Contents

pp v-v

Acknowledgements

pp vi-vi

Series Editor’s Preface

pp vii-viii

Part I - Why Secondary Qualities are a Problem

pp 1-8

1 - Why Direct Realism?

pp 9-21

2 - General Exposition of the Problem of Secondary Qualities

pp 22-26

3 - Why Direct Realism Needs Objective Secondary Qualities

pp 27-50

Part II - How Thomas Reid Solves the Problem

pp 51-54

4 - Primary and Secondary Qualities in Reid’s Theory of Perception

pp 55-85

5 - Answering the Problem of Secondary Qualities

pp 86-94

6 - Understanding Reid’s Distinction

pp 95-118

Part III - Objections to Reid’s Theory of Secondary Qualities and Replies

pp 119-122

7 - Scientific Objections

pp 123-148

8 - A Priori Objections

pp 149-158

9 - A Historical Objection

pp 159-168

10 - Conclusion

pp 169-172

Bibliography

pp 173-179

Index

pp 180-184