The study of moral emotions is thriving, with an upsurge in research on the topic. However, a key question that needs to be answered is: What makes moral emotions unique? Specifically, it is important to understand the distinct qualities of specific emotions and the degree to which an emotion can be moral. It is essential to consider this question, as moral emotions are believed to influence both our judgments and actions. In terms of emotions being related to moral judgments, three claims have been made in the literature: 1) emotions are associated with moral judgments; 2) emotions amplify moral judgments; and 3) emotions moralize nonmoral acts (Avramova & Inbar, Reference Avramova and Inbar2013). Evidence to date is mainly supportive of the first claim – in other words, emotions are at the very least associated with moral judgments. Focusing on the relationship between emotions and action, some researchers have argued that a person’s moral emotions are better predictors of the person’s (moral) action than are other moral phenomena, such as moral reasoning (for reviews, see Haidt, Reference Haidt2001, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003; Teper et al., Reference Teper, Zhong and Inzlicht2015). Given that emotions may play a crucial role in both moral action and judgment, this suggests emotions are important to morality. Therefore, it is necessary to understand whether a given emotion is moral and whether moral emotions are distinct from nonmoral emotions. Unsurprisingly, it is difficult to decipher what makes a moral emotion distinct from a nonmoral emotion, since there are outstanding debates about what is a nonmoral emotion (Barrett & Russell, Reference Barrett and Russell2015; Cowen & Keltner, Reference Cowen and Keltner2017; Ekman, Reference Ekman1999), what the scope of morality is (Ellemers et al., Reference Ellemers, van der Toorn, Paunov and van Leeuwen2019), what a moral judgment is (Malle, Reference Malle2021), and what constitutes a moral action (Teper et al., Reference Teper, Zhong and Inzlicht2015). A careful examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is nevertheless necessary to keep these issues in mind when evaluating whether and to what degree a given emotion is moral.
10.1 What Makes Moral Emotions Unique?
In terms of determining whether a given emotion is moral, previous definitions have focused either on unique elicitors of moral emotions (e.g., certain norm violations) and/or unique consequences of moral emotions (e.g., prosocial behavior). For example, Tangney et al. (Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007) have argued that moral emotions respond to violations of norms that are supported by groups and whole societies. Therefore, moral emotions are crucial to social functioning because individuals often feel socially shared emotions in reaction to various events that are moral. This definition focuses more on the elicitors of certain moral emotions, with moral action being a byproduct. By contrast, Haidt (Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003) defines moral emotions as “those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” (p. 853). According to this definition, a prototypical moral emotion has two features. First, prototypical moral emotions have “disinterested elicitors,” meaning that a situation does not need to directly involve or impact an individual to trigger an emotional response. Specifically, Haidt argued that “the more an emotion tends to be triggered by such disinterested elicitors, the more it can be considered a prototypical moral emotion” (p. 854). Second, moral emotions are associated with prosocial tendencies, meaning that moral emotions are likely to motivate actions that will benefit others. Thus, Haidt’s definition focuses on both elicitors and outcomes that make a moral emotion unique.
Expanding on these previous definitions of moral emotions, it is important to consider in more depth who is benefiting from the emotion and the consequences of specific moral emotions. Cohen-Chen et al. (Reference Cohen-Chen, Pliskin and Goldenberg2020) have argued emotions should be distinguished based on “whether they feel good” and/or “whether they do good.” Evidently, emotions that make us feel uncomfortable can lead to extremely favorable outcomes. For example, anger can be considered a prototypical moral emotion according to Haidt’s (Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003) definition and can have both very negative consequences in the case of aggression and very positive socio-moral consequences, ultimately leading to corrective behaviors, negotiation, and reconciliation. Thus, anger can be good for relationships and groups. Cohen-Chen et al.’s (Reference Cohen-Chen, Pliskin and Goldenberg2020) conceptualization was used to explain emotions in conflict but can be applied here to moral emotions as well. In other words, we should be questioning ultimately whether certain moral emotions “do good” for individuals, groups, and societies, which is more important than whether emotions make us “feel good,” as emotions do not have to be a positive feeling or experience to lead to positive outcomes. However, we should broaden the scope of outcomes of moral emotions, by considering the impact of moral emotions on our thoughts and perceptions and how these affect others, in addition to actions and action tendencies. Thus, there needs to be a shift in focus from the elicitors of moral emotions to the social consequences of feeling moral emotions, which includes both cognitive and behavioral consequences for both the self and others.
The current chapter will analyze the different families of moral emotions (i.e., emotions within a family are similar but should have some differences) along the lines of whether they do good for others, both in terms of behavioral responses (e.g., promoting engagement, helping, and approach) and social-cognitive processes (e.g., open-mindedness, flexible thinking, and connectedness). The four main families of moral emotions include the other-condemning emotions (e.g., contempt, anger, and disgust); the self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame and guilt); the other-suffering emotions (e.g., compassion and empathy); and the other-praising emotions (e.g., awe and elevation) (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003). I will examine the typical consequences of these specific emotions, not just the situations that typically elicit them (see Table 10.1 for a summary).
| Emotion | Elicitors | Degree criteria | Consequences | Degree criteria |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contempt | Community violations; seeing someone as beneath you, not measuring up and/or being incompetent. | ◌ | Social exclusion and nonnormative collective action. | ◌ |
| Anger | Autonomy violations; blameworthy and/or harmful actions, which are often performed intentionally. | ✔ | Aggression and retaliation but also reparative behavior and normative collective action. | ✔ |
| Disgust | Divinity violations; moral violations that demonstrate bad character and/or are despicable; bodily norm violations. | ◌ | Avoidance and purification, some evidence for nonnormative collective action and aggression. | ◌ |
| Guilt | Self-moral failures, which focus on the action itself and/or prescriptive moral violations. | ✔ | Reparative behavior, social improvement, and collective action but not always when shame is accounted for. | ✔ |
| Shame | Self-moral failures, which focus on the person and/or proscriptive moral violations. | ◌ | Avoidance, denial, and withdrawal, some evidence for social support and other positive consequences when the situation is repairable. | ◌ |
| Empathy | Feeling the same emotion as another and/or understanding what they are feeling. | ◌ | Reconciliation, forgiveness, helping, and humanizing behaviors; increase in positive attitudes and seeing similarities with others, or self-other overlap; decrease in hostile action, aggression, stereotyping, and prejudice. However, we often avoid experiencing empathy and empathy failures are frequent. | ◌ |
| Compassion | Feeling concerned for another person’s suffering. | ◌ | Compassion shares most of empathy’s positive outcomes, such as helping and humanizing behaviors. However, we often experience compassion fade. | ◌ |
| Awe | Things that are vast, transcend previous experiences, or exceed expectancies. | ◌ | Need for accommodation and connection, critical thinking, decrease in selfishness and increase in positive feelings, helping, well-being, environmental concern, and charitable giving; perceiving that time is slowing down; more willingness to associate with others with opposing views. | ✔ |
| Elevation | Witnessing acts of uncommon goodness or moral beauty. | ✔ | Helping behaviors, imitation of positive role models, desire to share more overlap with others, and decrease in prejudice. | ✔ |
10.2 Other-Condemning Emotions
Anger, disgust, and contempt are other-condemning emotions, sometimes referred to as morally condemning emotions (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003), or the hostility triad (Izard, Reference Izard1991). Thus, we experience these emotions when we think that someone else (or a group) has engaged in some form of (moral) wrongdoing. These emotions have been considered to be basic or primary emotions (Ekman, Reference Ekman1999), which implies that they are universally experienced and have unique facial expressions. By contrast, others have argued that emotions are socially constructed (Averill, Reference Averill1983; Barrett & Russell, Reference Barrett and Russell2015; Parrott, Reference Parrott2001); thus, there are no universal or basic emotions. If we take disgust, for example, recent evidence suggests that this emotion is more likely to be caused by social learning (Aznar et al., Reference Aznar, Tenenbaum and Russell2021; Rottman et al., 2018) than previous research suggests (Bloom, Reference Bloom2004; Danovitch & Bloom, Reference Danovitch and Bloom2009). As a result, the “basicness” of these morally condemning emotions is questionable.
10.2.1 Contempt
Within the moral realm, research on the CAD triad hypothesis maps the three emotions (contempt, anger, disgust) to three distinct moral violations (community, autonomy, divinity) (Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999). Specifically, it was found that community violations are associated with contempt, autonomy violations are associated with anger, and divinity violations are associated with disgust. However, of the three other-condemning emotions, it is questionable whether contempt is distinct from anger and disgust. For example, some have argued that contempt is a form of disgust (for a review see Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Fischer and Giner-Sorolla2016). Even when examining the CAD triad hypothesis (Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999), it was found that contempt often overlapped with anger and disgust and was triggered by norm violations in multiple moral domains (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Fischer and Giner-Sorolla2016; P. S. Russell et al., Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013). There are also known methodological issues with measuring contempt, such as that the facial expression for contempt is less clear than that of anger or disgust (J. A. Russell, Reference Russell1991). Additionally, for self-report measures, English speakers do not always understand what the term “contempt” means (Ekman et al., Reference Ekman, O’Sullivan and Matsumoto1991). Related to this point, people less frequently think of contempt as an emotion; thus, it is less accessible (Fehr & Russell, Reference Fehr and Russell1984).
If we first focus on the elicitors of contempt, within hierarchical societies contempt is elicited when an individual sees another individual as beneath them and not even worthy of strong feelings such as anger (Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Fischer and Giner-Sorolla2016). In more egalitarian societies, contempt is seen as an expression that an individual does not measure up (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003). Research has also identified that we experience contempt when we judge someone to be incompetent (Hutcherson & Gross, Reference Hutcherson and Gross2011). As mentioned previously, the CAD hypothesis links contempt with ethics of community, which includes concerns such as caring that a certain hierarchy exists and that everyone has certain roles within society that they must fulfill (Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999). Contempt can be directed to the person as a whole being, or their actions (Malle et al., Reference Malle, Voiklis, Kim and Mason2018). In terms of the experience of contempt, this emotion is said to be much cooler than anger and disgust (Izard, Reference Izard and Izard1977; Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999). Some have even questioned whether contempt is a sentiment (i.e., a standing attitude) rather than an experienced state emotion (for reviews see Fischer & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Fischer and Giner-Sorolla2016 and Malle et al., Reference Malle, Voiklis, Kim and Mason2018).
In terms of consequences, contempt can be associated with cognitive changes, in which an individual is treated as having less worth within future interactions (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, Reference Oatley, Johnson-Laird, Martin and Tesser1996). For the behavioral tendencies and actions, evidence has been mixed in terms of whether contempt is associated with avoidance and/or attack tendencies (Malle et al., Reference Malle, Voiklis, Kim and Mason2018). For example, it has been found that in the short term and long term contempt can result from unresolved anger and can lead to social exclusion behaviors (Fischer & Roseman, Reference Fischer and Roseman2007). Also, recent evidence indicates that disgust may be a better predictor than contempt for nonnormative collective action tendencies, such as violent protest (Noon, Reference Noon2019). Disgust has also been shown to be a better predictor of dehumanizing beliefs and action tendencies than contempt (Giner-Sorolla & Russell, Reference Bartoș, Russell and Hegarty2020). In summary, contempt seems to be a less straightforward moral emotion, in terms of its elicitors and consequences. Additionally, it may be part of the experience of disgust and anger, or more similar to an emotion like hatred, due to its longevity. In short, even though contempt is relevant to morality, it may not be a distinct emotion.
10.2.2 Anger
Next, I turn to the moral nature of anger. As a moral emotion, anger probably has the most long-standing history in the field, besides that of empathy. Mounting evidence demonstrates that anger can often be a moral emotion for two reasons. First, there seem to be common triggers of anger, which are often linked to moral situations and contexts (see Lomas, Reference Lomas2019, and P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013, for a review). These contextual factors can operate as mitigating circumstances intensifying or reducing anger depending on the situation at hand. Second, the common belief that anger is a negative emotion that leads to aggression (i.e., it does bad) is questionable, with growing research refuting this assumption. Specifically, evidence indicates that anger can lead to positive outcomes in some circumstances. Below I outline the evidence for both reasons for designating anger as a typically moral emotion.
Over decades of research, a clear connection has been made between anger and its cognitive elicitors, which are often linked to moral situations. Anger has been linked with the appraisals of goal blockage, other blame, and unfairness (Cova et al., Reference Cova, Deonna and Sander2013; Lazarus, Reference Lazarus1991; Roseman et al., Reference Roseman, Antoniou and Jose1996; Smith & Ellsworth, Reference Smith and Ellsworth1985; Wranik & Scherer, Reference Wranik, Scherer, Potegal, Stemmler and Spielberger2010). In the moral realm, anger is elicited in response to actual or symbolic harm (Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999) and especially intentional harm (Cova et al., Reference Cova, Deonna and Sander2013; P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa2011). Anger has also been associated with attributions of responsibility and blame (Alicke, Reference Alicke2000; Goldberg et al., Reference Goldberg, Lerner and Tetlock1999; Tetlock et al., Reference Tetlock, Visser, Singh, Polifroni, Scott, Elson, Mazzocco and Rescober2007), in which there is a cyclical relationship between anger and these appraisals. Finally, anger can also be reduced if it is felt that the behavior was carried out in the service of a greater good (Darley et al., Reference Darley, Klosson and Zanna1978). Thus, all of these appraisals or elicitors are directly related to evaluations of a moral situation and its consequences.
Focusing on the consequences, anger is an approach-related emotion associated with appetitive motivations, as some positive emotions are (Carver & Harmon-Jones, Reference Carver and Harmon-Jones2009). The social function of anger is attained by “forcing a change in another person’s behavior,” in hopes of achieving a better outcome (Fischer & Roseman, Reference Fischer and Roseman2007, p. 104). Whether or not the behavioral consequence of anger is hostile, it can nevertheless be argued that anger, in general, motivates individuals to approach the cause of their anger. Numerous studies have highlighted aggression as a common response to feeling angry, whether verbal and/or physical (Izard, Reference Izard and Izard1977). In many instances, people are motivated to get back at individuals perceived as having wronged them (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003; Izard, Reference Izard and Izard1977; Plutchik, Reference Plutchik, Plutchik and Kellerman1980; Shaver et al., Reference Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson and O’Connor1987). Anger encourages the person experiencing the emotion to either punish or rebuke the person who has offended them (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003; Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum2004). But social cohesion or reparation is a more common consequence of anger than previously thought (Averill, Reference Averill1983; Fischer & Roseman, Reference Fischer and Roseman2007). It has been found that anger inspires persons to engage in reparative behaviors, such as talking things over with the transgressor, particularly in the long term (Fischer & Roseman, Reference Fischer and Roseman2007; Weber, Reference Weber2004). Anger has also been shown to be a key motivator for collective action, particularly normative collective action, such as signing petitions and engaging in peaceful protest (Sasse et al., Reference Sasse, Halmburger and Baumert2020; Tausch et al., Reference Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh and Siddiqui2011).
The reason anger can lead to such different behaviors is that anger varies depending on the current context. That is, it is a contextually or situationally dependent emotion, which is evident by the mitigating factors that can influence whether anger is experienced, and its intensity, as reviewed in this section earlier. Not only does the context impact the experience of anger, but it also impacts how people respond to their anger. For example, relationships between transgressors and victims influence both the intensity of anger and the resulting actions (Fischer & Roseman, Reference Fischer and Roseman2007; Kuppens et al., Reference Kuppens, Van Mechelen and Meulders2004, Reference Kuppens, Van-Mechelen, Smits, De Boek and Ceulemans2007; Weber, Reference Weber2004). By contrast, contempt and disgust are less likely to be elicited by those who are close to us and are more likely to elicit rejection consistently, whereas anger is more likely to occur in close relationships and groups and elicit variable behavioral responses (Fischer & Roseman, Reference Fischer and Roseman2007; Hutcherson & Gross, Reference Hutcherson and Gross2011). Anger seems to play a crucial role in both interpersonal relationships, as well as social and group contexts (Cottrell & Neuberg, Reference Cottrell and Neuberg2005), by eliciting approach behaviors that can include hostility, but generally anger can encourage reform or change, especially in the long term.
Another factor that may influence one’s anger, and associated response, is social accountability, that is, whether individuals feel that their actions will impact others influences their anger (Averill, Reference Averill1983). Thus, when persons feel accountable, they will be less likely to respond automatically and thoughtlessly to their anger. It has been argued that social accountability reduces the impact of anger (Lerner et al., Reference Lerner, Goldberg and Tetlock1998). Therefore, persons are motivated to respond appropriately and constructively to their anger because if they do not it can have extremely negative consequences for them and others (Izard, Reference Izard and Izard1977). Evidence surrounding both accountability and the nature of relationships suggests that anger is not just elicited in the moment but can lead individuals to consider how their anger, and associated response, may impact future relationships with other individuals and groups. Thus, anger focuses on the future and can elicit long-term change, which results in positive outcomes. In summary, evidence suggests that anger is typically a moral emotion due to both its moral elicitors and positive consequences, such as reconciliation.
10.2.3 Disgust
Next, I discuss the controversial emotion of disgust. Disgust is an emotion that has captured the attention of many researchers. However, within the literature, there is still debate as to whether disgust is a moral emotion at all, whether it is similar to or different from core disgust, and whether it overlaps with anger and contempt. If we first look at the individual or personal level of disgust, rather than the moral or social realm specifically, we can see that theorists have struggled to capture what elicits disgust, resulting in tautological explanations. For example, appraisals that elicit disgust include “distasteful stimuli” (Ortony et al., Reference Ortony, Clore and Collins1988) and “poisonous ideas” (Lazarus, Reference Lazarus1991). This debate concerning what elicits disgust also extends into the moral realm. One of the key questions within this family is whether disgust is a distinct emotion and how far into the moral realm it extends. There are four main positions regarding what moral disgust is: 1) the general morality/character position, 2) the metaphorical use position, 3) the purity position, and 4) the bodily norm position (P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013). Here I will review the two extreme ends of this debate: the general morality/character position and the bodily norm position. Even though these two positions conflict in scope, they demonstrate that disgust is a person- or object-focused emotion that contrasts with anger, a situational or context-focused emotion. Before covering these two positions, for comparison purposes, I will briefly review the purity and metaphorical use positions. The purity position argues that disgust is elicited by purity or divinity violations, such as cleaning a toilet with a national flag or eating one’s pet dog (Horberg et al., Reference Horberg, Oveis, Keltner and Cohen2009; Rozin et al. Reference Rozin, Lowery, Imada and Haidt1999). However, there are very few purity violations that do not also involve bodily norm violations (e.g., sexual behaviors) and/or core disgust elicitors, such as bodily fluids or blood (see P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013 for a review of the issue). Thus, because of this overlap in violations, the bodily norm position may encapsulate the purity position. In contrast, the metaphorical use position argues that when disgust is expressed in the moral realm, individuals are just using the term “disgust” to express their true feeling of anger (Nabi, Reference Nabi2002; Royzman et al., Reference Royzman, Atanasov, Landy, Parks and Gepty2014). Due to the importance of examining parallels between the general morality position and the bodily norm violation, I will now focus on these two positions.
First, according to the general morality or character position, disgust can be elicited by a range of immoral actions or violations, such as cheating and unfairness. In support of this position, one of the most common definitions of disgust has been proposed by Rozin et al. (Reference Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, Lewis, Haviland-Jones and Barrett1993). They argue that the core function of disgust is the avoidance of ingesting contaminating or offensive objects in the mouth. Extending further, disgust has evolved to include socio-moral elicitors in which disgust is used as a form of social control. At the socio-moral level, disgust is elicited in response to individuals who appear as if they cannot give back to society and/or have deep character flaws. Based on this general morality hypothesis, individuals or groups can elicit disgust when they have done something that is morally wrong or does not fit in with their society.
Supporting this view, Jones and Fitness (Reference Jones and Fitness2008) argue that individuals are physically repulsed by moral transgressors who use deception and/or abuse their power. Therefore, according to this definition, an individual can be deemed as disgusting if they have engaged in despicable behavior. Both accounts, Rozin et al. (Reference Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, Lewis, Haviland-Jones and Barrett1993) and Jones and Fitness (Reference Jones and Fitness2008), make it difficult to distinguish moral disgust from anger by associating disgust broadly to most norm violations and/or deceptive behavior. These definitions are then problematic because anger is just as likely to arise in these situations, making it difficult to distinguish anger and disgust’s individual effects. More recently, it has been argued that disgust is elicited by someone who has a bad character or has done something that shows bad character. For example, Giner-Sorolla and Chapman (Reference Giner-Sorolla and Chapman2017) found that disgust is elicited by bad character, whereas anger focuses on the event. The researchers demonstrated this across several studies by varying violation types (i.e., indicative of bad character or not) and manipulating relevant factors in an experimental design (i.e., harmful desire and harmful consequences). They found that the desire to cause harm (an indicator of bad character) was predictive of disgust, while harmful consequences were more closely related to anger. Conceptually, the triggers of moral disgust, according to the general morality or bad character position, seem to be similarly tautological as the triggers of nonmoral core disgust, since these elicitors just connote that a person or action is really bad.
Additionally, one problem with research in support of this position is that most studies still primarily rely on self-report of emotion terms or facial endorsement, that is, participants responding to whether an emotion expression corresponds to how they are feeling (P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013). This is particularly problematic if researchers are asking people to report their “moral disgust,” as they may be artificially increasing the importance of this term (P. S. Russell et al., Reference Russell, Piazza and Giner-Sorolla2013). Relatedly, it has been found that when the physical sensations or action tendencies of disgust are not measured, anger, rather than disgust, is elicited by divinity violations unrelated to the body or pathogens (Royzman et al., Reference Royzman, Atanasov, Landy, Parks and Gepty2014).
In contrast to the previous arguments, according to the bodily norm position, disgust has a very specific function, which is to govern norms regarding the body, particularly norms about sexual behaviors and eating (e.g., bestiality, incest, and pedophilia). In these contexts, disgust tends to be elicited from a categorical judgment, as to whether the behavior is taboo or not. In these contexts, disgust appears to be an unreasoning emotion that gives rise to inflexible thoughts and behaviors, namely avoidance and purification (P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013). People also find it difficult to justify their disgust in these contexts, instead providing tautological reasons, such as: “It’s just disgusting.” By contrast, in response to other socio-moral violations, such as harm and unfairness, disgust appears to heavily overlap with anger and does not appear to have the same detrimental consequences as disgust experienced in reaction to bodily norm violations (such as incest). Among consequences, disgust encourages avoidance, purification, and expulsion of objects, other individuals, or groups (see P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013, for a review). Recent evidence also indicates that disgust may be associated with indirect aggression (Tybur et al., Reference Tybur, Molho, Cakmak, Cruz, Singh and Zwicker2020) and nonnormative collective action (Noon, Reference Noon2019).
The reason why we should care whether something is truly “morally” disgusting (or whether a different emotion is elicited, such as anger) is because disgust is a “sticky” emotion. For example, Rozin and colleagues have found that disgusting qualities can be transferred to different objects based on the laws of sympathetic magic (Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff1986; Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Markwith and Ross1990; Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Markwith and Nemeroff1992; Rozin & Nemeroff, Reference Rozin and Nemeroff2002). The first law of sympathetic magic holds that “once in contact, always in contact”; therefore, disgusting qualities cannot be eliminated once they have been transferred (e.g., a sweater worn by Hitler or someone with AIDS will remain disgusting) (Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff1986; Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Markwith and Nemeroff1992). The second law of similarity holds that “the image equals the object.” This law can explain why an object that is similar in shape to an inherently disgusting object would also be deemed disgusting (e.g., chocolate that is in the shape of dog poop). These laws of sympathetic magic also imply that the effects of contagion are insensitive to dose (e.g., it doesn’t matter how long the sweater was worn by someone). It has been found that individuals engage in avoidance and purification behaviours when disgusting qualities are transferred to a previously neutral object (e.g., Rozin et al., Reference Rozin, Millman and Nemeroff1986). Additionally, when asked to explain these behaviors, persons admitted that they could not come up with reasons and could not deny that their behaviors were based on irrational thoughts. This evidence suggests that core disgust can have transference or contagion effects. Evidence also suggests that moral contagion effects can occur via disgust (Eskine et al., Reference Eskine, Novreske and Richards2013). Specifically, Eskine and colleagues found that after direct or indirect contact with someone who engaged in an immoral transgression (e.g., lying or cheating), people experienced more guilt following contact, suggesting a moral transfer effect. This effect was moderated by disgust sensitivity (i.e., an individual difference in the propensity to experience disgust); in other words, those with higher levels of disgust sensitivity were more likely to experience the moral transfer of guilt than those with lower levels of disgust sensitivity. However, the researchers did not measure whether feelings of state disgust were experienced by participants and/or the original transgressor, which is necessary for future research to establish whether moral disgust truly transfers interpersonally, that is, between individuals. This is important since recent evidence suggests that these moral contagion effects may occur because of reputation concerns, not necessarily because of disgust (Kupfer & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Kupfer and Giner-Sorolla2021). Specifically, these authors found that participants avoided morally tainted objects because of concerns about how they would appear to others if the object was on public display, more so than from concerns about coming into contact with the disgusting objects.
Another reason to be concerned with whether something is actually morally disgusting is that disgust has been found to have an automatic influence on moral judgment. For example, Wheatley and Haidt (Reference Wheatley and Haidt2005) elicited unconscious disgust using hypnosis, which made moral judgments more severe. Similarly, Schnall et al. (Reference Schnall, Haidt, Clore and Jordan2008) found that disgust from an outside source, that is, ambient disgust, had the same effect on moral judgments. However, a meta-analysis suggests that these effects may be smaller than previously thought, or even nonexistent (Landy & Goodwin, Reference Landy and Goodwin2015). Indeed, large-scale replication studies have failed to replicate the original effect, when disgust is elicited by taste (Ghelfi et al., Reference Ghelfi, Christopherson, Urry, Lenne, Legate, Fischer, Wagemans, Wiggins, Barrett, Bornstein, de Haan, Guberman, Issa, Kim, Na, O’Brien, Paulk, Peck, Sashihara and Sullivan2020). This ambiguous evidence regarding whether disgust impacts or amplifies our moral judgments casts doubt on the claim that disgust is directly connected to moral concerns. In summary, disgust may sometimes co-occur with moral concerns, but its standing as a moral emotion is open to question.
10.3 Self-Conscious Emotions
As with the other-condemning emotions, researchers have questioned the distinctiveness of the self-conscious emotions. Additionally, there has been mixed evidence in terms of whether the self-conscious emotions are always associated with positive consequences. Emotions that belong to this family of (moral) emotions include shame, regret, guilt, pride, and embarrassment. These emotions are secondary in nature, meaning they are more complex, normally less automatic, and require self-awareness (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003; Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). We typically feel these emotions when we have experienced some kind of self-failure (for example, feeling as if you have not achieved something or failed to act in the way that you should have), which can be moral in nature (Tracy & Robins, Reference Tracy and Robins2006). We feel these emotions when we have either engaged in some moral wrongdoing (e.g., shame and guilt) or when we have acted in a morally superior way (e.g., pride). Extending further, we can feel these self-conscious emotions when reflecting on our own group’s present or past behavior (Branscombe & Doosje, Reference Branscombe and Doosje2004; Lickel et al., Reference Lickel, Steele and Schmader2011).
This section will focus on comparing shame and guilt’s elicitors and consequences. Evidence regarding their distinctiveness is mixed. There is an unresolved debate as to whether shame is always detrimental, and guilt always beneficial, as originally proposed by Tangney and colleagues (Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). I will not discuss pride here because it is elicited when we feel that we have done something good (see Tracy & Robins, Reference Tracy and Robins2007 for a review), which is different from the triggers of shame and guilt. Embarrassment and regret appear to have too much overlap with shame and guilt methodologically and conceptually, often being used as synonymous terms with shame and guilt, respectively (e.g., Lickel et al., Reference Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier and Ames2005; Noon, Reference Noon2019). Thus, embarrassment and regret will not be evaluated here either.
One of the most prominent outstanding issues is whether shame and guilt are the same emotion (see Teroni & Deonna, Reference Teroni and Deonna2008 for a review), as Tompkins (Reference Tompkins1963) famously proposed. There are some important similarities between shame and guilt. First, they are often considered to be complex emotions that are uniquely experienced by humans and require some form of self-awareness or reflective thought (Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). Second, the self is the focus event, providing immediate feedback on or punishment for one’s behavior (Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). In other words, people feel bad about what they have done. Third, they are often triggered by self-failures (Gausel & Leach, Reference Gausel and Leach2011). Finally, these emotions typically develop later and are believed to be secondary emotions, as they are tied to more complex goals and behaviors (Izard, Reference Izard1971; Tangney & Dearing, Reference Tangney and Dearing2002).
By contrast, there are some notable differences between shame and guilt. It has been found that shame relates to proscriptive morality (i.e., what we should not do, avoidance) and guilt relates to prescriptive morality (i.e., what we should do, approach) (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, Reference Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman2010). This relationship was found at the trait level, where the authors found a positive correlation between the Behavioural Inhibition System and shame proneness and between the Behavioural Approach System and guilt proneness. Also, at the state level, priming a proscriptive orientation was found to increase shame, and priming a prescriptive orientation was found to increase guilt. Finally, when the authors manipulated the type of violations, proscriptive violations predicted feelings of shame and prescriptive violations predicted feelings of guilt.
People also frequently anticipate that they will feel either shame or guilt. In the extended theory of planned behavior, anticipated regret or guilt and moral norms are additional factors that can explain whether we engage in certain behaviors (Rivis et al., Reference Rivis, Sheeran and Armitage2009). A recent systematic review found that in the context of women’s reactions to breastfeeding, which is often perceived as a moralized issue, women commonly anticipate and experience shame and guilt about the way they choose to feed their baby and about public breastfeeding (P. S. Russell et al., Reference Russell, Smith, Birtel, Hart and Golding2021). Women experience guilt when they feel as if they have not acted in the way that they should have – for example, if they have not reached their feeding goals, or if they feel like a bad mother. This evidence suggests that shame and guilt are focused on different kinds of injunctive norms.
Additionally, shame and guilt show some unique parallels with disgust and anger, respectively, which suggests that shame and guilt are distinct. For instance, shame and disgust are believed to be avoidance emotions, while guilt and anger are approach emotions (Leach, Reference Leach, Woodyat, Worthington, Wenzel and Griffin2017; P. S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, Reference Russell and Giner-Sorolla2013). It has also been argued that shame and disgust are bodily-focused emotions, while guilt and anger are focused on harm and fairness (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum2004). Like the other-condemning emotions, self-conscious emotions can be experienced in the moment as states and can exist as dispositions or traits (i.e., shame or guilt proneness; Cohen et al., Reference Cohen, Wolf, Panter and Insko2011). Recent evidence has also shown that core disgust sensitivity and contamination concerns are related to shame proneness whereas moral disgust sensitivity is related to guilt proneness (Terrizzi Jr. & Shook, Reference Terrizzi and Shook2020). Research has also found that anger and disgust can socially cue guilt and shame, respectively (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, Reference Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa2011). Specifically, it was found that after exposure to an angry expression, participants reported feeling more guilt, while after exposure to a disgusted facial expression, participants reported feeling more shame. Due to parallels between disgust and shame, this evidence may suggest that, like disgust, shame is a less typical moral emotion. By contrast, like anger, guilt may be a more typical moral emotion.
When examining differences between shame and guilt, until recently, shame has been positioned as a bad or detrimental emotion, in comparison to guilt. In terms of elicitors, some have argued that shame and guilt are triggered by similar types of moral violations, but what differs is the appraisal of the situation or wrongdoing (Tangney & Dearing, Reference Tangney and Dearing2002; Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). Specifically, these findings indicate that shame is more focused on global negative beliefs about the self (“I am bad”), while guilt is more focused on the action or event (“I did a bad thing”). Additionally, it has been found that shame is associated with internal, stable, and uncontrollable attributions (i.e., lack of ability as the cause of self-failure), while guilt is associated with internal, unstable, and controllable attributions (i.e., lack of effort as the cause of self-failure; Tracy & Robins, Reference Tracy and Robins2006). It has also been argued that shame is triggered by concerns of image or reputation (Sznycer, Reference Sznycer2019). Others have contended that an important distinction between the two emotions is that shame relates to values whereas guilt is associated with norm violations (Teroni & Deonna, Reference Teroni and Deonna2008). These findings do not fully align with the categorical distinction between global self versus action appraisals originally proposed by Tangney but instead suggest more variability in terms of the elicitors of these emotions.
An additional distinction that requires more attention is whether guilt and shame relate to different behaviors or consequences. The general assumption is that shame is an avoidance emotion linked with hiding, denying, and escaping (Tangney & Dearing, Reference Tangney and Dearing2002), while guilt is an approach emotion linked with reparative and confession behaviors (Lickel et al., Reference Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier and Ames2005; Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). Shame proneness (i.e., an individual difference or disposition to feel shame more intensely) is also more closely related to detrimental outcomes related to the self, such as poor self-esteem, depression, and eating disorders (see Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007 for a review). Additionally, shame proneness increases the likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors, while guilt has the opposite effect (Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). In comparison to shame, guilt has a long-standing history of being tied to compensatory behaviors or apologies (Doosje et al., Reference Doosje, Branscombe, Spears and Manstead1998) and collective action (Becker et al., Reference Becker, Tausch and Wagner2011; Tausch et al., Reference Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh and Siddiqui2011). Guilt has also been found to relate to social improvement (Gausel & Leach, Reference Gausel and Leach2011). However, guilt has also be linked to less functional behaviors, such as self-punishment when someone feels they have done something wrong (Inbar et al., Reference Inbar, Pizarro, Gilovich and Ariely2013). Additionally, some evidence has shown that after controlling for shame, guilt does not always have such a strong association with reparations and apologies as other evidence suggests (Giner-Sorolla et al., Reference Giner-Sorolla, Piazza and Espinosa2011; Iyer et al., Reference Iyer, Schmader and Lickel2007).
Scholars have also suggested that shame may have more diverse relationships with behavior and motivation than previously thought (Gausel & Leach, Reference Gausel and Leach2011). Specifically, in their review, Gausel and Leach (Reference Gausel and Leach2011) found that, in response to moral self-failures, when an individual focuses on specific events/attributions this appraisal triggers feelings of shame and the need to self-improve. In contrast, when an individual has experienced moral self-failure and is focused on the global self, this appraisal triggers feelings of inferiority and defensive behaviors, such as avoidance. Therefore, according to this view, it is feelings of inferiority, not shame, that result in negative defensive behaviors. Further clarifying the role of guilt and shame in constructive behaviors, a meta-analysis by Leach and Cidam (Reference Leach and Cidam2015) identified that shame is more likely to be associated with positive outcomes when the situation seems reparable, in terms of either cause or consequence, while guilt is associated with positive outcomes regardless of how reparable the situation is.
Related to this point, when moral shame (triggered by one’s actions violating moral norms) and image shame (triggered by a tarnished social image) are distinguished from one another, this distinction provides evidence against the claim that shame always leads to negative behavioral effects (Rees et al., Reference Rees, Allpress and Brown2013). Specifically, in this research, it was found that image shame triggered from an in-group’s historical transgression (e.g., Germans’ role in the Holocaust) was associated with social distance from an unrelated victimized minority group (i.e., foreigners). By contrast, moral shame was found to be associated with support for foreigners. Similarly, it has been found that even longitudinally, moral shame and image shame are predictive of different types of behaviors, with image shame being related to negative behaviors and moral shame being related to positive behaviors (Allpress et al., Reference Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, Deonna and Teroni2014). In this research, it was also found that guilt was inconsistently related to positive behaviors.
This evidence suggests that shame may not always lead to negative outcomes in response to moral self-failures; thus, the damage to the self and social relations may not always occur. As a result, shame can be a functional moral emotion when the situation seems reparable. Also, like anger, the behavioral responses that are associated with guilt vary, but the conclusion seems to be the same as for anger, namely, that the overall response to guilt can be positive under certain circumstances. Cumulatively, the evidence suggests that when shame is focused on moral norms specifically, rather than one’s image or reputation, it can be considered a moral emotion, and that guilt is normally a moral emotion, due to its elicitors and consequences.
10.4 Positive Emotions
Up to this point, the chapter has focused on the moral status of several negative emotions, examining the similarities and differences between emotions within the moral families. It is now important to examine whether any positive emotions – that is, emotions that typically feel and/or do good – can be moral emotions. Also, it is important to examine whether these emotions can be considered separate constructs. Specifically, I will now turn toward comparing two other-suffering emotions (empathy and compassion) and two other-praising emotions (awe and elevation). Gratitude can also be considered to belong to the latter family but will not be discussed here because it is elicited by the perception that someone else has done something good or beneficial for the individual experiencing gratitude (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003). Thus, the self is more involved in the experience of gratitude than with the experience of awe and elevation, which are more focused on the object or another individual.
10.4.1 Empathy and Compassion
Empathy and compassion are generally considered to be other-suffering emotions, meaning they get us to focus on others and care for others. Like anger, empathy is an established emotion in the field of moral psychology (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003). At face value, many consider empathy to be central to morality. However, a central problem is that there have been far too many definitions of what empathy is, which makes it difficult to study empathy. For example, a review of prior literature has identified 43 different definitions of what empathy is (Cuff et al., Reference Cuff, Brown, Taylor and Howat2016). Additionally, among these definitions of empathy, there is a large amount of overlap with the constructs of compassion and sympathy.
Specifically, empathy can be defined as feeling the same or similar emotion as another individual or group, or understanding how another person is feeling (Decety & Jackson, Reference Decety and Jackson2004; Eisenberg et al., Reference Eisenberg, Fabes, Spinrad, Eisenberg, Damon and Lerner2006). It is recognized that there are then two components of empathy: affective empathy, which is feeling the same emotion as another person, and cognitive empathy, which is understanding what another individual or group is feeling (Cuff et al., Reference Cuff, Brown, Taylor and Howat2016). However, the latter (cognitive empathy) overlaps with the cognitive construct of perspective taking, that is, understanding what another individual or group is thinking, which is not an emotion. Compassion is conceptualized as an emotion we feel when we are concerned for another person’s suffering (Goetz et al., Reference Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas2010). Overlapping with compassion, sympathy is defined as feeling compassionate or concerned for another individual’s or group’s current state (Eisenberg, Reference Eisenberg1988). Therefore, compassion seems to subsume feelings of sympathy. Compassion is believed to be different from empathy in that individuals are not experiencing the same emotion as the target person (Tangney et al., Reference Tangney, Stuewig and Mashek2007). However, there is still the overlap for both empathy and compassion, in that we are concerned or focused on what another individual or group is feeling.
There is also overlap in the consequences of compassion and empathy, in that both emotions have been linked to positive social outcomes. Generally, empathy (and also perspective taking) is believed to be essential for social relations, encouraging prosocial behaviors and discouraging hostile action (Batson & Ahmad, Reference Batson and Ahmad2009). Empathy facilitates the humanizing of others; thus, it can be seen to oppose other-condemning emotions, particularly disgust and contempt, which encourage dehumanization (Giner-Sorolla & P. S. Russell, Reference Giner-Sorolla and Russell2019). For example, in intractable conflicts, empathy and compassion have been shown to reduce aggression, increase positive attitudes as well as helping behavior, and increase the desire for reconciliation and forgiveness (Klimecki, Reference Klimecki2019). Empathy can lead to helping behaviors, situational attributions, and seeing more similarities with others, or self-other overlap (Batson & Ahmad, Reference Batson and Ahmad2009). Empathy can also reduce stereotyping, prejudice, and hostile action (Batson & Ahmad, Reference Batson and Ahmad2009).
However, other evidence has found that people may find it difficult to experience empathy, or may even avoid it, because it is physically, emotionally, and cognitively taxing (Cameron et al., Reference Cameron, Hutcherson, Ferguson, Scheffer, Hadjiandreou and Inzlicht2019; Hodges & Klein, Reference Hodges and Klein2001). Additionally, we often experience “empathy failures” when people are dissimilar to us and/or are rivals (Bloom, Reference Bloom2017; Zaki & Cikara, Reference Zaki and Cikara2015).
Compassion has similar positive effects as empathy. For example, compassion has been shown to enhance moral expansiveness, that is, including more beings in our moral circle (Crimston et al., Reference Crimston, Blessing, Gilbert and Kirby2022). However, “compassion fade” can occur (i.e., compassion can be reduced or eliminated) when there are multiple victims rather than a single victim (Västfjäll et al., Reference Västfjäll, Slovic, Mayorga and Peters2014). Thus, in conclusion, there is considerable overlap between the other-suffering emotions, and they do not always lead to the best social outcomes, either cognitively or behaviorally. As a result, even though empathy and compassion can be moral, as they often have positive consequences, there are instances when people do not feel these emotions despite typical triggers.
10.4.2 Awe and Elation
This then leads to the final type of moral emotions, the other-praising emotions. However, it is questionable whether the other-praising emotions of elevation and awe are unique moral emotions or rather fall under the umbrella term of “kama muta” (see Bartoș et al., Reference Bartoș, Russell and Hegarty2020; Zickfeld et al., Reference Zickfeld, Schubert, Seibt and Fiske2017). Kama muta is similar to feeling moved, and the most typical feature of this experience is the heightened sense of communal sharing (Fiske, Reference Fiske2020). It is also described as an emotion that elicits physiological sensations like those of elevation and awe, such as chills and a warm feeling in the chest (Fiske, Reference Fiske2020).
By contrast, some have argued that elevation, awe, and admiration are distinct in terms of what elicits them, how they are experienced, and their consequences (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003; Onu et al., Reference Onu, Kessler and Smith2016). Admiration is an other-focused emotion (Onu et al., Reference Onu, Kessler and Smith2016). However, admiration is distinct in that it is believed by some to be elicited when we see someone exceed expectations of skill or talent (Algoe & Haidt, Reference Algoe and Haidt2009; Onu et al., Reference Onu, Kessler and Smith2016). Thus, admiration is often focused on competency rather than morality, and as such, it seems less relevant to morality. It is also questionable whether it is elicited distinctly from the other other-praising emotions of elevation and awe, or whether it is just part of these experiences, as there is overlap in terms of elicitors and consequences. Admiration has been linked with prosocial outcomes and has been shown to reduce prejudice. Specifically, admiration facilitates social change (Sweetman et al., Reference Sweetman, Spears, Livingstone and Manstead2013). Admiration also underlies reductions in both sexual and racial prejudice through intergroup contact (Seger et al., Reference Seger, Banerji, Park, Smith and Mackie2017). Since some have questioned whether admiration is a moral emotion at all, and admiration appears to overlap with awe and elevation, only the latter two emotions will be compared in further detail.
Both awe and elevation are believed to operate as a “hive switch,” encouraging people to be less selfish and more prosocial, by broadening attention and regard for others (Haidt, Reference Haidt2012; Pohling & Diessner, Reference Pohling and Diessner2016). In terms of the experience or elicited bodily sensations, they are both associated with feeling moved in some way and described as feeling warm in the chest, tingly, and having goosebumps (Algoe & Haidt, Reference Algoe and Haidt2009). Awe is elicited in response to perceived vastness or by things that transcend previous experiences, or more specifically exceed our expectancies (Gocłowska et al., Reference Gocłowska, Elliot, van Elk, Bulska, Thorstenson and Baas2023). It can be elicited by a range of objects, including nature, landscapes, art, music, and religious experiences. Keltner and Haidt (Reference Keltner and Haidt2003) postulated that the awe experience can be categorized into five different kinds or flavors: threat, beauty, ability, virtue, and supernatural causality. What is striking about the flavors of awe (Keltner & Haidt, Reference Keltner and Haidt2003) is that ability overlaps with admiration’s elicitors and virtue overlaps with elevation’s elicitors (described below), which captures the clear overlap and co-occurrence of these emotions. Thus, there is overlap with awe and elevation, and with awe and admiration. What is also apparent from awe elicitors or flavors is that the experience of awe is not always entirely positive, since it is connected to feelings of threat (Chaudhury et al., Reference Chaudhury, Garg and Jiang2021). Finally, awe is rarely elicited by what other people are doing or have done, or to morality but instead can be triggered by physical objects (e.g., nature).
By contrast, elevation is elicited by witnessing acts of uncommon goodness or moral beauty, that is, someone acting in an exceptionally moral way (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003). More specifically, elevation is triggered when we see someone else assist another individual who is “poor, sick, or stranded in a difficult situation” (Thomson & Siegel, Reference Thomson and Siegel2017, p. 629). As a result, it could be argued that elevation is a mixed emotion, as even though it is primarily positive, there is a negative undertone to elevation, as it involves rising above some negative experience. It also has the potential to trigger self-comparisons that are not always positive, as we may not feel that we are good enough in comparison to the hero that elicits elevation. Prior research has already identified that the experience of elevation is moderated by one’s own moral identity (Aquino et al., Reference Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim and Felps2009). Specifically, it was found that those that are higher in moral identity are more likely to experience elevation intensely. This suggests that when unflattering self-comparisons are possible, those with higher moral identity may be more threatened, and elevation is less likely to be experienced, or may even backfire.
In terms of consequences, awe is characterized by numerous positive outcomes (see Gottlieb et al., Reference Gottlieb, Keltner and Lombrozo2018, and Keltner & Haidt, Reference Keltner and Haidt2003, for reviews). First, awe triggers a need for accommodation to change the current circumstances one has witnessed, for example, by eliciting the need to include more beings in our moral or social circle. Second, awe increases critical thinking, promotes consideration of additional perspectives, and can trigger feelings of humility. Third, awe decreases selfishness and triggers the need to connect with others. Fourth, awe increases positive feelings and well-being. Awe has also been shown to increase environmental concern (Yang et al., Reference Yang, Hu, Jing and Nguyen2018) and charitable giving (Guan et al., Reference Guan, Chen, Chen, Liu and Zha2019). Awe also triggers the belief that time is slowing down and, as a result, awe increases one’s willingness to dedicate more time to others (Rudd et al., Reference Rudd, Vohs and Aaker2012). Recently, awe has been shown to reduce ideological conviction and increase willingness to associate with others with opposing views (Stancatio & Keltner, Reference Stancato and Keltner2019). Therefore, even though awe in some instances can be a nonsocial rather than moral emotion based on its elicitors, it can result in numerous positive social outcomes, which foster connectedness and social harmony. Therefore, in terms of doing good, awe does seem to be a good candidate for a moral emotion.
Like awe, elevation has also been shown to have numerous positive outcomes. Elevation encourages helping behaviors (Schnall & Roper, Reference Schnall and Roper2012; Van de Vyver & Abrams, Reference Van de Vyver and Abrams2015), imitation of positive role models (Diessner et al., Reference Diessner, Iyer, Smith and Haidt2013), and the desire to share more overlap with others (see Pohling & Diessner, Reference Pohling and Diessner2016; Thomson & Siegel, Reference Thomson and Siegel2017; Van de Vyver & Abrams, Reference Van de Vyver and Abrams2015, for reviews). Haidt has argued that elevation operates in opposition to disgust in social relations (Haidt, Reference Haidt, Davidson, Scherer and Goldsmith2003; Lai et al., Reference Lai, Haidt and Nosek2014). For example, previous research found that elevation reduces sexual prejudice but not racial prejudice, which the authors argue was explained by disgust being the basis of sexual prejudice (Lai et al., Reference Lai, Haidt and Nosek2014). However, recent research that has aimed to replicate this effect found that admiration is also effective at reducing sexual prejudice (Bartoș et al., Reference Bartoș, Russell and Hegarty2020). Interestingly, elevation was found to be positively associated with disgust in one of the studies. This latter result may support the idea that elevation is a mixed emotion and the idea that, to see the true benefit of elevation, negative emotions such as disgust need to be diminished. Future research may focus on elevation and awe as prejudice reduction tools, to gain a better understanding of when, where, and why these emotions lead to positive social outcomes.
In summary, a common feature of awe and elevation is that they are triggered by witnessing something exceptional or unusual. But what differentiates these emotions is their focus: Elevation focuses on morality and awe often focuses on natural objects and scenes, such as landscapes. Thus, in terms of elicitors, awe shows less of an obvious connection with morality. However, both emotions are related to feelings of warmth, through the consequences that they typically elicit and their experience (i.e., feeling chills and goosebumps). It could also be argued that admiration is commonly triggered within both elevation and awe experiences. For example, when we witness someone engage in a selfless act (i.e., a situation that can trigger elevation), it is virtually impossible not to feel admiration as well. The same is true for awe, in that when viewing an exceptional beauty scene or art, we also come to admire the space that we are in or the piece of artwork. Thus, in this family of emotions, there is a large amount of overlap in terms of both elicitors and consequences. From this one could conclude that these emotions fall under the umbrella term of “kama muta” (i.e., feeling moved) and thus are equally beneficial in terms of promoting positive social outcomes. Thus, while both elevation and awe are relevant to morality because of their consequences, the elicitors of awe are not strongly related to morality.
10.5 Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter provided an extension of previous models of moral emotions, by highlighting the importance of examining both cognitive and behavioral consequences of emotions when determining the degree to which an emotion can be moral. Even though there have been some notable findings in terms of the likely consequences of the moral emotions examined in this chapter, it is evident that further research is needed on this topic, shifting focus away from what elicits moral emotions.
The unique components of four different emotion families have been examined in this chapter: other-condemning, self-conscious, other-suffering, and other-praising (see Table 10.1 for summary). Within the other-condemning emotion family, contempt overlaps considerably with anger and disgust. Disgust seems to be associated with morality, but according to the qualities of moral emotions proposed here, it is not typically a moral emotion, due to its negative consequences. By contrast, anger is often a moral emotion regarding both its elicitors and consequences. Future research should endeavor to focus on the positive consequences of anger and when these types of effects can be cultivated. Among the self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt, neither emotion shows a straightforward path to positive outcomes. Of the two emotions, however, it still seems that guilt is more likely to lead to moral consequences and improved social relations. For empathy and compassion, since there is still so much ambiguity in defining what these emotions even are, it is difficult to determine whether they are moral emotions and have positive consequences. Also, as reviewed here, there is growing evidence of the potential negative impact of experiencing empathy or compassion. Finally, elevation and awe show considerable overlap in their consequences, often leading to prosocial outcomes, but there are differences between their elicitors, in which awe is rarely triggered by moral situations but elevation is often elicited by moral situations that require self-comparisons that can backfire.
In summary, from this analysis of the moral emotions, there appears to be more overlap and ambiguities for the positive emotions than for the negative emotions. It is also evident that anger and guilt are the best candidate moral emotions in terms of the tendency to foster improved social relations, which aligns with previous analysis of moral emotions. In comparison, some have positioned emotions like empathy, compassion, shame, and disgust as being essential to morality. However, other evidence suggests that the moral character of these emotions is questionable. Hopefully, this review will encourage further research on both the cognitive and behavioral consequences of moral emotions.
