Chapter 7 Creating Indonesia, 1893–1952 Major Power Rivalry and the Making of Sovereign Statehood
As a general theoretical framework, my argument about state formation needs to explain more than China. It needs to account for cases like the East Indies’ movement from a Dutch colonial state to the sovereign Republic of Indonesia too. I contend that the intervention logic bears out when examining the relationships between the development of governance and shifts in the aggregated patterns of outside intervention in the East Indies. This was in spite of the geographic, ethnic, and religious differences between Indonesia and China, as well as the archipelago’s long history under a colonial yoke. Convergent external expectations about the significant opportunity costs of intervention, in particular, fostered the development of sovereign statehood in the East Indies after World War II. Conversely, perceptions about the moderate opportunity costs in first The Hague and then Tokyo coupled with the belief by other foreign actors about the excessive costs of intervention sustained colonial statehood in the archipelago until the mid twentieth century.
Considering the East Indies is useful for this project as it presents another less likely case for my argument. Many accounts tie the persistence of Dutch colonialism, Japanese occupation, and the polity’s eventual move toward sovereign statehood to the development of Indonesian nationalism. In this respect, it is possible to be more confident of my claims if they hold for the East Indies in addition to China and Siam. Still, the dynamics surrounding external intervention are more straightforward and less disputed in Indonesia than in China. This permits me to discuss the East Indies as a more condensed supporting case.
By applying structured, focused comparisons of the East Indies from 1893 to 1922 and from 1923 to 1952, I can examine my theory against alternative accounts of state formation. These include the diffusion of global self-determination norms, nationalism, institutional commitment, and capitalised coercion. In evaluating the state formation experience of the East Indies against China and Siam, I can control for preexisting cultural conditions, the nature of intervening powers, geography, and regional peculiarities.
Continuity and the Dutch Colonial State in the East Indies, 1893–1922
The persistence of the Dutch colonial state in the Indonesia from 1893 to 1922 represents a situation where an external power that anticipated moderate opportunity costs to intervention prevailed in the competition for access. The Hague was able to regulate access over the East Indies between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as other powers largely conceded access over that polity. Dutch efforts to manage access led the Netherlands Indies to demonstrate low external autonomy and high territorial exclusivity whilst political centralisation grew. The Hague controlled the external affairs of its colony and oversaw the policies of the Batavia-based Dutch East Indies colonial administration, which could in turn veto political developments across the archipelago.
Opportunity Cost Expectations and Patterns in External Involvement
Between 1893 and 1922, Dutch leaders anticipated the opportunity costs of intervening in the East Indies to be moderate. The Hague expected a continuation of efforts to regulate access across the archipelago to promise high net returns to an investment of limited capabilities. Other powers active around Southeast Asia expected the costs of intervening into the East Indies to be prohibitively high, and were unwilling to seek more than nonprivileged access. Such a configuration of approaches toward intervention in the East Indies left Holland as the only power able to shape governance in the archipelago between the end of the nineteenth century and the second decade of the twentieth.
Dutch Opportunity Costs Perceptions and Rule in the Late Colonial East Indies
From the perspective of Dutch elites in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an ability to control access to the East Indies was key to prosperity. Official sponsorship of cash crop production and export in Java as well as other parts of the Indonesian archipelago was key to Dutch economic development since the initiation of the cultuurstelsel, or cultivation system, in the 1830s.1 By the 1850s, remittances from the Netherlands Indies accounted for more than 30 percent of Dutch state revenues whilst the livelihoods of about one-in-five Dutchmen rested directly or indirectly on the East Indies economy.2 Making the East Indies seem even more attractive by the late nineteenth and mid twentieth centuries was the discovery of oil in the Outer Islands and the suitability of these regions for large-scale rubber planting.3 A near simultaneous rise in world demand for these commodities and the abundance of cheap labour further augmented the appeal of exclusive access over the East Indies for Dutch business and political leaders.
Dutch leaders, however, faced significant capability limitations when it came to securing access over Indonesia. The sheer social diversity and size of the archipelago – which included more than 17,000 islands with a land area roughly that of Australia and a population of about 30 million around 1900 – required substantial administrative capacities.4 Being halfway around the world and with an estimated population of around 5 million at the turn of the century, ruling the East Indies was a challenge for Dutch elites.5Compounding matters were the European rivalries of the late nineteenth century that unfolded into World War I. Though Holland managed stay out of the complications of great power politics through armed neutrality, this policy rested on maintaining pricey military forces.6
Given the potential for substantial gains from access denial and the significant investment in capabilities needed to accrue such benefits, Dutch policymakers between 1893 and 1922 saw moderate opportunity costs to intervening in the East Indies. Fully denying rivals access to the archipelago was a goal beyond reach of the Netherlands government given its physical and fiscal constraints, especially next to security concerns in Europe. Allowing other major powers complete equality in access to its Southeast Asian colony was not something leaders in The Hague were ready to accept given the rents they desired to accrue by maintaining exclusionary access. The most feasible option seemed to be regulating access by cultivating of indigenous elites and promoting the subservience of the local population. This could minimise capability commitments whilst enabling Dutch interests to capture many of the gains from access denial.
Colonialism as Access Regulation
The economic liberal and commercial interests prominent in the Dutch parliament, the States-General, along with their political allies were willing to forego full access denial in the East Indies.7Working with humanitarians like Conrad Théodoor van Deventer, who wished to improve the lot of indigenous peoples under Dutch colonial rule, economic liberals and capitalists pushed the Ethical Policy (Ethische Politiek) for the Netherlands Indies through the States-General in 1901.8 This policy continued at least in name until the early 1940s. Here, the Dutch government used cooperative indigenous elites in various regions and localities to govern the East Indies whilst offering order, development, technical education, and healthcare to help consolidate Dutch rule over the populace.9 The Ethical Policy represented an effort to maximise the gains from access regulation with a minimal commitment of capabilities by an intervening power perceiving moderate costs.
To impose rule from Batavia, the Dutch colonial administration sponsored cooperative groups from Javanese bupatito Minangkabau penghulusand Acehnese uleëbalangs.10 In return, these local nobles received substantial financial and military assistance from Batavia, support for the maintenance of their social standing, and opportunities to profit from the colonial economy and, in some cases, limited administrative autonomy.11 The colonial government nurtured indigenous people to serve as civil administrators, or priyayi, and soldiers by offering economic and social advancement – in fact, Indonesians outnumbered Europeans almost two-to-one in the 42,000 strong colonial army.12 To acquire local support, the Dutch also allowed for some indigenous tempering of colonial policies by bringing local elites into advisory and consultative assemblies in the centre, regions, and villages.13
Under the shadow of World War I, The Hague and Batavia further established a colony-wide assembly, the Volksraad or People’s Council, in 1918. This arrangement allowed a degree of indigenous representation in exchange for local participation in a part-time militia raised to defend the colony.14 Known as the Indië weerbaar, this policy used local militia to offset the expenditures associated with defending the Netherlands Indies by avoiding an expansion of the professional armed forces.
For their support, representatives of the indigenous population, along with Dutch colonists and Chinese business people, could offer counsel to the colonial government, even if the Governor-General formally did not have to heed this advice. By the mid 1920s, the priyayi took up about 40 percent of the Volksraad, even if conservative, Dutch-dominated local councils controlled voting.15 Such co-optation of cooperative local elites enabled The Hague to regulate access over the East Indies.
So long as Dutch interests received most of the gains from the regulation of access, The Hague was open to non-Dutch capital in certain sectors of the economy, particularly if done in conjunction with Dutch businesses. This was most evident in the oil industry, where the major player was the Anglo-Dutch concern, Royal Dutch Shell, but also included the California Texas Oil Corporation, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company, and the Japanese-owned Borneo Oil Company.16Nonetheless, the ability of the Dutch government to regulate access in the East Indies enabled Dutch businesses to dominate the lucrative rubber, sugar, coffee, and tea sectors to the exclusion of other powers.17
Britain and Access Denial in the East Indies
Key to The Hague’s success in pursuing its preferences on access denial in the East Indies was the way that the other external powers active in the Far East anticipated the opportunity costs of intervention in the Indonesian archipelago. British leaders viewed the opportunity costs of intervention into Dutch-controlled areas to be high even though Britain’s territories in North Borneo, Malaya, Burma, India, Australia, and New Guinea surrounded the Netherlands Indies.18The strategic preoccupation of leaders in London from 1893 to 1922 was the management of relative decline next to the rise of Germany, the United States, and Japan.19 This meant that British leaders saw far greater returns from investing their limited capabilities into securing the British Isles and maintaining the empire than expanding access denial elsewhere, especially if it meant armed confrontation.
Moreover, policymakers in London did not see much advantage from actively reducing Dutch access to the East Indies. Holland was an entrenched presence in the archipelago, which London incidentally recognised in a series of Anglo-Dutch agreements.20 Rolling back Dutch rule seemed likely to involve a significant capability investment that the British government could ill afford between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It might even throw doubt over the credibility of similar arrangements that Britain made with France and other imperial powers to stabilise mutually shared colonial frontiers.21 Overassertiveness toward the East Indies could then turn Holland and other major powers against Britain at a time when it did not need additional challenges to its strategic situation.
Consequently, British leaders did not challenge Dutch access regulation efforts in the East Indies. London believed that the needs of defending its empire and managing the rise of new rivals were already stretching its capabilities. Coupled with expectations about the high costs of intervention into the Indonesian archipelago, London was happy to accept the nondenial of access and even the granting of some access to British commercial interests by the Dutch.22 This allowed British investment in the East Indies and encouraged the British government’s openness toward bilateral trade between the Netherlands Indies and adjacent areas of the British Empire.23
Japan and the United States
Japanese and American policymakers were likewise too preoccupied with other concerns to seriously contemplate access denial in the East Indies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Tokyo’s efforts at access denial efforts between 1893 and 1922 focused on Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, to some degree Fujian, and, by the mid 1910s, Shandong.24 Washington committed American attentions first toward the incorporation of the Philippines and then preventing German denial of access over Europe during the Great War.25 Both the U.S. and Imperial Japanese governments saw little gain from investing their already stretched financial, military, and political capabilities into intervention in the Netherlands Indies. Like the British, Washington and Tokyo nonetheless welcomed nonexclusion from the East Indies where possible, as seen in investments in the oil industry and efforts to develop trade with Indonesia.26
France, Germany, and Russia
Other powers active in the Far East from 1893 to 1922 forwent competing for access in the Netherlands Indies as such an exercise promised to draw significant capabilities away from other more pressing objectives. When not concerned with security in Europe, the French Third Republic appeared happy to concentrate its military and financial capabilities in Africa, Indochina, and, to a more limited extent, South and Southwest China.Despite its postunification and pre–Great War imperial ambitions, Wilhelmine Germany wanted to focus its energies on Europe, Africa, Shandong, and existing holdings in the Pacific instead of competing with the Netherlands over the East Indies. Russia’s leaders, both Tsarist and Bolshevik, prioritised the need to safeguard against threats in Europe and then competition for access over Siberia, Manchuria, and Mongolia when it came to investing capabilities. By ignoring the East Indies from the 1890s to the early 1920s, these powers effectively conceded access to Holland.
Table 7.1 summarises the pattern of foreign expectations about the opportunity costs of intervention and approaches toward access denial in Indonesia.
That other powers conceded Dutch access regulation over the East Indies meant de facto acceptance of the The Hague’s efforts to continue and enhance colonial rule over the polity.
State Form in the Netherlands Indies under Late Colonial Rule
Absent effective challenges from other outside powers, the Dutch government was able to work through its local allies to regulate access over the East Indies from 1893 to 1922. On the ground, this spelt the persistence of a colonial state where The Hague directly oversaw foreign relations and domestic administration through the colonial government in Batavia. Dutch attempts to exert greater control through its local elites brought a rise in the Batavia government’s ability to veto political developments across the East Indies.
Political Centralisation
As Dutch leaders strove to consolidate their hold over the Indonesian archipelago between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political centralisation grew markedly despite an official call for devolving government.27 On Java, the colonial government increasingly curtailed the role of the aristocracy as Batavia-appointed Residents and Controleurs to each regional court took on greater administrative responsibilities.28 Dutch attempts to assert a more active role in governance all but relegated traditional Javanese rulers to largely ceremonial roles by the turn of the twentieth century. Following the first decade of the twentieth century, Dutch oversight grew even in the Outer Islands, in locales such as Kalimantan, Bali, Lombok, and Aceh, which had until then experienced limited foreign involvement in internal governance.29 Concerted Dutch efforts to regulate access systematically across the Netherlands Indies ultimately brought Batavia’s direct political supervision to the entire polity.30
Dutch dominance meant that The Hague could proscribe political developments within the Indonesian archipelago through the Batavia government and the latter’s indigenous proxies. The central colonial government in Batavia was especially effective in diluting political activities that could erode Dutch rule. Moderate groups advancing greater indigenous rights, such as Budi Utomo and Sarekat Islam, saw the absorption of many of their leaders into the colonial administration.31 Using existing political divisions, the Batavia government and its local allies too were able to encourage groups to turn on each other and isolate the more radical elements, as exemplified by the Dutch-backed expulsion of radical leftists within Sarekat Islam.32 Moreover, with its large, locally staffed police and military, Batavia could suppress the most troublesome local groups – like the Indische Partij as well as the radical leftists in Afdeeling B (Section B) of Sarekat Islam, and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI).33
Batavia was likewise able to override local opposition to the social and economic programmes of the Ethical Policy between 1893 and 1922. Just as the colonial government extended infrastructure, some basic education, and rudimentary healthcare across Indonesia, sometimes in face of local resistance, it also pushed emigration from Java to the Outer Islands and forcible village amalgamation.34 In the process, the colonial government extended direct oversight into the village level through the appointment of local Residents and Controleurs to more areas whilst increasing the incomes – and loyalties – of village headmen.35 This was despite the growth in corruption, poverty, and crime resulting from the rapid social displacement associated with these policies.36The Dutch ability to overcome dissent fuelled the rise of resource extraction industries and plantation agriculture along with food shortages and the rise of a colonial economy prone to commodity price fluctuations.37
Territorial Exclusivity
Dutch attempts to regulate access during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought a high degree of territorial exclusivity to the Netherlands Indies. As part of their access regulation efforts, Dutch leaders in The Hague had delegated oversight of the Netherlands Indies to the colonial government in Batavia since the early nineteenth century.38 Together with The Hague, the Batavia administration ensured that no other foreign actor would be responsible for governance within the East Indies. This translated into efforts to take charge of government administration, work with reliable local partners, and seal formal arrangements with potential foreign rivals, as in the instances of the 1824 and 1871 Anglo-Dutch Treaties.39 Consequently, Holland largely succeeded in relegating the role of other governments to facilitating commercial investment and trade for their own nationals and corporations under Dutch colonial auspices.40
External Autonomy
External relations for the Netherlands Indies also remained under the sole purview of The Hague, through the Ministry of Colonies and the colonial government in Batavia. Dutch officials reporting to The Hague were responsible for all negotiations with other foreign powers relating to the Netherlands Indies, whilst policies, treaties, agreements, and wars entered into by The Hague applied to the Dutch East Indies.41Indonesia, for instance, underwent increased taxation and mobilisation to help sustain Holland’s high-priced armed neutrality during World War I at the expense of welfare, economic development, and personal incomes.42Acehnese efforts to acquire American, Italian, and Japanese support between 1873 and 1905 was the last time an indigenous government in the East Indies attempted to exercise an independent foreign policy until 1945. Not only did the other powers ignore Aceh, these attempts at diplomacy invigorated Dutch suppression efforts, leading to full Dutch dominance over the foreign relations until World War II.43
Clearly, Dutch leaders managed to consolidate the colonial state in the Netherlands Indies between 1893 and 1922. In conjunction with cooperative local elites, The Hague and the colonial government in Batavia managed to sustain high levels of political centralisation and territorial exclusivity alongside a low degree of external autonomy. Dutch success in this regard came from the ineffectiveness of resistance by indigenous groups. This in turn rested on the fact that neither major power challenges to Dutch authority nor serious outside support for domestic opponents of Dutch rule existed during this period. As a result, Dutch leaders experienced few restraints when shaping the institutions of governance, rule, and political authority in the East Indies in accordance with their cost considerations.
Rising Opportunity Costs and a Sovereign Indonesia, 1923–1952
State form in the East Indies between 1923 and 1952 continued to approximate the colonial state until the end of World War II. It was only during the mid 1940s that the Indonesian polity began to move definitively toward sovereign statehood, adding a high level of external autonomy to already significant territorial exclusivity and political centralisation. Behind this shift were the increasingly high opportunity cost expectations that those external powers with an interest in access denial over the East Indies associated with intervention. This drove the relevant outside actors to support a takeover of the polity by a local political actor that could guarantee nonprivileged access to all foreign powers.
External Intervention under Rising Cost Expectations
The period from the early 1920s to the early 1950s saw a rise in the perceived opportunity costs of intervention into the Indonesian archipelago amongst the relevant foreign powers. From the Great Depression and World War II to postwar rebuilding and the strains of the early Cold War, there were growing demands on the capacities of the outside actors most able to compete for access in the East Indies. Most of the alternative options for committing capabilities even seemed to offer greater net returns than competing for full access denial in what was to become Indonesia. As a result, these foreign powers were unwilling to sink more capabilities into the East Indies than were adequate to safeguard equal opportunities for access relative to other outside actors.
The Growth of Opportunity Costs and Dutch Acceptance of Nonprivileged Access
From 1923 to 1952, Dutch leaders continued to foresee substantial benefits from sustained securing of access over the East Indies. A reason for the persistence of this view despite the difficulties associated with intervention was the expectation that the wealth of the Indies could help bail the metropole out of its financial troubles. Despite the fall in trade levies and taxes that led to a revenue crisis for the Batavia colonial government during the Depression, preferential trading arrangements allowed the East Indies to absorb exports from Holland.44 As a proportion of Netherlands Indies imports from 1934 to 1938, Dutch products grew from 13 percent to 22 percent, or from less than 8 percent of Holland’s exports to just below 12 percent.45
Even in the wake of World War II, the expected gains from denying access to rivals over the East Indies relative to other objectives remained high for Dutch leaders. Between the German occupation of Holland in May 1940 and Japan’s takeover of the East Indies in March 1942, the Netherlands Indies became the only substantial territory controlled by the Dutch exile government in London. Continuing to secure the archipelago could signal solidarity with the Allies as well as a contribution to the Allied defence of the Far East, especially in terms of denying vital war material, notably oil and rubber, to an increasingly bellicose Japan.46In the postwar era, The Hague saw securing access in the archipelago as an economic foundation for rebuilding Holland, as was the case after the Napoleonic Wars.47What ended Dutch involvement was American conditioning of Marshall Aid – crucial for Dutch reconstruction – on The Hague’s acceptance of Indonesian independence, which evaporated expected net gains from securing access.48
For their part, Dutch officials and policymakers recognised the heavy investment in capabilities necessary to safeguard access across the Netherlands Indies from 1923 on, given Holland’s broader economic and security concerns. The structural problems of a fairly small metropole ruling over a vast population and territory became more acute as the East Indies populace grew, rising from 48.3 million in 1920 to 59.1 million in 1930 and 70 million in 1939.49 Lording over Indonesia were roughly 240,000 Dutch and Dutch Eurasians in the East Indies and 7.5 million or so Dutchmen in the Netherlands.50 Further dampening The Hague’s expected ability to commit capabilities to secure access in the East Indies were the economic strain of the Great Depression and the Nazi threat that culminated in the German occupation of Holland in May 1940.51 Anticipated burdens on Dutch government capabilities continued to expand after World War II given the demands of reconstruction.
Still, the promise of large gains made a seemingly hefty commitment of capabilities to secure access seem worthwhile for The Hague until the late 1940s. This suggests that Dutch leaders’ expected costs of intervention in the East Indies remained moderate to that point. Even as anticipated gains from securing access across the Netherlands Indies rose under the pressures of the Great Depression, the outbreak of World War II, and postwar rebuilding, The Hague was unwilling to seek complete access denial.52 Dutch leaders understood that a highly extensive and intrusive role in Indonesia would likely erase the gains from access denial given the capability limitations they faced. Nevertheless, in raising the expected returns from access denial in the East Indies, events between 1923 and the end of the 1940s temporarily reduced official views on the costs of intervention in the territory.53 That was until the American linking of Dutch withdrawal from Indonesia to Marshall Plan aid in 1949 made any net returns from intervention look unattainable.54
Access Regulation under Pressure
Following from the lowered but still moderate expected opportunity costs of intervention between 1923 and 1942, The Hague continued to pursue regulation of access over the Indonesian archipelago. Even as attempts to foster active indigenous collaboration and raise Batavia’s oversight in access occurred, there was a simultaneous and systematic reduction of local voice opportunities in administrative affairs.55 Up until the Japanese occupation, The Hague curtailed the activities of the Volksraad and local councils and increasingly repressed those agitating against Batavia.56 The expected gains from committing capabilities into securing access outweighed the burdens of pursuing such action amidst the Great Depression and rising tensions in Europe.
Indicative of Dutch views about the moderate opportunity costs of intervention in the Indonesian archipelago after World War II was The Hague’s resolve in trying to preserve access regulation despite the burdens of postwar rebuilding. So long as it seemed that the East Indies could help fuel Holland’s reconstruction, Dutch leaders worked with pliant indigenous groups to forcibly reinstitute access regulation over Republican resistance between 1945 and 1949.57 Dutch efforts in this respect remained constant despite the substantial problems Republican guerrilla and scorched earth tactics created for Holland’s reconquest. Until the threat of losing Marshall Plan aid raised the opportunity costs of intervention over most of the archipelago to high levels in 1949, Dutch attempts to regulate access generally stayed consistent whether liberals or conservatives ran East Indies policy.58 In places where concerted American-led opposition was absent, The Hague’s expected costs of intervention remained moderate and Dutch access regulation persisted past 1952, as was the case with continued colonial rule over West New Guinea.59
Dutch government efforts to regulate access to the Netherlands Indies based on expectations about the moderate costs of intervention extended also to the management of the territory’s external affairs. Increased Indonesian absorption of Dutch products during the Depression was a result of increased protectionist measures that reduced imports from elsewhere. Japan, the top exporter to the East Indies in the 1930s, saw its exports fall from a high of 32.5 percent of imports into the Netherlands Indies in 1934 to 25.4 percent in 1936 and 14.4 percent in 1938.60 Even after Holland’s fall to the Nazis, the government-in-exile continued access regulation over the archipelago to the extent of reducing oil, rubber, and tin exports to Japan in July 1941 despite Tokyo’s efforts to acquire Dutch collaboration.61 In not accommodating Tokyo, the exiled Dutch leadership helped precipitate the confrontation between Japan and Netherlands forces in the only major territory they controlled.62 Unlike during the Indonesian Revolution, however, defeat to Japan represented Dutch capability constraints and failures in ability more than shifts in opportunity cost considerations.
Tokyo’s Imperial Gamble and Changing Japanese Opportunity Cost Expectations
Japanese leaders from 1923 to 1945 saw their expected opportunity costs of intervention in the East Indies fall from prohibitively high to moderate levels. This variation lay in part with relatively constant perceptions about the substantial capability investments necessary to compete for access over the Netherlands Indies, which was likely to take away from efforts to safeguard access in China. After all, leaders in Tokyo recognised the structural problems associated with the vastness of the Indonesian archipelago, its sizeable population, and distance from the Home Islands.63 This was despite the fact Japan possessed greater military, financial, administrative, and manpower capabilities than the Netherlands, and was substantially closer to the East Indies.
What changed for leaders in Tokyo toward the mid twentieth century were expectations of gain from the East Indies. Until the mid 1930s, Japan’s leaders seemed satisfied with the gains from investing in and trading with the Netherlands Indies.64 As the war in China unfolded and fears of the Soviets as well as Western powers grew with the militarist ascendancy in Tokyo, Japanese leaders began to see the East Indies, along with the rest of Southeast Asia, as offering crucial war material and a forward strategic position vital to averting defeat.65Such beliefs intensified with the imposition of the U.S. trade embargo on Japan in 1941. With defeat in 1945 and U.S. occupation through 1952, however, Tokyo was no longer in a position to compete for access over the Dutch East Indies.
As its expectations about the opportunity costs of intervention in the East Indies fluctuated between prohibitive, moderate, and high levels, the Japanese government accordingly ceded access, pursued access regulation, and sought nonprivileged access. Tokyo, for example, did not challenge protectionist measures put in place over the East Indies by the Dutch during the 1930s, even though they led to significant declines in Japanese exports to the archipelago.66 As the anticipated opportunity costs of intervention fell to moderate levels in the early 1940s, Tokyo offered political, organisational, and military support to local political groups willing to support Japanese access regulation efforts over the East Indies.67 Between its defeat in 1945 and 1952, Japan was under American occupation and unable to seek access denial over the East Indies.
America’s Search for Nonprivileged Access and Washington’s Anticipation of Rising Net Gains
For the U.S. government, the perceived opportunity costs of intervention in the East Indies fell from prohibitively high levels to high between 1923 and 1952. Until the late 1940s, the strength of isolationist sentiments and then the strain of the Great Depression, fighting World War II, and rebuilding Europe made the diversion of capabilities toward securing access in the East Indies seem unnecessary.68Given the perceived unimportance of the East Indies next to the need for a strong, noncommunist Holland, the Truman administration, for all its anticolonial rhetoric, began the postwar era complicit in Dutch recolonisation efforts.69 It was only with the intensification of the early Cold War in the late 1940s that expectations about the potential gains from increased involvement in the Indonesian archipelago grew. At this time, a perceived need in Washington to prevent rising communist influence in Southeast Asia increased the importance of access denial in the East Indies, even if this goal remained secondary next to objectives in Europe.70
Prioritising the rebuilding of allies and industrial bases in Europe and Japan in the face of domestic opposition meant that Washington would commit only limited capabilities toward securing access in the East Indies. Undoubtedly a perceived rise in communist threats across Asia, growing Soviet assertiveness in Europe, and the consolidation of noncommunist Holland in the late 1940s raised the value of securing access over the East Indies in Washington.71 However, the Truman administration’s focus on Western Europe and Japan after World War II and in the early Cold War meant that it was willing to commit only to the more limited goal of denying privileged access to the communist Soviets and Chinese elsewhere.72 This increased the attractiveness of creating a sovereign state in Indonesia that could help limit communist influence in the archipelago without substantially diverting American capabilities destined for other places.
Following from the shifts in their expected opportunity costs of intervention in the East Indies from prohibitively high to high, U.S. leaders moved from minimal involvement to supporting a centralised, autonomous, and territorially exclusive Indonesian state. Rather than just permitting U.S. corporations to invest in and trade with the archipelago, as was the situation before World War II, Washington began to throw diplomatic and political weight behind the Republican cause in the late 1940s.73 In particular, U.S. assistance spiked after the Indonesian Republicans suppressed the 1948 Communist uprising within their ranks.74Washington even attempted to broker settlements between the Dutch and Indonesians, finally threatening cut off Marshall Plan aid to The Hague in 1949 if it did not accept Republican rule over most of the archipelago.75 To further ensure the denial of privileged access to the East Indies by the communists without committing capabilities meant for Europe and Japan, Washington provided the fledgling Indonesian Republic with limited economic and military assistance after 1949.76
Britain and the East Indies
British leaders also perceived a fall in the costs of intervention in the East Indies from prohibitively high levels to high 1923 and 1952. The growing need to invest capabilities into the defence of Britain and the empire as well as to deal with the effects of the Great Depression meant that British leaders consistently saw little net gain from trying to secure access over the East Indies until the mid 1940s.77 Even with the mounting Japanese threat to Southeast Asia, London committed only a minimum of military forces to defend Malaya and the holdings of its Dutch ally in the Indonesian archipelago.78 Nevertheless, the need for at least nonprivileged access in less-developed parts of the world given rising communist threats and British imperial retreat in the late 1940s brought a limited willingness in London to invest some capabilities in the East Indies.79After engaging in a brief, limited military operation to recover and stabilise the archipelago following the Japanese surrender, the Attlee cabinet ultimately pushed Holland to accommodate the Indonesian Republicans.80
The Soviet Union and Limited Role in the East Indies
Soviet involvement in the East Indies from 1923 to 1952 was highly limited as Moscow saw the opportunity costs of intervention in the archipelago to be prohibitively high. Given Soviet leaders’ primary focus on threats in Europe and their secondary concerns with Japanese expansion in Manchuria and China through the mid 1940s, securing access in the far-off Indonesian archipelago did not feature highly in Moscow.81 The priority of facing down the American-led threat in Europe immediately after World War II again placed peripheral areas like the East Indies on the strategic backburner.82 Despite calls for global revolution, the Soviet Union restricted access denial efforts in the archipelago, with Moscow only committing capabilities to train small numbers of revolutionaries from the East Indies and giving refuge to exiled leftist leaders.
Table 7.2 highlights the opportunity cost expectations and the approaches taken to securing access by the most active foreign actors in Indonesia between 1923 and 1952. The fact that external powers in a position to intervene either sought nonprivileged access actively or conceded over access denial by the late 1940s spelt, in effect, convergent outside support for the establishment of sovereign statehood in the East Indies.
External Intervention and the Rise of the Indonesian Republic
Successful Dutch and Japanese efforts to regulate access over the East Indies with cooperative local actors gave rise to high degrees of territorial exclusivity and political centralisation coupled with low external autonomy until 1945. Subsequent shared perceptions amongst outside actors about the high opportunity costs of intervention in the Indonesian archipelago led to wide support for high external autonomy to go along with already substantial political centralisation and territorial exclusivity. Consequently, the archipelago moved away from colonial statehood and toward sovereignty.
State Form in the Interwar Years
Political Centralisation
Without serious external opposition to Dutch access regulation efforts, the Netherlands Indies continued as a colonial state between 1923 and 1942. During this time, the East Indies saw growing political centralisation matched with a substantial degree of territorial exclusivity and low external autonomy. Growing Dutch restrictions on the Volksraad and efforts to extend direct administration to villages spelt a rise in Batavia’s ability to veto developments across the East Indies, a trend underscored by increasing control over political activity.83
Faced with growing suppression, all local groups – from the nationalist Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and Partindo, to the left-leaning Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia and Partai Sosialis, PKI, the Islamic-oriented Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, and local nobles – saw their ability to shape politics decline.84When the PKI attempted to launch a colony-wide revolt in 1926, the Dutch effectively suppressed resistance within weeks. Colonial authorities arrested more than 13,000 people following that abortive rebellion, including most of the PKI’s top leadership.85Enforcing political centralisation was the sizeable number of Javanese, Madurese, Ambonese, and other locals absorbed into the colonial administration, intelligence services, police, and military.
External Autonomy and Territorial Exclusivity
The lack of external resistance to The Hague’s access regulation efforts further permitted the Dutch government to impress a low degree of external autonomy and high levels of territorial exclusivity over the East Indies until the 1942 Japanese takeover.86Under direction from The Hague, the Dutch East Indies substituted cheaper Japanese imports for dearer Dutch imports during the Depression.87 Even after its exile to London in 1940, the Dutch government was able to work with Batavia to reject Japanese demands for the use of military bases in the Netherlands Indies and even attempt to resist invasion from much stronger Japanese forces.88 With its local partners, the colonial government in Batavia continued to be responsible for domestic governance in the Netherlands Indies, limiting any foreign relationship with the archipelago, however substantial, to commercial activity.89
Institutions of Governance and the Japanese Interregnum
Japanese attempts to regulate access over the East Indies – often following earlier Dutch efforts – brought the continued rise of political centralisation whilst territorial exclusivity and external autonomy respectively remained at high and low levels. Still, Tokyo’s ability to perpetuate the colonial state in the East Indies resulted from the ultimate ineffectiveness of Dutch and Allied resistance to Japanese expansion.90To occupy and administer Indonesia, the Japanese military sponsored indigenous groups dissatisfied or marginalised under Dutch colonial rule, such as Minangkabau and Acehnese ulamasas well as political parties like Gerindo.91 The Japanese military also attempted to co-opt indigenous groups previously aligned with the Dutch, including Javanese priyayi, East Sumatranrajas, Minangkabau penghulus, and Acehnese uleëbalangs.92 Through these local allies, the Japanese administration tried to extend and consolidate its reach into the villages in order to reshape the economy and mobilise the populace in support of Japan’s war effort.93
Political Centralisation
To centralise rule over the East Indies, Tokyo attempted to actively harness Indonesian nationalism. This included recruiting nationalist figures like Sukarno and Hatta as well as traditional and Islamic leaders like Ki Hadjar Dewantara and Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, respectively.94 Like the Dutch before them, Japanese leaders tried to mobilise and penetrate the populace through mass organisations.
Japanese-sponsored organisations included the Islamic-oriented Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims, Masyumi) as well as the secular nationalist Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Centre of People’s Power, Putera) and its successor, the Jawa Hokokai (Java Service Association) amongst others.95 The Japanese military also helped to establish and train local armed forces, including a regular military, the Pembela Tanah Air (Protectors of the Fatherland, PETA), and a semimilitary youth corps.96 Japan’s military too sponsored the creation and maintenance of vigilante corps and guerrilla groups under Masyumi and Jawa Hokokai, as well as an indigenous auxiliary force attached to the Imperial Army and Navy, the Heiho.
External Autonomy and Territorial Exclusivity
In terms of territorial exclusivity and external autonomy, Japanese rule retained many features of the Dutch colonial state in the East Indies. Governance and official agencies across the archipelago lay under the purview of an administration under a Military Governor located in the former capital of the Dutch Indies, now referred to by its precolonial name, Jakarta, instead of Batavia.97 As in the case of the Netherlands Indies, the metropole delegated the domestic management of territory to the Military Government with the aid of indigenous advisory councils. Like the Dutch colonial government, the Japanese administration in the East Indies similarly took charge of taxation, monetary and fiscal matters, and development.98 Tokyo further enjoyed a veto over the external relations of the East Indies very much like the Dutch, even toying with the idea of a quasi-autonomous Indonesia within its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.99
Revolution and Beyond
From Japanese defeat in 1945 through the end of the Indonesian Revolution in 1949, the East Indies displayed declining political centralisation coupled with rising external autonomy, and levels of territorial exclusivity moving from moderate and high. These shifts in state form demonstrated the resilience of Dutch access regulation efforts and the importance of the aggregated effects of external intervention on state formation. In the chaotic transition between the end of Japanese rule and the start of the British-led receivership of the East Indies, the nationalists, with Sukarno as President and Hatta as Vice-President, declared the independence of the Indonesian Republic.100Here, the nationalists attempted to establish sovereign statehood by appropriating the politically centralised and territorially exclusive institutions of rule set up by the Japanese – including the various military and paramilitary organisations.101 To these, they tried to add substantive external autonomy and, in doing so, set the stage for conflict as the British-led Allies and Dutch tried to revive the prewar status quo.102
Political Centralisation
By the time British troops under South-East Asia Command handed jurisdiction of the East Indies to the Dutch government in 1946, the Dutch and Republicans effectively divided the archipelago given the separate areas they controlled. The postwar British-led Military Administration permitted Dutch military forces and civil administrators to take over areas in East Indonesia, Sulawesi, eastern Sumatra, and most of Java.103British troops even engaged in the suppression of Indonesian nationalists, notably in Surabaya, where the battle between British and Republican forces devastated the latter’s manpower and equipment, even if the incident became a rallying event for the Republicans.104In formerly British-held areas, the Dutch Lieutenant-Governor’s office began to work with local aristocrats and leaders to reestablish the old colonial state, with an eye to retaking the entire archipelago.105From Republican-dominated areas in Central Java, Madura, and Sumatra, the Indonesian nationalists took pains to assert greater centralisation, territorial exclusivity, and outward autonomy across Indonesia through armed resistance and mass mobilisation.
Dutch efforts to reimpose colonial rule over the Indonesian archipelago met with surprisingly considerable, albeit costly, successes for a time. This brought a fragmentation of the polity until late 1949. Negotiations between the belligerents from 1946 to 1948 led to arrangements for a federal Indonesia within a Dutch-Indonesian union, with The Hague controlling areas outside Java, Sumatra, and Madura.106
However, The Hague unilaterally attempted to establish this federal Indonesia under complete and direct Dutch rule. Soon after the announcement of the union, colonial forces under Lieutenant-Governor Hubertus van Mook tried to forcefully install cooperative local elites. Following two major “police actions”, Dutch forces reduced Republican-held areas to Aceh and the interior of Central Java by early 1948 and occupied all major towns, including the Republican capital of Jogjakarta, late that year.107 These developments deepened the divides between areas in Republican control and those under reinstituted Dutch rule.108
What allowed for initial postwar Dutch recolonisation – and hence greater fragmentation – and the subsequent emergence of sovereign statehood in the East Indies, were U.S.-led efforts to ensure nonprivileged access across most of the archipelago. Cessation of American aid that could be directed to the Dutch war effort in Indonesia during December 1948 made recolonisation increasingly difficult, and eventually impossible, to sustain.109 Making withdrawal even more compelling were American threats to cease economic aid, which could spell the evaporation of all postwar reconstruction funding since U.S.-led pressure at the United Nations made alternative sources of assistance difficult to come by. In the end, in return for guarantees for Dutch investments in the East Indies, Indonesian responsibility for Netherlands Indies debt, and continued Dutch control over West New Guinea, The Hague accepted the formation of a sovereign Indonesian state by mid 1950.110 This enabled political centralisation, territorial exclusivity, and external autonomy across much of the archipelago to become substantial by the early 1950s, with foreign roles relegated to trade, investment, commercial services, and some advisory roles.111
After the collapse of Dutch efforts to reconquer the East Indies, the Indonesian Republicans moved to assert their external independence and consolidate their rule over most of the archipelago.112 Whilst many of the federal regions created during the postwar Dutch colonial administration underwent rapid absorption into Indonesia, several areas attempted to assert a degree of autonomy from the new central government in Jakarta.113 These included regional authorities in West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Ambon, East Sumatra, and Aceh as well as religious-inspired militants such as groups in West Java.114 Given their lack of sustained international support, these efforts to establish much higher degrees of regional autonomy soon saw either capitulation or political marginalisation.115 This enabled the Indonesian state to add increasingly high levels of political centralisation to the high degrees of external autonomy and territorial exclusivity present from independence.
Shifts in the aggregated effects of external intervention, conditioned by perceptions about the opportunity costs of intervention, drove shifts in state form for the East Indies from 1923 to 1952. So long as an external actor expecting moderate opportunity costs of intervention prevailed over other interested powers, the archipelago remained a colonial state. In fact, the Dutch colonial state was able to persist in West New Guinea past 1952, as The Hague’s efforts to act on its moderate expectations of opportunity costs there went unchallenged. Otherwise, state form in the East Indies shifted towards sovereign statehood once all the competing powers access began to act on anticipated high opportunity costs. Political fragmentation between 1945 and 1949 is consistent with my expectations of developments when rival external actors are still working out differences over access.
As Figure 7.1 above illustrates, 1893 to 1922 brought a consolidation of the colonial state in the East Indies, whilst state form shifted toward sovereign statehood in the years between 1923 and 1952, albeit with a brief fragmentary phase from 1945 to 1949.
Figure 7.1 Shifts in State Form for the East Indies, 1893–1952
Alternative Explanations
I now turn to the main competing positions also purporting to account for the East Indies’ movement from colonial to sovereign statehood between 1893 and 1952. As in the other cases in this study, I examine competing claims from the nationalist, normative, institutional commitment, and capitalised coercion perspectives. I argue that these positions do not fully consider how interactions between external and domestic forces inform Indonesia’s state formation process. This does not take away from the fact that these arguments illustrate important details about Indonesia’s state formation.
Nationalism and Self-Determination
By far the most popular explanation for the persistence of the colonial state in the East Indies from 1893 to 1922 and the movement toward sovereign statehood between 1923 and 1952 is the rise of nationalism. According to this view, the rise of Malay as a lingua franca through the development of mass media and standardised education, alongside commonalities in religion and culture, enabled the emergence of a common consciousness across the archipelago.116 Seizing this opportunity, nationalist groups and leaders – like Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, and others – mobilised this awareness into an anticolonial political force that came of age during the middle of the twentieth century.117
What the nationalist position does not fully account for is the fact that external forces, Dutch or Japanese, were quite adept at manipulating, dividing, and suppressing nationalist-inspired groups. Also, Japanese and, subsequently, American backing were key to the success of the nationalist Republicans in building a sovereign Indonesian state after World War II. Nationalism seemed insufficient for creating sovereign statehood in the East Indies even if it was necessary.
Another perspective on the establishment of the sovereign Indonesian state takes the role of self-determination norms as vital. According to this view, broad international support for national self-determination and disdain for colonialism after World War II pressured The Hague into the decolonisation whilst bolstering indigenous efforts to create sovereign statehood in the East Indies. Evidence for this comes from the diplomatic support for the Republican cause at the United Nations, which included demonstrations of sympathy from the United States, Soviet Union, and, eventually, Britain.118
However, it was when support for a Republic of Indonesia separate from Dutch rule became politically expedient for achieving larger Cold War aims in both Europe and Asia, that Washington threw its weight behind the creation of sovereign statehood in the East Indies. Until then, the U.S. government did not oppose The Hague’s use of American postwar aid for its efforts to reestablish colonial rule in the archipelago. Similarly, expectations of high and prohibitively high opportunity costs were respectively behind British support for and Soviet absence from the sovereign state creation process in Indonesia.
Bellicism and State Formation
Bellicist accounts provide quite a compelling approach to understanding the shift from colonial to sovereign state over much of the Indonesian archipelago. Changes in the relative ability of the Republican forces to amass arms and access wealth alongside the Dutch may account for both the continuation of the colonial state and the establishment of a sovereign Indonesia. Key to the indigenous capacity to both accumulate and concentrate capital as well as the tools of coercion, however, were the roles played by intervening external actors not included in standard capitalised coercion logic. Japanese rule reinforced the local role in governance already extant under the Dutch, whilst providing the training and equipment that expanded the ability of indigenous groups to manipulate the levers of coercion. Conversely, American limitation of aid curtailed Dutch attempts to redevelop centralised, extractive institutions and to defeat the Republicans militarily.
Institutional Commitments and Institutions of Governance
The institutional commitment perspective gives a final competing assessment about the rise of sovereign statehood in the Indonesian archipelago from 1893 to 1952. Just as co-opting traditional local elites and professionals permitted the persistence of colonial statehood, the Republicans’ ability to win over many of these groups during Japanese rule strengthened the nationalist cause before the Indonesian Revolution. Yet, the building of the nationalist coalition was set in motion by the wartime Japanese military administration of the East Indies as a means of first expelling Dutch and Allied opposition and then ruling the archipelago. Further, the wider inclusion of different social groups into the Republican cause alone did not establish the sovereign Indonesian state. Critical to the creation of sovereign statehood in the East Indies were Dutch, American, Japanese, and, to a lesser extent, British actions based on their leaders’ changing expectations about the opportunity costs of interceding into Indonesian domestic politics.
Conclusion
Shifts in the aggregated pattern of foreign intervention in the East Indies, dependent on changes in external expectations about opportunity costs, lay behind this variation in state form. The consolidation of the colonial state under both the Dutch and Japanese resulted from the prevailing of outside actors that anticipated moderate opportunity costs of intervention in the archipelago. Sovereign statehood in the polity came about when all external powers desiring to secure access began to foresee intervention into the archipelago as expensive and turned to support this outcome.
The robustness of the interventionist approach is evident from its ability to account for the Indonesian polity’s movement from colonial to sovereign state between 1893 and 1952. Not only is my argument able to address the development of sovereign statehood in the East Indies, it provides an explanation for the persistence of the colonial state in that polity. This makes it more comprehensive than most normative arguments that take either nationalist or self-determinationist understandings. By adding a dimension of foreign competition, the interventionist claim helps overcome key gaps in the capitalised coercion and institutional commitment views of state formation. The particular strength of the interventionist perspective lies in taking seriously the power asymmetry between actors in the target polity and other international actors, which suggests that future studies may gain by considering such conditions alongside systemic pressures.
1 The “Culture System” is a more popular, but less accurate, name for the Cultivation System. Drakeley, Reference Drakeley2005, 39–42; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 119–28, 153–54; van den Bosch, Reference van den Bosch and Penders1977, 5–15; van Niel, Reference van Niel, Booth, O’Malley and Weidemann1990, 67–89; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 269–78, Reference Vlekke1945, 151–61; Wiarda, Reference Wiarda2007, 128–29.
2 Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 20; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 223–24, 351–52; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 291–93.
3 Barlow and Drabble, Reference Barlow, Drabble, Booth, O’Malley and Weidemann1990, 187–208; Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 303–45; Owen, Reference Owen2005, 184–86; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 295–97, Reference Vlekke1945, 164–68.
4 Preger, Reference Preger1944, 21, 39.
5 Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 380–96.
6 Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 160–61, 72–76.
7 Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 225–36; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 151–53.
8 Brooshooft, Reference Brooshooft and Penders1977, 65–77; Drakeley, Reference Drakeley2005, 45–46; Kat Angelino and Renier, Reference Angelino, Dirk Adriaan de and Johannes Renier1931, 71–129, 205–57, 354–426; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 317–20, Reference Vlekke1945, 162–64, 175.
9 This approach was perhaps most evident under Alexander W.F. Idenburg in his long, almost unbroken tenure as Minister of Colonies and Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies between 1902 and 1919. Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 21–22; Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 20–24; Preger, Reference Preger1944, 13–20, 38–42, 57–61, 84–113; Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 207–09; Surjomihardjo, Reference Surjomihardjo, Soebadio-Noto Soebagio and du Marchie Sarvaas1978, 277–306; Tarling, Reference Tarling2001, 337–40; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 283–93; Van der Veur, Reference Van der Veur2006; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 63–73, 147–57, 200–22.
10 Abdullah, Reference Abdullah, Soebadio-Noto and du Marchie Sarvaas1978, 216; Benda, 1972, 236–52; Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 4–7.
11 Kahin, Reference Ricklefs1993, 14–17, 32–42; Ricklefs, 1939, 119–76.
12 In 1905, the Royal Dutch East Indies Army, or the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL), was 68 percent Javanese and 21 percent Ambonese, with the rest being Sundanese, Madurese, Bugis, Timorese, and Malay. Anderson, Reference Anderson1991, 115n–16n; Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 34–80; Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 284–301; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek1978, 15–19; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005, 54–58; Van den Bosch, 1941, 166–73, 343–50.
13 Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 257–95; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 14–17; Kat Angelino and Renier, Reference Angelino, Dirk Adriaan de and Johannes Renier1931, 80–97, 324–426; Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 205–07; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005, 58–70; Vandenbosch, 147–57.
14 Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 205–07; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 169; Vlekke, 185.
15 The colonial government set up most of these regional and village councils between 1905 and 1930. An electorate of a little more than two thousand Dutch leaders, priyayi elites, and influential Chinese selected members for the Volksraad. Benda, Reference Benda1958, 64–66; Dahm, Reference Dahm1971, 45–51, 70–71; Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 1–28; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 114–17, 343–44; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 296–97, 348–49.
16 Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg2002, 66–82; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 152–53; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1945, 166–68.
17 Caldwell and Utrecht, Reference Caldwell and Utrecht1979, 37–51; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 291–92.
18 Tarling, Reference Tarling1993, 26–32; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 378–79.
19 Brendon, Reference Brendon2007, 214–88; Ferguson, Reference Ferguson2004, 185–245; Friedberg, Reference Friedberg1988.
20 Fasseur, Reference Fasseur, Seth Davidson and Henley2007, 50–66; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 138–47; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005; Tarling, Reference Tarling1975, 19–25.
21 Anderson, Reference Anderson1991, 99; Crosby, Reference Crosby1945, 60–61; Crosby and Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, Reference Crosby1920, 3–12; Grenville, Reference Grenville1964; Hargreaves, Reference Hargreaves1953; Kupchan, Reference Kupchan1994, 105–13, 210–11; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005; Terwiel, Reference Terwiel2005, 211–12, 226; Wyatt, Reference Wyatt1984, 183–89, 204–31.
22 Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 352–53.
23 Field and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934, 448–50; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 152–53; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005.
24 Barnhart, Reference Barnhart1995, 21–78.
25 Kennan, Reference Kennan1984, 3–73; Schoonover, Reference Schoonover2003, 65–122.
26 Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 87, 152; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005, 139–46; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 397–98.
27 Benda, Reference Benda1958, 34–38, 64–66; Kat Angelino and Renier, Reference Angelino, Dirk Adriaan de and Johannes Renier1931, 365–426; Ong, Reference Ong, McVey, Suddard and Benda1978, 112–57; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 74–109, 26–57.
28 Benda, Reference Benda, Castles and Jindrich Benda1972, 236–52; Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 255–60; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 41–42; Kat Angelino and Renier, Reference Angelino, Dirk Adriaan de and Johannes Renier1931, 71–129, 354–426; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 128–30.
29 Abdullah, Reference Abdullah, Soebadio-Noto and du Marchie Sarvaas1978, 211–20; Owen, Reference Owen2005, 130–36; Reid, Reference Reid1969; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 131–47; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005, 27–106; van den Doel, Reference van den Doel and Cribb1994, 62–68.
30 Houben, Reference Houben and Cribb1994, 191–210; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 168–69; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 238–78; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 348, Reference Vlekke1945, 168–74.
31 Dahm, Reference Dahm1971, 45–51; Nagazumi, Reference Nagazumi1972, 51–150; Report of the Meeting of the Partij Sarekat Islam Held on 26 January Reference Penders1928, to Commemorate Its Fifteen Years of Existence, Reference Tjokroaminoto and Penders1977, 257–61; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 163–73; Tjokroaminoto, Reference Tjokroaminoto and Penders1977, 255–57; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 315–23.
32 Sarekat Islam began as a diffuse organisation that contained a central Sarekat Islam associated with other regional organisations functioning under the same name. It was only after infighting in the late 1910s and early 1920s, particularly with leftist elements in the organisation, that sustained attempts to establish “party discipline” and greater centralisation emerged. Benda and Castles, Reference Benda, Castles and Jindrich Benda1972, 269–301; Benda, Reference Benda1958, 70–71; McVey, Reference McVey1965, 76–154; Shiraishi, Reference Shiraishi1990, 216–48; van Dijk, Reference van Dijk and Cribb1994.
33 Benda and Castles, Reference Benda, Castles and Jindrich Benda1972, 269–301; Douwes Dekker, Reference Douwes Dekker and Penders1977, 228–27; Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 5–6; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 60–77; Mangoenkoesoemo, Reference Mangoenkoesoemo and Penders1977, 234–35; Poeze, Reference Poeze and Cribb1994, 229–32; Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 209–10; Shiraishi, Reference Shiraishi1990, 113–16, 203–15, 309–38; Soerjaningrat, Reference Soerjaningrat and Penders1977, 232–34; Van der Veur, Reference Van der Veur2006, 183–236, 379–438.
34 Field and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934, 34–35; Preger, Reference Preger1944, 38–42, 57–61, 80–113; Surjomihardjo, Reference Surjomihardjo, Soebadio-Noto Soebagio and du Marchie Sarvaas1978, 277–306; Tarling, Reference Tarling2001, 337–40.
35 Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 257–95; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 14–17; Kartodirdjo, Reference Kartodirdjo, Soebadio-Noto Soebagio and du Marchie Sarvaas1978, 237–46; Kat Angelino and Renier, Reference Angelino, Dirk Adriaan de and Johannes Renier1931, 258–644; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 156.
36 Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 20–24; Preger, Reference Preger1944, 84–113; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 156.
37 Notably, the Netherlands Indies produced about half the world’s rubber supply by 1930. Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 20–24; Owen, Reference Owen2005, 184–86; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 152–55.
38 Benda, Reference Benda, Castles and Jindrich Benda1972, 83–92; Benda, Reference Benda1958, 9–99; Fasseur, Reference Fasseur, Seth Davidson and Henley2007, 50–66; Kat Angelino and Renier, Reference Angelino, Dirk Adriaan de and Johannes Renier1931, 130–93; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 167–68; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 26–46, 76–97, 74–109; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 348; Wolters, Reference Wolters and Cribb1994, 173–87.
39 In addition to settling a number of outstanding issues in Anglo-Dutch relations in Europe, Africa, and Asia, the 1824 London Treaty, 1871 Treaty of Sumatra, as well as associated agreements fixed the boundaries of jurisdiction between the Netherlands Indies and British holdings in Malaya and North Borneo. The treaties also permitted trade between Dutch- and British-dominated territories in Southeast Asia. Fasseur, Reference Fasseur, Seth Davidson and Henley2007, 50–66; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 138–47; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005, 1–181; Tarling, Reference Tarling1975, 19–25.
40 Field and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934, 448–50; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 152–53; Tagliacozzo, Reference Tagliacozzo2005.
41 Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 74–109, 293–301; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 298–301, 348.
42 Booth, Reference Booth, Booth, O’Malley and Weidemann1990, 217–29.
43 Owen, Reference Owen2005, 132; Reid, Reference Owen2005, Reference Reid and Reid2006.
44 Booth, Reference Booth, Booth, O’Malley and Weidemann1990a, 228–29, Reference Den Baker and Huitker1990b, 279–93; Den Baker and Huitker, Reference Den Baker and Huitker1990, 190–93; Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 428–45; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 293–309; Vlekke, 1943, 363–67.
45 Den Baker and Huitker, Reference Den Baker and Huitker1990, 18; Field and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934, 448–51; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 187; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 235–43.
46 Barnhart, Reference Barnhart1987, 166, 207–24; Ford, Reference Ford1996, 16–27; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 213–313.
47 Booth, Reference van Niel, Booth, O’Malley and Weidemann1990, 210–17; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 119–24, 212–13; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 148–66; van Niel, Reference van Niel, Booth, O’Malley and Weidemann1990, 67–89; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 293–309.
48 From the end of World War II to the end of Dutch efforts to recolonialise the East Indies, the U.S. government provided Holland with about US$979 million in aid. This included US$298 million in Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands, US$61 million in Marshall Plan aid for the East Indies, US$130 million for the acquisition of U.S. war surpluses, US$190 million in supplies, and US$300 million in Export-Import Bank credits. Dahm, Reference Dahm1971, 136–42; Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg2002, 290–92; Kahin, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 355–58; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 230–32; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 173–75.
49 Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 92; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 20; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 155, 161; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 223–24.
50 Maddison, Reference Maddison and Anne Booth1990, 322–25; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 155.
51 Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 380–90.
52 Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 99–100, 345–50, 405–06, 432; Wiarda, Reference Wiarda2007, 130–31.
53 Caldwell and Utrecht, Reference Caldwell and Utrecht1979, 81–82; Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 39–41, 92; Ford, Reference Ford1996, 13–25; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 20; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 11–38, 146–75.
54 Such net returns can include ideological commitments to imperialism, although they are hard to measure. Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg2002, 290–92; Kahin, 1997, 355–58; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 230–32.
55 Benda, Reference Benda and Jindrich Benda1972e, 236–52; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 181–95.
56 Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 188–95.
57 To engage in its “police actions” against the Republican forces, the Dutch government raised and maintained a 100,000-strong army in spite of trying postwar conditions in Holland. Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg2002, 287–91; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 142–46, 213–55, 332–445, Reference Kahin2003, 27–28; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 215–31; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 148–66.
58 Between 1926 and 1949, liberal supporters of the Ethical Policy like Governor-General Andries C.D. de Graeff as well as conservative leaders such as Governors-General Bonifacius C. de Jonge, Alidius W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, Hubertus J. van Mook, and Minister of Colonies Hendrikus Colijn were all staunchly behind efforts to make Dutch regulation of access in the East Indies more robust. Kahin Reference Kahin1952, 99–100, 142–46, 213–19, 235–54, 332–445, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 355–58, Reference Kahin2003, 23–25; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 185–91, 216–32; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 148–75.
59 Colbert, 1997, 72, 186–91; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 34–45; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 232–43; Tarling, Reference Tarling2005, 26–44, 131–48; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 312–14, 350–52.
60 Japan’s imports to the Dutch East Indies exceeded Dutch imports between 1931 and 1938. Aziz, Reference Aziz1955, 99–120; Booth, Reference Booth, Booth, O’Malley and Weidemann1990, 279; Field and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934, 448–51; Indonesia, and Netherlands, Regeeringsvoorlichtingsdienst, 1942, 36–45; Sato, Reference Sato1994, 4–5; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 235–43, 398–411; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 363–65.
61 By 1940, Tokyo was pressuring Dutch leaders first in The Hague and later Batavia to open bases to Japanese forces, as was the case in Vichy French-held Indochina, and to free the exports of raw materials, especially oil and rubber, to Japan. Tokyo sent a high-level mission led by former Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi in early 1941 to secure Dutch cooperation on these issues in exchange for Japanese support for continued Netherlands rule over the Indonesian archipelago. Furnivall, Reference Furnivall1939, 333–34; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 194–200; Van der Veur, Reference Van der Veur2006, 539–43; Wilkins, Reference Wilkins, Borg and Okamoto1973, 366–67.
62 Declaration of the Netherlands Government in Exile in London, 27 January Reference Penders1942, 149, Ford, Reference Ford1996, 13–25; Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 211; Tarling, Reference Tarling2001, 66–68; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1945, 193–201.
63 Barnhart, Reference Barnhart1987, 19, 44–45, 146–75, 191–224, 245, Reference Barnhart1995, 127–65.
64 Schneider, Reference Schneider and Fuess1998, 161–82; Toru, Reference Toru, Nagai and Iriye1977, 321–26; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1945, 189–202.
65 Benda, 1972; Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Reference Benda, Irikura and Kishi1965, 1–52; Goto, Reference Goto1986; Iriye, Reference Iriye1967, 201, 308, 372; Ishikawa, Reference Ishikawa1995, 406–530; Kinhide, Reference Kinhide, Borg and Okamoto1973, 597–98; Kupchan, Reference Kupchan1994, 334–55; Sadao, Reference Sadao, Borg and Okamoto1973, 244–54; Sato, Reference Kupchan1994, 5–80; Snyder, Reference Snyder1991, 112–52; Tarling, Reference Tarling2001, 39–83, 125–46, 174–92, 219–31; Vickers, Reference Vickers2005, 88–90; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 363–65, 375–76; Wilkins, Reference Kinhide, Borg and Okamoto1973, 366–67.
66 Field and Institute of Pacific Relations, 1934, 448–51; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 398–411.
67 Benda, Reference Benda1958, 103–94; Benda and Larkin, Reference Benda and Larkin1967, 219–24; Iwatake, Reference Iwatake1989, 254–74; Toru, Reference Toru, Nagai and Iriye1977, 324–26; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1945, 194–95.
68 Cohen, Reference Graebner, Borg and Okamoto1973, 457; Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 27–51, 86–92; Ford, Reference Ford1996, 18–49; Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Mrázek2002, 66–118; Graebner, Reference Graebner, Borg and Okamoto1973, 44–51; Iriye, Reference Iriye1967, 201; Kahin, 345–49, 51–52; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 25, 29–31; Kennan, Reference Kennan and Kenneth1993, 74–90; Lowe, Reference Lowe1997, 173–76; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek1978, 61–62; Weigley, Reference Weigley, Borg and Okamoto1973, 181–87.
69 Early U.S. and U.S.-backed United Nations efforts at brokering a Dutch-Indonesian truce led to the 1948 Renville Agreement. The agreement favoured the Dutch in calling for the withdrawal of Republican forces from Dutch-held territory and a lifting of the Dutch blockade on Republican-held areas, after which there would be a plebiscite in Dutch-controlled areas on whether to be under Dutch or Republican rule. The plebiscite in never took place, and Washington did not press The Hague. The United Nations Security Council then established the Committee of Good Offices to mediate between the Dutch and Indonesian Republican governments, as well as to oversee any agreements that ensued from negotiations. Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 27–53, 70–71, 86–92; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 146, 213–29, 254–55, Reference Colbert1977, 355–58, Reference Kahin2003, 19–32; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 29–31; Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 237–47; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek1978, 62–75; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 225–31; Roadnight, Reference Roadnight2002, 26–77; Tarling, Reference Tarling1998, 160–73, 211–36, 280–95.
70 Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 137–43; Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg2002, 25–65, 131–64, 190–236, 266–304; Iriye, Reference Colbert1977, 378–405; LaFeber, Reference Colbert1977, 43–62; McMahon, Reference McMahon, Statler and Johns2006, 77–78; Nagai, Reference Nagai, Nagai and Iriye1977, 15–38; Tadashi, Reference Tadashi, Nagai and Iriye1977, 66–85; Thayer, Reference Thayer1953; Toru, Reference Toru, Nagai and Iriye1977, 329–30; Yamamoto, Reference Yamamoto, Nagai and Iriye1977, 408–24.
71 1948 and 1949 brought the Berlin Blockade, the Soviet-instigated communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Communist victory in China, as well as Communist insurrections in Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines. These events put pressure on the U.S. government to resist communism whilst concentrating its capabilities on the rebuilding of Europe and Japan. Kahin Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 349–50, Reference Kahin2003, 122–25; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 29–31; Mrázek, 1978, 91–103; Prados, Reference Prados, Statler and Johns2006, 40–41; Roadnight, Reference Roadnight2002, 1–77.
72 Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 81–90, 144–51; Vickers, Reference Vickers2005, 109.
73 Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 72, 89–92, 137–74, 186–91; Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg2002, 25–65, 394–404; McMahon, Reference McMahon, Statler and Johns2006, 77–78; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 225–31; Spector, Reference Spector2007, 274; Wilkins, Reference Wilkins, Borg and Okamoto1973, 374.
74 The Madiun Rebellion is another name for this event. Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Mrázek2002, 266–99; Kahin, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 256–331, Reference Kahin2003, 19–32, 54–62; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 31–33; Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 251–78; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek1978, 64–68, 91–122; Reid, Reference Reid1974, 59–102, 121–47; Roadnight, Reference Roadnight2002, 55–102; Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 232–34; Swift, Reference Swift1989; Yahuda, Reference Yahuda1996, 32.
75 The exception in U.S. calls for the incorporation of the Netherlands Indies into the Indonesian Republic was West New Guinea, which remained the Dutch colony of Netherlands New Guinea until 1962. Drakeley, Reference Drakeley2005, 80–81, 99; Kahin, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 355–58; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 173–75; Tarling, Reference Tarling2005, 26–44, 131–48; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 336, 350–52.
76 Caldwell and Utrecht, Reference Caldwell and Utrecht1979, 79–80; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 225–31.
77 Brendon, Reference Brendon2007, 289–480; Ferguson, Reference Ferguson2004, 245–302; Kennedy, Reference Kennedy2002; Kimball, Reference Kimball1969, 80–81; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 195–200, 228–31; Tarling, Reference Tarling1998, 40–43.
78 Bayly and Harper, Reference Bayly and Harper2007, 158–89; Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 63–67; Ford, Reference Ford1996, 18–49; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 101; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 25–27; Lowe, Reference Lowe1981, 173–80; Tarling, Reference Tarling1993, 108–10, 130–58.
79 The British government had to deal with a communist insurgency in its colonies in Malaya and Singapore starting in 1948. Malayan rubber and tin were key to earning the foreign exchange that helped keep the British postwar economy afloat, while Singapore allowed the British to extend its trade and naval presence in the Far East. A communist Indonesia could seriously complicate London’s efforts to maintain its position in Malaya and Singapore. Anderson, Reference Anderson1972, 131–39; Dennis, Reference Dennis1987; Kahin, 19, 39–40; Toru, Reference Toru, Nagai and Iriye1977, 326–36; Watt, Reference Watt, Nagai and Iriye1977, 89–118.
80 Postwar British military operations in the East Indies included several large-scale skirmishes with Indonesian Republican forces. The Battle of Surabaya led to more than 6,000 Indonesian civilian casualties. The British were also responsible for the 1946 Linggajati Agreement, the first internationally backed attempt at a settlement between the Dutch and Indonesian Republicans. Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 141–46, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 338–40; McMillan, Reference McMillan2005; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 216–26; Spector, Reference Spector2007, 169–214; Tarling, Reference Tarling1998, 87–105, 160–73; Tarling, Reference Ricklefs1993, 192–93.
81 McVey, Reference McVey1965, 34–104, 155–256, 336–46; Tanigawa, Reference Tanigawa, Nagai and Iriye1977, 362–76.
82 Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 81–86, 192–96; Kahin, Reference Colbert1977, 342–45, Reference Kahin2003, 39–40.
83 Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 1–28; Owen, Reference Owen2005, 127–36; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 188–95; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 168–69; Vickers, Reference Vickers2005, 80.
84 The Dutch either disbanded these groups or placed significant restrictions on their activities. Often, the Batavia government arrested and exiled the leaders of these movements, including Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, and Amir Sjarifuddin. Benda, Reference Benda, McVey and Penders1977, 61–99; Kediri, Reference Benda, McVey and Penders1977, 288–91; McVey, Reference McVey1965, 343–46; Poeze, Reference Poeze and Cribb1994, 232–42.
85 Benda, Reference Benda1958, 23–36; Benda and McVey, Reference Benda, McVey and Penders1977, 284–87; Caldwell and Utrecht, Reference Caldwell and Utrecht1979, 54–60; Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 60–63, 77–100; McVey, Reference McVey1965, 343–46; Poeze, Reference Poeze and Cribb1994, 232–42.
86 van Asbeck, Reference van Asbeck, Louise Mitchell and Holland1940, 252–70; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 76–109, 150–68, 341–42, 405–11.
87 Aziz, Reference Aziz1955, 106–40; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 187; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 190–222.
88 Indonesia, 1985, 149; Iwatake, Reference Iwatake1989, 19–21; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 22; Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 73–76; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 194–95; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 381–92.
89 Batavia even succeeded in raising taxes in the East Indies to help fund the London-based Dutch government-in-exile between 1940 and Reference Vandenbosch1941. Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 81–88; Vandenbosch, Reference Vandenbosch1941, 86–109; Vlekke, 197.
90 Bastin and Benda, Reference Bastin and Jindrich Benda1968, 124; Ford, Reference Ford1996, 13–49; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 195–201; Tarling, Reference Tarling2001, 85–95, 174–92, 226–31; Vlekke, Reference Vlekke1943, 393–408, Reference Vlekke1945, 211–22.
91 In the initial phases of its occupation of the East Indies, the Japanese even co-opted remaining Dutch administrators to manage local governance in parts of the archipelago. Aziz, Reference Aziz1955, 142–66, 182–245; Benda, Reference Benda1958, 103–94, Reference Benda, Castles and Jindrich Benda1972, 37–49; Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Reference Benda, Irikura and Kishi1965, 1–100, 133–234, 37–79; Benda and Larkin, Reference Benda and Larkin1967, 219–24; Indonesia, and Netherlands, Regeeringsvoorlichtingsdienst, 1942, 57–63; Reid, Reference Reid2005.
92 Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 57–58; Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 89–105, 33–71; Ismail, Reference Ismail and Cribb1994, 79–87; Owen, Reference Owen2005, 305–6; Reid, Reference Owen2005; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993; Sato, Reference Sato and Kratoska2005, 10–12, 22–200.
93 Aziz, Reference Aziz1955, 152–66, 82–93, 222–26; Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 89–118, 33–71; Iwatake, Reference Iwatake1989, 18–54, 95–110, 159–214, 254–74; Poeze, Reference Poeze and Kratoska2005, 152–78; Raben, Reference Raben and Kratoska2005, 197–212; Sato, Reference Sato and Kratoska2005, 129–51; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 310–39.
94 Benda, Reference Benda1958, 103–49; Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Reference Benda, Irikura and Kishi1965, 59–279; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 104–06; Legge, Reference Legge1988, 3–4, 42–66; Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 213–15; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 171; Tarling, Reference Tarling2001, 125–46, 174–92, 226–31; Vickers, Reference Vickers2005, 93–95.
95 Estimates put the total strength of these organisations to be more than 2 million by the end of World War II, with about 60 percent in the vigilante corps, the Keibodan. Aziz, Reference Aziz1955, 200–45; Benda, Reference Benda1958, 150–68, Reference Benda, Castles and Jindrich Benda1972, 37–49; Sato, Reference Sato1994, 53–59, 71–75.
96 Anderson, Reference Anderson1972, 16–39, 237; Bastin and Benda, Reference Bastin and Jindrich Benda1968, 145–46; Maekawa, Reference Maekawa and Kratoska2005, 179–96; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek1978, 22–34; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 319–20; Vickers, Reference Vickers2005, 94.
97 Benda and Larkin, Reference Benda and Larkin1967, 219–24; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 201–8; Sato, Reference Sato1994, 10–12, 61–71.
98 Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, Reference Benda, Irikura and Kishi1965, 59–279; Benda and Larkin, Reference Benda and Larkin1967, 219–24; Iwatake, Reference Iwatake1989, 18–54, 201–40, 292–30; Sato, Reference Sato1994, 10–12, 60–80.
99 Aziz, Reference Aziz1955, 244–58; Benda, Reference Benda1958, 169–94; Iwatake, Reference Iwatake1989, 95–110; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 120–27; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 171–72; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 319–27.
100 Sukarno and Hatta declared independence as the leaders of the Komité Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP, or the Central Indonesian National Committee). Anderson, Reference Anderson1972, 61–124; Caldwell and Utrecht, Reference Caldwell and Utrecht1979, 67–68; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 134–212; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 25–26; Reid, Reference Reid1974, 19–39.
101 Drakeley, Reference Drakeley2005, 75–77; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 141–212, 230–47; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek1978, 34–49; Robertson and Spruyt, Reference Robertson and Spruyt1967, 213–20; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 324–27.
102 Ford, Reference Ford1996, 229–69, 281–331, 343–411; Frederick, Reference Frederick1989, 193–97, 230–67; Gouda and Zaalberg, Reference Gouda and Brocades Zaalberg2002, 173–90; Kahin, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 338–40; Tarling, Reference Tarling1993, 192, Reference Tarling1998, 87–95.
103 Bayly and Harper, Reference Bayly and Harper2007, 158–89; Kahin, Reference Kahin2003, 19; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 27; McMillan, Reference McMillan2005, 10–12, 85–106, 131–37; Reid, Reference Reid1974, 42–57, 104–19; Spector, Reference Spector2007, 178–214.
104 Anderson, Reference Anderson1972, 139–66, 296–97; Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 63–67; McMillan, Reference McMillan2005, 31–84.
105 Chauvel, Reference Chauvel and Kahin1985, 237–61; Cribb, Reference Cribb and Kahin1985, 179–201; Harvey, Reference Harvey and Kahin1985, 207–28.
106 These include a secret agreement between Sjahrir and van Mook in March 1946, as well as the British-brokered Linggajati ceasefire arrangement in November of that year. After United Nations ceasefire calls in July 1947, the Dutch and Indonesian governments reached the Renville Agreement. This effectively recognised Dutch control over territory behind lines of advance achieved under the first police action. Cribb, Reference Cribb and Kahin1985, 199–200; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 99–100, 146, 235–47, 345–90, 406–8; Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 191–205, 234–47, 297–304; Tarling, Reference Tarling1998, 160–73, 211–36, 280–95.
107 When moving into Jogjakarta, Dutch forces captured Sukarno, Hatta, Foreign Minister Agus Salim, Sjahrir, and most of the Republican cabinet. Facing a strong Dutch offensive, Republican leaders gave themselves up in the hope that unilateral Dutch actions would incense the rest of the world, particularly the United States, leading to pressure for a Dutch withdrawal. With the loss of most areas under Republican control and the arrest of its leaders, Republican forces increased guerrilla warfare efforts from the interior and behind Dutch lines. Adrian Vickers notes that Dutch casualties from the fighting between 1945 and 1949 were remarkably light, with less than 700 soldiers killed in action. Estimates of Indonesian casualties stand at between 45,000 and 100,000, with another 7 million people displaced on Java and Sumatra alone. Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 213–47, 332–469; Reid, Reference Reid1974, 112–14, 49–53; Vickers, Reference Vickers2005, 99–111.
108 Dahm, Reference Dahm1971, 127–29; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 230–31; Spruyt, Reference Spruyt2005, 172–73.
109 Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 30–45; Roadnight, Reference Roadnight2002, 55–77; Spector, Reference Spector2007, 274.
110 To support the new Indonesian government and encourage the acceptance of the terms of the Dutch withdrawal, the Truman administration offered the Republicans a low-interest US$100 million loan from the Export-Import Bank. United States plans for having the Indonesian Republic shoulder the debt of the Netherlands Indies government was in part to avoid undermining the newly achieved political and economic stability of the noncommunist government in The Hague. Kahin, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 352–55, Reference Kahin2003, 19–22, 86–125; Tarling, Reference Tarling1998, 357–73, Reference Tarling2005, 26–44, 131–48.
111 Shell, Standard Oil, and Caltex remained prominent in the oil industry, while Dutch, British, and ethnic Chinese firms dominated banking. Dutch commercial concerns also continued their heavy involvement in inter-island shipping. Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 307–50; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 239.
112 Anderson, Reference Anderson1998, 278–80; Colbert, Reference Colbert1977, 185–91; Elson, Reference Elson2008, 149–98; Liddle, Reference Liddle1970; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek1978, 83–122; Vickers, Reference Vickers2005, 113–41.
113 Tarling, Reference Tarling2001, 490–92; Taylor, Reference Taylor2003, 336–48; Wiarda, Reference Wiarda2007, 131.
114 Feith, Reference Feith1962; Harvey, Reference Harvey and Kahin1985; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 37–40, 54; Ricklefs, Reference Ricklefs1993, 227–47.
115 Caldwell and Utrecht, Reference Caldwell and Utrecht1979, 86–88; Feith, Reference Feith1962; Harvey, Reference Harvey and Kahin1985; Reid, Reference Caldwell and Utrecht1979, 162–68; Roadnight, Reference Roadnight2002, 78–102.
116 The term for the official version of Malay spoken in Indonesia is “Bahasa Indonesia”, or the Indonesian Language. Abdulgani, Reference Abdulgani, Soebadio-Noto and du Marchie Sarvaas1978, 257–75; Anderson, Reference Anderson1991, 9–82, 119–54, 176–82; Kahin, Reference Kahin1952, 41, 108–33; Leifer, Reference Leifer and Leifer2000, 159–60; Mrázek, Reference Mrázek2002, 31–42; Oemarjati, Reference Oemarjati, Soebagio and du Marchie Sarvaas1978, 307–28.
117 Anderson, Reference Anderson1998, 77–130, 278–80; Benda and Larkin, Reference Benda and Larkin1967, 189–96; Elson, Reference Elson2008, 44–148.
118 Kahin Reference Kahin1952, 146, 213–29, 254–55, Reference Kahin, Nagai and Iriye1977, 355–58, Reference Kahin2003, 19–32; Kahin and Kahin, Reference Kahin and McTurnan Kahin1995, 29–31; Ma, Reference Ma and ban1957, 234–47, 307–14; Roadnight, Reference Roadnight2002, 26–77.
