Response Matching

Some of the earliest work in communication adaptation was that on response matching (Argyle, Reference Argyle1969), defined as immediately following another speaker’s action with a similar action. Argyle (Reference Argyle1969) proposed that response matching could occur across a range of verbal and nonverbal behaviors, including utterance length, utterance type, words, gesture, posture, and self-disclosure. While he did not explicitly outline a mechanism for behavior matching, he suggested that it could be the result of imitation or social learning (e.g., Bandura, Reference Bandura1986), though he did not specify any other accompanying psychological processes. He also proposed that while some of this behavior – such as self-disclosure, utterance length, and use of interruptions – may be “slow and reflective” (p. 176) or conscious in nature, other aspects such as postural, gestural, and lexical matching are likely to be unconscious. Work on response matching (e.g., Argyle, Reference Argyle1969, Tognoli, Reference Tognoli1969) generally did not address the function or effects of such matching; it focused instead on describing the phenomenon across contexts, and proposing possible mechanisms for it. However, later work did observe that it tended to coincide with positive affect and perceived similarity (e.g., Maxwell & Pringle, Reference Maxwell and Pringle1981).

Code-switching

Code-switching (CS) is a construct out of sociolinguistics that is defined as the use of two or more languages or dialects in the same stretch of speech by bilingual or bidialectal speakers (Gardner-Chloros, Reference Gardner-Chloros2009a; Gumperz, Reference Gumperz1982). This phenomenon that has been the object of extensive study by (socio)linguists; research on CS as interactional adjustment constitutes only a small portion of this work. Although the definition of “code” is not well-defined (Bullock & Toribo, Reference Bullock, Toribo, Bullock and Toribo2009), most of the literature on CS has focused on instances of switching dialects or languages in interaction; it has been suggested that CS is the bilingual’s analog to style shifting (see Coupland, Reference Coupland2007; Gardner-Chloros, Reference Gardner-Chloros2009a). Gumperz (Reference Gumperz1982) proposed that CS was either situational (reactive; e.g., a response to a shift in topic or individuals present) or metaphorical (unprompted; e.g., a shift for emphatic purposes). However, some have questioned the extent to which (entirely) situational switches are an idealized notion (Gardner-Chloros, Reference Gardner-Chloros, Bullock and Toribo2009b). Functionally, CS may serve to specify certain addresses (i.e., include or exclude particular members of the audience), express (dis)identification or (dis)affiliation with certain others or other groups, and/or define a situation in terms of a particular social arena (e.g., Beebe, Reference Beebe1981; Bullock & Toribo, Reference Bullock, Toribo, Bullock and Toribo2009; Gardner-Chloros, Reference Gardner-Chloros2009a; Gumperz, Reference Gumperz1982; Scotton & Ury, Reference Scotton and Ury1977). Speakers are often unaware of the fact that they are engaging in CS; as such, CS is considered to be largely unconscious (Beebe, Reference Beebe1981; Gumperz, Reference Gumperz1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, Reference Sachdev, Bourhis, Robinson and Giles2001).

Audience Design

Audience design, defined as taking one’s audience into account when designing one’s speech or communication, came out of Bell’s (Reference Bell1984) analysis of New Zealand radio broadcasters, whose use of specific phonetic variants differed depending on the audience they were ostensibly reading for. Most of the early research using audience design was concerned with linguistic variables (such as phonetic variation) in given speakers’ repertoire, and with understanding their interplay with the various levels of audiences (addressee, auditor, overhearer, eavesdropper, referee) specified by the theory, though it also posits that topic and content may also be adapted for audiences. According to Bell (Reference Bell1984), changes in communicative style may be reactive or proactive (what he terms responsive and initiative dimensions), and affect both the intelligibility and the social meaning of what is said for a given audience. As a model, audience design is primarily descriptive, and focused on the (social) effects of adjustment rather than its causes. It does not offer an explanation of how these adjustments take place or have a robust explanation for why people adapt their communication in interaction, other than proposing that changes in meaning associated with different topics and settings are derived from our associating those topics and settings with their corresponding people. Although the theory is not explicit about this fact, the language it uses, particularly in its use of the term “design” – which implies a certain level of agency (Coupland, Reference Coupland2007) – suggests strategic, motivated action and, as such, that communicative adjustments are a conscious process (see also Bell, Reference Bell, Giles, Coupland and Coupland1991).

Recipient Design

The conversation analytic construct of recipient design (e.g., Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, Reference Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson1974; Schegloff, Reference Schegloff and Giglioli1972; Schegloff, Reference Schegloff and Fox1996) centers on the idea that speakers design talk with knowledge of the addressee or recipient in mind. Although early work in recipient design focused on referential information (e.g., location, names; Sacks & Schegloff, Reference Sacks, Schegloff and Psathas1979; Schegloff, Reference Schegloff and Giglioli1972), the construct’s scope is broad. Sacks and colleagues (Reference Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson1974) propose that recipient design is operant in a range of verbal and linguistic areas, among them topic selection, word selection, admissibility and ordering of sequences, options and obligations for starting and ending conversations, and turn order. Accessibility of information is proposed to be the primary function and effect of these adjustments; adjustment is seen as a means to effective communication. In contrast to work in sociolinguistics (e.g., audience design), however, research using the concept of recipient design tends to focus on word choice and/or the content of speech, rather than (para) linguistic variables. As part of an analytic tradition focused on observable structure and sequences of action as opposed to psychological variables (Enfield & Levinson, Reference Enfield, Levinson, Enfield and Levinson2006), recipient design does not propose any explanations for why individuals engage in these adjustments, or any particular mechanism by which they occur. Recipient design also does not specify whether these adjustments are conscious or unconscious. However, the language used by Schegloff, Sacks, and colleagues – for example, when discussing selections that speakers make among any number of possible ways to express a given piece of information (Schegloff, Reference Schegloff and Giglioli1972) – seems to imply at least some level of conscious choice.

Grounding

Grounding, defined as working with fellow interactants to reach the mutual belief that each party understands each other well enough for current purposes (Clark & Brennan, Reference Clark, Brennan, Resnick, Levine and Teasley1991; Clark & Krych, Reference Clark and Krych2004), takes a different approach to understanding communicative adjustment. Grounding is premised on the idea that communication is a joint activity managed through joint commitments by its participants; according to this perspective, people adjust their communication to coordinate activity and content in interaction (Clark, Reference Clark, Enfield and Levinson2006). Conversation is proposed to have two phases, a presentation phase and an acceptance phase (Clark & Brennan, Reference Clark, Brennan, Resnick, Levine and Teasley1991). Moving from one phase to the other requires the parties to display positive evidence of understanding for each other’s communication. When this understanding is not evidenced, parties must work together until grounding is achieved (Clark & Brennan, Reference Clark, Brennan, Resnick, Levine and Teasley1991).

According to this approach, individuals are constantly testing and monitoring for understanding, and attempting to adjust to each other to establish common ground for interaction. In Clark’s work, the functional effects of grounding are primarily informational – that is, it establishes a sense of shared understanding so that information may be conveyed – but it has also been proposed that grounding has social-affiliational consequences. Staying attuned to one’s conversational partner to constantly test for shared understanding, it is argued, also entails maintaining a level of interpersonal affiliation across the course of an interaction (Enfield, Reference Enfied, Enfield and Levinson2006). Work on grounding does not explicitly address the issue of conscious versus unconscious processes in interactional adjustment; however, discussions of testing for understanding (e.g., Clark & Brennan, Reference Clark, Brennan, Resnick, Levine and Teasley1991) arguably imply at least some level of consciousness in adapting one’s communication.

Mimicry

Another perspective on communication adjustment is offered by social psychological work on mimicry, defined as mirroring or imitating another person outside of conscious awareness (Chartrand & van Baaren, Reference Chartrand, van Baaren and Zanna2009). An area in which research has exploded in the last fifteen years, mimicry has been studied in verbal behavior (e.g., accent, speech rate, utterance duration, syntax, latency), facial expressions, emotions, and physical behavior (e.g., gesture, posture). How this occurs is not entirely understood, though researchers are actively investigating the cognitive and neurological correlates of mimicry (Chartrand & van Baaren, Reference Chartrand, van Baaren and Zanna2009). Empirical work in this area suggests that mimicry functions as a signal of rapport and a tool to generate social support, as well as a way to facilitate smoother social interaction, perhaps by promoting a more interdependent self-construals and thus a fundamental shift in how we see ourselves relative to others.

Mimicry may also help us understand emotions felt and displayed by others, as mimicking others’ emotions facilitates feeling and subsequently recognizing those emotions ourselves. As such, it has been proposed that people engage in this kind of adjustment not only as a communication tool for emotion, but also as a sort of “social glue” (i.e., a low-cost way of regulating belonging), as well as a means of managing social distance (Chartrand & van Baaren, Reference Chartrand, van Baaren and Zanna2009). In support of this, it has been shown that generally, people respond to mimicry from ingroup members with increased cognitive and affective empathy, liking, and bonding, as well as mimic ingroup members that they like more. Converse effects have been found for mimicry by and of outgroup members (e.g., Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & Pearce, Reference Yabar, Johnston, Miles and Peace2006). The well-documented social effects of mimicry across a range of forms and situations provides evidence that adjustment and adaptation of communication, and indeed behavior more broadly, is deeply fundamental to human interaction.

Linguistic Style Matching

Linguistic style matching (LSM; Ireland & Pennebaker, Reference Ireland and Pennebaker2010; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, Reference Niederhoffer and Pennebaker2002) can be understood as a specific form of verbal mimicry. Defined as synchronized use of function words (prepositions, articles, conjunctions, auxiliary verbs), LSM operationalizes communicative adjustment in terms of matching of lexical forms (Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, Reference Niederhoffer and Pennebaker2002). Pennebaker and colleagues proposed that this type of language matching is a means to establish common ground for interaction through the synchronization of cognitive frameworks, and that LSM is positively correlated with engagement (either positively or negatively valenced). Empirical work has shown that LSM is entirely outside of consciousness – neither speakers nor third party judges were able to detect it – and appears to be unrelated to subjective rapport (Ireland & Pennebaker, Reference Ireland and Pennebaker2010; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, Reference Niederhoffer and Pennebaker2002), which contrasts with findings on other types of mimicry as outlined earlier. As such, it has been proposed the function and effect of this kind of adjustment appears to be to coordinate, and thus make interaction possible, at an extremely basic, unconscious level.

Constructivism

Although communication adjustment is not the conceptual focus of constructivism, it is one of the primary outcomes the theory explains and predicts. Constructivists contend that “impressions of others and their perspectives are erected within cognitive structures (constructs) that the perceiver brings with him to interpersonal situations” (Delia, Reference Delia1977, p. 71). Having a better developed system of cognitive constructs (i.e., higher cognitive complexity) was theorized to result in greater social perspective-taking and, consequently, greater communication competence – that is, a greater ability to achieve one’s goals in context. Delia and colleagues argued that being able to understand a situation from another person’s point of view should allow a speaker to craft a more person-centered (i.e., targeted and effective) message. In persuasive contexts, higher cognitive complexity and greater social perspective-taking have both been linked to more effective message adaptation (e.g., Clark & Delia, Reference Clark and Delia1977). Beyond stating that person-centered (i.e., adapted) messages should be more effective at achieving goals in context, however, constructivism does not speak to either the function or social effects of communication adjustment. It also does not specify whether these processes are conscious or unconscious.

Discrepancy Arousal Theory

Discrepancy arousal theory (DAT; Cappella & Greene, Reference Cappella and Greene1982, Reference Cappella and Greene1984) proposes that adjustment in interaction follows from changes in cognitive arousal, which are the result of discrepancies between expectations and reality. The theory suggests that small changes in arousal are experienced as positive, provoking an approach/converge response, but that large changes in arousal are experienced as negative, provoking an avoid/diverge response. This is proposed to hold across verbal, kinesic, and vocalic behavior, and be a relatively automatic reaction that follows from cognitive arousal. Focused on explaining the mechanisms through which different kinds of adjustment occurs, DAT does not specify either functions or social effects of adjustment. It also does not take into account the valence of the action leading to arousal.

Interaction Adaptation Theory

Finally, interaction adaptation theory (IAT; Burgoon & Ebesu Hubbard, Reference Burgoon, Ebesu Hubbard and Gudykunst2005; Burgoon, Stern, & Dillman, Reference Burgoon, Stern and Dillman1995; White, Reference White, Baxter and Braithwaite2008) provides an alternative framework outlining the conditions under which adaptive communication behavior will be convergent or divergent. The theory states that each person comes to an interaction with requirements (R), the level of a given behavior needed to satisfy basic human needs; expectations (E), the anticipated level of a given behavior; and desires (D), their preferences for the level of a given behavior. Together, these three elements (RED) constitute a person’s interaction position (IP). When the actual behavior that takes place is more positive than the IP, convergence, matching, and reciprocity are proposed to result; however, when the actual behavior is less positive than the IP, divergence, compensation, or maintenance are proposed to result. Considering the mechanisms involved, IAT assumes that we have a basic human tendency toward entrainment and synchrony, but that these needs are moderated by personal and situational factors (see Burgoon & Ebesu Hubbard, Reference Burgoon, Ebesu Hubbard and Gudykunst2005 for a summary of assumptions of IAT). These needs are seen as driving observed behavior. To the extent that the pursuit of basic human needs drive behavior, adaptation is arguably unconscious; however, in situations where additional social or personal factors moderate or otherwise affect these basic drives, certain aspects of adaptation could be conscious. Like DAT, IAT does not specify the function or social effects of communication adjustment.

Adjustment as Fundamental to Interaction

In both the centrality of communication adjustment to the theory and in the range of behaviors and outcomes its theorizing incorporates, CAT is consistent with the first proposition addressing communication adjustment outlined earlier. Although it began as a framework addressing shifts in accent (Giles, Reference Giles1973), CAT’s present scope is broad: the theory has been applied and tested across a range of verbal and nonverbal communication behaviors, among them accent, code (dialect/language), pitch, speech rate, topic, and discourse management behaviors. Notably, CAT contends that we may simultaneously converge and diverge with different aspects of our communication, an assertion (and degree of complexity) not found in other approaches reviewed in this chapter. CAT has also guided studies across a wide range of applied domains, including intercultural/interethnic, intergenerational, legal, educational, organizational, and computer-mediated interactions (Soliz & Giles, Reference Soliz, Giles and Cohen2014; see Chapters 7–9). These studies have used a wide range of research methods, both quantitative (see Chapter 4) and qualitative (see Chapter 6). This contrasts with other approaches to studying communication adjustment, in which a given construct or theory is more closely tied to a particular methodology or analytic approach (e.g., social scientific experiments or conversation analysis).

Compared to a number of the constructs and theories reviewed earlier (e.g., CS, LSM), CAT also proposes to explain a much broader range of communication forms and outcomes. Finally, CAT is unique in that it addresses motivations at outcomes at the level of both the individual and the social group (e.g., Dragojevic & Giles, Reference 34Dragojevic, Giles and Berger2014). No other theory or construct reviewed here explicitly addresses the joint operation of individual and social identity (see Chapter 7). Thus, CAT offers a broader and more comprehensive approach to studying communication adjustment, both theoretically and empirically, than do alternative frameworks.

Functions of Adjustment

Theorizing on CAT has proposed two distinct functions for communicative adjustment: first, managing social distance and related identity concerns (affective function) and second, managing comprehension (cognitive function; see Street & Giles, Reference Street, Giles, Roloff and Berger1982). Broadly, this is consistent with the constructs and theories reviewed earlier: while some focus primarily on the social regulation (e.g., mimicry, response matching) and others on the comprehension and accessibility of information (e.g., recipient design, grounding) this body of theory and research as whole points to these two primary functions (see the second proposition above). To date, empirical and theoretical work using CAT has focused primarily on the affective function of accommodation. Empirical and theoretical research that has been undertaken on the cognitive function has focused on observable linguistic and paralinguistic variables such as lexicon, syntax, speech rate (e.g., Thakerar, Giles, & Cheshire, Reference Thakerar, Giles, Cheshire, Fraser and Scherer1982), and conceptualized adjustments in these areas as helping increase communication “efficiency” (Gallois, Ogay, & Giles, Reference Gallois, Ogay, Giles and Gudykunst2005). Although it asserts that communication adjustment is fundamental to social interaction (see Chapter 3) both theorizing and empirical work in CAT generally takes the existence of interaction itself as given; it does not explicitly argue that communication adjustment is what allows interaction to take place, as other approaches do (e.g., LSM, grounding).

Explanations for Adjustment

Turning to explanations for communication adjustment, CAT is once again more specific – and indeed here, also more complete and comprehensive – than most other theories and constructs addressing interpersonal adjustment. CAT is premised on the idea that interpersonal and intergroup relationships are mediated and managed through communication (Gallois & Giles, Reference Gallois, Giles, Palmer and Barnett1998). Implicit in this statement, and in related theorizing, is the notion that communication adjustment can be proactive and reactive, which is consistent with the third proposition addressing communication adjustment advanced earlier. CAT proposes that adjustment is used to regulate social distance in pursuit of positive personal and social identities. Providing an explanation for social effects is a significant contribution to theorizing about communication adjustment, and one of CAT’s strengths.

As Table 2.1 shows, a number of constructs in the domain of communication adjustment are just that – constructs – and as such do not provide explanations for why we adjust. Those that do offer a social explanation for adjustment (notably IAT, though also mimicry and CS) tend to have broad statements referencing the general human need for affiliation and comfort (e.g., Burgoon & Ebesu Hubbard, Reference Burgoon, Ebesu Hubbard and Gudykunst2005) or are fairly speculative (e.g., Chartrand & van Baaren, Reference Chartrand, van Baaren and Zanna2009). Compared to these, the explanation proposed by CAT is relatively specific and concrete. Other constructs (e.g., recipient design, grounding, LSM) either explicitly state or imply that we adjust in order to facilitate communication and interaction as a process (cognitive function of adjustment). CAT also acknowledges this function of communication adjustment, though the theory’s main contribution to describing, understanding, and predicting communicative behavior arguably lies in its use of social identity as an explanatory mechanism. Given the amount of support that predictions generated by this aspect of the theory have received (see Chapter 3; Soliz & Giles, Reference Soliz, Giles and Cohen2014), this should be seen as an important contribution to theorizing about communication adjustment.

“Appropriate” Adjustment: Perceptions, Attributions, and Nonaccommodation

Consistent with the fourth proposition earlier, CAT acknowledges that people have expectations for what constitutes “appropriate” adjustment; according to the theory, these expectations are grounded in the socio-historical context of a given interaction. Compared to other approaches, CAT’s treatment of this issue and its implications is quite robust. CAT includes processes of perception, attribution, and evaluation of speakers’ behavior as central components of its framework (see Chapters 3 & 5). Other communication theories also suggest that evaluation of communication behavior (presumably, relative to a set of standards for appropriateness) takes place – for example, IAT posits that it is evaluation of the interaction position relative to actual behavior that determines the type of adjustment individuals make. However, CAT does so in a way that is more structured and systematic, allowing for complexities that other models and constructs do not address.

First and foremost among these complexities is the distinction between objective and subjective adjustment (see Chapter 3). CAT acknowledges that the intention to accommodate or the impression that one is accommodating does not necessarily correspond to objective accommodation, in terms of communication behavior. This distinction, in conjunction with CAT’s incorporation of perception and attribution processes, allows for modeling a situation in which one party believes that they are adjusting adequately (i.e., they are psychologically accommodating), but the other party does not perceive it as such (see Chapter 5). While parts of this situation could be understood separately with other theories (e.g., audience design or recipient design might explain how or why the first speaker adjusted as he did, and IAT could be used to predict the recipient’s response), CAT can explain the interaction as a whole, and offers predictions for consequences that follow.

Second, in terms of these consequences, CAT’s incorporation of attribution and evaluation processes addresses consequences that go beyond the immediate interaction. Unlike other constructs and theories, in CAT, perceptions and evaluations of behavior are theorized to result in attributions about the speaker (e.g., politeness, competence, empathy) and the speaker’s group, as well as have consequences for speakers’ desires to engage in future interaction. Although work in sociolinguistics considers the social consequences of particular language choices (see Coupland, Reference Coupland2007), neither theorizing in audience design nor theorizing in CS explicitly addresses attributions, or makes concrete predictions about the effect of present communication adjustment on future interactions.

Third and finally, CAT also offers particular insight how people perceive and evaluate communication that is not adjusted as they expect or desire (i.e., nonaccommodation; see Chapter 5). CAT is not the only theory or construct to consider this issue; CS, DAT, and IAT all address divergence, or adjusting one’s communication “away” from another’s, as a means of differentiating oneself, increasing social distance, and/or excluding another from an interaction. However, CAT’s treatment of the issue is more comprehensive than that offered by other theories. Nonaccommodation in CAT includes not only divergence, which can be defined psychologically or linguistically, but also the constructs of underaccommodation and overaccommodation (Coupland, Coupland, Giles, & Henwood, Reference Coupland, Coupland, Giles and Henwood1988; see also Chapter 5). As this is an interesting and important area of inquiry, both a theoretical framework and relatively robust research program addressing this issue is another important strength and contribution of CAT to work on communication adjustment.

Automaticity and Adjustment

One of the biggest unresolved questions in CAT is that of awareness: are speakers aware of the adjustments that they are making? (Are listeners, in turn, aware of adjustments that speakers are making?) To date, the theory has not taken a stance on whether the processes it proposes are conscious or unconscious (i.e., automatic). As indicated earlier, a review of related constructs and theories across fields, unfortunately, does not resolve this question definitively. However, it does offer some insight into when processes may or may not be conscious.

Bargh and Chartrand (Reference Bargh and Chartrand1999) define conscious processes as those that we are aware of, that we intend, that require effort, and that we can control. Automatic or unconscious processes are the converse: that is, those that we are not aware of, do not intend, do not require effort, and cannot control. Research in the area of automaticity has shown that a great deal of what we do, from evaluations to physical behavior, is in fact automatic as opposed to conscious (e.g., Bargh, Reference Bargh2006; Bargh & Chartrand, Reference Bargh and Chartrand1999; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, Reference Bargh, Chen and Burrows1996). Other research in social cognition has shown that people have relatively little insight into their own cognitive processes and that people are often unaware of important stimuli that influence responses and/or that a given stimulus have produced responses in question. Rather, people tend to construct reports of their own cognitive processes based on plausible a priori theories of behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, Reference Nisbett and Wilson1977).

Considering communication adjustment specifically, research in the area of mimicry has demonstrated that a broad range of verbal and nonverbal behaviors are adjusted unconsciously over the course of interaction. These include accent, speech rate, utterance duration, latency, syntax, gesture, posture, emotion, and facial expression. In experiments, participants typically do not report awareness of mimicry having taken place; adjustment of these behaviors also does not appear to be affected by cognitive load, and correlates more consistently with implicit than explicit attitudes (Chartrand & van Baaren, Reference Chartrand, van Baaren and Zanna2009). All of this supports the contention that adjustment in these domains is automatic as opposed to conscious. That speakers will insist that they have consistently spoken one code when in fact they have engaged in CS (often expressing surprise when tapes of the conversation are replayed for them; e.g., Gumperz, Reference Gumperz1982) suggests that in addition to the variables outlined earlier, adjustment of code (i.e., language and/or dialect) may also be unconscious. Finally, work in LSM (e.g., Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, Reference Niederhoffer and Pennebaker2002) demonstrates that adjustment occurs at the level of function words, but that such adjustments occur outside the awareness of both speakers and third party judges. Thus, there is evidence that gestural, postural, linguistic and paralinguistic adjustments can and do occur automatically.

However, many of these adjustments also can occur consciously: if we choose to, we can alter our volume, pitch, gesture, posture, syntax, word choice, and facial expressions, as well as many other characteristics of our communication. A simple example is a situation in which our interlocutor indicates that they do not understand us: while there is some evidence that an initial (and likely unconscious) response is to repeat what we have just said louder and slower (Berger & di Battista, Reference Berger and Battista1993), higher order adaptation (see e.g., Berger, Reference 33Berger1997) often entails conscious consideration of other ways to phrase or explain the point we are trying to get across. When certain words or phrases can signal that speakers are from a particular group, they may consciously use or avoid these words to (respectively) indicate or avoid indicating their association with that group identity (Dragojevic, Giles, & Watson, Reference Dragojevic, Giles, Watson, Giles and Watson2013; see also, Chapter 7). However, consciously thinking about how we are communicating takes cognitive energy (consider how it feels to speak another language when one attempts to translate phrase-by-phrase). As such, it seems unlikely that conscious adjustment would be an interactional “default”, particularly in routine interactions.

Taken together, these findings and examples suggest that unless there are intervening conditions, people are likely not aware of many of the adjustments in communication that they make in context. However, in situations where automatic adjustments do not produce the desired outcome (as in the case of an interlocutor expressing a lack of comprehension), or where a social goal is particularly salient (such as avoiding undesirable social labeling), people may consciously adjust their communication on any number of dimensions. With that said, there has been surprisingly little systematic study of this issue; when and why people adjust their communication consciously versus automatically is an open and interesting area for future empirical work.