Ferris et al. Reference Ferris, Treadway, Brouer, Perrewe, Douglas and Lux2007). Against this limited view, Drory and others argue that characterizing interests as ‘self-serving’ does not in any way exclude altruism and other pro-social behaviour – as long as the actor considers them important to her or him, legitimate and subjectively rational (Drory and Romm Reference Drory and Romm1990; Neuberger Reference Neuberger2006). Consequently, political behaviour in organizations does not preclude that actors act in the interest of the organization, i.e. pursue strategies that contribute to organizational objectives – as long as he or she can assume that these organizational goals are in congruence or instrumental to their own well-being or personal plans (Vroom Reference Vroom1964). Whose interests are served by political activities is ultimately dependent on the subjective assessment of those affected, and foremost on an empirical question. As Küpper and Felsch (Reference Küpper and Felsch2000) argue, organizational politics is concerned with those interests – whether self-serving, pro-social or formally legitimate – that we can perceive and disclose in the concrete political episode or action system.

On the organizational level, organizational politics approaches affirm that interests are – since they give primacy to idiosyncratic actor perspectives – most probably heterogeneous. The presumed heterogeneity of interests inside the organization is, in fact, the condition sine qua non of the organizational politics approach. This view does not preclude that many organizations seek to attain interest harmonization among their members through sophisticated incentive systems, the implementation of shared values and other vehicles of cultural and social integration. It only takes the somewhat realistic view, that these efforts might not always produce the desired effects and that therefore the assumption that individual and organizational interests potentially conflict in organizations is a more realistic view of the world than the assumption of a fully conforming ‘organization man’ (Whyte Reference Whyte1957/2013). According to March (March Reference March1988: 17), ‘the apparent coherence [in organizations] is often produced less by resolving inconsistencies than by obscuring them’. This is even more evident in MNCs where, on the one hand, personal biographies apart, actor interests are shaped by diverging cultural, institutional, structural and social influences (Wildavsky Reference Wildavsky1987) and, on the other hand, where there are potentially more opportunities to conceal non-compliant behaviour. The culturally and geographically dispersed constitution of the MNC gives more room for ‘ceremonial adoption’ where actors apparently adopt headquarters’ (HQ) standards, values and routines, while in the subsidiary they in fact cultivate their own, local practices and interests (Björkman and Lervik Reference Björkman and Lervik2007; Kostova and Roth Reference Kostova and Roth2002).

Power

Politics has frequently been defined as the strategic employment of power (Table 2.1) so it seems imminent to look more closely at this key concept in the social sciences at large and for our debate around organizational politics in particular. Since power is a core definitional element of politics, even to the extent that in some instances the terms seem to collapse and become conceptually indistinguishable, we also want to delineate where and how the concept of power goes beyond its usage in the organizational politics literature – particularly since much of the organizational politics literature has made only partial use of a much broader power concept prevalent in the social science. As we discuss below, the organizational politics approach has long been dominated by concepts emphasizing agentic or episodic power at the expense of systemic and discursive power concepts (see Table 2.2).

A plethora of definitions, theories and perspectives on power exists so that Lukes refers to a ‘contested phenomenon’ (Lukes Reference Lukes2005) whereas Haugaard and Clegg (Reference Haugaard, Clegg, Clegg and Haugaard2009: 3) consider this a ‘requisite variety’ enabling multiperspective research. Still, a number of attempts have been made to put some order into the field by classifying approaches and/or dimensions of power. We consider two of these classifications – power to/power over and episodic/systemic power – in the following.

The distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ is based on the observation that power works, depending on the situation, as either an enabling or a constraining force (Giddens Reference Giddens1984; Göhler Reference Göhler, Clegg and Haugaard2009). Parsons (Reference Parsons1963) has been influential in the debate in delineating power as a positive force creating, maintaining and eventually changing the institutional and organizational order as long as it is based on legitimate authority. In Giddens’ (Reference Giddens1984) concept ‘power to’ is related to the enabling, facilitative side of power that holds the capacity for action. ‘Power to’ thus captures the productive face of power; it ‘empowers’ actors to pursue their (legitimate) interests. In turn, ‘power over’ describes the restraining, prohibitive dimension of power. Power works as a constraint for action (Giddens Reference Giddens1984) and prevents actors from pursuing and attaining their interests, e.g. by delimiting their scope of action, coercion or manipulation. This is the power actors would tend to resist but also the power of domination when actors are involuntary complicit, e.g. through powerful discourses and socialization, with the dominating structures (Haugaard and Clegg Reference Haugaard, Clegg, Clegg and Haugaard2009).

Although the ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ typology has been successfully employed in studies on power and politics in MNCs (cf. Blazejewski and Becker-Ritterspach Reference Blazejewski, Becker-Ritterspach, Dörrenbächer and Geppert2011), we agree with Göhler (Reference Göhler, Clegg and Haugaard2009) that both faces of power are essentially two sides of the same coin and do not help to theoretically distinguish fundamental facets of the power concept. Göhler (Reference Göhler, Clegg and Haugaard2009) argues that the positive deployment of ‘power to’ by any actor to further his or her interests, invariably disenfranchises others, generating ‘power over’ and potential resistance to change. For instance, Khan et al. (Reference Khan, Munir and Willmott2007) use the case of soccer ball production to demonstrate how MNCs use their power to provide for ‘better’ labour conditions in the Pakistan region of Sialkot, where up to 80 per cent of the global manufacturing of soccer balls takes place. Among the working women and their families in Sialkot, however, this initiative entails a number of negative consequences (work away from home where they could tend their children and gardens alongside their stitching, among others). For them, the MNCs’ positive power to change their working situation turns into constraint and domination and prevents them from voicing and safeguarding their local and personal interests. In addition, Courpasson and Dany (Reference Courpasson, Dany, Clegg and Haugaard2009) argue that resistance to power can also become creative and productive and effectively empower seemingly peripheral or ‘powerless’ actors. Here, a case in point is the Danish subsidiary of the MNC case company in the work by Kristensen and Zeitlin (Reference Kristensen and Zeitlin2005) which through formally ‘illegitimate’ action and secret resistance to HQ strategic intents establishes itself as a strong competence centre that eventually enables the MNC to develop strategically. As Clegg and others maintain, whether power is productive or constraining, is ‘strictly contingent’ (Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006: 191) and depends predominantly on the context, the perception of those involved and also their potential to emancipate from seemingly oppressive norms, discourses and structures.

The second attempt at structuring the field, the distinction between episodic and systemic power, is the more fruitful for our purposes. Table 2.2 provides an overview of power and politics approaches along these dimensions. Not only has the differentiation between systemic and episodic power, through the work of Clegg and others (Clegg Reference Clegg1989; Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006; Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014; Haugaard and Clegg Reference Haugaard, Clegg, Clegg and Haugaard2009), become more or less endemic to the field of organizational studies, it also mirrors best the development of the organizational politics field from a focus on the political actor, his or her intentions and behavioural strategies – sometimes rooted in paradigmatic traditions of methodological individualism and voluntarism – to integrated views that take account of the embeddedness and the contextual constitution of political actors and political agency.

With its focus on actors’ strategic behaviour the organizational politics literature has often retained an understanding of power as episodic and agentic (Allen et al. Reference Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick and Mayes1979; Buchanan and Badham Reference Buchanan and Badham1999; Burns Reference Burns1961; Dlugos et al. Reference Dlugos, Dlugos, Dorow and Farrell1993; Mintzberg Reference Mintzberg1983; Pfeffer Reference Pfeffer1981; see Table 2.2). Power in this sense is manifest in concrete situations and concrete actions where different actors with different bundles of power sources available to them seek to protect their interests in interaction (Clegg Reference Clegg1989). Episodic power is the power which actors actually put to use in political processes – ‘the direct exercise of power’ (Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014: 240) – and which comes about in ‘identifiable acts that shape the behaviour of others’ (Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014: 240). It is consistent with Lukes’ description of the first face of power (Lukes Reference Lukes2005) and also with the classical definition by Weber (Reference Weber1976) which served as a theoretical basis for many of the early proponents of the organizational politics perspective: ‘Power has typically been seen as the ability to get others to do what you want them to, if necessary against their will, or to get them to do something they would otherwise not do’ (Hardy and Clegg Reference Hardy, Clegg, Clegg, Hardy and Nords1996: 623).

In its episodic face, the concept of power is associated with causality, control, power sources and power means. Causality is implied when we define power as the ability to get others to do what we want them to do. Power, then, is the ability to mobilize resources in order to affect and/or change outcomes (e.g. the behaviour of others) (Giddens Reference Giddens1984; Mintzberg Reference Mintzberg1983, Reference Mintzberg1985) even against potential resistance and even when there is agreement that political actors usually cannot fully determine the outcome, e.g. when opponents react in an unexpected way. Episodic power is also associated with control: control over critical resources (Bacharach and Lawler Reference Bacharach and Lawler1980; Dowding Reference Dowding, Clegg and Haugaard2009; French and Raven Reference French, Raven, Cartwright and Zander1960; Pfeffer Reference Pfeffer1992; Salancik and Pfeffer Reference Salancik and Pfeffer1974) and control over zones of uncertainty (Crozier and Friedberg Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980). While the proponents of the resource (dependence) theory of power identify different sources or bases of power (rewards, titles, charisma, expert knowledge, network access, information etc.) and delineate how actors strategically withhold or make use of these power bases in tactical behaviour (threatening, manipulating, rewarding etc.), Crozier and Friedberg (Reference Crozier and Friedberg1980) argue that power becomes available when actors experience ambiguity or insecurity. When the relationship between causes and effects is unclear in a specific situation, those actors who are potentially able to contain or relieve others of this insecurity become powerful. In MNCs, HQ is often unaware or less knowledgeable about the local situation, culture and practices in international subsidiaries than local employees. When institutional environments are thus ambiguous or disputed at least from the viewpoint of the HQ, local actors might credibly portray HQ policies as being incompatible with local business customs, and intentionally reinterpret and readjust global standards according to their interests. The team around Edward and Ferner (Almond and Ferner Reference Almond and Ferner2006; Ferner et al. Reference Ferner, Almond, Clark, Colling, Edwards, Holden and Müller-Carmen2004) demonstrates how European subsidiaries of US companies deliberately employ margins of interpretation and institutional ambiguity in order to protect local practices in human resources (HR) management and resist the strategies of global standardization pursued by their HQ. Regarding the power-as-resources perspective, manifold literature exists in IB analysing the distribution of power bases between HQ and subsidiaries or among subsidiaries and also the evolution and change of this allocation of power when, for example, subsidiaries gain status and expertise as global competence centres (Birkinshaw and Hood Reference Birkinshaw and Hood1998; Bouquet and Birkinshaw Reference Bouquet and Birkinshaw2008). Similarly, the withdrawal of capital and production capacity can also offset and rearrange the balance of power between HQ and subsidiaries (Blazejewski Reference Blazejewski2009). In the MNC literature, language has been identified as a key resource or skill that actors make use of as a strategic power source (Logemann and Piekkari Reference Logemann and Piekkari2015; Welch et al. Reference Welch, Welch and Piekkari2005). According to the resource-based view, power is relational, context dependent and dynamic. As demonstrated by Bouquet and Birkinshaw (Reference Bouquet and Birkinshaw2008), powerless actors might gain power over time, e.g. when they make sophisticated use of local expertise and networks. Also, Pfeffer (Reference Pfeffer1992) among others, argues that power is relational and contingent in that the successful employment of a power base in a specific situation depends on the political skills of actors in selecting and enacting adequate tactics (Blickle et al. Reference Blickle, Meurs, Zettler, Solga, Noethen, Kramer and Ferris2008; Ferris et al. Reference Ferris, Treadway, Brouer, Perrewe, Douglas and Lux2007) and on the relevance of these power bases to the parties involved.

Based on earlier work by Bachrach and Baratz (Reference Bachrach and Baratz1962, Reference Bachrach and Baratz1963) more recently authors emphasize that power even in its episodic understanding goes beyond the visible employment of power sources and power means (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard Reference Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard2011; Kolb and Bartunek Reference Kolb and Bartunek1992). Non-action, non-information and non-decisions are important tactics of power withholding or withdrawing presumably valuable alternatives of action from potentially interested but ignorant parties. In this sense, episodic power does not only relate to Lukes’ first face of power but also to his second face emphasizing power as preventing decision making or limiting choices available (Lukes Reference Lukes2005). Again, in MNCs language as a power source plays a crucial role in this sense: translations are an important and often non-observable tool for reinterpreting, reevaluating or withholding information exchanged between MNC subunits (Logemann and Piekkari Reference Logemann and Piekkari2015). Investigating the episodic deployment of these MNC-specific power bases still offers many avenues for further research even when from a theoretical point of view, the episodic perspective on power – ‘the dull stuff’ (Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006) – is limited in a number of ways which we will discuss below. This is particularly the case when authors (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard Reference Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard2011; Dörrenbächer and Geppert Reference Dörrenbächer and Geppert2009; Logemann and Piekkari Reference Logemann and Piekkari2015; Vaara et al. Reference Vaara, Tienari, Piekkari and Säntti2005; Welch et al. Reference Welch, Welch and Piekkari2005) do not only delineate political tactics and related power bases in use in concrete human interaction but link the political behaviour of actors to their structural, systemic and discursive embeddedness. Episodic power relates to its structural and systemic context in at least two ways: (i) outcomes of power episodes do have effects on the context (e.g. on the reallocation of resources among parties); and (ii) structures, norms and discourses largely determine who has which kind of power available in an episode (e.g. who has access to rewards and sanctions; who is able to mobilize legitimate discourses in the situation).

Systemic power is power that reaches beyond the episode and resides between actors rather than being ‘held’ by any given party (Clegg 1990). Systemic power thus maintains that power is always there even if it is not currently employed in a circumscribed political episode. So, even if we may feel free to decide and act according to our interests in a certain situation, our freedom may be structured and contained by forces we are not aware of or cannot control. This view of power is associated with the influential work by Foucault (Foucault Reference Foucault1977, Reference Foucault1982; Foucault and Gordon Reference Foucault and Gordon1980) who strongly emphasizes the systemic dimension of power: ‘power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must, I think, be analysed as something that circulates, or rather that functions only when it is part of a chain…In other words, power passes through individuals’ (Foucault Reference Foucault2003: 29). Power is therefore implicated in our everyday world, not just in episodes of (visible, discernible) political action; in this sense, ‘Power does not show itself because it is implicated in all that we are and all that we inhabit’ (Allen Reference Allen2003: 65). Therefore systemic power is congealed in the institutions, cultures and norms that structure our discourses, our interests, our roles and identities (Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014). In this way, actors, their goals, their power bases and power means are constituted through systemic power. It also determines who has access to the political games and who is prevented from entering the field – who, in other words, is unable to position him- or herself as an interested, political actor in a specific situation. In the case study of the Pakistanian soccer stitchers (Khan et al. Reference Khan, Munir and Willmott2007), for instance, the local community is – either purposively or involuntarily – precluded from access to the debate about their ‘better’ future of work initiated by the MNCs and global NGOs. In consequence, they neither have a chance to voice their interests, nor to undertake political action to protect those interests that seem relevant and ‘real’ to them. Using a different case, Frenkel (Reference Frenkel2008) traces such institutionalized power back to colonial structures of first world versus third world geopolitical relations which even nowadays define some discourses as relevant or legitimate while subduing others. Lukes (Reference Lukes2005) terms this systemic dimension of power that is grounded in unquestionable norms and dominant discourses the ‘third face’ of power. While he seems to imply that there is no way out, no way of emancipation from these dominating structures because the actors are trapped in powerful norms unknowable to themselves, Clegg et al. (Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006) argue that because these norms are man-made they are also potentially subject to man-made change initiatives. Following our argument that human actors always retain a margin of liberty, we also consent that they might use it in order to non-conform, reaffirm or to question, reinterpret and eventually modify dominant discourses and taken-for-granted rules and rulers. This argumentation parallels the debate around institutional entrepreneurship which consents that even ‘powerless’ actors might be able to tackle, adjust, hybridize or create institutions depending on their motivation and their ability to generate powerful coalitions and networks (Battilana Reference Battilana2006; Garud et al. Reference Garud, Hardy and Maguire2007; Marti and Mair Reference Marti, Mair, Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca2010). If we accept that systemic power as institutional power is subject to institutional work, it is evident that even when actors perceive them as insurmountable, structures and discourses of dominance are per se not eternally fixed but essentially in flux. Through actors’ reflexive capacity and reproduction, reinterpretation and reassessment of rules and norms as they go along, they partake at structuring and restructuring the fields for political action.

Fleming and Spicer differentiate between two modes of systemic power: domination and subjectification (Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014). Domination occurs when ideological values, practices, interpretations and technologies become hegemonic. They then shape actors and their ‘perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept the role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable’ (Lukes Reference Lukes2005: 24). In some MNCs dominance becomes discernible when subsidiaries always turn to headquarters for advice, resources or direction, thus reproducing an inherent core-periphery-structure which, in turn, keeps them in their strategically marginal position (Boussebaa Reference Boussebaa2015; Boussebaa et al. Reference Boussebaa, Sturdy and Morgan2014). The argument is similar to the work by Frenkel and others (Banerjee and Prasad Reference Banerjee and Prasad2008; Frenkel Reference Frenkel2008) on neo-colonial power structures between ‘Western’ headquarters and their subunits in developing countries.

Subjectification is largely based on the work by Foucault (Foucault Reference Foucault1977; Hutton et al. Reference Hutton, Gutman, Martin and Foucault1988) who convincingly argued that we internalize roles, identities and norms shaped by structures of dominance power in such a way that we ourselves embody, control and maintain our own domination through self-monitoring and self-disciplining. If we internalize formerly external norms about ‘what is good for us’ through regulation processes (Deci Reference Deci, Renninger, Hidi and Krapp1992; Deci and Ryan Reference Deci and Ryan2000), we develop an identity or self-concept that even though the impulse for its development might originally be located outside – and represent outside interests – is perceived as authentically ours. Mumby and colleagues (Laclau and Mouffe Reference Laclau and Mouffe2001; Mumby Reference Mumby, Putnam and Jablin2001; Mumby and Stohl Reference Mumby and Stohl1991) delineate the role of discourses in identity formation and development, for instance in constructing masculinity, as an underlying and self-reproducing albeit invisible power structure in organizations (Mumby Reference Mumby1998). Power as subjectification thus does not require coercive or manipulative action or dominance structures to ‘get B doing what A wants’. When B has thoroughly internalized the ‘right’ behaviour as his or her own intrinsic motivation, there is no need for incentives, pressures, control, monitoring or any other perceptible political action or instrument. By infiltrating ‘the very heart of the employee’ (Fleming and Spicer Reference Fleming and Spicer2014: 268), actors are ostensibly ‘free’ to choose their action according to their inherent interests, but their interests, identities and perception of alternatives for action have been shaped by norms and structures beyond their reach and consciousness. Even though the action is ‘freely’ chosen, it retains a quality of power that is, however, barely visible. At times, it becomes discernible in its consequences, e.g. when the prevalence of burn-out syndromes can be traced back to a long-term discongruity between internalized aspirations (about ‘success’, ‘achievement’, ‘career’ etc.) and the motivational deep structure that over time exhausts the human capacity for volition (Kehr Reference Kehr2004). For the case of the MNC we can suppose that the identity of ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ managers with its implications of boundaryless transferability and élite status is a potentially rewarding field for research on processes of subjectification (Cappellen and Janssens Reference Cappellen and Janssens2010; Gagnon and Collinson Reference Gagnon and Collinson2014).

Systemic and episodic power are interrelated: while systemic power shapes actors, interests, identities and the allocation of power sources, as well as the legitimacy of power means and structures and the arena in which politics takes place, each embedded power episode contributes to the stabilization or destabilization of its constitutive context. Clegg's circuits of power framework (Clegg Reference Clegg1989; Clegg et al. Reference Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips2006) provides the most thorough theorization of this interrelationship. His framework integrates: (i) episodic or transitive power where actors employ available power bases to pursue their recognized interests in instances of organizational politics; (ii) systemic power as domination based on rules that fix relations of meaning and membership (i.e. define roles, positions, hegemonic values and norms); and (iii) systemic power as subjectification where techniques of production and discipline (i.e. internationalization and self-regulation) generate the social structures that, in turn, define who is an actor and which interests are pursued. Apart from differentiating the three faces or dimensions of power, Clegg's model is exemplary in emphasizing the multiple feedback loops between episodic and systemic power. Episodic outcomes reproduce or transform structures of domination which in turn facilitate or hinder the development of regimes of discipline or production. Systemic power defines who has access to the field of political activity, which power sources are relevant and how they are allocated, what the rules of the political game are and how legitimacy is constituted. In Clegg's framework, ‘obligatory passage points’ (channels, conduits) are instrumental for the flow of power through episodes and structures. Here, institutionalized structures and norms (systemic power) are used by controlling actors or agencies to define what the game in question is, that is, obligatory passage points represent and constitute the extant power positions, rules and relations.

The framework is hardly ever applied in full to the analysis of political games in MNCs; particularly the complex concept of the obligatory passage points seems to resist a smooth and lean application to MNC research. Vaara et al. (Reference Vaara, Tienari, Piekkari and Säntti2005: see also Chapter 6) explicitly refer to the framework but essentially uses it only to differentiate between episodic and systemic dimensions of power. Similarly, even theoretical contributions such as the recent work by Fleming and Spicer (Reference Fleming and Spicer2014) – although they refer extensively to Clegg's work – do not discuss the more intricate elements of the model. More recently, Geppert et al. (Reference Geppert, Williams and Wortmann2014) apply Clegg's model for the study and comparison of micropolitical game-playing at Lidl stores across Europe but still focus on the three dimensions of power rather than on the dynamic linkages between them. A possible explanation for the selective use of the model in the IB field but also in the power and politics literature at large might lie in the iterative development of the field. As we emphasized at the beginning of this chapter, the organizational politics literature is rooted in the conception of politics as the employment of power by interested actors, i.e. as episodic. Early proponents of the perspective in organizational studies (Mintzberg Reference Mintzberg1983; Pfeffer Reference Pfeffer1981; Salancik and Pfeffer Reference Salancik and Pfeffer1974) but also early work on power and politics in MNCs (Prahalad and Doz Reference Prahalad and Doz1987) are basically limited to an agentic and episodic view of power. With the increased interest in power and politics in MNCs during the last decade, underlying conceptions of power have been growing in complexity and increasingly also take account of the systemic embeddedness of political agency and the feedback loops between the structural and the episodic dimension of power. In our own work, for instance, we have drawn attention to the interaction between power resources employed by actors in the field and the constitution of the field – and thus also the reconfiguration of power structures in MNCs – through previous and ensuing political action (Blazejewski Reference Blazejewski2009). With the integration of institutional perspectives into MNC research, the structural and systemic context of political agency has gained considerable attention in recent years. Maybe this development also prepares the field for a more thorough reception of the more complex conceptualizations of power in sociology and organizational studies in the future.

Conflicts

Some authors include conflict as a core element of organizational politics (Blazejewski Reference Blazejewski, Geppert and Mayer2006; Dlugos Reference Dlugos, Dlugos, Dorow and Farrell1993; March Reference March1962; Narayanan and Fahey Reference Narayanan and Fahey1982; Schotter and Beamish Reference Schotter, Beamish, Dörrenbächer and Geppert2011). Drory and Romm (Reference Drory and Romm1990), for instance, maintain that politics as a behavioural quality is associated with conflict as a situational characteristic. On a macro level, Dahrendorf argues that politics create conflicts when actors resist the influencing attempts of others (Dahrendorf Reference Dahrendorf1988). In turn, Neuberger (Reference Neuberger2006) argues that politics is not necessarily conflictual, for instance, when pro-social political behaviour does not produce any resistance. In our view, the debate about whether conflict is an element of politics or not largely hinges on the definition of conflict in use by respective authors. If we employ a narrow definition of conflict as a manifest episode in which actors fight, bargain and negotiate their opposing interests, it is in fact difficult to assert that political behaviour is necessarily conflictual. A broader and more adequate definition of conflict as incompatible interests in interdependent social situations which are perceived by at least one of the actors or parties involved (Boulding Reference Boulding1962; Dlugos et al. Reference Dlugos, Dlugos, Dorow and Farrell1993; Thomas Reference Thomas and Dunnette1976), however, does also allow for conflicts to be latent, covert or hidden (Kolb and Bartunek Reference Kolb and Bartunek1992; Morrill et al. Reference Morrill, Zald and Rao2003). Such a definition of conflict does also more adequately correspond to our concept of power as both episodic and systemic. In an episodic perspective, conflicts occur when actors perceive that their interests are endangered by the political activities of others. They will then seek to make use of their own power bases to handle the conflict, i.e. stage resistance or negotiate a consensus. In the systemic perspective, power is employed to foreclose or silence potential resistance. The domination can be perceived by actors as oppressive but they might feel themselves unable to acknowledge, voice or even react against it; the situation would produce a latent or hidden conflict – which, however, when the dominating authority is challenged or actors develop an emancipatory impulse, might become manifest at any time. With subjectification actors would not even be aware of potentially conflictual interests; they have learned to identify with and internalize hegemonic interests and values. Especially this total absence of conflict should make the politics researcher suspicious: it is then highly interesting to understand how and through which political strategies actors in this field are prevented from holding conflictual interests in the first place.

The conflict construct therefore seems to us a useful correlate to the politics and power perspective as we have argued more extensively elsewhere (Blazejewski and Becker-Ritterspach Reference Blazejewski, Becker-Ritterspach, Dörrenbächer and Geppert2011). Conflicts are necessarily conceptualized as processual and dynamic (Barki and Hartwick Reference Barki and Hartwick2001; Pondy Reference Pondy1967; Thomas Reference Thomas and Dunnette1976; Wall Jr and Callister Reference Wall and Callister1995): inside the episode the perception of conflict by at least one party triggers a process of (reciprocal) conflict handling. Beyond the episode the consequences of conflict-handling processes produce a new situation which in turn might give rise to further episodes or conflict escalation processes (Diehl Reference Diehl2006; Glasl Reference Glasl2010; Pearson d'Estrée Reference Pearson d'Estrée, Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast2003). The conflict concept thus emphasizes and supports a processual view of politics in organizations and takes account of the multiple interactional effects between political action, situation and the organizational or institutional context at large.

Conclusion

Power and politics is rather a conceptual field with many multifaceted definitions and constructs than a coherent theory in organization studies. Over time and from changing angles, organizational politics has been understood as a specific quality of – mostly dysfunctional – behaviour or as a generic approach to understanding organizations. Authors have limited their research endeavours to the identification of political tactics, skills or the consequences of political behaviour. Or they have broadened their perspective to look beyond the concrete episode of political activity to the institutional and contextual embeddedness of power and politics. In view of the multiple approaches and viewpoints – and their insightful application to many different empirical phenomena in the literature – it seems both useless and senseless to attempt to provide a general definition of organizational politics here. Instead, we have suggested that there are certain debates – around power, interests, actors and conflict – that are and always have been closely associated with politics and that help us to get a grasp on and structure our own understanding of the concept. In this sense, the chapter is intended to help the reader, first, to map his or her understanding of power and politics against the manifold perspectives already out there, and, second, to extend, develop or adjust this position through critically reassessing some of the arguments presented here. In the following chapters we revisit many of the debates and issues raised in this chapter; this chapter then may serve as a useful backdrop for navigating the field of power and politics in the multinational corporation.