While for many, the term “rational choice” signifies a normative judgment about an individual’s choices, it presents a much different reality for scholars. For social scientists, it refers to a range of models that posit that individuals will be motivated by self-interest and a desire to maximize their sense of well-being or, in the language of economists, their utility. These models have imposed an element of predictability on human behavior, allowing for the scientific study of a range of economic, social, and political processes – including terrorism. In addition, rational choice also has much to offer in the study of religious terrorism, despite the metaphysical dimensions of belief. This chapter discusses the assumptions of the rational choice model, its use in terrorism research and applicability to the study of religious terrorism, objections to the model, and its future applications.
The Rational Choice Model
In their simplest form, rational choice models posit that actors seek to maximize their utility. Utility has a variety of definitions within this; most commonly it is thought of as self-regarding behavior. Efforts to maximize wealth or income spring most readily to mind. It can also encompass the satisfaction that comes with the fulfillment of a personal goal or, for the faithful, the attainment of enlightenment, or afterlife. Utility can also be conceptualized in terms of other-regarding behavior. Altruistic actions that help support friends, family, and strangers would also fit within most rational choice models.
In order for actors to maximize their respective utilities, rational choice models require that actors fulfill three basic requirements.1 First, an individual has to have complete preferences over the set of potential outcomes. This means that a person knows whether they prefer, are indifferent, or dislike the assumed consequences of their decisions. Second, these preferences are transitive. That is, if the individual believes outcome a to be superior to outcome b and b is superior to c, then it holds that outcome a is better than outcome c. These two conditions allow the individual to make a preference ordering, ranking the outcomes from best to worst and facilitating the third condition, the ability to select their most preferred outcome. As a result, rational choice models allow for human behavior to be generalizable and predictable, and analyzed through econometric techniques.
Because of the differences between the standard conception of rational choice and its use in social science, it is important to point out the misconceptions that result. First, rational choice refers to a description of the decision-making process, not the preferences that an actor is using to make their decision. A terrorist may pursue morally suspect goals; however, they do so by engaging in the rational choice process when weighing their options. Rational choice, then, is about the “logic of consequences” rather than the “logic of appropriateness.”2 Second, the process depicted by the rational choice approach is a generalized description of the basic logic underlying an individual’s decisions, not an actual calculation or a cognitive process.
Rational choice also does not imply that different individuals will reach the same decision even when given similar situations. Instead, a variety of outcomes may result that reflect different actors’ preferences over the outcomes. In terrorism, one organization may value some actions solely due to their destructive potential, perhaps seeking to maximize civilian casualties, while another may prefer actions which are more symbolic than destructive, perhaps because they wish to only engage in property destruction. Furthermore, in those situations where different actors share similar preferences, their unique risk tolerances may cause them to choose different actions. Two terrorist organizations may both wish to overthrow a government, but one may use more risk-acceptant strategies than the other. Lastly, rational choice does not imply that the outcomes are free of error: the outcomes of a rational choice process are only as good as the ability of the actor to find and weigh options.
The picture presented by the classical rational choice approach, that of economic man (homo economicus), was quickly challenged from a number of sides. Scholars were quick to note that people were simply not able to fully accomplish the tasks laid out by the standard approach. Rather, individuals face inherent cognitive and processing limits when confronted with information, thus resulting in decision-making that differs from the classical ideal. To account for this, scholars began to suggest that individuals were “boundedly rational;” that is, people engage in cognitive processes that allow them to gather and process enough information to lead to decisions that, while not value-maximizing, are “good enough.”3 This has led to discussions about variation in human decision-making processes and the degree to which the precepts of the rational choice model are followed; these variants are generally referred to as “thick” and “thin” rationality.
Scholars challenged the concept of expected utility maximization as the outcome of the rational choice process. In many instances, the outcomes associated with a particular decision are incommensurable. For example, if an action results in an income loss, how many “units” of religious benefit would balance out or exceed this loss? The solution was to create a subjective expected utility in which previously incommensurable costs and benefits can be translated.4 Debate about how individuals aggregated these costs would later spawn a wide number of alternative and sophisticated decision rules.
Rational Choice Models in Terrorism
The application of rational choice models to terrorism began when William Landes applied Gary Becker’s model of crime and punishment to estimate the effects of US counterterrorism policy on the phenomena of aircraft hijacking.5 In Becker’s original model, criminals were assumed to be rational individuals acting on self-interest, who had the ability to choose between legal employment or a life of crime. Crime became a rational choice when its rewards exceeded a.) the probability of punishment, b.) the severity of the punishment, c.) the loss of income from legal work, and several other variables.6 Efforts to change these variables, such as increasing fines or raising wages, would therefore lead to a decreased likelihood that an individual would turn to crime.
For Landes, a potential hijacker operated along similar principles. The utility of hijacking an aircraft was a function of the offender’s wealth as well as the probability that the individual would be apprehended and the monetary costs (to the offender) associated with trial and eventual incarceration.7 Efforts to increase the probability of apprehension, as was done with the installation of metal detectors in US airports in 1973, and increasing punishments were posited to decrease the occurrence of hijacking. Landes tested his theoretical model using Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data on all airline hijackings in the United States from 1961 to 1976, demonstrating the real-life effect that each of his variables had on the occurrence of hijacking. In particular, he found that ex ante measures, such as screening, were much more effective in reducing the likelihood of hijacking than ex post actions, like measures that increased apprehension after the hijacking had already taken place.
These two works also form the parameters of the rational choice model as they apply to terrorists. Like the classic model, terrorist are rational actors seeking to maximize their utility (read political goals) while operating under three basic assumptions.8 First, terrorists are motivated by stable and consistent political goals. That is, political grievances form the base and motivation for terrorist violence. Second, terrorism is a course of action decided on when other forms of political participation have been blocked. This perspective is consistent with work that views terrorism as an allocation decision made when total resources to the organization are highest, where the costs of illegal acts are low, and where the relative gains for illegality are high.9 Lastly, terrorism is used insofar as its effectiveness outweighs the effectiveness of other means. A variant of this argument can also suggest that particular forms of terrorism are used over others based on their effectiveness. Given this, terrorists should be discriminating about their attacks and select violence consistent with the risks and consequences involved.
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler would further refine the concept of terrorist rationality by introducing the concept of “substitutability.”10 They suggested that rationality is not simply evident in the targets selected or the means employed. Rationality can also be seen in the ways that terrorists respond to changes in the availability of resources; the behavior of terrorists under conditions of scarcity will differ from their behavior under times of abundance. The nature of operations are predictable; operationally “simple” activities that require few resources, such as bombings, far outpace more complex and resource-intensive activities like hostage-taking and barricading operations. In addition, counterterrorism efforts by the government impact these actions, as they serve to increase the costs of certain acts. As a result, organizations may substitute less costly acts, and even nonviolent activities, for violent ones.
Over this time, rational choice models have been effective in elucidating a wide range of terrorist activities. While most of this focus has been on the factors that determine the number of attacks, others have focused on issues relating to group maintenance, tactical innovation, basing decisions, and many more.11 A full accounting of these works would be impossible within the parameters of this review, instead see Todd Sandler’s “The Analytical Study of Terrorism: Taking Stock” for an appraisal of terrorism research using the rational choice approach and its future directions.12
Rationality and Religious Terrorism: The Club Model
When considering religious terrorism however, many quickly dismiss the utility of the rational choice approach. This response is well understood, religious terrorism has often resulted in appalling levels of brutality and has been espoused by people noteworthy for their maximalist rhetoric and their unwillingness to accept any level of political compromise.13 Surely, individuals following the dictates of a higher power, and acting unbound from “society’s law and limitations” demonstrate a different, and noneconomic, logic.14 Instead, rational choice explanation retains its pride of place as an explanation for terrorist violence and, in essence, suggests that religious and secular terrorism can be considered very similarly.
As Bryan Caplan (2006) observes, the analysis of terrorism – and religious terrorism in particular – contains a paradox.15 While many may believe in the rewards that accrue to them should they engage in terrorism, so few actually take that step. If individuals did not act in the ways described by the rational choice approach, argues Caplan, terrorism employed by the faithful would be much more common than it is. Religion then, rather than being a competing explanation to rational choice, can be considered a parameter to be evaluated within the model. While reducing religious belief into a dissection of costs and benefits may seem sterile, this approach has allowed us to better understand why individuals and groups may conduct violence that appears both illogical and irreligious.16 This approach to the study of religion does not deny the value that faith has for many, but instead provides us with a framework to comprehend and, potentially, combat this type of violence.
In this approach, the individual is viewed as a consumer of religion. An individual seeks faith because it is a way to “transcend the usual technological constraints and physical limits of everyday life.”17 This is a rational and appropriate response for individuals, especially as they confront the challenges and questions of everyday life. In economic terms, an embrace of one’s faith is a decision that enhances one’s expected utility provided that the costs that come with it are sufficiently low. This can be considered a “wise investment” as it does not require a deep devotion to any particular belief but instead a sufficient level of doubt pertaining to the lack of a higher power.18
The individual benefits of faith provide one explanation of how rational choice can be used to evaluate religious terrorism. The decision to engage in terrorism can be a rational one if the act of terrorism is believed to be rewarded in the hereafter, is considered a form of altruism, or advances the goals of a larger group. Individual terrorists can certainly believe that their acts will be recognized after their death, parables about the rewards of afterlife and the benefits of noble self-sacrifice are found throughout the major religions of the world. This justification, however, has not been predominant among those terrorists that have been imprisoned or have failed in acts of suicide terrorism. While interviews of incarcerated populations have their drawbacks, it is more likely that the rationale for violent acts is linked to the last two ideas.19
Given that these justifications are more communal, it is also necessary to evaluate the role of religion as an entity which both depends upon and benefits the many. Evaluating religious organizations as a provider of benefits is particularly important in those areas where the state is unable to provide basic public goods (products which are considered nonrivalrous and nonexcludable) such as law and order, education, and welfare services. In these types of situations, the religious community becomes a center around which services are both produced and provided. It is this aspect, stressing the costs of coordination and the benefits that faith communities provide to ensure obedience that forms the “club model” approach.20 This provides an explanation for the violence of organizations like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban, and their success in conducting suicide terrorism.
To start, the club model recognizes one of the basic problems that confront all organizations – a concept called the “free-rider” problem.21 This is simply the propensity for people to use a public goods organization for its benefits while providing nothing in return. Organizations attempt to solve this problem by creating costs that separate true believers from opportunists. In religious organizations, these costs can involve direct sacrifice – the destruction of valued resources, distinctive dress and grooming habits, and prohibitions on certain activities.22 This removes the group, to some degree, from the external world, helps make group activities more valuable, and encourages participation from members.
By screening out participants, the good that the organization provides changes from a public to a club good (a product which is nonrivalrous but excludable). As a result, those who become members – while being called upon to have high levels of commitment and participation – benefit more than those that did not make the group. The beneficiaries then have a reason to contribute to the organization, even despite the risks that come with membership. The high costs demanded through these screening practices also create a signal to the rest of the organization regarding the suitability to potential applicants.23 It is for these reasons that religious organizations are advantaged in the creation of violence.24
This means that the average member of a terrorist organization, be it religious or secular, is likely to be quite different than the background population. Rather than being poor and desperate, the profile of the terrorist supporter and participant are noteworthy for their relative affluence and education.25 Within the context of the club model, the consequences are sobering: the better the provisions a religious organization is able to provide (the stronger the club), the more loyal the members, and the more likely the group will be to use suicide terrorism. Moreover, stronger clubs will also be more likely to engage in more lethal attacks.
Examples of the benefits that accrue to people within these organizations are not difficult to find. Benefits to recruits and a stipend to recruits’ families have been noted in Chechnya.26 In the Gaza Strip, Nasra Hassan (2001) noted that suicide bombers, and their families, are revered. Images of the perpetrator are emblazoned across the neighborhood, in graffiti, and publications – including a “Martyr of the Month” calendar.27 The perpetrators’ families are feted with celebrations honoring the sacrifice of their family member and are swamped with well-wishers offering them blessings and congratulations, raising their social profile and encouraging others to become suicide bombers. Families also benefit financially. Many of these organizations have developed a social welfare system that provides generous benefits to the family of a suicide bomber long after their death.28 Jean-Paul Azam notes that suicide terrorism then may be thought of as a form of “intergenerational investment,” whereby potential perpetrators view the act of suicide terrorism as a way to create and pass down wealth to benefit their immediate family.29 This type of payoff may be appealing in areas where economic conditions are poor and might be useful in steering future adherents to the cause.
Because the club model focuses on the material incentives that accrue to adherents, the ways to address religious terrorism may be more straightforward – and closer to policy prescriptions for secular terrorists – than initially thought. Rather than Juergensmeyer’s conception of a “cosmic war” that eludes earthly solutions, answers may in fact be possible.30 One solution lies in creating incentives for defection among members of the club. Destroying bonds of trust should reduce the activity of the group, given that no one will know whether their compatriot is an honest party or not. Efforts in Italy, known as the “Repentance Laws” – so named because they reduced prison sentences in exchange for group information – were successful in reducing instances of both left and right-wing terrorism.31 The second is to increase the capacity of the government to provide public goods, particularly to the populations that already, or may, engage in terrorist violence. This way the choice to not joining an extremist religious organization becomes rational.
This should in no way suggest that secular terrorism is any simpler to address than religious terrorism. For either type of terrorism, counterterror efforts are likely to be dogged by the “substitution effect,” briefly alluded to above.32 Like the name suggests, attempts to deter terrorism will lead terrorists to change tactics and to select less well-defended targets. Enders and Sandler found that the imposition of metal detectors led to a decrease in hijackings, yet increased hostage-taking. Efforts to fortify embassies led to less attacks against personnel in those facilities, but more assassinations as these individuals were attacked off embassy grounds. Even efforts to punish terrorists, like Reagan’s bombing of Libya in 1986, have little discernable effect on broader trends. Instead, punishments led to an increase in low-cost terrorist activity, with the number of higher-cost attacks ultimately reverting back to its “normal” rate.33 As a result, actions to address the material aspects of religious terrorist organizations may also only temporarily allay the threat of terrorism.
Criticisms of the Rational Choice Model
The ubiquity of this approach has not meant it is free from criticism. In one of the best-known critiques of the approach, Abrahms highlights seven common terrorist behaviors that challenge the rational choice model.34 First, terrorists may not possess complete and transitive preferences over the potential outcomes of their actions. Terrorist statements often indicate an amorphous and inconsistent political ideology in which ideological distinctions and differences do not appear to be honored. In Germany, right-wing terrorist organizations had so fully adopted the rhetoric of the left that law enforcement initially identified these groups as Communists.35 In Italy, the Red Brigades justified their actions on the basis of a hodgepodge of left and right-wing ideas conceptualized as “revolutionary justice.”36 Some groups have abandoned a previously avowed political platform, often very quickly, in favor of beliefs that were almost contradictory to their original position. The absence of nuance and lack of conviction in both rhetoric and action suggest that terrorists may not have any sort of preference ordering in place by which to make a decision from among potential choices.
Further, terrorist organizations do not appear to be able to make decisions that maximize their utility. Because terrorism rarely achieves its stated goals, most groups – if they bided by utility maximization – would not engage in terrorism to begin with. Instead, terrorism is a first choice, many times triumphing over more peaceful and more effective means of political change. Similarly, when confronted with compromise, many terrorist groups reflexively reject it in favoring of continuing a campaign of violence, even if this action is ultimately destructive to the group’s stated end goals.
Finally, in order for the organization to reap any benefits from the act of terrorism, the identity of the perpetrator has to be known. Instead, many groups hide their participation and fail to take credit for terrorist operations.37 This puzzle is pervasive; Abrahms (2008, 89) notes that around 64 percent of global terrorist attacks since 1968 – and three quarters of attacks since September 11th – have been conducted by unknown or anonymous perpetrators. Such behaviors are at odds with the assumption of utility maximization.
Rather, Abrahms (2008) suggests that the incentive structure for terrorists do not center on the organization’s political goals, but rather that individuals join and persist in organizations on the basis of group solidarity.38 In other words, groups are not rational in the classical sense, as organization-wide political objectives do not form the basis of the organization’s utility function. Instead, the personal relationships and social benefits that a group imparts forms its utility function. One cause for this rests in the terrorist recruitment process: groups rely on preexisting social contacts for new members and, once that member joins, locks them into the organization. This breaks the recruits’ connections with the outside world, thus cementing their loyalty to the organization and their fellow members. Moreover, these strong social bonds will cause the organization to pursue actions that keep the connections intact, even while sacrificing larger operational goals. This suggests that actions that make terrorism less politically fruitful will be ineffective. Smarter counterterrorism strategies should focus on social networks between members and break the connections that make terrorist organizations socially desirable.
Future Directions
From the early work of Becker and Landes, the study of terrorism has evolved and become increasingly complex, in many ways responding to the growth and complexity of the threat itself.39 While challenges to the rational choice model do exist, its overall health is excellent as evidenced by new developments in the field. While there are many, I will limit my discussion to two recent developments: the application of game-theoretic models to capture intraorganizational dynamics and the growing use of spatial methodology.
Game-theoretic models offer a strategic component to rational choice models. That is, game theory approximates the interactions of two (or more) rational choice actors. Rather than simply deciding what is the best course of action for the player, actors within a game have to decide what is utility-maximizing while also accounting for the possible decision of another actor. As such, it is good for understanding the interplay between terrorist groups and governments, competing terrorist organizations, or competing factions within a terrorist organization.
This work has already yielded impressive findings. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson argue that terrorist organizations, delineated as extremist or moderate, vie for leadership of an aggrieved population.40 Extremists, seeking control of the population, engage in acts of violence to provoke one of two government responses – discriminating or undiscriminating. Discriminating counterterror does not radicalize the population; indiscriminate counterterror, on the other hand, is counterproductive because it radicalizes the population and emboldens extremists, thus leading to increased mobilization for the organization and greater levels of violence. States, however, are in a dilemma as crackdowns may be the only perceived effective way to deal with terrorism. This may perhaps explain why religious terrorist organizations often pursue strategies that appear self-defeating and may understand why religious terrorist organizations often gain the support of those defined as nonreligious.41
Looking at intragroup dynamics, Jacob Shapiro and David Siegel study the dichotomy of poor operatives working for large, well-funded, organizations.42 They posit that a principal-agent process is at work: leaders delegate to middlemen the funds for operations and, because of operational security, cannot track the way funds are spent. Benefiting from a lack of oversight, middlemen skim from the funds given to them, leaving operatives very little in the way of resources. This greed will, in some instances, cause leaders to cease funding attacks, simply because the costs of skimming are too great. Concerns about skimming are universal – religious terrorist organizations, despite their professed piety, have no more honor among their operatives than do secular organizations. Rather, as Shapiro notes, these concerns are more related to how groups are organized – either as hierarchies or through other forms – rather than their ideology.43
The second major development in the field has been the application of geographic information systems (GIS) approaches. The refinement of GIS methodology and a renewed focus on data collection – at increasingly smaller units of aggregation – presents an exciting new area of focus for terrorism researchers. This also allows the insights of rational choice theory to be applied within countries, as the risks of terrorism differ based on the characteristics found at a subnational level.44 This honors the influence of the rational choice perspective, but applies it in a more realistic way – reflecting the influence of local, as opposed to national, conditions. Insights from the club model, especially those bearing upon the heightened level of commitment among these types of organizations, should be manifested in geographic data. A validation of the club model would see religious terrorist organizations more likely to strike “difficult” targets and areas that are systematically distinct from other types of organizations.
Conclusion
Understanding terrorism, and religious terrorism, through the lens of rational choice theory has greatly aided our knowledge of its formation, its prevalence, and its potential staying power. Certainly, criticisms exist; aspects of terrorist behavior remain anomalous to discussions about utility maximization. Others may argue that rational choice appears to be too calculating and utilitarian to be applied to a system of belief that provides comfort to billions. In sum however, the usefulness of the rational choice approach lies in its parsimony and explanatory power, allowing us to understand why religion may serve as an appeal to violence and why so few may heed its call.
