Among liberal circles in Israel, it is common to hear the view that one of the most serious problems of the country is its alliance of state and religion, and that the only solution to this problem is their full separation (hereafter Separation).Footnote 1 Such separation would mean the end of what is called “religious coercion” in all its forms. But it would also mean undoing the governmental status conferred on religious bodies such as the Rabbinate, ending government support for religious institutions such as seminaries for the study of Torah (yeshivas), and terminating state support for religious services such as ritual baths (mikvas). From this liberal viewpoint, a state that does not cater to religious needs is more just than a state that does. The controversy between advocates and opponents of Separation is often presented as one between liberals, who are mostly secular, and non-liberals, who are mostly religious.
But it is not only secular liberals who call for a separation between state and religion; the idea is also supported by some people in the religious community. Its most salient representative was Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who spent years preaching for such a separation.Footnote 2 There is an important difference, however, between the liberal and the religious arguments in favor of Separation. The liberal argument is usually based on values such as freedom, dignity, and fairness, whereas the religious argument is usually based on the benefit to religion by such policy.
Separation does not imply that the government should be completely indifferent to religious interests, in particular, that the right to religious freedom should be abolished.Footnote 3 Actually, a demand for a strict separation between state and religion is likely to offer a stronger support for religious freedom, conceived as a sort of compensation for its removal, so to say, from the public sphere.Footnote 4 The refusal to give religious communities even one cent to fund their houses of prayer might lead to a firmer determination to protect their right to band together and pray according to their religious beliefs.
As that may be, both Separation and the special protection granted to religion under the right to religious freedom seem to single out religion for special treatment. According to Separation, while all other conceptions of the good, or ways of living, are entitled to state support, and religious ones are not. According to the right to religious freedom, religious individuals and institutions are entitled to a wider protection from laws and regulations that conflict with their worldview (mainly in the form of exemptions) than that afforded to nonreligious individuals or institutions. On the face of it, these two moves are inconsistent; the former seems to disadvantage religion by excluding it from the public sphere, while the latter seems to advantage it by granting it special protection. Whether or not these attitudes are inconsistent and whether, in general, religion should be seen as “unique,” are among the questions that will be discussed in Part I of this book.Footnote 5
The question regarding the role of religion in liberal states takes a special form in Israel because of the close connection in Judaism between its religious and its national elements. Judaism is a religion, to be sure, with its holy texts, rituals, customs, and beliefs, but it is also a nation, or a people.Footnote 6 Most Jews today don’t practice their religion and don’t subscribe to traditional Jewish beliefs, but nonetheless regard themselves, and are regarded by others, as part of the Jewish people. Some liberals in Israel react to this dual character of Jewishness by calling for an end to the Jewish character of the state, both on the religious level – by supporting Separation – and on the national level – by turning Israel into what is often referred to as “a state of all its citizens.”Footnote 7 Others react by trying to base their objection to Separation on national justifications; if the Sabbath is not only a holy day but is also one central to the life of any Jewish community then some restrictions on trade on the Sabbath might be justified. In any case, the dual nature of Judaism often blurs the distinction between questions regarding state and religion and those regarding state and nationhood (or peoplehood).
When we set out to write this book, we intended to start with a brief summary of the main doctrines in political philosophy regarding the relation between state and religion and then dive into the complex dilemmas in this field that have been under constant dispute in Israel from the moment of its inception. But very soon it turned out that a much wider exploration of the philosophical issues was needed to create the required tools for a critical analysis of the Israeli case. In the end, what was planned to be a short introductory chapter turned out to occupy half the book and to make its own contribution – or so we hope – to the lively philosophical debate about the role of religion in liberal states. In Part II, we use the theoretical insights of Part I to discuss critically some of the central issues in Israel 2018 in the area of religion and the state. Thus, Part I presents the theoretical underpinnings of our argument, while Part II applies them to the case of Israel.
