Acknowledgments
We thank conference participants at Yale University, Northwestern University, Vanderbilt University, New York University, the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the US Department of Treasury, the US Federal Reserve Board, the Council of Institutional Investors, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and The Clearing House for constructive comments on presentation of parts of this book.
This book partly draws on our prior research, which stresses different aspects of the restricted-equity executive incentive compensation proposal, including
Bhagat, S., and B. Bolton. 2014. “Financial Crisis and Bank Executive Incentive Compensation.” Journal of Corporate Finance 25, 313–41.
Bhagat, S., and H. Tookes. 2012. “Voluntary and Mandatory Skin in the Game: Understanding Outside Directors’ Stock Holdings.” European Journal of Finance 18, 191.
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B., and Romano, R. 2014. “Getting Incentives Right: Is Deferred Bank Executive Compensation Sufficient?” Yale Journal of Regulation 31, 523–64.
Bhagat, S., Bolton, B., and Lu, J. 2015. “Size, Leverage, and Risk-Taking of Financial Institutions.” Journal of Banking and Finance 59, 520–37.
Passages from these articles are used with permission.
