Contention concerning domestic politics

The general elections of 2007 placed Fianna Fáil in government with the Green Party and Progressive Democrats as its coalition partners. It was this government that held both Lisbon Treaty referendums. Ireland had enjoyed a period of unprecedented prosperity in its recent past, outperforming all other OECD countries. The Celtic Tiger was born in 1994 and lasted until the severe economic crisis of 2008.Footnote ⁵ Although the end of the Celtic Tiger was slowly becoming visible at the time of the first referendum, the second round saw full-blown economic crisis. In polls from fall 2007, several months before the first vote, the Irish public was asked to specify the two most important issues facing their country. The top two answers were crime (57%) and health care (45%), followed by rising prices/inflation (22%), housing (14%), immigration (14%), and unemployment (10%).Footnote ⁶ Between fall 2007 and June 2009, polls demonstrate a sharp increase in Irish citizens’ concern with the state of the economy. Whereas only 8% named it as one of the two most important issues in 2007, this figure rose to 48% by June 2009.Footnote ⁷ Satisfaction with the government followed a similar pattern: Whereas 32% of the Irish public stated trust in their government in fall 2007, only 20% did so in June 2009, the lowest since opinion polling began in the 1970s.Footnote ⁸

Apart from the economic concerns that increased during this period, the Irish public has been traditionally sensitive in two domains, moral issues and military neutrality. Regarding the first one, the “liberal-conservative” cleavage has been a highly salient one in Irish society.Footnote ⁹ Numerous Irish referendums on issues such as divorce and abortion uncovered the intensity of this cleavage in the past decades.Footnote ¹⁰ The literature offers various explanations for its prominence, presenting this cleavage as driven by generational replacement, or as reflecting the clash between the Catholic Church and the state, or as related to the definition of the Irish identity in terms of Catholicism after independence.Footnote ¹¹ Given these various factors, the secular-liberal versus religious-conservative cleavage has been and continues to be a prominent one, along with the radical versus moderate nationalist cleavage. These cleavages are much stronger than the rather weak left versus right cleavage in Irish society.Footnote ¹²

Second, the concept of military neutrality has been the “leitmotif of Irish independence and sovereignty” in efforts to consolidate independence from the UK.Footnote ¹³ During the Second World War, Irish neutrality became flexible, because Ireland was too benevolent toward the allies.Footnote ¹⁴ Yet, as a result of strict censorship laws, the public saw “an illusion of strict impartiality and moral superiority, the crowning glory of independence, untainted by the hidden realities, particularly the close links with the old enemy.”Footnote ¹⁵ In the postwar era as well, with the country's membership in European integration, the pragmatic and ambiguous nature of this policy was confirmed. However, neutrality grew to be more than a security policy and became closely connected with Irish identity and values.

Contention concerning the EU

Despite becoming slightly more negative in the last few years, Figure 7.3 shows that Irish public opinion toward the Union has traditionally been, and still is, above the EU average.Footnote ¹⁶

Figure 7.3. Irish support for EU membership (1973–2008).

Ireland has been a major recipient of EU funding. Since accession into the EU, Irish politicians have tied Irish and Community interests closely and “put integration in the same uncontroversial category of things as motherhood and apple pie.”Footnote ¹⁷ Between 1989 and 1999, Ireland received 2.6% of its GNP from structural funds, leading to detailed studies on whether the Celtic Tiger was related to these benefits.Footnote ¹⁸ Accordingly, successive Irish governments presented the EU's redistributive policies as in the Irish national interest. Indeed, when asked what the EU means to them, the Irish are more likely to refer to the economic aspects of the Union.Footnote ¹⁹ Attitudes toward security and defense matters are less positive. On the whole, the responses are more positive than negative; however, a large percentage of the Irish public is unsure on the European security and defense cooperation.Footnote ²⁰ This is closely related to the commitment to Irish neutrality.

Attitudes toward specific EU policies in the five years leading up to the Lisbon referendums are shown in Figure 7.4. Irish citizens are almost unanimously in favor of the monetary union and the single currency, with support levels well above 80% and stable over time.Footnote ²¹ On the other hand, support for common foreign and defense policy is unstable and highly interesting for this research. The Irish support rate fell sharply from early 2008 onward. This drop should be read in line with the first No campaign against the Lisbon Treaty. Besides, the Irish public's support for enlargement has been unstable, showing shifts over time. The No campaigners did not use this theme in the Lisbon referendums, however.

Figure 7.4. Irish support for EU policies (2004–2009).

The Irish mainstream political elite, much like their counterparts in the other EU member states, favor European integration. The consensus among the three largest parties Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labour have secured a large basis of support for the EU. Nevertheless, the Green Party, the Sinn Féin, the Socialist Party, the Socialist Workers’ Party, and the Workers’ Party have been critical of the integration project. Although their standing is classified as soft Eurosceptic, and not against EU membership per se, their criticisms became more visible with successive EU referendums. In Ireland, Article 46 of the 1937 Constitution requires that every proposal to amend the Irish Constitution “be submitted by Referendum to the decision of the people.”Footnote ²² Accordingly, Ireland has held eight referendums on European integration so far: on European Communities membership in 1972, the Single European Act in 1987, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998, the Nice Treaty in 2001, a second round on the Nice Treaty in 2002, the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, and once again a second round on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Among these referendums, the Nice and Lisbon Treaties were both rejected, only to be subsequently approved in the second rounds. The mainstream political parties have campaigned on the Yes side consistently in these referendums.Footnote ²³ On the other side were the Green Party, the Sinn Féin and far left political parties such as the Socialist Party, the Socialist Workers’ Party, and the Workers’ Party, forming the No camp.Footnote ²⁴ Broadly speaking, these political parties blamed the EU proposals for being too market-friendly, eroding national sovereignty, militarizing Europe, and thereby threatening Irish neutrality.Footnote ²⁵ A number of civil society groups, such as the National Platform, the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, and pro-life Catholic groups, also campaigned against the treaty reforms on the basis that the reforms would undermine Irish sovereignty, oppose Irish neutrality, and threaten Irish Catholic values on family and abortion.

Regardless of the opposition, the 1972, 1987, 1992, and 1998 referendums passed smoothly. The first vote on the Nice Treaty, which rejected it, came as a shock. Until this referendum, European integration has not been politicized in Ireland. Detailed studies found that the campaigns mattered.Footnote ²⁶ The shift from a lackluster and ambivalent pro-Nice campaign in the first round to a much more energized and effective one in the second round was decisive in the approval of the same treaty the second time around. Moreover, the Irish government secured guarantees from the EU, at the Seville European Council in 2002, before the second referendum. This declaration ensured that Irish neutrality was not under threat by the European Security and Defense Policy. The existing studies found that a large segment of the potential Yes voters did not vote in 2001 and were activated to vote in 2002, whereas the No campaign reached the limit in its support base in 2001.Footnote ²⁷ Even if numerous votes made the EU a salient topic in Irish politics around the time of these referendums, its role in national elections has been minimal.Footnote ²⁸ The Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, announced the establishment of the National Forum on Europe in the aftermath of the first Nice referendum.Footnote ²⁹ In a series of debates between political parties and civil society groups across Ireland, it aimed to provide a neutral and regular public space for debating the EU. Although it was a great step toward a healthy politicization of the Union, it was discontinued after the first Lisbon referendum.

Despite their traditional worries on moral issues and neutrality, the Irish public favored the referendum proposals several months before the votes. Yet, these concerns suddenly became politicized during the Lisbon campaigns, just as they did in the Nice campaigns. The public's concern on enlargement was not even activated, as the No campaigners chose to steer clear of it. On the other hand, public anxieties relating to the economy and government dissatisfaction increased sharply from 2008 to 2009, leading to an unexpected pattern. The “second-order” model predicts that government unpopularity leads to higher negative vote share in EU referendums. What happened was exactly the opposite. The answer lies in what the campaigners argued.

Agenda setting and priming

The Yes side “sleepwalked into the first Lisbon campaign” in the words of Caroline Erskine, the Communications Director of Ireland for Europe.Footnote ³¹ Even though the government did not declare the referendum date until late April 2008, at that point the No side was already well developed.Footnote ³² There were several reasons behind this. First, governing parties had internal problems that stopped them from devoting their full energy to the Lisbon process. Allegations of corruption caused a switch in the leadership of Fianna Fáil, the leading party in the government, roughly one month before the referendum. Taoiseach Bertie Ahern stepped down on 7 May 2008, initiating a transition process in leadership from himself to the new Taoiseach, Brian Cowen. David Harmon, Director of Press and Communications of the Fianna Fáil, explained that people's attention was on this transition.Footnote ³³ He added: “The referendum campaign still went on but because other big ticket political issues were in the air, it was sidelined.” Similarly, another member of the ruling coalition, the Green Party had internal debates on whether it should support the Lisbon Treaty. Having opposed the Nice Treaty, the switch to the Yes side was not smooth, as their congress failed to reach the two thirds necessary to back the treaty officially. The party unofficially campaigned on the Yes side despite its dissenting members.Footnote ³⁴ Second, perhaps more importantly, the mainstream political elites assumed that the Lisbon Treaty would be unproblematic as it was only a technical reform treaty. Timmy Dooley, Fianna Fáil MP, stated that the treaty lacked a “hook” to hang it on, providing only technical fixes.Footnote ³⁵ In the interviews, almost all of the Yes campaigners presented “complacency” and the “feeling that it was going to be carried” as the main reasons for their inaction. As Joe Costello, Labour MP and Spokesperson on Europe, put it:Footnote ³⁶

The result was indeed a vacuum that the No side effectively used. The Libertas campaign, as well as the Cóir and Sinn Féin campaigns, were well under way at least six months before the referendum. Naoise Nunn, the Executive Director of the Libertas campaign, mentioned their early start as the main reason for their “foothold.”Footnote ³⁷ Eoin Ó'Broin, Campaign Director of Sinn Féin, also stressed their strategic early start, referring to the French No campaign's success with its early start in the 2005 TCE campaign.Footnote ³⁸ In turn, Minister of State for European Affairs Dick Roche explained their problem on the Yes side:Footnote ³⁹

Timmy Dooley, Fianna Fáil MP, repeated the same point: “Our campaign quickly became a defense of what the treaty was not, as opposed to what it was.”Footnote ⁴⁰ Terry Murphy of the Fine Gael agreed: “The trouble was, once you were answering, once you were trying to deal with their issues, you were not dealing with your own issues, and you were dealing with the negatives and not putting forward the positives.”Footnote ⁴¹

In the second campaign, the positions were reversed. The government neither accepted the inevitability of a second vote nor announced the date until July 2009, but this was easily predicted from the Nice experience.Footnote ⁴² This time the Yes side was highly active in setting a new tone to the debate, as they knew how to do this from the Nice campaigns. National Campaign Coordinator of Ireland for Europe Brendan Halligan stated that with Pat Cox and Brigid Laffan, they started planning the second campaign even a few days before the first referendum, seeing that it would be lost.Footnote ⁴³ “Whoever starts first almost definitely wins. This was the case in Nice and in Lisbon as well. The No side started first in the first campaigns, and we started first in the second campaigns,” he added. On the No side, Communications Director of Libertas John McGuirk explained their strategy to “dramatically turn the tide by entering the campaign late, six weeks before the vote,” to bring a sense of momentum to the No campaign.Footnote ⁴⁴ However, he acknowledged that this strategy did not work.

Framing

The main Yes campaign frames can be categorized as:

1. 1. (First round) Ireland benefited greatly from EU membership. The Lisbon Treaty would consolidate Ireland's future in Europe, and secure Ireland as a center for foreign investment and job creation.

2. 2. (First round) The treaty would make the EU more democratic. It would enable it to work more efficiently and effectively, speeding up the decision making, and giving citizens a greater say. It would give the national parliaments a greater role and establish the new citizens’ initiative. Moreover, it would introduce the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

3. 3. (First round) The treaty would make Europe more secure, allow it to act with greater unity on the world stage, provide opportunities for sustainable prosperity, and make it easier to craft policies on climate change, energy security, and cross-border crime. It would also extend the EU's potential in conflict prevention and post-conflict missions.

4. 4. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would retain our veto on tax, protect military neutrality, ensure that the Irish people decide on laws to protect the unborn, and give Ireland full equality in the Commission even with Germany and the UK.

5. 5. (Second round) Europe has listened to the Irish people and responded with legal guarantees. We would keep our Commissioner; Irish taxation policy would remain a domestic matter; Ireland's tradition of military neutrality would be fully respected with no threat of conscription or alliances; the Irish people alone would decide on laws on abortion and other social issues; workers’ rights and public services would be protected.

6. 6. (Second round) Voting Yes would ensure economic recovery and create jobs. We must send positive signals to foreign investors who are worried about Ireland's place in Europe. Ireland would benefit significantly from the EU's recent 5 billion euros economic recovery plan designed to stimulate growth. Access to liquidity from the European Central Bank would be essential to Irish economy.

In the first round, all mainstream political parties used variations of the first four Yes frames. There was a clear change in argumentation in the second referendum. This time all the Yes side political parties, along with the civil society campaign Ireland for Europe, adopted the last two Yes frames in combination with the earlier ones. The same shift was visible in the choice of slogans. Fine Gael's slogan in the first campaign was “Let's Be at the Heart of It,” whereas in the second campaign it was “Yes to Jobs. Yes for Ireland. Yes for Our Economy.” Fianna Fáil's first round slogan was “Good for Ireland. Good for Europe,” and it switched to “Yes for Ireland's Future, Yes for the Economy” in the second round.Footnote ⁴⁵ Irish Alliance for Europe was the civil society campaign in the first round. They used “Let's Make Europe Work Better.”Footnote ⁴⁶ Ireland for Europe, the civil society campaign in the second round, opted for a more tangible slogan: “Ruin versus Recovery.”

On the other hand, the No campaign frames can be categorized as:

1. 1. (First round) The heroes of 1916 fought to free the Irish people, but the Lisbon Treaty would create an EU super-state. The Lisbon Treaty is the EU Constitution, meaning that Irish citizens’ rights could be overruled. Voting No would protect the Irish constitution.

2. 2. (First round) Ireland would lose power as it would lose its permanent EU Commissioner. The Lisbon Treaty would also change the voting balance in favor of the bigger countries by putting EU's decision making on a pure population size basis. The new procedure would double Germany's voting power in making EU laws and increase the UK's, France's, and Italy's, while halving Ireland's. This would turn the EU from being an economic union of equals to a federal super-state.

3. 3. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would undermine Ireland's ability to set its own corporate tax rate. Ireland's low corporate tax rate brings a huge amount of jobs to Ireland, which would be under attack if the Lisbon Treaty passed.

4. 4. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would undermine Ireland's neutrality, which Irish people are rightly proud of. It would further militarize the EU by increasing the member states’ military spending. It would also strengthen the military alliance of EU member states with NATO and would pull Ireland further into an EU army.

5. 5. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would cause a race to the bottom due to its market-friendly policies. The treaty would pave the way for the liberalization of public services, such as health, education, and social security. It would also enhance the right of businesses to use cheap labor from countries where wages are lower. The ECJ rulings such as Ruffert, Laval, and Viking already place a huge downward pressure on wages. Even the Charter of Fundamental Rights would not provide protection against it, as the right to freely provide services overrides these rights.

6. 6. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would harm our farmers as it would give the European Commission exclusive competence over international trade agreements and abolish the Irish veto on World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.

7. 7. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would make the Charter of Fundamental Rights binding, which could force us to change our laws on abortion, euthanasia, and legalization of prostitution and drugs.

8. 8. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would hand full control over immigration and asylum policy to the EU. The Union would decide who could come to Ireland looking for employment, regardless of the status of our economy.

9. 9. (First round) The Lisbon Treaty would offer nothing on climate change and undermine fair trade with the developing world.

10. 10. (First round) The treaty would be a bad deal for Ireland, and for Europe. Voting No would create the possibility of negotiating a better deal.

11. 11. (Second round) The voters would be asked to vote again on exactly the same treaty. This treaty would still be a bad deal for Ireland.

12. 12. (Second round) The so-called guarantees would not be legally binding.

In the first round, on the right, Libertas became a key actor by using the first three No campaign arguments. It adopted a variety of slogans such as “Europe Has Been Great for Ireland, Let's Keep It That Way,” “Lisbon: Good for Them, Bad for Us,” “Keep Brussels’ Hands off Our Taxes,” and “Keep Ireland Strong in the EU.” The pro-life Catholic group Cóir employed a wider range of arguments, using the first eight No campaign frames (except the fourth one on neutrality). Some examples of the Cóir slogans were “We Will Lose under Lisbon,” “People Died for Your Freedom, Don't Throw It Away,” and “Lisbon, It'll Cost You, More Tax, Less Power.” On the left, Sinn Féin combined the sovereignty theme with a left-wing agenda, by using the first six frames along with the 10th frame. Its slogan was “For a Better Deal in Europe Vote No.” The Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party used similar left-wing themes, adopting the fourth, fifth, and ninth No frames. Finally, the Peace and Neutrality Alliance opposed the treaty on grounds of military neutrality. Opting for the fourth No campaign frame, they said “Vote No to War, NATO, and Lisbon Treaty.”

In the second round, the No campaigners used the last two frames in addition to their earlier ones. In response to the new Yes camp arguments on jobs and guarantees, they chose slogans such as “The Only Job Lisbon Saves Is His” (Libertas – showing a photo of Taoiseach Brian Cowen), “Same Treaty Same Answer” (Sinn Féin), “Vote No, Don't Be Bullied” (Cóir). They also adopted slogans emphasizing their earlier arguments. Cóir used “New Voting Rights: Germany 17%, Ireland 0.8%,” and “€1.84 Minimum Wage After Lisbon?.” Similarly, Sinn Féin switched to “Lisbon = Less Power in Europe, 17% for Germany, 12% for the UK, 0.8% for Ireland,” “Lisbon = Lower Wages,” and “Lisbon = More Military Spending.”

Relative strength of frames

Among the Yes frames, the first three frames were abstract, while the last three frames were more concrete. The first frame, a general pro-EU argument frequently used in Ireland, underlined the economic benefits of the membership. Thus, even if this was an available and accessible concern for the Irish, it was not highly applicable as the economic situation was only slowly beginning to deteriorate during the first campaign. As such, it did not carry the emotional content of the last Yes frame. The second frame, just as in the other cases, presented the treaty as an institutional step toward a better Europe. It did not involve available or accessible concerns, as European citizens are not familiar with the technicalities of the integration project. The third frame was abstract, without direct relation to any of the contentious issues of the period. Therefore, the first three frames were neither emotionally compelling nor based on recent contention. The fourth, fifth, and sixth Yes frames were strong. The fourth frame was put forward in order to respond to the No campaign themes that were successfully set on the agenda. These themes were closely linked to the public's anxieties and were thereby highly available and applicable. However, these appeared only defensively in the debate and did not carry any emotional content, as the stronger No frames did. The last two Yes frames, the fifth and the sixth, appeared only in the second round. The fifth frame, despite having almost the same content as the fourth one, was more powerful because it had backing from the EU. This time it was not simply defensive statements but rather credible guarantees acknowledging the Irish public's contention. The legal substance of the fifth frame unquestionably removed these controversial themes from the agenda. The last frame was also strong as it connected the idea of economic recovery to the Yes vote, suggesting that a No vote would exacerbate the situation. Given the looming economic crisis, this frame was concrete, applicable, and emotionally compelling.

On the No side, the first frame on the loss of Irish independence, the second frame on the loss of Irish Commissioner, the third frame on the loss of Irish economic benefits through the corporate tax issue, the fourth frame on the loss of Irish neutrality, and the seventh one on the loss of Irish control over moral issues were all very strong because they not only tapped into highly accessible and applicable sensitive subjects in the Irish society but also carried emotional appeal. The 10th frame was also a strong one, as it linked the No vote to a better treaty, a better deal for Ireland. As such, a No vote meant a new treaty that could address all these sensitive issues. This is an available and applicable option for the Irish public, given their experience with the Nice Treaty. The fifth frame on the degradation of the welfare state, the sixth on the negative impact on farming, the eighth on the loss of control on immigration, and the ninth on the ignorance of climate change were weak because they were not immediately connected to any of the existing controversial issues for the Irish. However, some No campaign posters portrayed these arguments very effectively. These vivid and emotional posters gained traction within the debate. Finally, the last two No frames appeared in the second round only. These sought to bring the winning themes of the first No campaign back into the second one. Nevertheless, they were weak because they were no longer applicable in light of the guarantees that the Yes side secured.

A selection of campaign posters reflects these patterns. Figure 7.5 presents examples from the first Yes campaign, by Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. Most of my interviewees (from other parties) criticized Fine Gael's strategy of using their MEPs’ photos on the posters.Footnote ⁴⁷ This was seen as an investment in the upcoming EP elections of 2009, instead of focusing on the referendum. Libertas’ choice of posters for the first campaign were also highly catchy.Footnote ⁴⁸ To convey the “loss of independence” message, Libertas showed the Irish Proclamation of Independence with the red “void” stamp on it. In another one, it simply used the words “European army.” Cóir posters in Figure 7.6 are similarly memorable and emotional. One signaled that the treaty would throw away the Irish Proclamation of Independence; another used the well-known image of three monkeys to suggest that the Irish would have no say in the new EU. Sinn Féin, on the other hand, designed an abstract poster using the picture of their MEP, as can be seen in Figure 7.7. Neither the Sinn Féin poster nor the Yes campaign ones were as powerful as the vivid Libertas and Cóir ones.

Figure 7.5. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael posters in the first Lisbon campaign.

Figure 7.6. Cóir posters in the first Lisbon campaign.

Figure 7.7. Sinn Féin poster in the first Lisbon campaign.

The second round saw a dramatic change in terms of postering as well. As can be seen in Figures 7.8 through 7.10, this time the Yes side was using more specific themes, such as jobs, investment, and recovery. Among these, the Ireland for Europe poster in Figure 7.10, showing voters at the crossroad of ruin and recovery, is particularly memorable. This poster was deliberately pink, to appeal to female voters, who voted more negatively than men in the first referendum. Sinn Féin chose to be more specific and vivid in its posters in the second round, as Figure 7.11 demonstrates. With catchy images such as a minimized Irish flag, an empty pocket, and a tank, it concretely portrayed its case. Cóir's postering in the second round, in Figure 7.12, continued to be emotionally compelling. This time it used a highly provocative one that showed pictures of an unborn baby and an old woman, insinuating that the treaty would change Ireland's abortion and euthanasia laws. Another one claimed that the treaty would lower the Irish minimum wage below 2 euros. These were highly influential and were brought up by most of my interviewees. However, given the EU guarantees on these particular subjects, they were no longer applicable and they lacked credibility. Finally, Libertas, which entered the campaign very late in the second round, used photos of the unpopular Taoiseach, with the slogan “The Only Job Lisbon Saves Is His,” claiming that he was tricking the public into approving the same treaty by using arguments concerning creation of new jobs.Footnote ⁴⁹ It also designed a highly dramatic poster, which depicted an apocalyptic scene with a crying child to imply that Irish democracy would come to an end if the treaty passed. Most of my interviewees referred to this poster, arguing that it was too dramatic or that it lacked the concreteness of the first-round Libertas posters.

Figure 7.8. Fianna Fáil posters in the second Lisbon campaign.

Figure 7.9. Fine Gael posters in the second Lisbon campaign.

Figure 7.10. Ireland for Europe's poster in the second Lisbon campaign.

Figure 7.11. Sinn Féin posters in the second Lisbon campaign.

Figure 7.12. Cóir posters in the second Lisbon campaign.

To begin with the first campaign, without exception, all Yes campaigners acknowledged that the No side ran a better campaign. Dick Roche, Minister of State for European Affairs, explained that the Yes side lacked the energy, the enthusiasm, and the passion that the No side put in, emphasizing the strength of the No campaign posters.Footnote ⁵⁰ Joe Costello, Labour Party MP and Spokesperson on Europe, also expressed his frustration:Footnote ⁵¹

Déirdre de Búrca of the Green Party also described the first Yes campaign as lackadaisical, with very little effort put into convincing the electorate, as opposed to the No side which she characterized as passionate and focused on the details of the treaty.Footnote ⁵² In her words, the Yes arguments were “too global, just appealing to people's sense that Europe is good for Ireland.”

Just like the French, Dutch, and Luxembourgish No side, the Irish No campaigners were intentionally more specific in their argumentation. Eoin Ó'Broin, Campaign Director of Sinn Féin, explained that their goal was to focus on the treaty's content:Footnote ⁵³

Naoise Nunn, Executive Director of Libertas, compared the No campaign to guerilla warfare in this regard: “You picked one little issue on which there was some doubt and contention, and then you sold and created enough doubt in the minds of the audience, and the Yes campaigners were struggling, backpedalling, trying to explain, and when they were explaining they were losing.”Footnote ⁵⁴ For instance, President of Libertas Declan Ganley noted that at the core of his opposition to the Lisbon Treaty was the idea of “unaccountable government” – that is, transferring too much power to Brussels without the necessary checks and balances.Footnote ⁵⁵ To explain this concept to people in a concrete way, Libertas picked a poster that depicted the Irish proclamation of independence as void. In his words, “How do you capture this idea in something that has popular resonance? Everybody recognizes the proclamation of independence. It was a simple way of doing that.” Echoing the Dutch No campaigners, Ganley also criticized the Yes campaign for always referring to the past and to how Europe had been great for Ireland, but avoiding any concrete debate on its future.Footnote ⁵⁶

The Yes campaigners explained the difficulties they had in responding to these No campaign arguments. As Karen White, member of Irish Alliance for Europe, put it: “If you are on the No side, you can appeal to different groups with different messages. We had to counter all these different arguments.”Footnote ⁵⁷ Similarly, David Harmon, Director of Press and Communications of the Fianna Fáil said: “Referendum campaigns are very tricky creatures…the No campaigners would jump on any branch of the tree to help bring down a referendum…and that does the trick. The No campaign only has to sell one line, where the Yes campaign has to explain everything.”Footnote ⁵⁸ More specifically, the Yes campaigners stated that it was difficult to respond without being too technical. Anthony Brown, Director of Research of Ireland for Europe, explained that in order to reply to arguments on neutrality or abortion, the answer had to be related to the EU's “competences,” which he referred to as a “dread-word” in a political debate.Footnote ⁵⁹ Jillian van Turnhout of Ireland for Europe described Yes campaigners in those moments as “fountains of knowledge,” who were nevertheless unable to capture the public's mind.Footnote ⁶⁰ The opposite situation was also true, that campaigners did not know enough. Pat Cox, Campaign Director of Ireland for Europe, noted that many Yes campaigners found it uneasy to campaign on the content of the treaty, because of the complexity of “Article 48A Paragraph 3.”Footnote ⁶¹ Indeed, prominent Yes campaigners acknowledged that they had not read the treaty.Footnote ⁶² Taoiseach Brian Cowen said he had not read the treaty “from cover to cover,” Irish Commissioner Charlie McCreevy mentioned that “no sane or sensible” person could be expected to read the document, and finally the president of the Referendum Commission Mr. Justice O'Neill stated that “it certainly would not be your favorite holiday reading, it is a dense legal document.” Similarly, Mr. Justice O'Neill could not answer a series of questions on the text of the treaty put to him by journalists.Footnote ⁶³

As another difficulty, the Yes side criticized the No side for creating diversions in the debate. Timmy Dooley, Fianna Fáil MP, stated that the No campaigners introduced arguments that were neither grounded in nor part of the Lisbon Treaty.Footnote ⁶⁴ He added: “We underestimated the capacity of all those to charge at us.” Terry Murphy of Fine Gael shared this perspective, explaining that the No campaign created holes or diversions and played on people's fears about Europe.Footnote ⁶⁵ Brendan Kiely, Chief Executive of Irish Alliance for Europe, also noted that the No side was successful in launching a number of themes in the public's mind: that the Irish Constitution would die, that Ireland would fail to attract foreign direct investment, and that the EU would interfere in Irish corporate tax laws.Footnote ⁶⁶ Dick Roche, Minister of State for European Affairs, stated his frustration similarly: “They always come up, Ireland will lose neutrality, no we have not, Ireland will lose its character, no we have not, we will be subsumed in Europe, no we have not, we will lose our culture, no we have not.”Footnote ⁶⁷ Referring to the same phenomenon, Brigid Laffan, Chairperson of Ireland for Europe, characterized the No campaign themes such as abortion and neutrality as Ireland's “neuralgic issues.”Footnote ⁶⁸

Some of these No side arguments actually took on a life of their own, becoming all the more controversial. The argument on military neutrality became linked to the possibility of conscription to an EU army. None of my interviewees from the No side admitted to using this argument and expressed their frustration with the blame throughout the campaign. Being considered “extreme” was a frequent concern of the No campaigners. Former Taoiseach Bertie Ahern dismissed the No campaigners as “loolahs” (meaning “lunatics”).Footnote ⁶⁹ Mary Lou McDonald, Sinn Féin MP, mentioned that the Yes side zeroed in on the most extreme arguments – such as conscription – and boxed the No side as extremists.Footnote ⁷⁰ In fact, Libertas based its campaign strategy on giving the No campaign a non-extreme outlook precisely because of this perception. Communications Director of Libertas John McGurik explained that, after conducting research on the public's view of the EU, they identified two key factors that held them back from voting negatively:Footnote ⁷¹

Executive Director of Libertas Naoise Nunn similarly highlighted the point that Libertas aimed to change the usual complexion of the No side in EU referendums, which is the far left and the far right.Footnote ⁷² In his words: “What we had to do was to make this mainstream, appealing to the middle-class, educated, urban groups. We were seeking to be the acceptable face of the No side…Our campaign was center ground, we did not use any inflammatory language, we tried to keep it all straight down in the middle, practical and logical.” He explained that Libertas therefore used the corporate tax rate argument, which has been “a real hot button issue for the business community, for the middle-class, and for the self-employed.”

On this point, my interviewees agreed on Libertas’ success. Both the Yes and No campaigners mentioned that Declan Ganley was able to appeal to the middle ground in the first campaign. Déirdre de Búrca of the Green Party emphasized that Ganley did not match the stereotype of the anti-EU treaty campaigners: “He was not extreme, he was a businessperson, and normally business is pro-EU.”Footnote ⁷³ Anthony Coughlan of the National Platform also mentioned that Ganley was a new and unusual voice in the No campaign, never heard before, and different from the previous No campaigners.Footnote ⁷⁴ He added: “Coming from business and being very good on television, he was exotic, the media was very interested in him.” Pat Cox, Campaign Director of Ireland for Europe, explained similarly that Libertas animated something that had previously been only marginal, coming from the far left or from a rather fundamentalist Catholic right.Footnote ⁷⁵ As he put it: “On the No side you had this great new energy that injected a research-led, well-communicated, and well-funded campaign.” Brigid Laffan, Chairperson of Ireland for Europe, also characterized him as “new, different, and plausible” and stressed his importance in swaying the soft-Yes and soft-No voters to the No side.Footnote ⁷⁶

In terms of Libertas’ economic arguments, Blair Horan of the Civil and Public Service Union (CPSU) emphasized that the Irish electorate had indeed associated the EU with economic benefits in past referendums.Footnote ⁷⁷ According to him, Libertas’ corporate tax argument struck a chord with public by bringing up potential economic damages. Brendan Kiely of Irish Alliance for Europe acknowledged that he regretted not having used better polling resources as Libertas did.Footnote ⁷⁸ Thomas Broughan, Labour MP, explained the same phenomenon as Ganley, “zeroing in on the feeling of disenchantment and successfully getting people suspicious about Europe.”Footnote ⁷⁹

In addition, the No campaigners also chose not to challenge each other, in contrast with the Yes campaigners. Although the No side forces avoided coordinating institutionally, key individuals from different No campaign groups met regularly to discuss the agenda.Footnote ⁸⁰ The aim was not to come up with common arguments but instead to prevent being dragged into fights with each other and to avoid contradiction in the No messages. Moreover, left-wing No campaigners joined forces in an umbrella organization called the Campaign against the EU Constitution. On the other hand, the Yes side was distracted from the message as key political parties disagreed a few times within the last few weeks of the campaign.Footnote ⁸¹ There was disagreement even over a common photo shoot as the leader of the Green Party complained that he had not been included.Footnote ⁸² Labour MP Ruairi Quinn brought together the civil society groups on the Yes side, forming Irish Alliance for Europe. Brendan Kiely, the chief executive of this campaign, explained that they created pillars, such as the business and legal pillars, seeking to involve the civil society.Footnote ⁸³ However, in comparison to the civil-society Yes campaign of the second round (Ireland for Europe), Irish Alliance for Europe was smaller and less active. My interviewees explained that the civil society campaign in the second round was geographically more spread and that it made the difference with its independent offshoots. “That structure [Ireland for Europe] was better in that it effectively allowed more organizations to campaign in different streams,” said Blair Horan of the CPSU, who participated in both initiatives.Footnote ⁸⁴ Also, one of my interviewees explained that as part of civil society, s/he did not want to take part in Quinn's initiative in the first round because he was an active politician and that her/his organization did not want to align with a particular political party.Footnote ⁸⁵ In the second round, this initiative was taken by Pat Cox, who was not an active politician.

All of these factors led to a strategic No campaign in the first round, with strong frames and a coherent No message. This campaign therefore highly resembled the French, Dutch, and Luxembourgish experience with the TCE. But the second campaign did not. This time, without exception all the No campaigners acknowledged that the Yes side ran a better campaign. Dick Roche, Minister of State for European Affairs, mentioned that in clear contrast with the first campaign, the second round Yes messaging was far more focused.Footnote ⁸⁶ Lucinda Creighton, Fine Gael MP, similarly explained that there was a shift in focus from promoting the treaty “because it is good for you” in the first round, to a focus on assuaging people's concerns in the second round.Footnote ⁸⁷ This was made possible by two new campaign strategies on the Yes side: securing legal guarantees from the EU, and campaigning with more effective frames.

The first strategy defined the campaign ground completely differently in the second round. The government obtained legally binding guarantees: one on the Irish commissioner; another in relation to Irish competency over tax rates, abortion, and neutrality; and finally an agreement on workers’ rights.Footnote ⁸⁸ All of the Yes campaigners agreed that these made a big difference. Joe Costello, Labour MP, explained this strategy:Footnote ⁸⁹

Pat Cox, Campaign Director of Ireland for Europe, agreed:Footnote ⁹⁰

In the face of these guarantees, the No side could not credibly make the same arguments again. They repeated these frames in the second round, too, and with powerful posters. However, they were no longer applicable themes. The Yes side could now discredit them easily. Ireland for Europe, the civil society Yes campaign in the second round, used various marketing strategies to counter such No-side posters. They designed posters that quoted No-side messages and labeled them directly as lies, in light of the guarantees. Put differently, the Yes campaigners could portray the No side as irrational and extreme, as their arguments no longer applied to the situation. Besides, the “middle ground” Libertas chose not to enter the debate until the last weeks, helping the Yes side further.

The No side agreed that the guarantees were vital in the second referendum. Roger Cole, Chairman of the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA), characterized this strategy as painting a whole new picture as the Yes side picked out a few reasons why people had voted No and sought clarifications.Footnote ⁹¹ Mary Lou McDonald, Sinn Féin MP, described it as a successful political device to assuage and neuter the No side's arguments.Footnote ⁹² John McGuirk, Communications Director of Libertas, similarly said, “They took the negotiating table away.”Footnote ⁹³ Padraig Mannion, Campaign Director of the Workers’ Party, also acknowledged that the whole momentum changed in the second round.Footnote ⁹⁴ Killian Forde, Sinn Féin's Director of Strategy in the first Lisbon campaign, specifically referred to the problem of putting forward the “we can get a better deal” argument in the first round.Footnote ⁹⁵ This, according to him, also weakened the No side's hand in the second campaign, now that Ireland had a better deal.

Importantly, the guarantees helped the Yes side to not be on the defense in the second round, and present Yes messages from the beginning. This time they used stronger frames. Fine Gael MP Lucinda Creighton explained that in the first round the Yes messages were about Ireland's place in Europe, with an aspirational and abstract tone.Footnote ⁹⁶ She noted that “they went back to basics” for the second campaign with a more economy-based argumentation. Ireland's economy worsened between 2008 and 2009. In the second referendum debate, the Yes campaigners argued that a Yes vote would be the solution to the unfolding economic crisis. Joe Costello, Labour MP, agreed: “We export about 90% of our products, we are a huge exporting country so we badly need markets, and this was not the time to be leaving the common market…[We explained that] this was the time we needed solidarity and support of the EU.”Footnote ⁹⁷ As Billie Sparks, member of Women for Europe, put it: “In the second round, the Yes side played the No side at their own game. Once you start with the technical details, you lose people. This time the messages were simpler, such as ‘Yes for Jobs.’”Footnote ⁹⁸ Pat Cox, Campaign Director of Ireland for Europe, mentioned that their messaging got harder and more distilled throughout the campaign.Footnote ⁹⁹ They used various marketing strategies to make their arguments simple and concrete. For instance, they started with softer slogans such as “The Choice Is Yours,” trying to respect people's choices. Yet noticing that it did not take off, they switched to “Ruin versus Recovery.” Caroline Erskine, Communications Director of Ireland for Europe, explained that they also switched to the color pink, as it not only was bright but also appealed to women, who voted more negatively than men in the first round.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ “This was a step to feminize the EU,” Brendan Halligan, National Campaign Coordinator of Ireland for Europe, added.Footnote ¹⁰¹ On the Guinness day, they wore T-shirts that replaced the famous message “Guinness is good for you” with “Europe is good for you.” Similarly, to confront the UK Independence Party's leafleting in Ireland, they used posters calling the UKIP the UK “Interference” Party.

The Yes campaign's emphasis on the economy is very important because it shows that the Yes side can also use recent contention in crafting campaign arguments. Ciarán Toland, a key civil society Yes campaigner in the Nice Treaty referendums, compared the “jobs” argument of the Yes campaign to the “abortion” and “neutrality” arguments of the No campaign, in that they both had nothing to do with the treaty in question.Footnote ¹⁰² The Yes side made its message much simpler for the public, instead of remaining in the technical domain as they did in the first round. Killian Forde, Sinn Féin's Director of Strategy, explained that their strategy in the first round was to bring their opponents down to the detail about the treaty and to quote specific articles.Footnote ¹⁰³ In clear contrast, Brigid Laffan, Chairperson of Ireland for Europe, noted that their strategy for the second round was to avoid being drawn into a text war, and to propose arguments on the rationale for voting Yes.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Indeed, this time the No campaigners complained that the Yes side was distracting from the treaty by bringing in themes such as “jobs” that did not belong to the text. Exactly as the Yes campaigners in the French, Dutch, Luxembourgish, and first Lisbon referendums did, the No side in the second Lisbon referendum resented having to fight on “unrelated” themes. Like many other No campaigners, Socialist Party MP Joe Higgins described the second round as a “campaign of fear and distortion” because of the Yes side's warnings and emphasis on jobs.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ John McGuirk, Communications Director of Libertas, agreed: “There was no argument that we could make effectively in response to it.”Footnote ¹⁰⁶ In relation to this shift, Eoin Ó'Broin, Campaign Director of the Sinn Féin, stated that the No campaigners were the ones on the defense in the second campaign and added: “We found it incredibly difficult to have the same debate.”Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Similarly, Anthony Coughlan of the National Platform said:Footnote ¹⁰⁸

Besides, the Yes side ran a much better coordinated campaign in comparison to the first round. In contrast, the No side lacked a key player, Declan Ganley and his Libertas, until the last few weeks of the campaign. There was a broad civil society Yes campaign, Ireland for Europe, which strategically did not link itself to any particular political party. Naoise Nunn, Executive Director of Libertas in the first campaign, switched sides and campaigned for a Yes in the second round. According to him, the Yes side learned from their mistakes and decided to engage or get endorsement from well-known people.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ He added: “This time it was not just the politicians presenting the arguments, instead it was a broad-based civil society presenting the argument.” All of my interviewees specified this new civil society involvement as a major factor contributing to the Yes side's success in the second round.

Ireland for Europe campaign conducted focus group studies after the first referendum, to understand the reasons behind voting No, and to specify target groups. Its Campaign Director, Pat Cox, explained their strategy: “We tried to understand the demographic dynamic of the soft-Yes and soft-No voters. We tried to conceptualize how to locate the campaign, the battleground.”Footnote ¹¹⁰ This was a significant departure from the previous Yes campaign style, as they targeted particular groups in the society for the first time.Footnote ¹¹¹ Brendan Halligan, National Campaign Coordinator of Ireland for Europe, emphasized the tailored messages they built for different target groups such as women and youth, who were critical of the treaty in the first round.Footnote ¹¹² Ireland for Europe was an umbrella organization. Halligan compared its structure to a wedding cake with three tiers. On the top was the National Campaign Committee. In the middle, there were various civil society organizations targeting different voter groups such as Women for Europe, Generation Yes (for the youth), Economists for Europe, Lawyers for Europe, Solicitors for Europe, Business for Europe, Christians for Europe, and the Charter Group (among trade unionists). Finally, the bottom tier had geographic units, which ran their own local campaigns, such as Wicklow for Europe. These constituencies have strong local identities, and the local Gaelic football teams create strong affiliations. Ireland for Europe strategically sought to build on this infrastructure, by using the Gaelic Athletic Association to organize these local campaigns. Jillian van Turnhout of Ireland for Europe explained that the top tier, the National Campaign Committee, provided local campaigns (e.g., Cork for Europe) all the information they needed to launch their campaign in a kit, which she referred to as “campaign in a box.”Footnote ¹¹³ Blair Horan of the CPSU similarly mentioned that in the Charter Group, which focused on workers’ rights, they prepared a booklet explaining how Europe benefits workers.Footnote ¹¹⁴ They circulated this booklet widely, offering it as a toolkit for people who needed to make these arguments.

Regarding women, Michelle O'Donnell Keating, co-founder of Women for Europe, similarly noted that they prepared kits and distributed them to women who attended their meetings.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Billie Sparks, member of Women for Europe, also emphasized the local and grassroots nature of their campaign, where they provided communications training to women to enable them to talk to other women in their own communities.Footnote ¹¹⁶ Using the Irish Countrywomen's Association (ICA), this committee met with 2,500 women at 53 events across Ireland during the second campaign. They organized coffee mornings and community meetings, and picked different controversial themes from the media (on the Lisbon Treaty) to be discussed at each event. O'Donnell Keating mentioned that most women were concerned about introduction of conscription to a European army and abortion. Importantly, Anthony Brown, Director of Research of Ireland for Europe, explained that they decided to fight arguments on abortion and neutrality by asking key experts to comment on them.Footnote ¹¹⁷ On the issue of abortion, Noel Treanor, the Bishop of Belfast (but previously the Head of the Secretariat of the Council of Catholic Bishops in the EU) agreed to issue a statement disconnecting the vote from moral issues. Similarly, the former Chiefs of Staff of the Irish army spoke to deal with the neutrality issue. Regarding youth, the Generation Yes campaign covered university campuses, secondary schools, and even nightclubs. “They blogged, Facebooked, tweeted, and YouTubed,” as Brown put it. The group had more than 5,000 Facebook members and claimed to have spent 3,630 hours canvassing.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Furthermore, Irish citizens working in the EU institutions formed a group called “Europe for Ireland” and toured Ireland during the campaign. Caroline Erskine, Communications Director of Ireland for Europe, explained that they also invited famous Irish personalities to their campaign – not politicians but personalities from sports, entertainment, and the business community – such as Nobel laureate Seamus Haney, former rugby player Denis Hickey, and The Edge from U2.Footnote ¹¹⁹

Therefore, in the second round the civil society ran a more strategic campaign, leading to a much more uniform and forceful Yes message in comparison to the first-round messaging. The Yes-side political parties also decided to coordinate among themselves in the second round, whereas no such cooperation had existed in the first round. Joe Costello, Labour MP, explained that this time they had a cross-party platform that met weekly to discuss arguments.Footnote ¹²⁰ Fine Gael's poster, in Figure 7.10, says “Country first, vote Yes,” asking people implicitly not to punish the unpopular Fianna Fáil government.Footnote ¹²¹ Similarly, Ireland for Europe campaign facilitated some coordination among these mainstream political parties, suggesting a sequence for launching campaigns and gaining more attention by not doing it all at once.

The No campaigners acknowledged the difference these strategies made in the second campaign. Mary Lou McDonald, Sinn Féin MP, described it as a switch from a reactive and responsive Yes campaign in the first round to a second Yes campaign that was better organized and resourced, encompassing the entire spectrum of the society.Footnote ¹²² She added, “We ran into that wall.” Eoin Ó'Broin, Campaign Director of Sinn Féin, also noted that the second round was “an avalanche of the political establishment, the financial, political, social and all.”Footnote ¹²³ Scott Schittl, Campaign Director of Cóir, characterized the second campaign as “David versus 10 Goliaths.”Footnote ¹²⁴ Ganley similarly said, “We knew we would not win the second time.”Footnote ¹²⁵

Credibility of the speakers

Government popularity is particularly important in this case, as the two referendums were held by the same government, a coalition of Fianna Fáil, the Green Party, and the Progressive Democrats. Because the economy took a downturn between 2007 and 2009, the government was more unpopular in the second round. The fact that the second referendum passed confirms that government popularity does not explain referendum outcomes on its own, and that it needs to be analyzed in relation to the campaign. In the Lisbon case, there was another factor at play that affected the credibility of the speakers. Because it was a double referendum, the guarantees that the government secured before the second round discredited the No campaign arguments and gave more credibility to the Yes side's arguments on these particular points. In the face of such guarantees, the No campaigners lost their credibility in bringing up the same contentious themes. As Joe Costello, Labour MP, put it:Footnote ¹²⁶

Moreover, just before the second round, one of the most important No campaigners, Declan Ganley, ran for EP elections but came several thousand votes short of winning a seat. He had announced that if he failed in these elections, he would excuse himself from “leading any further campaigns” in any future EU referendums.Footnote ¹²⁷ The fact that he came back to the debate was conflicting with his earlier statement. Furthermore, the Yes side tried to raise questions on Declan Ganley's past on an investigative journalism program called Prime Time. Ganley characterized this program as an attempt to discredit him, “to blacken his name,” and a “huge character assassination.”Footnote ¹²⁸ Even though these claims were contested, this caused further credibility issues for the No side in the second round.

Another common source of credibility problems is the habit of using the EU as a scapegoat. This was not the case in Ireland. In Fine Gael MP Lucinda Creighton's words: “We wanted EU membership because we saw it as a ticket to enhanced economic independence.”Footnote ¹²⁹ In Ireland, domestic politicians have traditionally focused on the economic benefits from the EU, and the Celtic Tiger was often perceived to be a result of European funds.Footnote ¹³⁰ The fact that Irish public rejected several EU treaties despite the lack of such scapegoating suggests that this factor does not explain referendum outcomes on its own. Credibility problems also arise when there are splits within the campaigning parties. Just as in France and the Netherlands, the Labour Party of Ireland had internal debates, but it officially campaigned for a Yes vote in both rounds. The Green Party was relatively more divided. In the first round, the Green Party – despite being part of the governing coalition – had internal divisions and failed to reach the two thirds necessary to officially support the treaty.Footnote ¹³¹ It unofficially joined the Yes side, but some Green Party MPs campaigned on the No side, posing problems for their Yes campaigners. In the second round, however, they were officially on the Yes side.

Resources

In the Irish case, financial resources and the broadcast time allocated to both sides are crucial because of Ireland's peculiar laws. Through Supreme Court rulings in McKenna v. An Taoiseach (No. 2) and Coughlan v. Broadcasting Complaints Commission and RTÉ, the No campaigners were granted equal public spending and airtime in referendum campaigns.Footnote ¹³² Yet because the political establishment always campaigns for a Yes vote in EU referendums, the Yes side still has better financial resources at its disposal. In the Lisbon case, Declan Ganley's presence on the No side – as a powerful and rich businessman – is an important deviation from this model. Referring to the first round, most of the Yes campaigners mentioned that they felt “outspent” by the Libertas campaign. These Yes campaigners added that they put more resources into the second round. Nevertheless, the figures I was given by the interviewees suggest that although Libertas outspent all other individual campaign organizations, cumulatively the Yes side spent more in both rounds, confirming that frames matter more than resources.

Concerning airtime, in 2000, Coughlan's court case secured equal airtime on public broadcasting service RTÉ for the Yes and No camps, as opposed to the previous system of proportionality with the allocation of seats in the Parliament, the Dáil Éireann. However, there were some important changes to this rule between the two Lisbon referendums. In the second Lisbon campaign, the Yes side – under the leadership of Ireland for Europe – consulted legal authorities to ask whether the Coughlan judgment strictly meant a 50–50 split of each program into Yes and No arguments. According to Director of Research of Ireland for Europe Anthony Brown, they learned that the broadcasters had misinterpreted the Coughlan judgment and that it did not demand that a debate between the two sides take place all the time.Footnote ¹³³ In his words: “The Director General of the RTÉ was present [at the legal consultation], and things changed after that. We got this nuance. The broadcasters were told to give a chance to the Yes side to explain their case, and interrogate both sides. What they tended to do previously was to let the No side person speak, and then ask the Yes side person to answer the question.” This new interpretation provided the Yes side with better opportunities to advance their arguments in the second campaign. In addition, the No side lost a key platform to present their arguments in the second round. The National Forum on Europe, established in the aftermath of the first Nice referendum, ran regular debates between political parties and civil society groups across Ireland. This platform was deliberately designed to facilitate debate between the Yes and No sides. Yet the National Forum on Europe was closed between the two Lisbon referendums. The official reason for closing it was financial. However, many of my interviewees from both sides explained that the No-side campaigners and activists dominated most Forum meetings, hinting that this could be one of the concerns of the government in making this decision. In terms of financial resources and debating space, the Yes side therefore got stronger in the second round.

Concerning the civil society, in the first campaign, it was weakly involved on the Yes side, and strongly involved on the No side. The second campaign saw powerful involvement on both sides. On the Yes side, in the first round, employers’ organizations, most trade unions, and various other interest groups recommended a Yes vote. Nonetheless, the Irish Farmers’ Organization (IFA) and the Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers’ Association (ICMSA) threatened to call for a No vote before they eventually switched to the Yes side.Footnote ¹³⁴ Similarly, the Irish Small and Medium Enterprises (ISME) association suggested that almost three quarters of them were going to vote No, and the president-elect of the Chambers of Commerce suggested that he did not support the treaty at a personal level.Footnote ¹³⁵ The trade unions were also split. The country's largest trade union – the Services, Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) – refused to endorse a Yes vote, whereas two trade unions – Unite, and the Technical, Engineering and Electrical Union (TEEU) – came out against the treaty. In the second round, the Yes side was much more unified. Major multinational companies such as Microsoft and Intel joined the Yes side. Moreover, Ryanair CEO Michael O'Leary announced that his company would spend 500,000 euros on a Yes campaign.Footnote ¹³⁶ But more importantly, in the second round, the Yes side mobilized the civil society exceptionally well under the umbrella association Ireland for Europe. There was remarkable cooperation across the board with various civil society groups such as Lawyers for Europe and Business for Europe, as well as regional campaigns such as Kerry for Europe.

On the No side, civil society was involved in both rounds. The Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) had organized a broad far-left opposition against the European Constitution in 2005. This umbrella organization was called the Campaign against the EU Constitution (CAEUC). Although the ratification process ended with the French and Dutch rejections, their opposition was redirected toward the Lisbon Treaty, because the two treaties shared the same substance. In a sense, CAEUC tried to become the equivalent of ATTAC in the other countries, but it never quite developed to become a strong local campaign. The other No campaigners were more active at the local level. Sinn Féin ran a local campaign, with multiple seminars across the country to train their activists. The pro-life Catholic group Cóir also had strong local implantation, with approximately 2,000 members across the country.Footnote ¹³⁷ Its campaign director Scott Schittl explained that they canvassed and leafleted locally across Ireland.Footnote ¹³⁸ He referred to Declan Ganley as the major air force, and the Cóir as the major ground force: “We had lots of people knocking on doors. We prepared guides for canvassers…Campaigners had cards and kits, with specific arguments to help them. If they believed in any one of the things that we promoted, they could campaign with that.” For instance, some Cóir activists also canvassed at churches, when people were coming out of Mass. During the Nice campaigns, a similar Catholic group – the Youth Defence – was linked closely to the abortion issue.Footnote ¹³⁹ This time, the Cóir avoided a similar association by focusing mostly on the “loss of sovereignty” argument. However, campaigners from other groups suggested that these local campaigns were where some Cóir campaigners advanced the abortion argument, somewhat below the radar. Thus, in terms of civil society involvement, the No camp had similar mobilization in both rounds.

Political parties

Civil society

• Declan Ganley (Libertas, President)

• Naoise Nunn (Libertas, Executive Director in Lisbon I; Yes campaigner in Lisbon II)

• John McGuirk (Libertas, Communications Director)

• Scott Schittl (Cóir, Campaign Director)

• Anthony Coughlan (National Platform, President)

• Roger Cole (Peace and Neutrality Alliance, President)

• Brendan Kiely (Irish Alliance for Europe, Chief Executive)

• Karen White (Irish Alliance for Europe)

• Pat Cox (Ireland for Europe, Campaign Director)

• Brendan Halligan (Ireland for Europe, National Campaign Coordinator)

• Brigid Laffan (Ireland for Europe, Chairperson)

• Caroline Erskine (Communications Director for Ireland for Europe, and previously for the National Forum on Europe)

• Anthony Brown (Ireland for Europe, Director of Research)

• Michelle O'Donnell Keating (Women for Europe, Co-founder)

• Jillian van Turnhout (Ireland for Europe)

• Billie Sparks (Women for Europe)

• Blair Horan (Charter Group)

• Ciarán Toland (Civil society Yes campaigner in the Nice Treaty referendums)